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PREFACE // ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ

Each thematic issue of *International Readings on the Theory, History and Philosophy of Culture* presents the results of conferences, symposia, and round-table discussions relating to the long-term research program of the International Center for the Fundamental Studies in Contemporary Culture. Present volume contain selected papers from the Eighth International Conference on Philosophy and Culture, *Unity and Diversity in Religion and Culture,* held in Seattle, Washington, USA in January, 2005. The eighth conference was sponsored by the UNESCO Chair on Comparative Studies of Spiritual Traditions, Their Specific Cultures and Interreligious Dialogue, in partnership with nine universities and colleges in the Pacific Northwest region of the United States and Canada and other organizations, both international and local. The UNESCO Chair is located at the St. Petersburg Branch of the Russian Institute for Cultural Research, where the previous seven conferences in the series occurred. The complete list of sponsors and partners for the eighth conference can be found on the frontispiece of this volume.

Like all of the previous conferences in this series, the purpose of the conference on *Unity and Diversity in Religion and Culture*, reflected in these papers, was to generate useful insight into the dynamic of contemporary culture. The purpose of the entire program, running as a theme through all work of the UNESCO Chair on Comparative Studies and the Center for Fundamental Studies, is to provide an accurate and thoughtful assessment of the transformations that humankind is experiencing as we move into the twenty-first century. This includes developing the ability to forecast, reliably and without prejudice, the future consequences of these transformations, plus knowledge and understanding which, it is hoped, can help humankind select a wisely creative course of action in response to the world situation as the pace of social change intensifies.

Currently, it seems the wisdom of humanity's response to the world situation is limited by the purview of our self-reflection, which emphasizes functionality rather than creative intent. If we fail to understand and acknowledge the creative intent behind human efforts of world creation, we create a world situation rife with unintended consequences. The result of acting with unclear intent, as is becoming increasingly self-evident, is an unsatisfactory state of affairs. Here, we contend the state of the world today can neither be understood completely nor remedied without drawing on the arts, the humanities, Philosophy and Psychology. Rather than being extraneous to the situation, these disciplines constitute underutilized resources in this era when functionalism demands practical solutions to world problems. Therefore, it is our aim and purpose to show how these disciplines are germane and vital. Our main objective continues to be the expanded use of resources. The global situation is so complex that a limited understanding of the meaning of our times, an insufficient hermeneutics, will only make matters worse. In order to respond wisely and creatively to and in the unfolding dynamic of contemporary culture humankind

must comprehend fully the complexity of the situation and must make full use of all available resources. If the arts and humanities, and especially philosophical research, appear to have little or no relevance in the day-to-day management of human affairs, their practical applications must be discovered, for humankind would not have developed these disciplines without reason. Our task is to illuminate and hone the creative function these disciplines serve so their resources become more available in humankind's global self-governance.

The *Conference on Unity and Diversity in Religion and Culture* and the reflections presented herein address pressing philosophical and psychological issues underlying the tension and conflict in the world today. Specifically, the conference examined issues related to *Identity, Being in Transition, Trustworthiness and Justice, Notions of Truth,* and *Community*. In each of these areas humankind is being challenged and pressured to produce solutions that match in their complexity and refinement the complexity of the world situation. The world situation in many ways defies explanation, and it is this defiance that must be met with understanding to resolve the troubling problems facing humanity in the twenty-first century.

First is the need to resolve issues of identity. With globalization people are increasingly aware of our intrinsic interconnectedness. People no longer live in isolated pockets of the world, but rather the fabric of society has been held to the light in such a way that we now see every pocket belongs to a whole. Yet here, confusion mounts its assault. How can we develop an all-inclusive sense of identity without eroding the unique identities — the many fine cultural, religious and ethnic variations on the theme of being human — that make the fabric of society such a richly detailed and valuable tapestry? More specifically, *what changes in consciousness are required for humankind to develop a global identity?* The *Conference on Unity and Diversity* addressed this issue. Deeply, if not yet conclusively.

Second is the challenge of *Being in Transition*. Over the course of organizing and hosting eight annual international conferences on philosophy and culture we have concluded the changes humanity is experiencing in the world today point to much deeper transformations than can be explained by socioeconomic or geopolitical theory. These transformations involve a change of mind and a change of heart so radical and profound they are taking humankind by surprise. Moreover, these transformations are brought about through life's learning experiences, not by objectivity that eludes the essence and reduces meaning to mere object lesson. In short, the world situation — the dynamic of contemporary culture — is *forcing* humankind to change the way we think, not only the way we think about and conceive of the world situation; the way our mind operates. We are being forced to think creatively, in terms of and in light of the whole, to come up with creative solutions. For the problems the world faces today are produced by the aggregate dynamic as much as by the actions of single individuals, nations and interest groups. Conceiving of the world situation in light of the whole, seeing past our differences and comprehending

how we are *of one mind* and how we *act as one* requires a new kind of logic. For a mind inured in Cartesian logic, a mind that sees itself split-off from reality cannot conceive of the unified field. Hence, the *Conference on Unity and Diversity* was organized to produce the dynamic shifts in awareness that are necessary to develop consciousness of the unified field. This meant that we stepped beyond the boundaries of academic objectivity into the realm of social artistry, which was partially successful. Our work remains a work in progress. A more detailed project report can be found at the Web site: www.networkforpeace.org.

The third set of issues is *Trustworthiness and Justice*. Here, our initial concern was the apparent lack of trust in human creativity, which is reflected pervasively in the media and negative political and social commentary. How can trust be restored given the traumatic history of wars, genocide, environmental degradation, and injustice that humankind has experienced? As it turned out the responses to our Call for Papers also focused on the justice system, so we expanded the section. Here, it seems the restoration of a sense of human trustworthiness requires a realignment of the justice system. With globalization, the coming together of the whole, the justice system as well as the economic, political, and communication systems are being transformed. Again, with respect to justice, we are beginning to see the problems the world encounters are produced as much by the aggregate dynamic — the sum of all our interactions — as by the actions of single individuals, nations and interest groups. Therefore, in holding accountable those nations, individuals and interest groups whose behaviors are directly causing the problems the actions, attitudes and interests of the whole must be weighed and taken into account. However, humankind does not yet have the capacity, the systemic understanding and the know-how to hold the whole responsible. It should be noted these and related issues are to be discussed further during the Ninth Conference on Philosophy and Culture, in Paris in June 2006. The title of the ninth conference is *New Dynamics of Plurality: Paradigms of Coexistence and Recognition*.

The fourth matter the eighth congress addressed is *Notions of Truth*. How can humankind learn to be *of one mind* and *act as one,* with clear intent, given the diversity of beliefs and ideas that hold us apart and distinguish us as individuals? What art of communication could be potent enough to get past the communication barriers that come to be erected in the preservation, containment, and advancement of our personal, group, and national self-interests? To think and act in the common interest requires a sense of communal responsibility. Yet, we are responsible also toward our individual callings and the causes we embrace. In seeking to comprehend how our strongly held and sometimes opposing ideas and beliefs can be unified without losing the differentiation that makes our world outstanding, the Eighth Congress drew upon music. Music provides a powerful analogy, for various voices are required to develop the theme of a symphony, and bringing forth the meaning of the work relies on counterpoint. The concluding workshop of the Notions of Truth track focused on music and Cornish College of the Arts commissioned an original

work for strings and piano to illustrate the themes of the conference, which was performed during the conference.

The fifth issue is community. The Call for Papers stated, "The desire for community, and by extension its spiritual correlate 'union,' is basic to the human condition. This urge is problematized in contemporary times by our unpreparedness to negotiate as a species the often-perilous byways of interior and external life. Yet, we are only beginning to understand the deepest implications regarding this basic human need and the necessity for literacy of self, other, and culture." There is a profound difference between actively experiencing community and analyzing or talking about what it takes to create a sense of community. A strong community is self-organizing. People are called to do things on behalf of the community and they act in the common interest, often unbeknownst to themselves. The *Conference on Unity and Diversity* sought to produce awareness of and respect for the self-organizing aspect of community. To accomplish this we used organizing techniques, like the Open Space technique, and dialogue techniques that are widely used in community development projects across America. The UNESCO Chair on Comparative Studies has as part of its mission a mandate to create programs that "reach the grassroots" (Rosa Guerreiro, during a UNESCO Chair meeting in Graz, Austria, in 2003). And representatives of community groups in the Pacific Northwest of the USA and Canada were included in the conference. The inclusion of non-academic participants caused some consternation among representatives of the academic community, evoking tension that highlighted and exemplified some of the existing barriers to the establishment of a strong global community. As long as people feel threatened by diversity the global community will be impoverished. For the wealth of our nations and our world rests on our ability to receive the gifts and contributions each person brings.

The *Conference on Unity and Diversity in Religion and Culture* was part of the on-going research program of the International Center for the Fundamental Studies of Contemporary Culture. We hope the readers will find these volumes to be a rich resource for contemplation. Respectfully,

Skye Burn & Liubava Moreva,
Bellingham, USA, and St. Petersburg, Russia, 2005

INTRODUCTION // ВВЕДЕНИЕ

REDISCOVERING HUMILITY

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Self-limitation tends to appear quite often in the framework of contemporary societal criticism. It would have been difficult for E. F. Schumacher to elaborate his imposing principle of 'Small is Beautiful' without recurring heavily to this pivotal notion. Another constructive example of self-limitation is presented by the concept of 'Stasis', elaborated by I. Illich. According to him, 'Sustainability without development' is the principal way of preventing the imminent ecological catastrophe, and this concept is definitely based on the idea of 'societal self-limitation'.

In analyzing historical roots and/or counterparts of contemporary doctrines of self-limitation we might primarily recur to sets of basic values of traditional societies, which almost inevitably include some kind of self-limitation. As P. Drucker emphasized, 'In Japanese *Kaizen*, every single step is a small one — a minor change here, a minor improvement there. But the aim is to produce by means of step-by-step improvements a radically different product, process, or service a few years later.' Drucker thus reshaped an important concept from a traditional Oriental culture, in hope it would find place within patterns of Western post-industrial culture.

Seeking other instances where the idea of self-limitation applies we come to the tradition of modern thought, duly labeled by R. Rorty as "Newtonian mechanics, Darwinian biology, and mass democracy," the combination of which gave birth to the present-day world. In this realm a plausible example could be the well-known principle of the '*economy of means and/or efforts*.' Sometimes the application of this notion is based upon deep spiritual insights. According to a famous apophthegm by A. Einstein, 'My religion consists of a humble admiration of the illimitable superior spirit who reveals himself in the slight details we are able to perceive with our frail and feeble minds.'

It probably would be sound to take one more step here, shifting toward great spiritual cultures, which were created not so much by reason, as by wisdom. It would be constructive in this respect to note that in the ascetic encyclopedia compiled by early Greek church fathers, under the title *Philokalia*, *'practicing humility'* was regarded as practicing not so much serendipity, but a quite dangerous spiritual art, often compared to 'riding a typhoon.' This doctrine of practicing humility remained pivotal for the Pax Orthodoxa. It has contributed a lot to the

creation of sort of spiritual 'iron curtain' around the Russian Orthodox world, far more effective than physical borders. In essence, the practice of humility tended to be traditionally delineated by recurring to the *doctrine of synergy* and that of *metanoia*.

Today it looks quite timely and constructive to rediscover humility, in the face of multiple challenges barring sustainable progress of our civilization.

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SHARING THE TRUTH

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Introduction

This paper is intended to be a contribution to the dialogue on the sacred unity of Truth and the diversity of its human perception. The temptation to polarize the truth has been, during human history, the main reason for conflicts and clashes between cultures. At the same time, belief in a supreme Truth, such as God's Truth, is still the main and most humanly shared truth. Truth is at the very center of cultural identity, a source of inspiration and of polemics. How could humanity better share truth in order to build a future of peace and of recognition of differences? Could the heritage of the Islamic philosophy of pluralism represent a new contemporary source for reflection on the modern debate?

Sharing truth is the opposite of preaching unification in the name of universalism. It is a new approach to human diversity, based both on the unity of Truth and the plurality of ways leading to a certain human truth of bliss and happiness. Within the dimensions of human perception, the sacred character of truth does not really exist. Only multiple rational interpretations and intuitive inspirations could emerge from our perceptions of the truth. However, the pure Truth, the Source, is a mystery. The cultural dialogue process regarding truth is more a personal experience on the conceptualization or spiritualization of the vision of the world than a collective identity process. Therefore the intensity of the personal experience of truth could regain its original missed role: regenerating humanity.

Definitions

Referring to its Greek etymology truth means, "not to hide." During the history of philosophy, truth has meant an extreme transparence and exactitude expressed differently by the idea of conformity. For Aristotle, truth is the conformity of one proposition with the reality. For the school of logic, this conformity became conformity with the rules of logic. However, in the existential school, such as Heidegger's, existence is a truth by itself and it represents a point of reference for the conformity. The conformity with existence is an internal conformity with the human being. In these three aspects of conformity, the research of a definition of the truth seems to be a research of sacred but intelligible evidence with both a status of source and finality of inspiration.

In different religious traditions truth has two main faces or dimensions: First, the holy and sacred dimension, which is unique and absolute. Second the human perception and conception of the truth, which is necessarily diverse and relative.

In the lexicon of the Koran the truth does not exist as a substance. The qualifier *true* replaces the substance Truth in a restrictive meaning of a divine attribute. The message and the promise of God are considered as true, because they emerge from the source of Truth, God. Only by God could the human act and reality be judged and evaluated as true. Therefore, the fact that a certain category of believers and believing is presented as true refers both to the source of belief and to the virtuous impact of this belief on the human life. "*Who establish regular prayers and spend freely out of the gifts / We have given them for sustenance, such in truth are the believers*" (Koran 8/ 3-4). Evaluating the truth belongs only to the essence of truth and its absolute source, God. Thus evoking the question of truth within the context of human terminology and intelligence situates us out of the absolute character of the truth. We, as human, have the capacity to testify on the truth through our beliefs and by acting on the inspiration. Joining belief with action is necessary for the status of human witness on the truth.

Thus, truth belongs to the space of belief, and the diversity of truth is in the multiple human experiences. "*Wherewith God guideth all who seek His good pleasure to ways of peace, and leadeth them out of darkness, by His Will, unto the light, guideth them to a path that is Straight*" (Koran 5/ 16).

From the substance Islam, acting towards Islam by the acceptance of the Islam way means much more than the acceptance of the ritual of Islam. First and essentially it means submitting one's being to God and treading the way of virtue of spirituality. "*Who can be better in religion than one who submits his whole self to God, does good, and follows the way of Abraham the true in faith*" (Koran 4/125).

Contrary to the common and multi-religious evidence considering religious practice as the final and upper-level of believing, we understand the practice of ritual as a stimulator factor in the spiritual process gone through by a believer towards a spiritual elevation of his soul to the source of truth and peace. Therefore, three stages have to be connected in the truth process of the human being. First, the essential and initial belief; second the witness practice; and third, belief as a transformation of the initial theoretical belief into an educational and virtuous one, which in Islamic sources is communicated by the terminology of "Ihsan" or excellency of the spirit. This third element is the missing dimension of belief and is the most intense expression of responsibility of the human being in the truth process. This forgotten dimension frequently engenders the multiple phenomena of orthodoxy and extremism.

The human truth is not a static truth substance, but a permanent individual and spiritual process toward a better inspiration from the Truth, the source of the human being. It has to reinforce the individual human responsibility and the avoidance of any temptation to monopolize the whole truth, in the name of the sacred truth. This individual dimension of the truth contributes to the spirit of sharing the truth within the city. As there is one supreme and sacred source of peace, but different ways to the peace "*wherewith God guideth all who seek His good pleasure to ways of peace*" (Koran 5/ 16), there is, as well, one supreme and sacred Truth, which dif-

ferent individual and spiritual inspirations and experiences relate. Truth in human life has no meaning other than an intimate individual experience of being within the truth inspiration. Truth in singular is not a conceivable dimension; truth as plural can be conceived as the human experience.

New challenges

Sharing the truth today requires an effort of evolution in the ways of believing. The human being is continuously evolving, through the evolution of societies, everyday life experience, sciences, and multiple systems of thought, and non-systems. Therefore, an evolution is needed in the believing traditions. Today, society is becoming more cross-cultural than mono-cultural, more like the antic and medieval society models. This implies necessarily more reflection on plural citizenship than on minority status, and illuminates the need for new religious and spiritual visions and approaches.

Within the secularized societies, belief is out of influence of power positions. However, there is evolving a new visibility of the religious within the public sphere, more through a practical revival of rituals and traditions than through the implication in public debate with the big questions of modern societies regarding ethics, science, family, etc. The excesses of individualism in materialist contemporary society influence even the new religious phenomenon. In fact, the religiosity of today is more an expression of refuge of the individual than a project of society. We consume the religious as we consume any material element. An excess of "spirituality individualism" handicaps any emergence of collective and sociable form of religiosity, except few and limited missionary or revolutionary tendencies through different religious expressions and especially the Islamic, Christian, Jewish and Buddhist. Certainly, there is no religious violence, because religions hold essentially peaceful messages, but multiple violence in the name of religion. Violence is the expression of frustration generated from the exclusion and censorship related to the society evolution and debates. The violence of religiosity is not necessary a victimization reaction, but could be a strategy action in the name of a missionary truth and light and fighting ignorance.

Within religious and spiritual tendencies, some experiences of dialogue have been initiated during the last twenty years. But the impact of these experiences on the conflict atmosphere is still weak, for different reasons. First, to dialogue is not to speak to each other but to exchange our different visions of ourselves and others. The reality of dialogue today is more similar to the mono-dialogue model based on the will of preaching and conversing than to the exchange model based on mutual respect and recognition. There is no visible will to share our worldviews, but still only a will to monopolize the truth. We are escaping any fundamental debate and replacing it with an "inter-religious courtesy." This courtesy is favoring different levels and ways of phobia within the inter-religious space itself. Living together could not be living side by side, but living within the respect of diversity of everyone and the testimony of his universal. *"To each among you have We prescribed a law and an*

open Way. If God have so willed, He would have made you a single people, but His plan is to test you in what He hath given you" (Koran 5/ 48).

Recognition and diversity

It seems contradictory to human nature to recognize other than oneself. Recognition is an intimate individual concept, even for those who by definition have an identity deficit. Recognition of "the other" is never full and conceivable, but the consequence of a marginal recognition of oneself, and is limited in the margin between extreme tolerance and extreme respect. Tolerance is the weakest expression of recognition, and respect is the highest manifestation of sharing dignity in the spirit of recognition, but still not recognition. Diversity is not perceivable in the mono-cultural spirit, because it needs to be visible in a plural space of cultural expression. The mono-cultural model of society is subjected to a crisis of identity. The incapacity to perceive the diversity of identities implies an incapacity to define one's own identity. The mono-cultural model is more susceptible to frustration, phobia and violence. It has a non-controllable capacity to produce conflicts and rejection whether coming from inside or from outside.

Today we are facing a rise in the multicultural framework of societies, but not necessarily cross-cultural. Today's world is more a model of mono-cultural systems living together or associated to general codes and rules than a platform of sharing a citizenship. Recognizing diversity is not recognizing the multiple mono-cultural models living together, but accepting shared humanity within respecting diversity. Diversity is a shared act of collective participation in citizenship. A new citizenship has to be rethought with reference to a cross-cultural collective identity. To maintain its vitality the mono-cultural identity must recognize a part of shared identity, and to go from the stage of living side by side in total individualism, within the multicultural framework, toward a new framework of cross-cultural. The cross-cultural model is not a negation of identities, but a source of interpellation, and therefore of stimulation for a better implementation of reality. Otherwise, there is the fatal risk of religious identities disappearing from the evolution of history. Diversity is not a fact but a fact project, through a whole intellectual and educational process. Having the consciousness to be in diversity needs an effort of accepting differences, not as a disturbing factor but as a natural and a necessary richness for the complementarity between people.

Diversity within each culture is hardly accepted as a positive element. The pressure of internal conflict contributes to the conflict atmosphere between cultures. The difficulty of introducing a new culture of recognition comes from the difficulty of defining the unity of each cultural identity, in order to identify the collective platform of coexistence. The civil framework of living within mutual respect has been referred to as the democracy, secularism and human rights rules. However, it becomes clear that these rules are not enough to recognize the status of minorities and to guarantee justice between people. The new cross-cultural societies imply new rules able

to preserve public space for the rising collective identities. Diversity is much more collective than individual. In western society the Muslim community and the Jewish community are highly and publicly expressing collective identity, whether through the massive return to religiosity or through implying justice of chance facing discrimination and phobia.

The citizenship of plural collective diversity needs to progress in the way that preserves national unity within diversity and without unification. During the first mono-cultural model of the twentieth century in the West, democracy has been the best moderator system of citizenship. Democracy has the mission of political representative through the principle of election, and the social justice role of preserving rights regarding law and constitution. However, democracy needs a cultural framework or reference. The main references are both the liberal social freedom and secularism. Liberalism has imposed liberation of economical movements within the capitalism of concurrence, but also the liberation of ethics from traditional and especially religious social limits. Secularism has two main faces, the French and the Anglo-Saxon. The French is most radical in the separation between state and religious authority. It makes impossible any state interference even in positive way within religious affairs. An obsession of neutrality guides this philosophy even regarding sensitive question as teaching, education and training. All other Anglo-Saxon models permit a possibility for the state to help in religious debate, and in financing projects even concerning the construction of churches or mosques.

The church and the different religious authorities have never totally accepted the liberal situation and the total separation between state and religious affairs, but their influence and impact on this new modern mono-cultural society became weak and marginal, despite their presence in public space. The mono-cultural modernity has replaced the mono-cultural religious and traditional society. Today with the new cross-cultural society a reality, new cross-cultural thought and culture referring to diversity, recognition and unity need to be engaged. This work implies criticism of mono-cultural modernity, and the capacity to surpass its handicaps and inadequacies. It also requires a capacity to rethink religion and religiosity in plural, within the plural public space. This dynamic intellectual scrutiny aims to be more than accompaniment for a cross-cultural forced reality; it needs to be a head of change and theoretical perspective for a new world.

Universal and identities

Under mono-cultural modernity, whether within the past dualistic opposition with socialism, or within the new framework of globalization, the modern universal world view has been conceived, perceived and presented as the unique alternative for humanity, a necessary condition for reaching the civilized world and to avoid poverty and ignorance. The status of collective identities is still considered a minority being, aside from civilization and progress.

The universal is the common human capacity to establish a platform of coexistence within human diversity. This capacity emerges as a group of ethical values expressed by civil principles and rules managing everyday life. However, the unity of the human universal is an association between a diversity of universal views coming from the diversity of collective identities. The collective identity has the capacity to be visible and recognized only in its universal dimension. Even if a dominated civilization refuses to share universal humanism and then to recognize a status and a place for the minority of diverse collective identities, it could not be conceivable in the abstract, or as the result of any influence or objection. The vitality of any universal system depends on its capacity to raise questions and generate debates.

Islamic approaches, like other approaches considered minority, despite their difficulty of accepting and discussing modernity, are nevertheless sensitive to modern influence and impact. The new modern challenges to Islamic thought influence its agenda, such the questions of democracy, secularism, human rights, and national state. At the same time, Islam and the Muslim world have interested western civilization since the medieval epoch, through the western world's contact with Islamic philosophy and sciences. Today the issue of the divine law called Sharia is prompting an ethical debate within modern life, concerning the relationships between sacred and profane. The polemics on the practice of jihad are causing debates on its meaning and history. Even the rise of fanaticism and violence in the name of God has provoked multiple issues, such the relationships between religion and violence and its consequence on civil peace.

However, the creativity of Islamic thought, whether in social sciences, in philosophy or in theology, seems to be ignored by the western mind. A big and productive movement of intellectual renewal inside the Muslim world has been initiated from the beginning of the twentieth century. The main aim of this movement is to rehabilitate the Muslim world so it can take part in contemporary civilization. But this contribution could not be possible without identity points of reference, the sacred source of inspiration of the world view philosophy. Belonging to the universal debate is the capacity for Islam to contribute its own vision on the universal. Sharing the universal truth requires a deep will and strategies in order to understand diversity on universal views.

The intercultural and interfaith dialogue could have a sensitive role to open new perspectives for the future. We need a new culture based on belief in diversity. New interest, within each culture, in understanding diversity and considering it an essential element for establishing a common human universal. The multiple spaces of dialogue between different visions of the universal have not yet succeeded in surpassing protocols and courtesies, which hide a closed spirit of fearful cultures from the foreigner. Which could explain the absence of intellectualism from these spaces, and therefore the absence of fundamental debate between cultures. Different phobic images of "the others" are substituted for dialogue and the necessity of understanding diversity.

Cultural globalization has permitted a large dynamic of exchanging information and establishing networks. However, it has intensified the liberal uniformity, through

the multiple manipulations of this dynamic by economical and political globalization strategies. Islam has become the enemy of modernity, and many temptations exist to liberate Islam from itself, from its sources and references toward a kind of "liberal Islam." The project of globalized Islam is similar to any others temptations to assimilate all cultural identities into liberal globalization. From the handicap of limited tolerance, today we face the danger of assimilation. Assimilation is the opposite of dialogue. It is an obsessive monologue that needs fixed representations of Islam that are ready to be consumed. In this "globalized supermarket" of religions, Islam seems to be the most accessible. It does not need a specific knowledge, because any "anonymous" could name himself an expert of Islam if he respects the commercialized stereotype of Islam.

This confusion between illusion and reality regarding the representation of Islam represents a new challenge for the renewal thinkers of Islam today. They need to add the image issue and fundamental dialogue to their academic agenda. On the other hand, western thinkers who are interested in Islam need to engage serious studies referring to the diversity within Islamic thought, and not focalizing on a specific tendency close to their frames of ideologies.

Finally

The sacred sense of truth has not disappeared from the secularist and globalized system. On the contrary, it adds to the classic religious dimension a new dimension of sacred truth on the name of modernity and civilized world. Thus, two principle kinds of conflict emerged from sacred truth concept. First the conflict between religious and secularist truth. Second the conflict between this unique sacred truth in general and the diversity of approaches regarding truth. There is an urgent need to develop future studies on the importance of evolving truth interpretation. Also, we need to orient studies within religions on "sacred"/essential human virtues and values that could guarantee justice and peace between people. The intensification of modernity criticism from inside or outside is a real necessity to "desacralize" scientific truth. Evolution is the essence of science, so no static truth could come from sciences. Also, religious phenomenon has to keep its mysterious Truth within the invisible world or the world of dogmas. The human approach will remain its inspiration position. Therefore, human truth will keep an objective, relative and evolution characters towards a harmony in coexistence between Truth, source of inspiration and spirituality, and truths, objectives visions from and for humanity.

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ПОНИМАНИЕ ИСТИНЫ

Мохаммед МЕСТИРИ
Международный институт исламской мысли

Данная работа является частью диалога о священном единстве Истины и разнообразии восприятия истины человеком. Полярность в трактовки истины на протяжении всей истории человечества оказывается главной причиной межкультурных конфликтов и столкновений. И в то же время, вера в высшую Истину, понимаемую как Истина Бога, по-прежнему остается основным ориентиром для большинства людей. Истина является центром культурной идентификации, источником вдохновения и полемики. Как человечеству научится лучше понимать истину, если оно стремится построить будущее, основанное на мире и приятии разнообразия взглядов? Может ли плюрализм исламского философского наследия стать новым современным источником понимания данного спора? Понимание истины противостоит процессу унификации во имя достижения универсальности. Это новый взгляд на человеческое разнообразие, основанный одновременно на единстве Истины и на множественности способов достижения истины счастья для отдельного человека. Возможности человека не позволяют ему постичь священную природу истины. Наше восприятие истины ограничено лишь многочисленными умственными интерпретациями и интуитивными прозрениями. По-прежнему, абсолютная истина, источник, остается тайной. Размышления об истине — это скорее индивидуальный опыт концептуализации и наделения символическим смыслом представлений о мире, нежели процесс выстраивания коллективной идентичности. Таким образом, глубина индивидуального опыта сможет вновь обрести свою утраченную роль — быть источником гуманности.

PLANETARY HEALING: USING TIME-TESTED HOLISTIC PARADIGMS TO ADDRESS CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICT

Rudolph BALLENTINE
Physician

The Healing Perspective

[Author's note: Healing is a word generally reserved for holistic approaches, not allopathic/oppositional ones. The principles of this approach must be differentiated from the adversarial ones that characterize the allopathic mindset.]

The notion of *healing* seems particularly valuable as a point of departure in addressing the current planetary crises for several reasons. First of all, healing is an undertaking that is both neutral and dynamic. It is neutral in the sense that it is not culturally bound. Most, if not all, cultures have a time-honored respect for the value — and often even the sacredness — of healing. Healing is also neutral in that it is grounded in the practicality of the body. It involves dealing with problems of living that are universal and real. This makes it relatively immune to seeming "foreign" or threatening. In addition, this practicality and familiarity ensure that the prospect of healing appeals to both personal and planetary needs. It connects our private, personal experience with our participation in the global struggle for meaning and peace.

The notion of healing is also a dynamic one, in several senses. First, the term "healing" itself implies the presence of a naturally occurring difficulty, something that is a part of a living system. Second, it also implies that there is some possibility of a resolution of this difficulty. In other words, something positive can happen, with movement in a creative, evolutionary direction. That is to say, it is not mere restitution but a move into a newness of being. Third, in many cultural contexts the word healing carries an additional connotation that this newness involves a higher degree of wholeness that comes from an integration of parts hitherto split off.

Therefore, when the discourse about religious and cultural conflict is framed in terms of healing, there are immediate benefits: There is an automatic assumption that this is a project of compassion; that its intent is to relieve suffering; and that it's not merely about stalemates, truces or even reparation; but about transformation; about moving into new ways of being on the planet. And there is the helpful implication that this transformation will arise from bringing together elements that have been separate, alienated. Creating a context for discussion that carries these implications seems strategically wise.

These holistic/holographic perspectives are just now becoming available to large segments of the population. Though present in an embryonic form in earlier times and

familiar to many indigenous cultures, they have only now begun to gain currency in the "developed" countries. They are particularly useful in part because they are rooted in and carry with them a different world view, one that opens possibilities not present before.

For example, because holistic healing is holographic — it finds the macrocosm in the microcosm — one's personal issues that need healing are a smaller/personal version of the issues that are playing out on the global stage. They are not merely echoes; they are integral parts. The same dynamic that one encounters internally is also operative on political, social, economic, and/or cultural macro-levels. Moreover, if we follow Sheldrake's concept of morphogenic fields our own inner shifts will eventually, in "hundredth monkey" fashion, trigger widespread changes on many levels in the outer world. From that perspective, personal healing not only replicates planetary healing; it initiates it and contributes to it. In other words, what one does on the individual level not only makes a difference for one personally, it makes a difference for everyone on the planet.

This is important not only because one's personal healing is a contribution to healing the larger suffering, but because the savvy one gains in the process of dealing with one's own personal issues equips one to tackle community, national, or international problems more skillfully.

While such notions of healing resonate with the spiritual realm, they are not identified with any specific religion or sect. Yet healing is regarded in many of the great spiritual traditions as often being necessary to facilitate movement along one's personal spiritual path. Here again there is a sense of integrating what had been split off. Hence the common roots of the words *heal*, *health*, *whole*, and *holy*. Suffering (dis-ease) occurs when the integration has, for some reason, been blocked so that the transitions that lead to unfoldment cannot occur. Such blocks are common when the impending transition is a particularly major one, i. e., when the next step along the individual or collective spiritual path involves an especially huge shift in consciousness. In that case there is fearful resistance to the shift because it threatens what is comfortable and familiar. The struggle that ensues may be termed a "healing crisis."

When we move this discussion from the individual to the collective, from personal to planetary, we begin to talk in terms of the group's path of evolution. Applying the healing dynamic at this level, we can speak of a planetary healing crisis. And again, as soon as we frame the crisis occurring on the planet as a "healing crisis," there is, immediately implicit, reasonable hope for a natural and positive resolution.

In other words, we are in transition. And that transition is from a state of less integration to one of more. More correctly, it is a *transformation* — one that will lead to something that cannot be fully foreseen, the birth of a totally new way of being.

If we accept this as a premise, we will next need to understand as much as possible about this transition/transformation — despite the fact that its outcome is to be something we have not previously known. If we can at least grasp the process and its direction, then we can begin to see what is interfering and how such interference can be removed.

Varying Realities

In order to illuminate the transition and what is interfering in the process this paper will take as its major frame of reference the work of the European philosopher Jean Gebser. Writing in the 1960's, Gebser suggested the planet was in the earliest stages of a major shift in consciousness. The new *structure* (his preferred term) of consciousness that would supervene he called the *Integral*. It would, he felt, emerge by integrating long repressed realms of human consciousness. More specifically, it would result from the recovering awareness of the *archetypal* realms of consciousness (which he called the "Mythical") and awareness of the phenomena of subtle *energy* ("Magical").

The archetypal realm of consciousness, or *Mythical Structure of Consciousness*, as Gebser terms it, is what Carl Jung mapped for us. It is the realm we enter during dream states and it is made up of imagery of a primal sort — the roles and figures that constitute our points of reference and that shape, in very significant ways, our waking consciousness. Gebser insists that mythical consciousness was the normal everyday consciousness of Man during medieval times, and even more so during prior periods when epics were the literature of cultures, and collective enactment of the stories they told — and implied — was what shaped history and human interactions. Gebser suggests the reality prevailing then was qualitatively drastically different from what most of us now experience. He says linear time was not a fact of life (clocks had not yet gone up in town squares) and, despite our assumption that our current reality has always prevailed, the denizen of the mythical society lived in a collective consciousness that did not experience ego, individuality, and alienation the way we do today. Nor was medieval man capable of the level of independence and individuality that we enjoy today. As Alan Watts would have it, he "had no back to his head." He was part of a group consciousness, and when he acted on behalf of his Lord (for whom he was vassal) he felt no violation of his autonomy. He was an extension of the (hierarchically organized) group and the stories that were told were his stories, which gave structure and meaning to his life.

Gebser maintains the Mythical Structure Of Consciousness did not disappear when we moved into our more intellectual, mental, modern mindset. Instead, the Mythical simply went underground — out of our awareness — and there it continues to function, much as before, shaping our beliefs, our group values, our collective (and individual) lives, and serving as the infrastructure of our psyches. Fundamentalist religion has a corner on the Mythical. It grasps the power and significance of *the story*, the "truth" of which transcends the (in some senses) more superficial truths of our intellectual, scientific modern minds. Without such an overview — one that can honor the profound truth of the fundamentalist position — we can never productively dialogue with those who are its adherents.

Even before the Mythical, when much of the world existed in a state that we would term "primitive," or tribal, an even less differentiated consciousness was prevalent —

what Gebser termed the "Magical." To appreciate the significance of the Magical we must divest ourselves of our contemporary scorn for what we call "magical thinking." We must grasp that man could, and did, live in such a close relationship with the ebbs and flows of primal energy that he had no real existence apart from it.

Both the Mythical and Magical, which had been more accessible in earlier eras, were gradually replaced around the time of the renaissance in Europe by the collective workaday consciousness that we are familiar with today. This current ego-oriented, logical, linear consciousness, which is characterized by separateness and subject to alienation, Gebser called *The Mental*.

To get a solid foothold in the Mental required the (at least temporary) banishment of the Mythical and Magical. However, continuous denial of the more fundamental Mythical and Magical has delayed the emergence of the Integral. The Integral Structure, emerging even as I write this, involves holding the consciousness of Magical, Mythical, and Mental together. Transparently, Gebser says, much as we would overlay several transparencies and project the composite onto a screen. Integral awareness moves us out of the constraints of linear time, space, and causality, which are properties of the (unmitigated) Mental. Life unbound by the limitations imposed by time, space, and causality seems incomprehensible to a consciousness rooted in the Mental. Yet today we are witnessing around us the breakdown of the familiar parameters that have defined our reality. In other words, we are moving toward a new way of being on the planet.

The recovery of the Mythical and the Magical and the emergence of the Integral is itself a healing process of sorts. It is a reintegration of that which had been lost, a movement to a state of greater wholeness / holiness / health.

Another significant contribution of Gebser's work is his inclusion of an even more primal structure of consciousness, what he calls the *archaic*. It is inclusion of this aspect that gives his work its spiritual grounding. The archaic is the fundamental, preternatural source referred to in the title of his book, *The Ever Present Origin*. Arriving at an understanding of the archaic origin through a systematic, integrative study of European science, philosophy, and culture and finding that this understanding corresponds in great detail with Eastern notions of spirituality provides a sound and potentially unifying vision of human consciousness. This unifying vision can be of great service in the search for resolution of cultural and religious conflict.

In so many ways Gebser's work is an integration that draws support for its thesis from the most accepted authorities in science, religion, and philosophy. This paper will suggest the use of the framework provided by this seminal work to explore the planetary "healing crisis" and to identify some of the ways that bringing an Integral Consciousness to bear can help us locate the unity we require while respecting and safeguarding cultural diversity.

The study of consciousness and its variations provides a critical context for approaching planetary crises and their possible healing — at least if we adopt the attitude that healing is transformative, not merely restorative. To know whether we are,

in fact, fostering healing we have to know where the path of transformation leads. Are we moving in the right direction? The Gebserian schema provides a framework within which to make such assessments. Gebser's work represents the consensus of the most advanced and creative thinkers of European philosophy, psychology, science, religion, and art. It teases out and weaves together the underlying efforts in each of these fields to come to grips with the phenomenon of consciousness. In fact, it might be considered the first thorough treatment of the subject of consciousness in the West. And, it is reassuring that Gebser's schema dovetails so elegantly with more ancient treatments of the subject from the East.

An Integral Healing Technique

The work of Bert Hellinger has been chosen as an example of how the Gebserian schema has practical relevance in understanding and working with religious and cultural conflict. Hellinger is a German psychotherapist. For twenty years he was a priest, and for much of that time he lived as a missionary with the Zulu in Africa. He studied psychoanalysis and gestalt techniques with Fritz Pearls and eventually carried these approaches into family therapy. Hellinger is best known now for what he calls "family constellations," a technique that he has used extensively to deal with families who were scarred by war, either as victims or perpetrators. More recently he has extended this work into dealing with ethnic and religious strife, such as that between Germans and Jews, between Turks and Greeks, or between indigenous peoples and their colonial conquerors.

In family work, Hellinger responds to a client's problems by helping the client recreate *spatially* the family constellation. Surrogate family members are placed in the workshop space in a way that reflects the relationships that exist between those in the family. The result is the "family constellation." Once it is established the emotions and body language of those assigned to represent family members are available for study. This is largely a non-verbal technique.

For instance, Hellinger recounts working with Ernest, one of whose children committed suicide. The other two children were traumatized by the event, and would not tolerate any mention of their deceased brother, nor any photo or other reminder of him in the house. Hellinger felt this was a sign of deep disturbance in the family, and that the siblings were at risk for self-destructive behavior themselves.

He asks Ernest to arrange representatives of each family member in a way that reflects their relationship to each other. Hellinger says, "...we need you, your wife, and your three children. Go ahead and set it up....Start with your [own] representative and lead him to his place. Stay centered in yourself. Whatever comes from your head won't help us. Feel your way into the situation and put everyone where it feels right."

Ernest then places volunteers who represent each family member, including the deceased son, but does not place anyone for his wife. When Hellinger asks where she is, Ernest replies that he can't put her in.

Hellinger: "What does that mean?"

Ernest: "She doesn't want to see it."

Hellinger: "Then move her to the place where someone who doesn't want to see must stand."

Ernest places the wife across from the rest of the family, with her back to them. Hellinger then asks the representatives how they are feeling. The wife's stand-in says, "My throat feels like it's being choked, and my arms are paralyzed." Then he asks the children.

Hellinger's observation is that the representatives of family members, after standing for awhile in the "grid" that reflects the dynamic network of relationships that makes up the family, will begin to experience the feelings the actual family members have. This, he says, only works if the constellation is constituted through guidance from gut-level feelings. "When people set up a constellation according to a concept, it doesn't work."

The recreated family stands quietly. Hellinger and other observers watch carefully. Silence may prevail for long stretches. Subtle movements, facial expressions, visible emotional responses by the representatives reveal much about what has happened — and is still transpiring at a deep level — within the family.

Although Hellinger does not himself mention Gebser in his work, the Gebserian schema is helpful in grasping what is a very complex and unusual therapeutic approach. For instance, we might say the instinctual feelings that guide the setting up of the constellation exist in the realm of Gebser's Magical Structure of Consciousness. So do the movements and emotions that animate the representatives in the constellation. The grid itself and the relationships that constitute it are spatial depictions of the structure of the family, a visual representation of its Mythical nature, a concise expression of the family's "story." But the understanding Hellinger reaps from observing the representatives' movements, expressions, and their reports of their feelings, exist in the Mental Structure.

Witnessing this work, I have been struck by how profoundly it affects me. Gebser would attribute this affect to the power of Integral Consciousness — what happens when the Magical, Mythical, and Mental (as well as the "Ever Present Origin" or Archaic) are overlaid "transparently," as they are here. In fact, the Hellinger work might be thought of as a reconfiguring of the Mythical/Magical, which had become stuck in a painful place. Or, he would say, the family constellation reactivates the natural tendency of the Mythical/Magical for ongoing evolution, change, and reconfiguration.

Hellinger's constellation work fosters reconciliation and resolution of (often unconscious) conflicts embedded deeply in a family's network of relationships. He also has applied this approach to reconciliation between ethnic and religious groups and between nations. Hellinger feels this sort of healing is based on replacing group

"conscience," i. e., loyalty to group values and interests, with a more human sort of rapprochement.

In a lecture given at the Psychological Institute of the University of Moscow in 2001 to an overflowing hall, Hellinger spoke about what separates and what reconciles. A major obstacle to peace and reconciliation, he says, is conscience.

"We often meet the widespread belief that when someone follows his or her conscience, the person's actions are good. Many even believe that the voice of conscience is the voice of God, telling us what to do." This, he says — based on his observations — is not the case. "Conscience does not tell us what is good and what is evil in a general sense. It only defines that within a particular framework." The framework is membership in a group. When that is jeopardized conscience nags.

Hellinger compares the discomfort of a bad conscience to the unpleasant feeling we have when we lose our balance. "When we have regained our balance, we feel good.... Conscience is our social sense of balance. When we do something in our family that endangers our belonging, we have a bad conscience. This bad conscience is so unpleasant that we change our behaviour so that we can safely belong to the group again. When we feel certain that we have safely regained our right to belong, we have a clear conscience."

"The main function of conscience," he says, "is to bind us to our families and, in a similar way, to other groups." In each group we know what is necessary to safeguard our right to belong. But that varies from group to group, and therefore, so does conscience. Unfortunately, because conscience binds us to one group, it separates us from others.

In the family, peace only results when husband and wife are willing to subordinate loyalty to their family of origin to the new family that is taking shape between them. Reciprocal respect and a valuing of what the other has to offer are essential. Neither can feel superior. But often, Hellinger notes, one or both say, "my family is better." They say this with a clear conscience, because it is their conscience that binds them to their families. Then a struggle ensues. "The children must be raised the way they were in my family," each feels. The result is that the children feel torn and conflicted.

Peace in the family comes only if each spouse can acknowledge that the other's family, though different, is as valuable as his or her own. But this is impossible, Hellinger says, without a guilty conscience. He continues:

> If the two listen to their conscience, they feel fearful. If they acknowledge the differences and pronounce them of equal value, they risk losing their right to belong to their own family. Progress and peace in the family is only achieved by sacrificing a clear conscience, and when both have a guilty conscience. A person who cannot accept guilt in this sense, remains a child forever.

The same principle applies between peoples, Hellinger believes,

> For example, between the Russians and the Germans. Peace is only possible if both acknowledge that they and the others are different, but of equal value. Only then can there be peace between them.... As long as you say, 'We Russians' or 'We Germans' the individuals cannot be seen. You see only members of another group. Each of us is bound to our group by our conscience and, within our group, we feel superior to other groups. This keeps the two groups separated.

This is illustrated by the example of a constellation Hellinger did for an Israeli and a Palestinian who were attending a workshop in Germany. The two of them had established an institute for peace and reconciliation between their peoples. He describes what happened:

> I chose five representatives for Palestinians, but I chose only Jews so they could experience the situation from the Palestianian side. I put in five representatives facing them to represent the Israelis. I did nothing further.
>
> In family constellations, and this is an example of a family constellation, the representatives quickly begin to feel like the people they are representing, even though they know nothing about these people. Therefore, I do not need to make many interventions, if any at all. As soon as these feelings are present, things happen between the people all by themselves. One woman who was representing a Palestinian kept staring down at the floor. From long experience I know that this means that someone is looking at a dead person. Therefore, I chose a man to represent the dead and had him lie between the two groups. It was not clear whether he was representing an Israeli or a Palestinian. The woman knelt down to this man and wept like a mother for her child. One woman from the Israeli group tried to go over to the Palestinians, but they wouldn't take her in, they just looked away. Slowly, it took about ten or fifteen minutes, the Palestinian representatives had all dropped to the floor and were filled with grief... An Israeli representative suddenly fell over backwards and sobbed loudly. There was also deep grieving in the Israeli group...."

Hellinger broke the constellation off here and asked the participants to share their experiences. He recounts:

> It was impressive to note that none of the Palestinians had any demands on the Israelis. Their only demand was to be seen and to have their suffering seen. Suddenly, the Israelis saw the suffering of the Palestinians and the Palestinians saw the suffering of the Israelis. They were able to look at each other as individuals. It was clear that between individuals, there would be some way to resolve the problems that would allow both groups a new beginning.

> Now what happened here? Both sides were able to see beyond the limits of their own group conscience. They didn't see each other only as Palestinians or Israelis, but could meet, person to person. Then, anything is possible.

Hellinger's perspectives on the phenomenon of conscience are of utmost importance for work in the area of peace and reconciliation. But there are other valuable insights that arise from observations made in the laboratory of his Integral constellation work. During a discussion between Greeks and Turks at a course in Athens in 2002, Hellinger reflected on the impact of violence and killing on family relationship grids:

> When there [is one] who was responsible for the deaths of others, or who secretly condoned the deaths of others, this person belongs to the victims. You have to let them go to their victims. If they don't do it themselves, a child in the family will do it later.

That person actually "leaves" the family or group of origin and now belongs energetically and emotionally to the family or group of the person or persons he has been responsible for the death of. Then Hellinger speaks about the family that takes in this perpetrator.

> From the other side, when there has been a victim in a family, the murderer belongs to [that] system. When the descendants of the victims feel superior to the perpetrators, make judgments and accusations, and battle against them, a descendent will later become a perpetrator and be driven by a perpetrator's energy. In many Jewish families there are children with perpetrator energies, and, of course, we can also see this in other situations. The perpetrator has to be taken into the system. That's the only way there can be peace.

When Hellinger says, "taken in," he means included in the network of loving respect. "When there is a family where there have been perpetrators and victims, one can be identified with both at the same time. Such a person may become schizophrenic."

Such insights give us a sense of what must be done to clear the roots of ethnic and religious conflict that have sunk so deep in the soil of our souls over millennia of hatred, violence, and warfare. Hellinger has experienced much resistance in Germany to doing his work with victims and perpetrators of the Nazi era. Many Germans feel that it is opening old wounds, but Hellinger maintains that the healing had been only superficial. The deeper persisting splits must be addressed. He now works internationally, addressing the buried grief that resulted from the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which is carried by Japanese and Americans, and the buried grief resulting from the genocide of the Native Americans by Europeans, etc.

Only when the Mythical / Magical roots of conflict that are operating unconsciously are brought to light is there a possibility for true resolution and reconciliation to

begin. Note that shining the light of consciousness here means bringing the Mental[1], into play. Hellinger's work buttresses the notion that the splitting of the Magical and Mythical from the Mental, and the banishing of them from awareness has allowed the Magical and Mythical to function in dark, distorted, and, often, tragic ways.

But there is powerful resistance to a conscious owning of the Mythical and Magical realms of our being. And this resistance is firmly rooted in gender dynamics, fears, and struggles that are currently highly sensitive and volatile. In the final section of this paper, we will look at how gender is morphing, where it may be headed, and how anxieties around such changes might be playing into planetary crises.

Gender Role Evolution

A major and increasingly noted shift in planetary dynamics is the rise of power among women and the reappearance of the feminine in religious life ("The return of the Goddess"). While there are many pop culture versions of this that may be easy to dismiss, there is evidence that the phenomenon is both profound and significant. No effective approach to dealing with planetary crisis and cultural upheaval would be complete if it failed to take into account this earth-shaking revolution.

In Gebserian terms, the relevance of the resurgence of feminine power is obvious in the clearly feminine attributes of both Mythical and Magical structures of consciousness. The Mental, on the other hand, is obviously masculine (at least in its congruence with our culturally defined sense of what is masculine), and is what has shaped what we think of today as "the patriarchy." In fact, patriarchal rigidity and violence may be seen, in large part, as a resistance to the recovery and integration of the (more feminine) Magical and Mythical potentials of human life. In other words, much of the harsh repressiveness of patriarchy is an attempt to keep us exclusively in the Mental, which prevents us from moving into the Integral.

While a full exploration of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, several points are relevant enough to warrant presentation here in an abbreviated form:

- **Gender issues are central to planetary healing:** Global institutions, economic, political, social — and even religious — are organized around a nearly universal hierarchical structure that is patriarchal in nature, and therefore based on gender roles that are rapidly becoming obsolete. In order to navigate these rapidly shifting waters, we need to understand — at the most fundamental level possible (i. e., through personal introspection as well as external observations) — what gender is, what its roots are, and where it might be going.
- **Gender issues link the personal to the planetary:** as mentioned in the opening section on Healing, with any holistic/holographic perspective, the dynamic one encounters in one's inner, personal work will reflect the dynamic one encounters in groups, nations, or internationally. As institutional structures crumble, responses to the collapse will be mirrored by the personal ad-

justments to changing inner archetypes, beliefs, and expectations (i. e., changes in the mythical structure of consciousness, both personal and collective).

- **The roots of violence lie in gender distortions and confusion:** At the heart of the urgency to address specific issues — cultural and religious conflict, for example — is the potential for violence. No threat is so immediate as the threat that communication will break down and that groups or nations will resort to violent efforts to prevail. This is no groundless fear, since wars are ongoing on much of the planet and there is undeniable potential for additional and larger ones.

Identifying, at the most fundamental level, the dynamics that underlie this tendency to violence is urgent. While Hellinger's insights about allegiance to group conscience are priceless, there is more to grasp about how group conflict moves to violent confrontation. Gender analysis offers what may be the most universal understanding of the fundamental nature of violence, since it delves down to a level where domestic violence and international politics have their deepest common roots.

A contemporary analysis of gender will require that we probe into the nature of power. I suggest that we define power, for the purposes of this discussion, as the capacity to create, to manifest. Here power means the capacity to bring forth something that is totally new.

One might object that more common usage of the word shows up in such phrases as "military power," or "muscle power." While these uses of the word reflect the ability to overcome, to coerce, or to control, they do not reflect the ability to create. Modern writers have come to make the distinction between "power over" and "self-empowerment." From an ethical or even from a psychological point of view, it will become evident that power is always power over, and is never self-empowerment, *unless* it involves some degree of self-expression, i.e., some manifestation of a creative sort that emerges from within.

Any successful attempt to reconcile conflict must recognize and value the unique contribution each person can make to the whole. Without that particular piece — that person's special role — the whole is incomplete and its viability compromised. This offering, if it is to be genuine, can only spring from the individual's deepest source of creative energy.

Though one may at times stumble and botch the expression of what is needed in the way of support, encouragement (and sometimes discipline) from the group to make it possible for one to bring forth one's contribution. To squelch this creative offering from another is not only destructive to that person, it is destructive to the emergence of the whole, the composite, the natural flow of the present into a healthy and sustainable future.

Therefore any action that fails to respect, acknowledge, and honor the creative capacity of oneself and of those around one might properly be seen as *violence*, however minimal it is. In fact, minimal violence becomes crucially important when we

look at collectives. Buying a pair of Nike shoes would have hardly been considered violent until we began to acknowledge the sweatshop labor involved, and realize that, multiplied by millions of consumers, the capacity for violence in this simple purchase may be unacceptable.

In order to pursue this gender-oriented inquiry into the nature of violence, we must make the important distinction between gender on the one hand and masculine and feminine principles on the other. While gender is a social construct and is subject to change, the masculine and feminine energies that create life are constant and present in relatively stable forms in nature. Here I will look to Taoist and tantric teachings for insights about the nature of the masculine and feminine forces in nature.

The creative capacity is, in its essence, the ability to "birth" something new. This creative spark, this life force is present internally in each of us. From the point of view of tantric philosophy, this is the essence of power. In fact, it is a basic tenet of tantra that all power is, in the final analysis, feminine. In tantric terms, the masculine has no power. It is important to remember here that we are not talking about men and women, but the masculine and feminine principles, which are present in each of us. Clearly women manifest in a more obvious and graphic way the feminine, as do men the masculine. But both are capacities or components of each of us, psychologically, emotionally, and even, to some extent, physically. For a man to draw on his own capacity for power, he must access his feminine.

Gebser would remind us that as the Mental became dominant, and the Mythical was banished from conscious awareness, our sense of the world shifted from one that recognized in opposites a *polarity* to one that saw in opposites a *duality*. This is an important distinction. For in the Mental Structure of Consciousness, currently our "normal" reality, perspective reigns supreme, i.e., I see from *my* perspective. This began to be reflected in art during the renaissance as depth and perspective in paintings. From my perspective, others are separate. During Mythical times, visual art portrayed scenes as "flat;" they reflected how *we* see, not how *I* see. The Mythical, group-oriented consciousness regards one who is opposite as holding a corresponding polarity. You are female, I am male, but we are two ends of a pole. The pole is the overriding reality here. Through it the ends are connected.

On the other hand, in our everyday Mental universe of separateness and ego emphasis, opposites are no longer a matter of polarity, but rather of duality. Masculine and feminine are no longer two ends of a pole, but have been split asunder into totally different universes that are unconnected. In recent centuries as the Mental came to reign exclusively, our sense of gender morphed. By the 20th century, men and women were alienated from one another, inhabiting dualistically discontinuous gender identities. And this despite the fact that Jungian psychology, tantric philosophy, and even laboratory physiology were soon to agree that each person, male or female, has both masculine and feminine components.

Nevertheless, in the realm of mainstream consciousness, the split has persisted. This has become problematic, especially for men. For if, as we posited earlier, power

resides in the feminine, and if a man cannot access that power, he's likely to be baffled and frustrated. And indeed he is. Living in a dualistic reality, contemporary "civilized" men are separated from their feminine energies. Yet they feel called upon to be the masters of all they survey. While some of that arrogation of dominance may properly be attributed to ego, acculturation certainly reinforces it. Men should be strong; they should be powerful. This, at best, is an uncomfortable bind to be in — I am expected to be powerful yet have lost access to power. If I have also been raised to feel that my ego should not be challenged and that to lack power is humiliating, it wouldn't be surprising if I just "lost it." In fact, a common reaction to this dilemma is rage. Man, cut off from the source of his power, yet expected to be powerful becomes furious. Impotent rage leads to violence. I may not have power of my own, but I can squash yours!

Violence is then, a sort of substitute for genuine power. It is, as we noted earlier, a form of *pseudo*power. With men who are suffering from this split holding major positions of leadership in government, business, education, and even religion, it is not surprising that our global culture is one that is shot through with violence. War, poverty, environmental destruction, wage slavery, domestic violence, greed, all relate to the impotent rage of the masculine principle, cut off from its connection the creative life force. While men are prototypical here, women, too, are subject increasingly to this problem. Women have retained more connection to the Mythical and the Magical, are more likely to see the masculine as a polar potentiality within, and have therefore more often integrated and put to use their contra-sexual opposite. Unfortunately, the masculine they integrate, taken on from male role models in their environment, offers them only various versions of impotent rage, and they not infrequently find themselves collaborators in perpetuating violence.

The healing solution to this disastrous situation is to bring back what was split off and separated, in this case the feminine Mythical and Magical consciousness, and access to the creative power that resides in the feminine within. This Integral solution will require a total revisioning of masculinity. It will require much "detoxing" of the deep imprints of violence in the individual, in families, in communities, and in national, racial, and ethnic groups, such as that being done by Hellinger. We must first heal the splits within ourselves. Then we must have the courage and persistence to begin to frame a weltanshaung that does not have violence woven through it, but that honors and cultivates the priceless creativity and genius of each of us.

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NOTES

[1] This must be clear and coherent — what Gebser calls the *efficient* mental. The *deficient* mental, characterized by murky thinking and poor logic, is more common today.

ПЛАНЕТАРНОЕ ЦЕЛИТЕЛЬСТВО: ПРИМЕНЕНИЕ ПРОВЕРЕННЫХ ВРЕМЕНЕМ ПАРАДИГМ ДЛЯ РЕШЕНИЯ КУЛЬТУРНЫХ И РЕЛИГИОЗНЫХ КОНФЛИКТОВ

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Для решения глобальных задач, которые ставятся сейчас перед нашей планетой, нам могут понадобиться масштабные концептуальные структуры, которые помогут создать необходимый контекст для дискуссии и достижения согласия. Целью данной работы является представить три подобных стратегических подхода к разрешению мирового кризиса, которые могут быть применены по отдельности, а также, в дальнейшем, использованы в их системном взаимодействии. Предлагаются следующие подходы:

1) **Исцеление как образ действия,** т. е. преимущества подхода излечивания по отношению к мировому кризису, и принципы, на которых он основывается.
2) **Изменяющиеся реалии как контекст** (т. е. «структуры сознания»), в котором люди всегда находились и находятся сейчас, и как возникают религиозные и культурные конфликты, когда сообщества ведут диалог, опираясь на разные реалии/структуры сознания, не отдавая себе в этом отчет. (Понимание этих разных реалий присутствует как в восточной, так и в западной философии, однако, наиболее отчетливо оно выражено в терминах западной философии европейским философом Жаном Жебсером).
3) **Развитие гендерного подхода** в мире, (наиболее ярко проявляется как «воскрешение женственности»), и как это может помочь противостоять насилию и привести к созидательным переменам.

Part 1. Being in Transition // Часть 1. Переходный период

IDENTITY IN TRANSITION: CONTEMPORARY PERILS AND PROMISE

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A great deal has been made recently regarding problems of human identity. Is a particular people's identity securely established, for example, or is their identity currently under threat and thus no longer secure? Might it even run the danger of extinction? And what forms might "identity-extinction" take? How have questions such as these regarding human identity reached the level of intensity that they have? Clearly such problems have always existed at times for various peoples as they have struggled to establish and then to maintain themselves as the people who they "are." Is the level of concern, then, mostly a matter of extensive media attention in a time of both globalization and global disorder? Or are there deeper historical and conceptual currents at play? I believe it is more the latter and will trace some of the trajectories that have brought us to our early twenty-first century present. That intense media attention can contribute significantly to a kind of self-consciousness — and even self-conscious posturing — that easily exacerbates various identity problems, however, I do not wish to deny.

Let us begin by reference to history, specifically to that of the last three centuries. In the West a view emerged roughly three hundred years ago that was also a program and became a project. For some time this view has been routinely referred to as the Enlightenment Project, and in some quarters it is still being very actively pursued today, though not necessarily under this label. The project has involved distinguishing between the essential core of human beings and their "accidental" trappings. At their core, it is believed, humans are the same as each other. They share a common human nature and identity. This shared identity might be hidden from them, however, by cultural and political differences: variations in custom, language, clothing, political practice, religious conviction and so on. Not always seeing through such differences, Enlightenment advocates have thought, many have believed and continue to believe that various groupings of people are actually and essentially different from each other, different not only in how they appear, but in who they really are in their actual underlying identity. It is this "false" belief in fundamental difference that the Enlightenment Project has hoped to eradicate.

And why the need for eradication? The answer to this question is both stark and in many respects unfortunate. Once the notion of essential difference arises, comparison becomes almost inevitable. The basic comparative principle has almost invariably been hierarchical: a bifurcation into the greater and the lesser, the better and the worse. This manner of assessing difference has all too often sanctioned strife, attempted quarantine or even extermination. In a human world assumed to contain essential difference, contamination has been feared, or the dilution of a "greater" or "better" identity. In times of scarcity it has been thought that since *they* are different from *us*, clearly lesser and worse, shouldn't *they* be the ones to suffer deprivation?

But how did and does this mode of thinking come about? Again, Enlightenment Project thinkers have believed that in scenarios such as these, externalities that exhibit only surface and superficial differences have been given too much play. Burdened by pre-Enlightenment superstition, people have tended to identify themselves with these externalities and have required not only their protection, but their enhancement, spread and further adoption, if these people — their advocates — were to be secure in their identity. Identity has thereby not only been externalized, but has also been given a rationale for colonization.

Another, closely related doctrine of the Enlightenment Project has been that of historical progress, and it is here that a special, genuine and almost bitter irony emerges. From what I have said you would have every reason to think that, going forward, "Enlightenment" thinkers, so-called, would argue very strongly for the complete and utter internalization of the sense of identity and a parallel program for lessening focus on externalities with respect to essential human affairs. In certain respects these thinkers have, but in more ways than not, they have turned in a paradoxically opposed direction. That this has been far, far more a seductive confusion in reasoning than an indicator of any malicious intent, I firmly believe. But before speaking to this matter I must first mention one grand, even great attempt at human identity's internalization. It is found in the work of Immanuel Kant, an historical figure some have called *the* Enlightenment thinker. Where he has been subsequently judged to fail is quite instructive.

Kant argued that it was in our essential and individual human nature to be able to give laws unto ourselves and thereby to determine our own personal conduct. This capacity derived from our possession of reason. It meant that we were free — autonomous is probably the better word — and deserving of respect. In this set of circumstances resided our dignity and, were Kant to have been pressed on the matter, our very human identity.

But how is this freedom to be exercised with respect to the enhancement of our essential humanity? Four things jump out at the reader of Kant almost immediately once this question is posed: (1) other persons are to be treated as ends, as autonomous agents in themselves, and never as means to our own ends; (2) a fundamental bifurcation is established between duty and inclination, obligation and passion, and in every relevant situation in which the bifurcation comes into play, duty and obli-

gation are to be chosen; (3) prudential calculations — if I want this, then I must do that — are to be set aside in any circumstance where moral factors are present, and the only basis for judging human action, then, is the purity of disinterested moral motivation; and (4) it is the individual and the individual alone, not the family, neighborhood or community, however large or small, that is the locus of dignity and responsibility.

If Kant, as the highest and purest expression of the Enlightenment ideal, is noble in intent, there is also a traction problem. It has dogged refined forms of Enlightenment thinking ever since. For a very circumscribed, if not isolated individual — oxymoronically cosmopolitan in belonging both everywhere and nowhere — Kant offers an extraordinary vision. It outlines a world we neither inhabit nor would know how to achieve. Virtually all of us live in families, communities and larger, overlapping and differently configured groupings. In these the notion of a steep chasm between duty and inclination — or involving the treatment of others always as ends and never as means — vacillates between the bewildering and the vacuous. As often as not we are brought up short by such conceptualizations. Either we are left with no reasonable course of action or cast to our dismay in the role of moral prig.

Notably, these sorts of criticisms of Enlightenment ideals stem from Hegel, an early nineteenth century writer, as well as from others. A lesson taught, if not altogether learned, is that ideals, however lofty, require specific content and concrete plausibility, if they are to serve a transformative or even a regulative and developmental function. An abstract, largely formulaic dependence upon Reason — however much the recipient of honorific residues from Athenian Greek philosophy — will simply not do. It offers little, if any guidance or direction in a fast moving, fractious and often disorienting world. In this sense Reason becomes little more than a truncated placeholder for the pre-Enlightenment notion of spirit or soul, but, whatever its locus, Reason so construed offers little, if anything in the way of inspiration. Whether the product or cause of disenchantment — probably both — Reason restrains that kind of devotion that most humans find essential to their sense of belonging and, thus, to their closely related sense of who they are, their sense of their personal identity. It is at best curious that in its programmatic quest to internalize identity, thereby overcoming the destructive aspects of perceived externalities, the Enlightenment at its "purest" would seem more to have sterilized human identity, diminishing and depleting it, rather than securing the conditions for its healthy and protected flourishing.

This, however, is but part of the story and may explain more than anything how the need for a belonging of a very thick, welcoming and personalized sort could arise as a paradoxical almost rebarbative outcome and reaction to Enlightenment ideals. That austere, almost solipsistic strain at the foundations of purist Enlightenment thinking has engendered powerful negative reactions. But the isolationist tendency in individualism, however cosmopolitan its rhetoric, is only one part of this story. The stress on belonging has other precipitating factors as well; not the least of which

is a particular understanding of the role and value of historical time that has also emerged over the last few centuries.

If the Enlightenment Project has believed in a human identity purged of potentially misleading and often contentious and inflammatory externalities, it has also believed in the potential and importance of human historical progress. This is a major part of our story. With and after Hegel this progress was seen to require the concrete and the expandingly plural, not the Kantian abstract and limitedly individual. Though not by name — and only latently and haltingly as a consequence of commercial trade — globalization is also underway. Notions of historical progress and of identity formation, in fact, come significantly to overlap. They serve as mutually supportive and reinforcing pillars of modernity.

Note the switch in phraseology that has just occurred. Whereas before the emphasis had been on further identity, internalization and protection, the phrase now has become 'identity formation.' Why does this occur? What underlies the introduction of what at best might seem an equivocation?

From the perspective of the Enlightenment Project it has never been difficult to see that some peoples are more embedded in their surrounding "externalities" than are others. Whatever account is given of this — and the more embedded are invariably understood as less advanced — the solution would seem to come through education. If people receive enlightenment values, it is thought, they will then be able to "dis-identify" themselves from externalities, however much they might still enjoy certain customs, continue to wear certain clothes, engage in particular religious practices, and so on. So "disidentified," these people will better appreciate the essential identity — the underlying siblinghood — of all peoples.

But if education is the answer, what are the particular Enlightenment values to be taught? It could hardly be an education in "disidentification" itself, for this would seem both highly abstract and also confusingly sermonic. On this model the lesson would appear to involve exercises in emotional disengagement from precisely that which had given people, yes, emotional residence, continuity and a supportive matrix of meaning. Without any positive supplement, such training could only be experienced as impoverishment, and thus as identity erosion.

Along this austere path, the route of abstract Enlightenment instruction, a parallel lesson would appear to be in the art of detecting that those other, contiguous peoples, themselves having differing overt matrices of embodied meaning and contexts of significant practice, are — beneath these appearances — the same in nature. This, of course, is very heady stuff, which is only to say that it is highly "refined" and intellectual. And it can be neither obvious nor comforting, for it gives all appearance of being denuding, especially of those quite concretely involved in their particular worlds.

What actually happened in terms of the unfolding of Enlightenment Project theory and practice, however, has been something importantly different. The notion of historical progress got confusedly entangled with the notion of identity's internalization. With deep inconsistency it came to be thought that as commerce reached

further into the heart of far-flung areas — and a variety of other political and religious ideas took hold, not the least of which being the political neutering of religion itself — identity internalization would concurrently develop. To some degree it also came to be thought that certain "Western" values needed to be inculcated for a reliably stable and modern identity to form.

But this, of course, begs the core issue in a number of ways. Why does an identity need to be modern? Is stability a concept having to do with the people to be modernized? Or is it a relational concept having more to do more than anything with their reliability as a continuing and beneficial partner in commercial transactions? Is the notion of identity that is the Enlightenment Project's aspiration itself free from externalities once it begins to play itself out historically? Or is this notion of identity, once unmoored from Kantian abstractions and left to float down industrial, technological and commercial causeways, not itself a complex and sophisticated bundle of externalities? The same education that originally began with the hope of transcending differences and focusing upon inner sameness might easily transform, gradually and unbeknownst to itself, into an indoctrination in a particular cluster of powerfully effective worldly externalities generative of considerable material enhancement. Under the banner of globalization, some two and one half centuries after the dawn of the Enlightenment, this may have largely, though quite unevenly occurred. Rather than simply making human identity interior, thus invisible, it may have substituted one set of externalities, large traditional and religious ones, for another set, itself dynamically innovative and quite commercial. The motivation for this substitution would by no means require a sinister or unflattering interpretation.

A discussion such as ours cannot avoid reference to the vexed notion of rights, for these are altogether enmeshed in concerns regarding the nature and extent of human identity. The conceptual as well as "real life" entanglements in this domain are both problematic and perplexing. Especially prevalent during the Enlightenment Project's formative period in the eighteenth century was the notion of a "right" as an immunization against interference by other parties. One had the right, it was claimed, to be left alone with regard to certain essential matters, thereby being allowed to make one's autonomous decisions. This freedom from interference was construed as the hallmark of self-determination. To grant this right was understood as involving a simple admission. It was meant to show respect and at the same time to acknowledge the dignity of the one so recognized. Not only this, it was also to serve as a sign of the enlightened state of the recognizer of such a fundamental right.

As directly and indirectly articulated in various founding and seminal documents and discourse regarding the United States — and derived primarily from the writings of John Locke — this right was construed as inalienable and of a piece with human freedom. Nowhere is this made more clear than in the American Declaration of Independence.

Heir to a long tradition of political and philosophical thinking that stems back even behind Hobbes and includes Burke, Constant, John Stuart Mill, Toqueville,

and, more recently, the Austrian School of Economics, this notion of right — as immunity — is captured well in Isaiah Berlin's famous account of negative liberty. It enters into the basic fabric of *classical*, as opposed to more contemporary forms of liberalism.

It is not, however, without its difficulties. If we think back to Kant and consider the notion of toleration found in Locke and his likeminded successors, we see that this classical and negative notion of liberty (or right) is far more abstract and formal than contentful. It says next to nothing regarding human nature and gives little, if any direction to human action. It constrains what can be done, but offers little regarding what must be done with regard to other people. In Kant's terms, to treat others as end-in-themselves and not as means is to be enjoined to allow people their own autonomy and those decisions that follow from it. The basic constraint is just this: activities undertaken with regard to others must not interfere with those others' own, self-determined choices, except insofar as their decision making itself interferes in turn with other people's equally valued autonomy.

Of course this manner of speaking has a peculiar ring. If a person has a basic right not to be contravened, so that same person has the responsibility not to intrude into the life of others. This can easily be construed as the right and even the duty to disregard what happens around one, so long as the relevant persons and activities to be disregarded are not themselves interfering in one's own life or the life of still others. As it stands this is a set of guidelines for a very robust individualism, requiring in turn robust and advantaged individuals capable of living on its terms.

I will return to the term 'advantaged' in a moment. What first needs stressing is the "rationality" of the model that immunization theories of rights endorse. The Enlightenment Project thinkers, after all, have sought to replace superstition and tradition — read religious beliefs and commitments insofar as they have worldly implications — with reason. Those who understand relations to others in terms of a more traditional "children of God" model are provided with far more content and, more importantly, a focus for natural human emotions of sympathy and concern. By way of contrast the notion of people as deserving respect for their character as bearers of Reason is not conducive to sentiment because the notion of Reason is itself sterile. The rationality model also reigns in disregard of how people actually live their lives.

Here we can clearly see the dilemma — actually a set of overlapping dilemmas. Construed as reason, an internalized identity is relatively empty. It lacks the vibrancy of soul or spirit, and also their viscosity. At its extreme such an identity is abstract and isolate. Left in place, however, externalized identity is potentially threatening and always dangerous. It is in the dynamic of an externalized identity to make claims for its content, pressing for further space, opportunity and even territory in which to exercise and exhibit its life and aspirations. Thus the internal/external alternatives for identity construal are each deeply problematic.

The notion of advantage is worth further comment, for it is especially troublesome, and its explication tends to undercut much that is claimed for it. Reserva-

tions regarding the abstract formality of reason aside, advantaged people are best suited for that vigorous autonomy associated with the individualism inherent in the Enlightenment Project and classical liberalism. The very notion of advantage, however, opens a kind of Pandora's box. It is hard not to include as part of "advantage" one's position and access to various fields of play, along with requisite resources for engaging in such play. But in a strict sense not only are these themselves externalities. They also differentiate human identities in overt and often quite visible and measurable ways.

It is as if the possession of particular externalities, construed as material advantages, is a necessary condition for the robust development of an "internalized" identity, and in a way this set of attitudes coalesced in the course of the Enlightenment Project's advance. It was not difficult to believe that a certain level of material well-being was important to the development of further liberty, construed as opportunity. If identity itself, it was initially thought, might be internalized, liberty could not, except as a dubious compensation for external restrictions. In more recent Enlightenment Project thinking, however, identity and liberty tend to overlap, if not fuse, with each reinforcing the felt needs and trajectories of the other. A shared sign of the attainment of either comes gradually to be construed as a reasonable level of prosperity. At first almost imperceptibly, one region of presumed externality, that resided in by *homo economicus*, comes to be understood as essential to both human liberty and identity, however internalized the rhetoric regarding these matters remains.

Many of these perplexing identity issues come particularly to the fore through a consideration of the phenomenon of *recognition*. In the middle of the twentieth century — and, we now see, quite prophetically — Isaiah Berlin had warned in his *Two Concepts of Liberty* that human beings, more and more, were demanding recognition as a condition for the attainment of that to which, increasingly, they saw themselves as having a most basic "right," *viz.*, the right to a full and complete *sense* of themselves. Not only this. This sense of themselves, it was thought, had to be recognized, and thereby validated, in a manner that was in accord with their understanding of their own authentic nature and, even, their aspirations. Only through such recognition, it was thought, was a sufficient sense of their human dignity and, by implication, the flourishing of their very humanity even construed to be possible. Recognition, thus, was coming to be viewed as a requirement for the attainment of human identity itself. Without it, it was implied, any such identity could only exist as a sham. Such an identity would lack the essential ingredients for sustainability, *viz.*, continuity and integrity. It could only be partial and altogether precarious. It could in no way flourish.

This is a decidedly strange turn of events, if understood in the light of the autonomy concerns we have already considered. Quite unlike autonomy, recognition is an unavoidably social phenomenon. If autonomy undergirds and also requires independence, the need for recognition fosters dependence, for it is in its very nature that it cannot be achieved alone. It requires the presence and even the active coop-

eration of others. Implied also is a significantly altered notion of "rights." If recognition is necessary for full and complete human identity, then rights cannot simply be understood as immunizations from interference. To be left alone will far from suffice insofar as one's identity is concerned. On the contrary, to be significantly ignored or disregarded — even though not interfered with — will undermine whatever identity one might otherwise have hoped to have. To be disregarded in this manner, starkly put, will have dehumanization as a major consequence.

The recognition doctrine itself is not new. It is most influentially found in Hegel and is, thus, nearly two hundred years old. The intensity of the concern regarding it — or possibly media attention drawn to it — is what may have changed over the last decades. As it is worked through in Hegel, it included a very strong thesis regarding human nature: our very selves are constituted in part by how we are perceived by others and by how we perceive ourselves. There is no underlying "atom," hidden or unhidden, that comprises the self, regardless of whether or how it is seen. Well, not quite: the "atomic" substratum may necessarily be there, but it is only a nascent self until self-perception and recognition of self by others engenders that nascent self's development. The rationally supposed atomistic underpinning is but part of an egalitarian trinity. In accordance with the recognition thesis, thus, the identity of the self has also and equally become relational.

From the side of recognition we have now reached nearly the same point that we reached from the standpoint of the autonomy thesis. The autonomy dynamic welcomed a distinction between interior and exteriorized identity. In this manner varying forms of conflict were to be immunized. It was one's uninterrupted and immunized core self, one's interiority, that was to be the locus of one's essential identity. At the same time, however, this understanding of autonomy and identity began to merge with the notion of a ripened and multidimensional self-development. The latter required a fertile, external environment over which it could exercise a significant measure of control, thus sustaining and not overtly contradicting the initial notion of autonomy as freedom from dependency. Historically the merger of autonomy with self-development was evolved in a manner that has suggested that certain, largely economic conditions and support systems have needed to be in place. Their placement has been required for the possibility of a fully *autonomous* life that is also *full* and variegated. Obviously this is no small order.

The linkages growing out of the autonomy dynamic turn out to be quite tight, if at the same time initially abstract in their resonance. A supportive autonomy has been essential to a flourishing identity. Such an identity has been essential to the attainment of a completely developed autonomy. Both have been deemed essential for and have also required human liberty, both positive and negative, opportunistic and free from interference. Thus a rewarding external environment has been a requirement for an autonomous identity that could secure for itself the conditions for its full flourishing. Self-completion could not be achieved by recourse to the inner interiorized sense of self alone.

But if such an exterior environment has been necessary for a fully realizable "interior" identity, that identity has then by this very circumstance been exteriorized. It has already by the nature of the requirements for its existence become what Hegel would have called "other to itself," if not overtly, then covertly. A fully developed and integral inner life begins to look like it needs robust opportunities for activities and expressions of itself in the world. It needs not only to deepen inwardly, but to expand outwardly as well. Only in this way could it become complete. But this means, of course, that the interiorized identity of the person could only sustain itself through its own, self-actuated exteriorization. A final remark regarding this paradoxical dynamic within autonomy and initially interiorized identity. A supportive environment for the fully developed autonomous life begins to look more and more like a commercial one, thereby making other people — at least their goods and services — essential to human identity itself, even in the professedly individual and separated case.

We are now in a position to draw some provisional conclusions. In the West, and particularly in the United States, we are very much heirs to the Enlightenment Project. Because the Enlightenment saw its initial and unfolding task to be the overcoming of superstition, it understood the attainment of human maturity to be the progressive achievement of autonomy. It also came to see this autonomy as unfolding more and more in the economic sphere and in a secular and largely agnostic way. The Enlightenment Project's understanding of Reason began abstractly, but became increasingly instrumental and technological. This understanding has set the parameters for and has defined the structures and the focus of modernity, what we call the modern world.

What we might call recognition-sympathies arose to a considerable extent in reaction to the austerity and, initially, the chill of Reason's framework and progressively exteriorizing agenda. Its growing requirement for commercial space came to be experienced by some as no less oppressive in its implications than what was found in the exteriorized religious world that the seventeenth century struggled against and partially curtailed through the treaty of Westphalia. These recognition-sympathies, thus, have often been called counter-enlightenment or romantic movements. Significantly, however, they have seldom been traditionally or institutionally religious. Of course there have been exceptions.

Recognition doctrines tend to be more closely communitarian in their dynamic. The communities they spawn are typically local or regional, rather than national or global in their reach or ambition. Such communities are enormously diverse and are inclined to closely bonded activities and insulated interests. Their temptation and tendency is to distance themselves or even opt out of the realm of technological, commercialized reason and its economic imperatives.

Most who have attempted to transcend or sidestep the dynamic of expansive technological Reason in this manner look to be in an irreversible position. It does not appear that they can return, either to pre-modern, pre-enlightenment faith or to the market driven rules and processes of an "enlightened" modernity.

Still other groups of people — some of whom we cannot but judge as adversaries of civilized life itself, not just of Enlightenment Project or "Western" values — are not post-Enlightenment nor even informed by Enlightenment modalities. Their presence in our world is in some cases dangerous, implacable and altogether unpredictable. In what ways and to what degree they can be circumscribed, contained, and distanced from our growing post-rational post-modernity will not be known by us for some time. It is highly unlikely that they could ever be co-opted.

Our situation, then, is most problematic, living as we do in a world of pre-moderns, modern and post-moderns, advocates of tribal, rationally individualistic, or post-modernly communal values. It may be modernity, in fact, that suffers the most. In one most crucial way this proves unfortunate to the extreme, for modernity has had the best, because most transparent and unambiguous means for articulating procedural mechanisms for resolving disputes.

If there is a credible and constructive path out of our current situation, that path is not obvious or evident. What we are likely to witness is further disintegration of global ambitions and the emergence of more and more regionalized and even localized communities. These communities are likely to be bonded far more by sentiment and feeling than by abstract reason. How their relations with each other will work out, the degree to which they will collide, and the legitimate hope we may nurture for gradually strengthened compassion will significantly determine our outlook and actual future.

ИЗМЕНЕНИЕ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ: СОВРЕМЕННЫЕ УГРОЗЫ И ОБЕЩАНИЯ

Стивен ЭРИКСОН
Колледж Помоны

Идентичность основывается на традиции, но зачастую может радикально меняться под воздействием смены надежд и ожиданий. В настоящий исторический момент можно наблюдать, по крайней мере, три изменения ориентиров во взгляде на будущее: (1) усиливается предчувствие того, что жизнь человека в этом мире будет значительно менее безопасной и в той же степени менее предсказуемой; (2) возрастает потребность в истинной принадлежности, которая усилит и даже реструктуризирует нашу человеческую идентификацию; и (3) формируется ощущение, что быстрая передача информации может быть не только полезной и конструктивной, но также иметь разрушительный дезинформирующий характер. В свете этих изменений ориентиров различные устоявшиеся традиции, в частности, религиозные и политические, подвергаются серьезной переоценке. В одном случае, возрастает внимание к традициям и они

оказываются вновь востребованными. В другом случае, традиции не принимаются во внимание и отвергаются. В первом случае, динамика одобрения смещает изменяющиеся сообщества в *до*-современном направлении. Во втором, динамика отвержения отчетливо ориентирует растущее число индивидуумов и прогрессивно настроенные сообщества, особенно в демократических странах с высоким уровнем технического развития, в *пост*-современном направлении. Выбор этих разнонаправленных и даже противоположно направленных траекторий практически исключает возможность продолжительного существования в рамках, заданных современностью. Возможно, это наиболее значимая тенденция нашего времени. Поскольку современность, определенная преимущественно через понятие *Разума*, всегда являлась центральной опорой нашей идентичности, я исследую то, каким образом нерациональные, но и ни в коей мере не иррациональные, элементы начинают изменять наши формирующуюся идентичность XXI века.

TOGETHER AND APART, WITHIN AND WITHOUT: IETNAMESE PERCEPTIONS, WESTERN MEDICINE, AND A DIFFERENT VIEW OF MADNESS

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Introduction

In the histories and present day realities of Western culture, madness carries the dubious distinction of being both a great unifier and a potent divider. By virtue of its existence, madness unifies by demonstrating that no society or individual is absolutely free from risk. It can also be argued that madness unifies by providing a definition of normalcy via antithesis (Foucault, 1965, 1994; Scull, 1989). Indeed, both the presence of madness and the perceptions of its forms and functions stand as symbolic indicators of cultural and social systems organized around individuality and the centrality of autonomous, independent reason (Gilman, 1982; 1988; Fabrega, 1991a; Dodds, 1951).

This unification (of social values, concepts of identity) is gained, however, through multiple acts of division. The West, at least, made and makes sharp distinctions between sanity and insanity in the legal realm, neurosis and psychosis in psychiatry, and the normal and crazed in public consciousness. And while these distinctions are far from static or unproblematic, when they do become established they often contribute to real or metaphoric walls, separating out those who "are" from those who "are not" (Wahl, 1995, 2003).

Thus, for Western Europe and its derivative societies, madness emerges as an entity of distinction and difference. But it is less clear whether the same can be said regarding non-Western societies, particularly Asian ones (Ng, 1990; Jenkins & Barrett, 2004). This is not to say that "social behavior anomalies or breakdowns" (Fabrega, 1991b, p. 537) exist or are troublesome only in the West. Rather, it is to assert that the functions and perceptions of what Western medicine refers to as "major mental illness" and what non-medical Western scholars call "madness" may be somewhat different in societies whose cultural identities are structured more by concepts of collectivity than individuality.

Accepting the assumption that individuality and collectivity stand as organizing concepts in Western and Asian societies respectively (Nisbett, 2003), and endorsing the notion that these concepts are also at play in how societies perceive and represent disease and deviance (Gilman, 1988), this paper will compare Asian and Western perceptions of madness.[1] Additionally, through examining medical, popular, and literary perceptions of madness in modern Viet Nam, we will discuss how the con-

cept changes when considered in relation to collectivity, and how the relationship between madness and individuality also becomes substantially more complicated. In particular, we will argue that sometimes madness protects individuality, and in doing so provides its bearer a culturally accepted position of distinction, meaningfulness, and connection.

Madness and Individuality: Western Perceptions

The importance of individuality to Western, and particularly American, thought and culture is recognized by scholars of cultural studies (Gilman, 1988; Feder, 1980, Bellah et al., 1987), psychology (Nisbett, 2003), psychotherapy (Cushman, 1995), anthropology (Geertz, 1973), and medicine (Porter, 1996). That individuality is defined and maintained by the presence of reason has also become a fundamental position of post-Enlightenment thought, although not one without its critics (e. g., Foucault, 1965). Nonetheless, the precise nature of this rational individuality has always been a bit difficult to discern, and has led to the development of some disciplines (e.g., psychology), while fundamentally shaping the nature of others (e.g., philosophy, medicine).

It can also be argued that this difficulty shapes Western perceptions of madness. Once conceptualized in a multitude of ways and serving a variety of functions, the reemergence of rational individuality during the Enlightenment also limited madness to the role of necessary antithesis (Fabrega, 1991a; Foucault, 1965, 1994; Scull, 1989). Madness defined what reason could never be. Thus, whereas reason became a central feature of the human being, madness partook of animality (Gamwell & Tomes, 1995; Romm, 1994). And while "being reasonable" meant acting like an autonomous adult, to be mad meant becoming like a dependent child (Tomes, 1984). And with antithesis came peripheralization. In Fabrega's (1991a) words, "as individual freedom, autonomy, and the exercise of civil liberties became increasing attributes of personhood in Western societies, the mad took on the anomalous identity of sequestration, dependence, and enforced non-participation in social and civil affairs" (p. 111).

Furthermore, these perceptions and the images representing them prove remarkably persistent. For example, Schoeneman and his colleagues (1994) demonstrate how abnormal psychology texts continue to use "classic" images (e.g., Hogarth's *A Rake's Progress* Plate VIII, 1763; Robert-Fleury's *Pinel Freeing the Insane,* 1876) in a manner that inadvertently supports perceptions of the mad as inhuman, separate, and dangerously dependent. In his work on contemporary mental illness and stigma, Wahl (1995) also argues that the mass media portray madness in ways that emphasize an "otherness" that can produce laughter, indifference, or fear. And in discussing Lillian Feder's (1980) study of madness in Western literature, Gilman (1988) notes how infrequently literary representations seem to change, and how little affected they are by developments in medicine. He believes the same is true for

visual depictions of all disease, stating that "the very face of the patient, is a continuous one, and through a study of its continuities comes a sense of the interrelationship of all our projected fears of collapse" (p. 3). And what is in danger of collapsing? The individual, be it the autonomous body, soul, or mind.

Madness and Collectivity: Asian Perceptions

But while individuality can be considered part of the "deep structure" of the West, the same cannot be said of most Asian cultures (Triandis & Suh, 2002). Defined more by notions of collectivity than individuality[2], Asian languages, concepts, and social structures tend to focus more on relationship than autonomy. For example, there is no word for "I" in Chinese, and the Japanese tend to prefer relational terms like "father" or "daughter" (Nisbett, 2003). Further, Ho (1998) points out that constructs playing "an important role in indigenous psychologies tend to be relational in character" (p. 99). These include the Japanese concept of *amae* (Doi, 1956; Lebra, 1976), the Korean concepts of *woori* (indicating an inclusive group) and *cheong* (human affection) (Choi, Kim, & Choi, 1993). Parenting practices in Japan encourage interdependence at the expense of independence (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). And there is a general tendency in Asian cultures to organize and understand individual and group behavior in terms of social and familial duty and obligation, as opposed to personal achievement (Triandis, 1995; Kleinman & Lin, 1981).[3]

Given this, how might collectivity affect Asian perceptions of madness? In asking this question, it is once again necessary to conceptualize madness as a cultural and historical vs. purely medical phenomenon. Indeed, doing so allows us to recognize that a society's perceptions of madness are at least partially organized by its core values and fears (Gilman, 1988). In the West, we suggest these fear and values center around individuality. However, in Asian societies generally, and Viet Nam in particular, we would expect perceptions to reflect the importance and fragility of the collective.

If we examine how madness is and is not perceived in Asian societies, we find that the historical scholarship and contemporary psychiatric literature lend support for a different focus (Lefley, 1990). China, for example, never shared the West's fascination with madness (Kleinman & Lin, 1981). No large asylums were constructed until the late 19th century (and were then the direct result of contact with Western medical and political representatives; Fabrega, 1991b; Ng, 1990). Diagnostic systems — well developed in traditional, holistic Chinese medicine — did not include specific or elaborate categories devoted to mental distress (Ng, 1990; Liu, 1981). Nor did dominant medical or social texts include visual depictions of mad individuals (Ng, 1990; A. Messner, personal communication, October 4, 2004). Furthermore, psychiatry was a very late developing specialty in China, Japan, and other Asian countries (Ng, 1990; Shinfuku, 1998; Samuma, 1978; McKelvey, Sang, & Tu, 1997). Its practitioners did not occupy positions of significant social or medical

status, and in some countries (e. g., Viet Nam) continued to keep their profession a secret from their families (Wallace, 1997; Nguyen, 2003). And while some of these developments speak to the role of stigma (Phan, 2000), the absence of institutions, disciplines, diagnostic systems, and representations also suggest that madness was not perceived as a significantly distinct individual (or individual-threatening) problem (Shapiro, 1995; Schwartz, 1985).

This does not mean severe behavioral anomalies or breakdowns did not occur, or were not troublesome prior to contact with the West. The historical literature, and common sense, suggests that they did and were (Ng, 1990; Fabrega, 1991b; Schwartz, 1995). However, the same literature also suggests that, more often than not, such anomalies were conceptualized along interpersonal lines, with the individual manifesting the problems of the group (Fabrega, 1991b; Lee & Kleinman, 1997; Ng, 1990). Indeed, even after years of significant, and often transformative, contact with the West, there is ample evidence that many Asian perceptions of madness retain interpersonal, interdependent dimensions. In China, for example, madness can still be regarded as resulting from "moral transgressions towards ancestors or social norms whereby the family is held responsible. Alternatively, it can be attributed to hereditary or even ancestral inheritance or misconduct, so that the sufferer and sometimes even siblings are excluded from marriage" (Ng, 1990, p. 385; Lin & Lin, 1981). In contemporary Japan, mental illness can be perceived as the result of psychological weakness (reflecting an individual focus) or "sociomoral concerns" (e. g., the breakdown of the family structure, or modernization; Ng, p. 386). Finally, in discussing stigma, Kirmeyer (1989) points to importance of the interdependent context, suggesting that in any society "where the person is conceived in terms of the family or the larger social unit ... stigma of illness affects the entire unit and demands a collective response" (p. 334).

Indeed, cross-cultural research on psychiatric stigma frequently highlights the relationship between the mad individual and the larger group. Evaluating perceptions of madness in various Asian cultures[4] researchers emphasize how madness is seen as a source of shame for the family (vs. the individual), and how responsibility regarding cause and cure is often believed to lie first and foremost with the family (vs. individual). Unfortunately, much of this literature also relies on Western conceptions of madness.[5] Culture-specific perceptions are presented against an implied backdrop of what "we" (Western medicine) know madness to truly be (i. e., mental illness, originating within the individual, and resulting from physical causes). Perceptions at odds with this are presented as stereotypes (i. e., erroneous), that are potentially harmful (i. e., resulting in stigma) and ultimately meaningless (i. e., carrying little informational value outside of alerting the Western-oriented practitioner when and how to re-educate).

Undoubtedly, individually-oriented Western medicine offers some clear benefits regardless of cultural group. But seeking to understand perceptions of madness from this perspective alone means we may also fail to appreciate some of the seemingly

anomalous meanings and functions it may have in a collectivist society. And such failure has significant implications for cross-cultural understanding in general, and for treatment in particular. In what follows, we will explore how Vietnamese perceptions of madness speak to the importance of the collective. We will also argue that within this essentially collectivist conceptualization, madness sometimes functions as a protector of individuality. When this happens, madness receives some degree of cultural sanction, and provides the madman or woman with a distinctive, meaningful, and connected position.

Protection, Sanction, and Status: Perceptions of Madness in Modern Viet Nam

Western scholars have known relatively little about Vietnamese conceptualizations and perceptions of madness (Phan, 2000; Phan & Silove, 1997; McKelvey et al., 1999). Furthermore, developing this knowledge is not an easy affair. Linguistic, contextual, and epistemological factors must be considered carefully when trying to discern what is and is not considered madness in modern Viet Nam (Phan & Silove, 1997).[6] Nonetheless, some similarities between Vietnamese, Chinese, and Japanese perceptions are discernable. Further, many of these speak to the centrality of the collective, and are also at odds with individually-focused Western medicine.

Medical and popular perceptions

For example, in Viet Nam there is a great deal of veneration for traditional medicine and cosmomedicine, both of which emphasize the interdependence existing between an individual's health and her/his environment (including physical, social, familial, and spiritual realms; Phan & Silove, 1997; Fabrega & Nguyen, 1992). Consequently, within Vietnamese traditional medicine — and in a manner similar to traditional Chinese medicine — madness does not emerge as an entity requiring an elaborate taxonomy (Phan, 2000). This is not to say that behavioral anomaly or breakdown are nonexistent exist in Vietnamese society, past or present. Rather, it suggests that within traditional medicine at least, such anomalies are often subsumed by a system of thought organized around integration, balance, and order, concepts integral to Asian collectivist societies, and closely tied to Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian traditions (Jamieson, 1993; Ng, 1990).

Secondly, and regarding popular, non-medical Vietnamese perceptions, both the family and larger social unit (e. g., village) figure prominently in beliefs about definitions of madness, its causes, and even the timing of treatment. For example, McKelvey and colleagues (1999) point out that popular, traditional notions of mental illness tend to be narrower than Western concepts, focusing on behaviors that violate social norms. In his analysis of non-medical Vietnamese literature, however, Phan (2000) finds the term "binh tam than" (mental ill-health) used to denote "a

diversity of conditions ranging from behaviors that do not conform to Vietnamese social norms, the physical symptoms that are not caused by illnesses described by Vietnamese traditional medicine, to excessive worry or sadness" (p. 413).

Regarding causation, malevolent spirits are sometimes perceived as responsible, particularly in rural Viet Nam (Fabrega & Nguyen, 1992; Kinzie et al., 1982; Tung, 1980). Additionally, Lien (1994) notes that most Vietnamese believe mental disorder to be "a predicament or punishment which they have to repay for the misdeeds of their ancestors in the past, [or] misdeeds in their previous lives ..." (p. 2). Indeed, the belief that the behaviors of one generation exert a direct and powerful impact on successive ones permeates Vietnamese life. For example, the common warning, "Cha an man, con khat nuoc" ("parents eat salty food, children will feel thirsty") suggests a connection between parents and children that supercedes the physical boundary of individual bodies (Le, 1956).

Finally, many non-medical perceptions are themselves sources of familial shame and embarrassment. As such, there are often delays in seeking outside help (Phan, 2000; Tung, 1980; McKelvey et al., 1999). As in Japan (Shinfuku, 1998; Hirosawa et al., 2002), every effort is made to keep the problem within the family (Nguyen, 1984; Boehnlein, 1987; Tung, 1980). And, as in traditional Chinese groups, the Vietnamese family may bear the burden of the blame and responsibility for care and cure (Wallace, 1997; Lien, 1994; Lin, 1981).

Madness in literature

Indeed, from a Western perspective it would be easy to assume that madness always exists as a threat to the collective. Manifesting itself within individuals and casting shadows over families and across generations, the unmistakable presence and intensity of shame and stigma lend support for this assumption. However, when we move beyond medical and popular concepts and turn to Vietnamese literature, functions and consequences of madness emerge which complicate this assumption. Specifically, we find that Vietnamese literature and the lives of those who write it provide examples of madness protecting the collective, and in doing so elevating the individual. We will present three stories illustrating this seemingly anomalous situation. Whether described as a deliberately chosen strategy (as in the story of *Me Moc* and the life of Nguyen Khuyen), or the unplanned result of an exceptional life (as with Bui Giang), each story illustrates a madness that is, to some degree, culturally sanctioned, and bestows upon its bearer a role of distinction, connection, and meaningfulness.

Considered a true story by some, *Me Moc* was part of Vietnamese oral tradition well before Nguyen Khuyen wrote his poem in the late 19th century (Jamieson, 1993).[7] In story and poem, Me Moc is a young woman whose husband is far from home. Taking advantage of his absence, powerful townsmen pursue her in hopes of making her marry them. As a traditional Vietnamese woman, Me Moc is loath to

betray her husband or break her commitment to him and his family (now her family). In order to protect herself, Me Moc decides to act mad. She tears her clothes, covers her body with ash, and behaves as a mad woman. Seeing her physical and mental ugliness, no one wants to come close to her, and she is left free and safe. Me Moc's strategy succeeds, and her story becomes an object lesson, first via oral tradition and then through Nguyen Khuyen's poem, for those who feel compelled to avoid moral, social, or political disturbances (Jamieson, 1993). And although it would be an error to equate her acting mad with other forms of non-volitional madness discussed above, it would also be a mistake to assume that her choice of madness is accidental or meaningless. Indeed, we propose that Me Moc's choice and its results speak to the somewhat paradoxical status of madness in Viet Nam. On the one hand, it reflects the typical perception of madness as Other (the men do, after all, leave her alone). But on the other hand, Me Moc's madness also allows her to be true to her self, her relationships, and Vietnamese ideal of faithfulness. Through madness, Me Moc avoids the peripheralization that would result from faithlessness, protects a relational value central to Vietnamese culture, and remains connected to her husband, family, and society (present and future).

Interestingly enough, Nguyen Khuyen, the author of *Me Moc* and a respected senior Mandarin in 19th century Viet Nam, also uses his protagonist's strategy to excuse himself from participating in French colonial government. Having witnessed the French dominate his country through corrupt and deceptive practices, Nguyen Khuyen leaves his government position and returns to his village where he can live a life removed from conflict and dilemma. Through poetry which is both allegorical and autobiographic, Nguyen Khuyen claims the status of madman (also identifying with those who choose blindness and deafness), and this label is readily accepted by others (Tran, 1984). This status not only allows Nguyen Khuyen to reject the values of a corrupt and corrupting French government, but also to express himself more freely. Indeed, Nguyen Khuyen goes on to publish poetry satirizing the government and those who ally themselves with its corruption (Jamieson, 1993).

Moreover, Nguyen Khuyen praises publicly those who act as he does. For example, when his friend claims deafness in order to refuse a position in an official post, Nguyen Khuyen writes and distributes a teasing poem of admiration (Jamieson, 1993).

> There's a man who pretends to be deaf.
> 'Huh? Huh? What say?' He stupidly asks.
> Little does one suspect he stops and starts his ears like they were plow buffaloes.
> I'd certainly like to be deaf like that.
> Amidst a chattering crowd he sits dumb as a block of wood
> But late at night and all alone he's lively as a monkey.
> In the back garden, to the front pond, enjoy a pipe, then a chew of betel,
> Six or seven cups of tea while playing with some lines from Kieu.

> Who wouldn't want to be deaf like that?
> But do you think it's easy?
> Just ask him. 'What say?' he'll reply (p. 51).

We argue that such identifications serve at least two functions for Nguyen Khuyen. First, they allow him to remain true to his own ethical principles and ideas about authenticity, thereby protecting his individuality at the expense of his cooperation with the ruling French government. As with his protagonist Me Moc, madness protects by providing Nguyen Khuyen a reason to withdraw acceptable to both the Vietnamese people and the French government. This acceptance can be further inferred by the fact that he is never punished by the government (there is no attempt to imprison him or prevent the publication of his work, even when it is inflammatory [Tran, 1992]). Interestingly, madness is also an excuse that does not result in total peripheralization. His work is both published and respected, in spite of his "mad status," and Nguyen Khuyen ultimately becomes and remains one of the official poets taught in Vietnamese education (Nguyen, 1984).

Secondly, and in a related vein, his poetry and life continue to serve the Vietnamese community. By choosing his village over the French colonial government, and supporting this choice through assuming a "mad" status, Nguyen Khuyen's life and poetry become examples of how an individualizing madness can and should serve the collective. Just as Me Moc uses madness to maintain her faithfulness to her husband and his family, Nguyen Khuyen uses his to remain faithful to his country, and to protest the actions of the French government (Tran, 1992). Both his actions and poetry present madness as not just a viable option, but an extremely wise and respectable cultural position.

Choosing "madness" as a means of withdrawal and protest is a well-recognized strategy in Vietnamese society (Tran, 1992), and when considered alongside medical and popular perceptions, underscores the paradoxical position of mental illness. One the one hand, medical and popular perceptions demonstrate that mental *problems* are not well received by society. The behaviors of the madman or woman are at once at odds with social rules and have the potential to disturb the structure and harmony of the collective. On the other hand, the *people* manifesting those problems can also be highly respectable, particularly when their madness serves a higher good.

One of the most powerful examples of this apparent paradox is Bui Giang. When he died in 1998, Bui Giang was a well-known scholar, gifted teacher, one of the greatest Vietnamese poets of all time, and finally, a madman. His madness — and the behaviors that identified him as such — frequently distanced him from the general public, but were also central to the poetry and teachings embraced and revered by Vietnamese scholars and students. He was considered a madman, and yet also regarded as a saint. Craziness and holiness coexisted in the person of Bui Giang.

Born in 1926 in the small village of Thanh Chau in Quang Nam Province, Bui Giang finished high school in Hue, near Quang Nam. Intending to pursue but ul-

timately rejecting a university education and life, he became a truly independent scholar. Immersing himself in research, translation, and poetry, over the course of his life Bui Giang published more than fifty books and thousands of poems (Thuy Khue, 1998).

After a brief marriage ending with the death of his wife, war, poverty, social upheaval, and personal sorrow culminated in a psychological breakdown. It is said that Bui Giang's mental problems became serious in 1969, culminating in psychiatric hospitalization (Nguyen, 1998). After the Communists took over South Viet Nam in 1975, his condition worsened. Interestingly, as Bui Giang's madness deepened, so did his self-awareness and poetry (Nguyen, 1998). For some, this cast doubt over the origins and volition of his mental distress: perhaps he was not actually mad, but choosing it as a means of withdrawal and protest like Nguyen Khuyen; or perhaps he saw madness as a way to live a life outside convention (Huynh, 1998).

In the eyes of the general public, however, Bui Giang was simply a madman, for his life and public behavior were socially unacceptable. He wandered the Saigon streets, wore tattered clothes, picked up whatever he liked from markets, and grumbled to himself. Sometimes he acted as a policeman, waiving hands to direct traffic. Children made fun of him. Women at the markets were often angry with him. Due to his appearance, Bui Giang was sometimes kicked out of upscale shopping venues, including bookstores prominently displaying his work (Thuy Khue, 1998). Within this society, within this context, Bui Giang was nobody; he had no voice and existed on the edge of the world.

Among the Vietnamese intellectuals and students, however, Bui Giang was and remains a great poet, brilliant scholar, and respected professor. Many scholars and writers befriended him, providing him with shelter, food, and companionship (Mai Thao, 1998). His books were published and remain widely read. In 1998, *Hop Luu*, a well known Vietnamese literary journal published in the United States, publicly honored him with a special issue devoted to his life and work (volume 44). In 2003, Pham Thi Hoai and other Vietnamese writers at home and oversees began advocating for a literary award in his name (Pham, 2003). Regardless of his strange behaviors, in this society, in this context, Bui Giang was and is highly respected. Indeed, here his madness becomes an integral part of what makes him such a powerful poet (Nguyen, 1998). Articulating clearly and directly the internal tensions that come with madness, Bui Giang writes in manner that is profound, humane, and full of human joy and suffering.

Thus, as a visible madman who is also a revered scholar, poet, and teacher, Bui Giang retains an eminent position in society. He belongs to Viet Nam and Viet Nam needs him, for in and through his madness Bui Giang expresses essential Vietnamese realities and dilemmas. Moreover, for some Bui Giang's madness is regarded as a necessary choice, resulting in a freedom hardly possible for the normal person (Huynh, 1998; Thuy Khue, 1999). Bui Giang is free from political ideology, social prejudices, physical confinement, and intellectual repression precisely because he is mad. Indeed, in a country still marked by significant repression and censorship, Bui Giang is able to express himself in a relatively unfettered manner (Nguyen, 1998).

Thus, although rebuked and ridiculed by one part of Vietnamese society, he remains a vital part of Vietnamese culture because he has the freedom and ability to express his culture's values, struggles, and hopes.

Conclusion

When considered within the context of collectivity, the perceptions and functions of madness become substantially more complicated. This is particularly true in Viet Nam, where madness in the context of the collective emerges as both threat and protector, object of ridicule and position of veneration. We believe that one can appreciate this complexity on a least three levels.

On the first, Vietnamese perceptions serve as interesting foils to those of the West. In particular, the madness existing in Viet Nam's literary figures and literature has interesting implications for the West's own longstanding debate regarding the relationship between creativity and psychopathology. Indeed, Bui Giang's life and work might be illuminating for Western scholars struggling to identify how it is possible for madness (as threat to individuality) to coexist with creativity (a tangible manifestation of individuality).

On a second and more fundamental level, the complex and seemingly paradoxical nature of Vietnamese beliefs remind us of how multiple layers of perception exist within a single culture. Madness as other and protector, as threat and promise — the stories, lives, and work of *Me Moc*, Nguyen Khuyen and Bui Giang illustrate the multiple meanings and functions madness has and confers on its voluntary and involuntary bearers.

Finally, these stories alert us to the many places madness can exist in Vietnamese culture specifically and all cultures in general. The individual, family, village, government — all stand as possible locations of madness, and as such bearers of meaning and responsibility. The social and cultural structures of Viet Nam recognize this: traditional medicine, popular perception, and literature all organize beliefs about madness around the centrality of the collective (be it the physical and metaphysical environments of the patient, the present and past family unit, or an entity dangerous to Vietnamese culture). Because of this, the mad individual becomes part and parcel of a larger whole. That this whole has the power to both hurt and honor is as essential as the mad individual's power to endanger and enlighten. And although these mutually interactive relationships are particularly visible in Viet Nam, we argue that they are present the world over, and that within them can be found madness' true capacity to unify even as it divides.

NOTES

[1] It is important to acknowledge that although the term "madness" implies a construction of psychological distress extending beyond Western medicine, it reflects a Western perspective: as a noun it conveys an object-like nature; and as a singular noun, implies a more individual

focus. We recognize these limitations, and although we use the term, do not endorse the assumption that this objective and singular status is the best way to characterize Asian concepts of severe psychological distress.

[2] Triandis and colleagues (2001) note that neither collectivity nor individuality completely defines any culture. For example, in collectivist countries 60% of the population are considered allocentric (i. e., having personality traits emphasizing interdependence, sociability, and family integrity), while individualistic countries are 60% idiocentric (i. e., self-reliant, competitive, and valuing uniqueness and emotional distance).

[3] It should be noted that, as with individualistic cultures, there are also many kinds of collectivistic cultures. Especially important is the distinction between vertical and horizontal collectivist and individualism. See Triandis and Suh (2002) for a brief discussion of these distinctions, and Triandis and Gefland (1998), and Altemeyer (1996) for more extended analyses. Additionally, see Gabriel and Gardner (1999), for a discussion of differences in collectivism according to gender.

[4] For example, Ng (1997) reviews the presence and experience of stigma in Chinese, Japanese, Southeast Asian, Indian, and Islamic cultures. Fabrega (1991b) discusses stigma from a historical perspective in ancient China, India, and medieval Islam.

[5] Researchers endorsing Western concepts of madness (implicitly or explicitly) include those evaluating attitudes towards mental illness in Japan (Hasui et al., 2000; Sugiura et al., 2001; Sugiura, 2000), China (Chung, Chen, & Liu, 2001; Yang, 1989; Chan et al., 1988), and Viet Nam (Wallace, 1997).

[6] Phan and Silove (1997) note that there are no Vietnamese words for psychiatry, schizophrenia, and depression (p. 87). They also point out that many popular Vietnamese terms for affective expression and states have no English equivalents (see pp. 87–88 for examples and discussion).

[7] In Vietnamese, "Me" means mother, and "Moc" indicates dark skin as a consequence of makeup.

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СООБЩА И ПОРОЗНЬ, СРАВНИВАЯ И ОТВЕРГАЯ: ВЬЕТНАМСКИЕ ПРЕДСТАВЛЕНИЯ, ЗАПАДНАЯ МЕДИЦИНА И ИНОЙ ВЗГЛЯД НА БЕЗУМИЕ

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Основываясь на предположении, что организация западного и восточного обществ базируются на индивидуальности и коллективности соответственно (Nisbett, 2003), и принимая во внимание, что эти организующие концепции также отражаются в отношении общества к болезни и отклонению (Gilman, 1988), мы посвятили данную работу исследованию восточного и западного представлений о безумии. Кроме того, проведя анализ примеров представлений о безумии на материале медицинских, народных и письменных источников в современном Вьетнаме, мы проследили, как изменяется понятие безумия в контексте коллективности, и как отношения между безумием и индивидуальностью становятся более сложными. В своей работе мы обращаем внимание на то, что вьетнамские представления с их опорой на коллективную культуру требуют корректировки индивидуалистских психиатрических понятий безумия с учетом локального и смыслового факторов.

THE PARADOX OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

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Introduction

A human being is part of the whole called by us "universe," a part limited to time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts, and feelings as something separated from the rest — a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. This delusion is a kind of prison for us, restricting us to our personal desires and to affections for a few persons nearest to us. Our task must be to free ourselves from this prison by widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living creatures and the whole nature in its beauty.

Albert Einstein

A cursory look at the history of religions shows that prophets, mystics and sages perennially received divine communiqu or enlightenment while in a deep meditative state. The new state of consciousness resulted from self-transcendence — transcendence beyond conditioned thoughts of prevailing dogmas, superstitions and ideologies. This *revolution* of consciousness occurred as a discontinuity in time. The founders — prophets, mystics and sages — succeeded in stepping beyond space-time field and experience love and compassion for humanity. They were intrinsically aroused to guide others on a virtuous path with the hope that all humans may ultimately experience a higher state of consciousness. Thus new religious ideologies were born.

Most converts follow the prescriptions of new religious teachings and rituals rigidly and mechanically with the hope of rewards in this life and the life hereafter. But most of them fail to attain self-transcendence to a higher state of consciousness. The teachings become *ideals* to be pursued, leaving the adherents in a perennial state of *becoming* without ever rising to higher state of *being*. When we aspire to actualize ideas, they become our *ideals*. When those ideals give meaning to our lives, they become *ideologies*.

The founders communicated their teachings in parables, allegories, metaphors and paradoxes because of the inadequacy of language as a tool for communicating spiritual messages, and because of the varying capacity of human comprehension. It has been argued that ambiguity and even self-contradictions, embodied in the poetic and paradoxical messages of the founders, reflect the divine intent to stimulate diverse interpretations, and promote the establishment of various tribes. Indeed, diverse interpretations reflect a creative and a progressive enrichment of human intellect — the evolution of our temporal consciousness.

Over the last five thousand years of recorded history, human societies have been exposed to exuberant proliferation of religious ideologies — from Zarathustra to Mohamed, and subsequent mystics like Rumi, Hafiz, Francis of Assisi, Thomas Aquinas and so on. They have all taught us to have love and compassion. Many of us subscribe to these teachings; and yet we continue to kill one another. What is it about the human condition that it cannot reject violence and tyranny and, indeed, be allured by them?

In the last several decades, a striking spate of literature on the subject of human aggression, hostility, and violence has appeared in the field of science, anthropology and psychology. Ardrey (1966) stresses on how the fundamental instinct of territoriality in man overrides all other human drives. Natural scientist, Lorenz (1970) postulated the presence of "killer instinct" in mankind matching that of only the most savage of animals. In 1970, Moore wrote, "Among living beings, humans are evidently quite extraordinary for the amount of cruel violence they inflict upon members of their own species. The most obvious form of human violence is war.... Of all known human societies only a handful of those without a written language have had no experience of the excitement and ravages of war" (p. 14).

Chris Hedges (2002), a foreign correspondent with *New York Times*, says, "Civil war, brutality, ideological intolerance, conspiracy, and murderous expression are part of the human condition — indeed almost the daily fare for many but a privileged minority" (p.13). Yet, he proclaims, war is the most powerful narcotic invented by man. People get "intoxicated and even addicted to war's heady brew." Ideologically, most of us believe that war is hell, but for many people who experience it, war is an emotionally intense and even an exhilarating experience. General George S. Patton is reported to have said, "Compared to war all other forms of human endeavor shrink to insignificance. God, I do love it so." Small wonder many war veterans support war. For some, it is an enticing elixir. Philip Gourevitch (1998, p. 19), staff writer at the *New Yorker*, gives a lucid experience of his encounter with the dead in the aftermath of the atrocities in Rwanda:

> The dead at Nyarubuye were, I am afraid, beautiful. There was no getting around it. The skeleton is a beautiful thing. The randomness of the fallen forms, the strange tranquility of their rude exposure, the skull here, the arm bent in some uninterpretable gesture there — these things were beautiful, and their beauty only added to the affront of the place. I couldn't settle on any meaningful response: revulsion, alarm, sorrow, grief, shame, incomprehension, sure, but nothing truly meaningful. I just looked, and I took photographs, because I wondered whether I could really see what I was seeing while I saw it, and I wanted also an excuse to look a bit more closely.

Drawing on the literature of combat, Hedges shows how human beings are conditioned to embrace what he calls the *myth of war* — the idea that combat is noble,

selfless, and glorious. Yet, this myth evaporates when faced with the sensory reality of war at its frontline. Lawrence Leshan (1992) draws a poignant distinction between the mythic reality and the sensory reality of wartime. In sensory reality, "we see events for what they are... organized murder. Those thrust into combat may not be able to maintain the mythic perception of war for long" (p. 21). At a lofty ideological level, we acknowledge that war is about destruction of humanity, and yet cherish ideologies that support wars. We seem to have the capacity to sustain multiple ideologies, many in conflict with one another. They give us selection from which we can rationalize our psyche and subsequent actions. This paper hopes to unravel the paradox of ideologies that have the capacity to enrich us intellectually, and at the same time diminish us morally and spiritually. How can we bring about a holarchic shift from the evolution of physical consciousness to the revolution of psychological consciousness?

In the evolution of physical consciousness human knowledge expands, enriching the human intellect. The synectics of diverse and often disparate ideas resulting from conversations trigger new ideas and ideals (Gordon, 1961). As this creative process mounts, the participants become increasingly engrossed in the intricacies of the creative process and the unfolding of novel ideas. The *subject* is absorbed in the *object* — the *observer,* in the *observed*. Discussions turn into dialogues, and communications into a communion. There is a distortion of physical time — not uncommon in creative process that Csikszentmihalyi (1996) calls *flow*. He observes:

> In flow, we are too involved in what we are doing to care about protecting the ego [*self*].... We might even feel that we have stepped out of the boundaries of the ego and have become part, at least temporarily, of a larger entity.... The musician feels at one with the harmony of the cosmos. The athlete moves at one with the team... Fundamentally, the self expands through acts of self forgetfulness." (p. 112).

The creative activity becomes *autotelic:* the activity is enjoyed for its own sake and not for some desired outcome or an extrinsic reward. The activity becomes an end in itself. Chronological time shifts into the psychological space between *chronos* and *kairos*. It provides an enabling environment for individual and collective transformation. Discussions with specific agenda are punctuated with spells of transformative dialogue. This paper outlines the process of such *dynamic conversation* in which there is a cyclic iteration between a skilled discussion and a dialogue. The former aims to decouple all the ideologies and enhance our knowledge — the *evolution* of our physical consciousness. The dialogue, on the other hand, is convened for its own sake. It is in and of itself transformative — an enabling environment for the *revolution* of psychological consciousness. In skilled discussions, all ideological advocacies are disentangled, heard, and the associated misperceptions cleared; whereas in a dialogue the misperceptions are harnessed to build new meanings that

can transform our mental models, and define new leadership that is free from the bondage of hegemony and associated psychopathology that causes immeasurable human suffering.

Interpretive Spectrum

Diverse interpretations of the teachings range from the exoteric to the esoteric, from the literal to the mythic. The exoteric adherents have a proclivity for evaluating reality in dualistic terms of right or wrong, true or false, and good or evil. Some of them believe that since they are the custodians of literal and moral interpretations of the sacred message, they are the only ones holding the *truth* — a position that erodes the very spirit of social ethics advocated by most religions. Social ethics requires an authentic contraction of the *self* through humility, and expansion of the self through compassion — a praxis that creates an environment for self-transcendence. Those who draw esoteric interpretations generally seem to have a predisposition for honoring religious pluralism. Within any single religion, its adherents draw diverse interpretations, ranging from literal and concrete interpretations to mythological ones as illustrated in figure 1.

Interpretations

Exoteric	*Esoteric*
Literal/Concrete	Mythic
Fundamentalist	Mystical
Either-Or (dualistic)	Both-And
Multiplicity (fragments)	Unity (whole)
Rigid (No options)	Flexible (Many options)

Figure 1: Interpretive Spectrum of Religious Ideologies

As we move from the exoteric to the esoteric end, we see greater acceptance of religious pluralism. An esoteric interpreter of the teachings is more likely to accept a wider range of interpretations than an exoteric interpreter. A mystic is generally more flexible than an extreme fundamentalist. There is greater flexibility of interpretations as we move from the exoteric to the esoteric end of the interpretive spectrum, as illustrated in figure 2.

Depth of conviction of ones interpretation can vary. But it is independent of ones location on the interpretive spectrum, because it rises from the depth of conditioning of the dogmas. A fundamentalist may have as strong a conviction of his exoteric interpretation as a mystic would of his esoteric interpretation. But there is a poignant difference between a person who intellectually accepts the mystical and mytho-

logical interpretations, and a mystic who has experienced self-transcendence. The former is bound by ideological conditioning; the latter is not. Unfortunately, when enlightened mystics try to help humanity and guide them on a virtuous path, they inadvertently create new ideals and ideologies that can be used as alibi for base actions.



Figure 2: Flexibility of Interpretations along the Interpretive Spectrum

The ideologies can be utilized to camouflage the base psyche of *domination and submission* that drive most actions**.** Some believe that a mystical worldview can evolve along a spiral trajectory starting with some tribal values to a systemic view of the whole. Spiral dynamics delineates such a progression. I believe that the base tribal values represented in the lower section of the spiral drives all actions at every level of the spiral, albeit disguised under some ideological masks.

Conflicting Ideologies in a Religious Domain

When all diverse religions are juxtaposed on a single plane, with each religion supporting its own range of interpretations, we begin to get a picture of the enormity and the complexity of religious pluralism. If we were to represent various religions by the radii (corresponding to the exoteric-esoteric axes) of a circle, the center would represent the convergence of all mystical traditions, and the perimeter would reflect the divergence between diverse interpretations at the exoteric end. We observe greater ideological conflicts between extreme fundamentalists than between the mystics. Since diverse interpretations and ideologies often serve to veil the psyche of *domination and submission* of ones location along each radius, this binary psyche is central to most decisions and actions, including often those who subscribe to mystical interpretations. This binary psyche can be represented by yin and yang circle.

Figure 3 illustrates diverse conflicting ideologies (I_i) converging to a central zone. Each radius represents the interpretive spectrum of a single faith — Judaism, Islam,

etc., with varying dissonance (δ) between religions. The center represents the mystical interpretation of all faiths. The central core of the circle, shown as the yin-yang circle, is the psyche driving actions camouflaged by ideologies.



Figure 3: Circle of Diverse Religious Ideologies

Conflicting Domains

The intersections of spectra representing various ideological domains — religious, political, cultural, economic, etc. — create a complex sphere of potential masks that can be deployed in any conflict. For example, one party may use a religious alibi and a conflicting party a political alibi to veil their individual psychic drive. Figure 4 shows spherical intersection of religious and political domains. Each radius represents a spectrum of diverse interpretations in each ideology with a central yin-yang sphere of the psyche driving all actions. The awareness of this complex sphere highlights the richness of human intellect in creating diverse interpretations and ideologies, but offers a repertoire of ideologies, which can be exploited to satisfy the base psyche.

Evolution & Revolution of Consciousness

Diverse interpretations of the newly acquired ideology create religious pluralism, which brings about proliferation of new perspectives and ideals that serve to enhance human knowledge. They signify the *evolution of our physical consciousness*, which is essential for our material and intellectual wellbeing. Incremental improvements and new discoveries expand our conditioned boundaries. Paradoxically, however, they also create opposing ideals and values that serve to rationalize schism within humanity. By and large, the masses are unable to transcend their self-centered psyche because they apply sequential steps (Greek *chronos*) to attain the experience of eternity (Greek *kairos*). They remain in a state of *becoming* without ever attaining the altered state of *being*. Self-transcendence can only be attained as a sudden

discontinuity or a revolution of psychological consciousness — what Krishnamurti called the *revolution of the psyche*.

Our ancestors engaged in warfare very much like we do today. The base psyche of *domination & submission* has not changed over thousands of years. *Self-centeredness* is at the root of *domination* to satisfy ones greed, envy, anger, power, etc. or *submission* to authority to satisfy ones need for security, safety and stability. Domination and submission are two constituents (*yin & yang*) of the base psyche embodied in the lowest *chakras* in Hinduism (*kundalini*), and in the lower soul in Islam (*nafs*). Joseph Campbell describes violence and sex as primary biological urges of animals. But, he argues the spiritual experience that can come out of these urges is often totally missed. Self-transcendence means transcending ones self-centeredness. It steps beyond the boundaries of space and time and our conditioned thoughts, enabling us to harmonize with creation.



Figure 4: Sphere of Diverse Ideological Domains

Domination versus Submission

The despots favor the exoteric and rigid interpretation of ideologies as it enables them to *command and control* the masses. In most societies, *domination and submission* operate at the exoteric end of the interpretive spectrum. Rulers and Administrators shape the societal values, offering an illusion of security, safety, stability, and better conditions in the life hereafter. Both *domination and submission* spring from self-centeredness, with perennial *fear* of loss of security and/or power that comes from affiliation to ideologies that define our self-identity. The base psyche of domination and submission is characterized by greed, insecurity, isolation, anger, and humiliation — the underpinnings of all violent conflicts. At the root of all these psychic expressions lies fear. It is ironical that the aim of most religious practice is to diminish the *self*; yet humans use religion as an ideological mask to justify ac-

tions that amplify the self. The powerful dominate because they have *fear* of being less powerful; and the powerless submit to the powerful because of their *fear* of the insecure consequences.

In ancient times, the warring tribes protected their individual communities and territories by borders defined by geographical landscapes and associated myths. Those myths were often represented symbolically with masks that struck fear, awe and superstitions in their enemies. In battles, the tribes would use stones, spears, arrows and poisonous darts as weapons. When a new enemy sprung unexpectedly, the tribes would form alliances for security and power, creating complex shuffling of friends and foes to suit new emerging scenarios.

Given all our technological advances and economic affluence today, we consider our ancestors as primitive. But despite our "civilization," our base psyche of domination and submission has remained unchanged. Today the dividing walls and the fences define our national borders, historically crafted for economic, social and political expediencies to satisfy the base psyche of colonizers and totalitarian rulers. We no longer wear our ancestors' primitive masks painted with awesome images and symbols. Instead, our soldiers wear colorful uniforms, marching like wooden puppets to receive salutes from autocrats, demagogues, rulers or monarchs. We wear masks of lofty ideals and myths that groom our youth to die as heroes, patriots and martyrs. As threats to national boundaries and security increase, countries form coalitions on the basis of congruent, convenient or contrived ideologies the same way as the neighboring tribes used to form alliances on some shared mythologies.

We have replaced the stones of our ancestors with bombs, spears and arrows with missiles, and poisonous darts with biological and chemical weapons. We can kill our opponents with formidable accuracy. Our technological sophistication has advanced by at least a thousand-fold, but our human psyche of tribal hostility has not changed one iota over the last five thousand years of recorded history. Krishnamurti (1994) called it the *mania of mankind*. It is the legacy that we have difficulty in rejecting. Despite our remarkable ingenuity and all our lofty ideologies, we have a habitual and almost instinctual affinity to tribal aggression and hostility. Plato said, "Only the dead have seen the end of war." As our ingenuity in the creation of our material growth has multiplied, our cunning to serve our base psyche has increased commensurately. The human race is remarkably ingenious at being disingenuous.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the psyche of domination in the West considered itself to be the center of the universe. And when Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo revealed the facts about our heliocentricity, they faced serious challenges from the church. In his introduction, Wilber (1998) says, "the relation of science and religion in the modern world — that is, in the last three or four centuries — has changed very little since their introduction to each other in the trial of Galileo, where the scientist agreed to shut his mouth and the church agreed not to burn him. Many wonderful exceptions aside, the plain historical fact has been that orthodox science and orthodox religion deeply distrust and often despise each other." This is an exam-

ple of ideological differences agreeing upon conciliation; but has not eliminated the inherent conflict sustained by the psyche of fear, uncertainty, power and insecurity over the last four hundred years.

Power of the Hegemony

> *For a millennium, war has been the dominant activity of European states for a good reason. The central tragic fact is simple: coercion works. Those who apply substantial force to their fellows get compliance, and from that compliance drew the multiple advantages of money, goods, deference, and access to pleasures, denied to the less powerful people.*
>
> Charles Tilly

As domination increases, the resistance of the masses weakens. In time, they submit to authority and come to accept its values as norm. These values define good versus evil, heroism versus cowardice, loyalty versus betrayal, success versus failure, and so on. Such is the *hegemony* of the powerful. There is a mutual causation between domination and submission. In hegemony, collusion is secured without force or violence. Such a steady state can continue until the atrocities of the rulers become so unbearable that they force a reelection or a revolution, replacing the existing ideology with a new one. The ideological differences offer an overt alibi to the powerful to justify contrivance or violence. Ironically, most people recognize this duplicity in which the covert psychic forces drive the actions, but is accepted as part of diplomacy, compromise, astuteness, politics, and other acceptable standards contrived by the hegemony of the powerful. Dualism of *right and wrong* or *good and evil* selectively drawn from scriptures, constitution, or other ideological artifacts provides fuel for domination and offer a mythic delusion of security to the masses.

Leaders reinforce "fear" through *illusion* of imminent disasters, apocalypse, etc. They solicit support of the masses for their dire actions by creating *mythic delusion* of nobility, patriotism, and martyrdom. If the socio-pathology cannot be transformed, what is the future of humanity under existing rulers? The colluders embrace the ruling values of opulence, domination, submission, etc., and consider them as normal and natural order of things. The hegemony of rulers has to be replaced with the hegemony of the masses through a dynamic conversation, in which "leadership" and associated values can be redefined by the masses.

When our soldiers die for their country, they become patriots, and we bury them with great honor. When they die in crusade or jihad, they become martyrs. Sacrificing the self for a higher cause (God, paradise, or homeland) has been a compelling ideology, indoctrinated by the hegemony of the rulers. Kamikaze fighters in Japan used airplanes as weapons to attack their enemies. They did it for their country, their honor, their duty and their obligation to the family. And they were told that they

would gather at the Shinto shrines after their resurrection from their final sacrifice. More recently the Iranians, the Palestinians, Al-Qa'ida, the Kurds, the Tamil Tigers, and Buddhists have engaged in acts of self-sacrifice. We find it politically expedient to dismiss such mythology as pathology.

Human history over the last five hundred years shows how a handful of nations — Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Holland, Portugal, Russia — colonized almost every corner of our globe unashamedly under a proclaimed mission of civilizing the world, often under the camouflage of religious, political or economic ideology. Indeed today's geopolitical landscape of the entire globe was drawn from this unabashed psyche of domination and greed to the point that it has become the accepted hallmark of civilized conquest. The coexistence of merciless domination and religiosity is recorded in history in terms of the amazing triumphs of great Empires, or in neutral, matter-of-fact narrative. Viewing the world today, we espouse and preach lofty ideals of world order, peace and democracy at a cerebral level; but the underlying psyche has not quit working in self-interest.

Indeed we have such a sophisticated level of cunning that we can juggle around with ideologies to the extent that contradictory ideologies can be made to coexist as complimentary. The Spanish Conquistadors annihilated civilizations in South America some five hundred years ago under the banner of Christian values. In 1860s, the Confederates in the US civil war supported the coexistence of slavery with liberty. Thomas Jefferson, who chartered the irrefutable right of every person to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, had scores of slaves himself. Apartheid was practiced on the basis of claimed endorsement of the Christian scriptures. The dispossession and cleansing of the Palestinians from their homeland some 50 years ago were carried on the basis of Abrahamic promise in the Old Testament. Terrorism is waged against the West on the grounds of *jihad*, the holy war. Such totalitarianism becomes a tool for political contrivance. Bin Laden declared a *fattwa* (a religious decree) that all who supported the USA were infidels; and the USA declared them as evildoers. The USA declared another decree stating that all countries of the world were either with them or with the Taliban. Taliban described their mission as *jihad;* the USA described their war on terrorism as the crusades. Each party used different language to convey the same sentiment, embodied in conflicting ideologies spawned from the old mythology and a common psyche of fear, insecurity, domination, and so forth.

Governments will go through great length to protect and validate the ideologies they support. The Nazi Germany is a case in point. Himmler expended a great deal of his energy and time to try to prove Germany's purity of race and greatness to intellectually justify a trail of tyranny. He said: "The course of greatness is that you need to step on dead bodies." Science and technology were mobilized to support the ideology of superior race. Skeletons collected from Auschwitz were used in research for the progress of science. The scientists of highest caliber and scholarship colluded in the research, and preserved the skulls as exhibition pieces to please their powerful masters. Persistent archeological search was conducted for locations where the

Holy Grail of the Aryan Knighthood could be unearthed. Historians faked history to please their tyrannical masters. The claim of superiority still prevails today as nations claim to be righteous, civilized or chosen. Such is the power of the hegemony.

Zoroastrian, Greek, Manichean, and Calvinist dualism, in its very simple form, posits that humanity can be divided into the good and the evil. Sadly this dogma is followed by a totalitarian logic that decrees that if you are not one you must inevitably be the other. It is one of the earliest myths that have endured, giving us a tool for political contrivance and hegemony. Through this mythology, we have come to view reality in terms of good or evil, right or wrong, guilty or innocent, just or unjust. Arendt (1979) suggests that the idea of pluralism has become so complex for the masses that they are too happy to settle for dualism. The totalitarian logic can be perilous and pernicious in that it can give one party an ethical license to ostracize or even annihilate its enemy, if the enemy can somehow be demonized. In 1740, David Hume in his *A Treatise on Human Nature* writes: "When our own nation is at war with any other, we detest them under the character of cruel, perfidious, unjust and violent: But always esteem ourselves and allies equitable, moderate and merciful."

The Paradox of Conversation

The question is: How can we exploit the richness of religious pluralism, and at the same time transcend the base psyche of domination and submission? — from chronos to kairos, from convenience to conviction, from the evolution of physical consciousness to the revolution of psychological consciousness. Religious, political, economic and social ideologies provide an intellectual and virtuous alibi for actualizing the base psyche. When confronted with such conflicts, we get firmly anchored in discussions around the merits and demerits of ideological differences, but fail to address the base psyche that drives violent actions. What is contrived as a religious conflict often goes to mask a political or an economic agenda driven by the base psyche. Therefore, when faced with any human conflict, it is imperative that we first uncouple the multiple ideologies that get drawn into the discussions, and then engage in a dialogue that could hopefully transform us to a higher state of consciousness.

The challenge lies in our ability to transcend our base psyche that has historically not evolved with time, despite the exuberance of virtuous ideologies. How can we facilitate the *revolution* of our psyche? The problem is that we *plan and practice* our espoused virtues with a goal of one day *becoming* humble, compassionate, tolerant, forgiving and so on. As pointed out earlier, most of us reside perennially in a state of "becoming" without ever "being" virtuous. But beneath the facade of virtuosity, there is a base psyche that continues to drive most actions. The encouraging fact, however, is that the human psyche is shared by all humanity, and therefore can serve as a common platform for a dialogue, if it could be acknowledged and accessed. But the challenge, Krishnamurti tells us, is that though ideologies change and evolve with time, the psyche does not. For a transformation of the psyche to oc-

cur, we need to enter into another state of consciousness that lies beyond our reality in space and time. To transcend this psyche, we need to engage in a collaborative process that ushers us into a transformative paradigm, in which the transformation is emergent and unfolding.

We need to engage in a dynamic conversation that carries the interplay of skilled discussion (*communication*) to enhance our knowledge (the evolutionary process) to serve humanity as a whole, and intermittent engagement in a dialogue (*communion*) that condenses time such that the dialogic process itself is transformative every moment (revolutionary process). A skilled discussion ensures that the meaning of the speaker is protected and accurately captured by the listener through an *inquiry* of assumptions and inferences associated with every observation or *advocacy*. The process is intended to minimize or eliminate any misperception of a view advocated. Thus there is a continual interplay of *inquiry* and *advocacy* to protect and preserve the intended meaning, as represented by what is known as a *ladder of inference* (Senge, 1990). The process aims to reduce incidence of false interpretations, assumptions and generalizations, on a premise that misperception of meaning creates irresolvable conflicts. However, an accurate understanding of the intended meaning does not necessarily preclude adversarial posture leading to a win-lose scenario. On the other hand, a congenial and supportive environment can bring about reconstruction of individual assumptions and mental models.

Dialogue is more organic. It is a transformative process as captured in the words of David Bohm (1996, p. 46): "I am suggesting that there is the possibility of a transformation of the nature of consciousness both individually and collectively, and that whether this can be solved culturally and socially depends on dialogue." Bohm and Krishnamurti have contributed a great deal towards explaining the anatomy of a dialogue. The following key elements briefly encapsulate their model:

- Unbridled conversation: Specificity of agenda inhibits creative intelligence. It makes the conversation superficial and inauthentic.
- Nature of collective thought and awareness: Dialogue explores the process of thought behind assumptions. It requires attention to the genesis, structure & process of thought. Shared and Emerging meaning: Misperceptions are harnessed to co-create new ideas that transcend and evolve the intended meaning of the speakers.
- Pervasiveness of fragmentation: The *fragmentation* of our world stems from the *incoherence* of our thought processes. Dialogue sheds new light on our *fragmented world*.
- Paradox of the *observer* and the *observed*: When we *re-present* our external perceptions, we assume that they project reality. In dialogue, time dimension changes. The observer is the observed.
- The micro-cultural context: The participants should represent diverse cultures for maximum synergy.

An Enabling Environment for a Dialogue

1. Accessing the Human Psyche
   a. Diverts attention from the conflicting ideologies.
   b. Metaphors, paradoxes and stories help to unveil the psyche without guilt or shame
2. Stepping Outside Consciousness
   a. Non-verbal observation of thought
   b. Storytelling
   c. Transcending from Local to Global
3. Facilitating Dynamic Conversation
   a. Shuttles across the interface
   b. Iterative movements

Conclusion

Close examination of our recent history shows that human societies can be held stable only by the rule of law. The rule of humanity or conscience is only a façade for intellectual leisure and vanity. And when the rule of law breaks down in riots or in wars, the facade is rapidly stripped. In wars, we have seen massacres and genocide of large populations, often with the collusion of the masses. We have seen such rampant atrocities in Europe, Bosnia, Rwanda, Congo, Somalia, Japan, Russia, and so on. And yet, there are handfuls of people in all such societies who are selfless, and are willing to risk their lives to save humanity. These people offer us a ray of hope that humanity has a capacity to be human.

This paper offers a forum for a constructive conversation to enhance our knowledge; at the same time lift us to a higher state of consciousness. Looking at all the turmoil in the world today, it is clear that if we do not wise up soon, we are likely to face a dreadful catastrophe or an apocalypse, which ironically may lift us from our neurotic fixation on the "self," and bring about the transformation of our psyche. We have enough nuclear, biological and chemical weapons to blow us all up. Given the turbulent state of our planet, it is clear that some transformative process is needed to save humanity. If it is not done expeditiously, we may bring about the extinction of the human race. The following words of Ted Perry inspired by Chief Seattle presents an apt conclusion of this paper:

> Whatever befalls the earth,
> befalls the sons and daughters of the earth.
> Man did not weave the web of life;
> he is merely a strand in it.
> Whatever he does to the web,
> he does to himself.
> Capra (1996)

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ПАРАДОКС РЕЛИГИОЗНОГО ПЛЮРАЛИЗМА

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Новые религии появляются тогда, когда пророков и мистиков переполняет желание вести за собой человечество. Поскольку человеческий язык беден, а возможности понимания ограничены, основатели используют притчи и парадоксы, которые их последователи интерпретируют. Некоторые понимают учения буквально и воспринимают реальность сквозь призму дуализма «истина/ложь», другие сохраняют холистический взгляд и уважают религиозный плюрализм. Подобную дихотомию можно наблюдать во всех идеологиях. В сложном сплетении разнообразных интерпретаций скрывается удивительный парадокс:

идеологический плюрализм одновременно и отражает богатство человеческого интеллекта и оправдывает насилие, вызываемое базовыми инстинктами. «Господство» и «Подчинение» есть два основных состояния человеческой души, на которых основывается власть, а массы воспринимают агрессию как законный признак успеха и цивилизации. В основе этого инстинкта лежит древний страх уменьшить или задеть свою «самость», за пределы которой нас учат выходить религия и общество. При обсуждении динамики религиозного плюрализма, необходимо (а) исследовать богатство различных религиозных традиций, (б) исследовать пересечения идеологий и существующие в них парадоксы и (в) определить инстинкты, которые позволяют оправдывать насилие идеологическими разногласиями. В статье представлен процесс «динамичной беседы», в которой постоянный переход от «профессиональной дискуссии» к «диалогу» вызывает «эволюцию» физического и «революцию» психологического сознания, что позволит сломать господствующие стереотипы, переосмыслить понятие «лидерства» и преобразовать общество.

RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND GLOBAL THEOLOGY: FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGICAL APPROACHES

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Introduction

The path of religious pluralism starts with the fact that our world contains a number of religious faiths having different ideas of the nature of divinity as the main and fundamental principle of religions and therefore different and various dogmas, rites and rituals.

Despite the claim that the idea of religious pluralism is a product of modern philosophies, specifically modern epistemological principles, I have attempted to demonstrate that what I have intentionally called 'Pluralism in Religion,' as a part of necessary and substantial distinction that has to be drawn between the mentioned hypothesis and classic theory of religious pluralism, is strongly rooted in the ultimate truth of 'Religion,' which has one of its best and most perfect interpretations in Islamic Epistemology.[1]

It is perhaps worth noting that this view not only does not deny the strong and unavoidable exclusivist tendency of all religions, but also tries to justify and clarify the necessity of such a tendency in religions toward exclusivism.[2] Obviously in this epistemological structure, the term exclusivism has an implication, completely distinct from the common meaning of the term, which stands contrary to the term pluralism.

Therefore, from the author's standpoint, the true claim of exclusivism in religions is considered as a complementary element of religious pluralism, which refers to the various manifestations and crystallization of ultimate truth of Religion.

In this paper, I begin with an introduction of the classic version of religious pluralism elaborated by John Hick, as one of the most prominent developers and defenders of religious pluralism in the twentieth century. According to Hick, the theory of pluralism should be built on philosophical and epistemological grounds, rather than on religious and theological foundations, such as the distinction between noumena and phenomena, or Wittgenstein's distinction between seeing and seeing-as.[3] Also in this paper, for proper and more rational understanding of the adopted theory, some critical points and objections to Hick's theory are presented in brief.

Last, but not the least, is the point that the hypothesis brought up by the Author is claimed to provide the fundamental bases for Global Theology as the essential outcome of the ultimate uniqueness of Religion which manifests and reveals itself in various and diverse forms.

Religious Pluralism, John Hick and the Problem of Ineffability

Hick begins his supra-Christian perception of God with this fact that the history of religions sets before us innumerable gods, with different names and various characteristics. In his remarkable book, *God Has Many Names,* Hick mentions some of these names in both non-theistic and theistic religions that might probably form a list as bulky "as the telephone directory of a large city."[4] Hick believes that all these names, each with its own characteristics, can be divided into two major categories, personal and non-personal Gods, both humanly experienced and conceived. Therefore, an important distinction is to distinguish between the Real *an sich* and the Real as variously experienced and thought by different human communities.[5]

Hick emphasizes that this distinction can also be seen within religions. Hindu thought distinguishes between Nirvana Brahman, Brahman without attributes, exceeding the grasp of human language; and Saguaro Brahman, Brahman with attributes, known within human religious experience. Also, in Islam, al Haq, the Real, the absolute divine reality beyond human description, differs from Allah who is to be understood within 99 Attributes in Koran alongside others in sacred scripture. The same distinction is easily found in other religions.[6]

Hick's emphasis on the expression "the Real" designates the transcendent reality authentically experienced in terms of different sets of human concepts, as the different gods and impersonal absolutes belonging to major religious traditions. In developing his theory, Hick relies heavily on the Kantian distinction between the real as it is in itself and the real as it is experienced and conceived by human being.[7]

In light of these remarks, and for achieving the conclusion of religious diversity which is based on negation all properties of the Real in itself and attributing different and even contrary predicates to the conceived real, Hick states that the Real lacks any kind of property, and as a result cannot be perceived, since whatever is conceived is not the Real, but the Real as it is understood humanly by religious experience.

For Hick, the idea of ineffability or transcategoriality, which implies that none of the concrete descriptions that are applicable within the realm of human experience can apply to the unexpriencable realm, goes half way toward making the theory of religious pluralism authentic and veridical. The other half consists in recognition of the different human conceptualizations within religious experience.[8]

Although, I am not opposed to the common view among scholars that for Hick the ideas of ineffability and religious experience are fundamental, I believe that these principles have been employed to rationalize Hick's exegesis of pluralism. For me, it seems dubious to see Hick as a prominent natural philosopher, converted to a positivist philosopher — even if one is to divide Hick to early Hick and later Hick — unless there is an assumption that can be justified, if not by natural theology, at least by other philosophical or epistemological foundations.[9] However, one might be correct in saying that such an evaluation of inner incentive is not philosophical if it can be validated psychologically. Nevertheless, my intention is to prove that each factor in the

theory of religious pluralism revolves around the central claim, whether it is derived from phenomenological premises or through the employment of natural theology.

This daring step in Christian denomination, which in contrast to other theistic religions is rooted in exclusivism theologically and juridically, has caused Hick to 'see everything as' to be in complete coherence with the hypothesis. Even when Hick talks in his early writings about the religious ambiguity of cosmos, and tries to interpret it in his later writings compatible with the pluralism theory. The idea of ineffability — the division into formal and substantial attributes — and the complementary factor of transcategorial religious experience are not excluded from the necessity of being consistent with this contemporary pluralistic hypothesis, in which the ultimate Reality is present beyond the scope of our perception, and our awareness of it in religious experience is a joint product of that Reality and our own conceptual epistemological systems. As, for Kant, the sense perception is the phenomena of the noumena which can never be conceived as it is in itself.[10] Kant's influence on Hick is one of the essential features of Hick's theoretical development. However, it is obvious that such an analogy does not require Hick's theory to have the same principles and consequences of Kant's sense perception. For, Kant's epistemology is confined to sense perception, while Hick's theological epistemology is applicable to religious perception.[11]

Needless to say, in defense of Hick against those objections which extend Kant's theoretical requirements to Hick's hypothesis, one theory neither requires, nor is incompatible with the other. In other words, the acceptance of one theory does not necessarily imply the other, since the domain that each theory applies to its cases is exclusive.

Having given a brief account of Hick's interpretation of ineffability as the main component, we should now move to its complementary factor, without which the ineffable Real lacks any kind of attribute, nor is it the chief object of adoration in religions, that is, religious experience.

Religious Experience and the Principle of Seeing

As was mentioned, Kant and Wittgenstein have played a crucial role in Hick's theory, endowing it with philosophical and epistemological foundations. Hick borrows from Kant's distinction between the Real and the Gods of religions. And from Wittgenstein's distinction between 'seeing' and 'seeing-as,' which is considered constructive in formulating the structure of what is called 'religious experience.'[12] However, I think there exists one important and usually ignored difference between Hick's usage of the theories of Kant and Wittgenstein. Indeed, Kant's theory of sense perception can never be extended to religious epistemology, while the extension of Wittgenstein's attitude of 'seeing-as' to other kinds of 'experiencing-as' including sensory, emotional, moral and religious experiencing might be valid and verifiable, or at least disputable. Wittgenstein might not disagree with Hick's development of his distinction or might be silent about that, but undoubtedly Kant would reject any inclusive

view of his sense perception. What Hick borrows from Kant's concepts and ideas is employed for his own purpose. For example, evidently, Kant would not have sanctioned any attempt to account for the experience of God. Additionally, God is not for Kant a reality, encountered in religious experience, but an object postulated by reason on the basis of practical functioning in moral agency.[13] Accordingly, moral obligation presupposes the reality of God for Kant. Consequently, although for both Kant and Hick, God is postulated, but for Kant God is postulated by moral values, whereas for Hick the Real is postulated by our conceptual awareness and perception.[14]

We turn now to the notion of religious experience and its relationship to Wittgenstein's distinction of seeing. Wittgenstein points to two senses of the word 'see.' In the first sense, seeing is a physical projection of an object. But in the second sense, seeing is accompanied and integrated by interpretation. In this sense, to see is to interpret or to find meaning or significance in what is before us. A point which Wittgenstein would, I think, want to stress is that the way in which we see the objects depends upon the system of our concepts. Indeed, the strength of Wittgenstein's account lies in the fact that every 'seeing' is 'seeing-as.' Which is why this indispensable distinction has fascinated Hick so that he applies the concept to other kinds of perceptions, including religious perceiving.[15] Hick emphasizes that this epistemological criterion helps us place the religious way of experiencing life in the epistemological pattern that is called 'experiencing-as.' Indeed, for Hick the interpretive activity of seeing-as, which is integral to seeing, could be expanded into the comprehensive notion of experiencing-as. Like seeing, experiencing is also integrated by interpretive elements of our concepts and thoughts.

Although the concept of religious experience is difficult to explain precisely or it might seem to be needless of being defined or described, since this term has been employed differently by many scholars in the modern west, we need to be clearer about what religious experience is. As stated earlier, for Wittgenstein seeing-as or aspect seeing presupposes a conceptual framework. For Hick, the same is true for religious experiencing.[16]

Hick does not define what is exactly meant by religious experience, whether it is a sensation as Schleiermacher believes, or perception as Alstone stresses. But his overemphasis on extending Wittgenstein's division between seeing and seeing-as to religious experiencing indicates the active role of conceptual framework to make religious beliefs justifiable.[17] That is why for Hick faith and revelation is a product of such an experience. Hick contrasts the traditional meaning of revelation and faith, in which propositional beliefs are to be accepted as divine mysteries beyond the scope of human knowledge. He states:

> Because faith thus involves choice and commitment it is meritorious and is accordingly classified as one of the virtues. The virtue of faith is not however the merely legal merit of assenting to the propositions that God has commanded us to believe. It is ultimately the inner virtue of the heart that opens

> itself to God...Faith as the interpretive response through which we are conscious of the Real comes fairly close to Wilfred Cantwell Smith's well-known account of faith. He uses the term to refer to the basic religious disposition. It is that human quality that has been expressed in, has been elicited, nurtured, and shaped by the religious traditions of the world... If one were to understand religious experience somewhat narrowly, as consisting in special numinous moments, then faith as the free interpretive element within this would be only one aspect of what Wilfred Cantwell Smith calls faith. But if on the other hand one understands religious experience very broadly, as the whole experience of persons in as far as they are religious, then the element of free responsive choice within this would seem to lie at the heart of faith in his sense.[18]

Hick's Approach to Religious Pluralism and Global Theology

Depending on the idea of Ineffability and its integral element, religious experience, Hick is faced with the question whether this mode of forming religious beliefs is sufficiently reliable to bring prosperity and salvation for the believers, as the main aim of religions. To find a solution Hick expands the notion of salvation from its traditional interpretation to what he calls transformation from self-centerdness to reality-centerdness.[19]

Although this notion of salvation and liberation has not remained immune from different objections, in my view this criterion is consistent with Hick's view of the theory mentioned above.

Hick concludes that in his contemporary pluralistic hypothesis, the ultimate transcategorical Reality, the Real, is universally present and that our awareness of it in religious experience is a joint product of that presence and our own conceptual system and their associated spiritual practices. Thus different personal or non-personal Gods exist only in relation to the religions and their believers. He states:

> To build on the application of this principle to religion we need a distinction analogous to Kant's but in this case between the noumenal Real *an sich* and its phenomenal appearances to human perceivers. For the mode of the knower varies from religion to religion, so that the ultimate Godhead, the Real, can only be humanly experienced in terms of our varying religious conceptualities and spiritual practices. In the intriguing words of an ancient Hindu text, "Thou art formless. Thy only form is our knowledge of thee." We cannot attribute to the unexperiencable reality in itself the attributes of its experiencable personae, the God figures, or its impersonae, the non-personal "absolutes." The Real in itself is thus, from our human point of view, totally transcategorial. But the principle of equal validity, i.e. the basic faith that human religious experience is a range of responses to a transcendent reality, taken together with the observation that the moral and spiritual fruits of the different world faiths are, so

> far as far as we can tell, equally valuable, helps to render the global religious situation intelligible. For it becomes intelligible when we postulate the ineffable Real as the necessary condition, not of the moral life, as Kant proposed, but of the religious life as described in the history of religions.[20]

By using the distinction between the Real *an sich* and the Real as humanly experienced, Hick would like to clarify the pluralistic hypothesis that the great world religions represent different perceptions and correspondingly responses to the Real from within the major variant ways of being human, and that within each of these ways the transformation of human existence from self-centerdness to Reality-centerdness is taking place.[21]

Consequently, if we could accept that salvation and liberation is taking place within all great religions, and that different religions reveal the Real in such variant lights, we must conclude that they are independently true and veridical.

Undeniably, Hick's work is a brave attempt to attain a pluralistic position in one of the most exclusivist religions. However, Hick's theory — its bases and requirements — has been challenged broadly. I have summarized and categorized these different critiques and objections in my book *Religious Pluralism or Pluralism in Religion*[22] and don't want to enter into that discussion here. Nevertheless, one important point, which might be my chief difficulty with such a pluralistic hypothesis, has to be clarified. This being the main objective of what is really needed and expected from any kind of real pluralistic attitude.

In fact, the religious pluralism that Hick is referring to is the view that the great world religions constitute different responses to an ultimate transcendent reality, and that these responses entail transformation from self-centerdness to reality-centerdness.

In my view, although this interpretation of religious pluralism provides necessary bases for social and religious and general cultural understanding and dialogue, I think this hypothesis lacks the basic premises for achieving the main conclusion to which all these efforts are for. Neither dialogue among cultures and civilizations nor pluralism in salvation alone is the main objective of such hypotheses. However, such could result necessarily from a real theory of pluralism.[23] What we really need and should expect from a theory of religious pluralism is the valid and veridical plurality of Truthfulness in different religions. That is why I do believe that a further and more fundamental reinterpretation of religious pluralism should be put forward.

Pluralism in Religion, Islamic Epistemology

When one looks at the topics of classical Islamic disciplines, such as Kalam (Theology), Figh (Jurisprudence), Tafsir (Quran's Exegesis), one cannot find the issue of pluralism as an independent subject dealt with extensively. But this does not mean that Islam does not take the issue into consideration at all. As I mentioned, I think

that Islamic Epistemology sources can offer a tangible account of a theology of religions and the plurality of faiths.

Moreover, many Moslem scholars might disagree with any kind of pluralistic trend, as clearly this is true in all religions. Nevertheless, I think there are some doctrines and tenets in Islam that distinguish this divine religion from other religions, regarding the problem of diversity. The overemphasis in Islam on the uniqueness of religion is the main entrance to Global Theology, which provides the essential premises for achieving religious pluralism through the means of truthfulness.

God and the Ultimate Reality

Islam emphasizes that God is knowable, not only because human beings are equipped with intellect but also because the cosmos and religions are embodied with a sacred substance.[24] That is why everything in Islam is sacred, owing to its relation to the sacredness of the transcendent ultimate Reality. This is one important difference between this theory and the former hypothesis of pluralism in which the Real as it is in itself can never be perceived.

However, I believe that the Real in itself is of course beyond all languages, all categories, but it can be conceived by those qualities which the Real has given to itself in order to reveal itself in each religion.[25]

Therefore, all of these qualities are really meaningful, and are not to be considered just as metaphors and symbols, even though they might be contradicted by other qualities or by other manifestations in other faiths. As every religion and consequently all the religious and sacred scriptures are to be regarded as the different and various manifestations of the Real. Accordingly, religious experience is not the only veridical way to produce faith and its rites, but the way that God has manifested himself is part of the sacred universe of that religion and cannot be tampered with or changed according to human conceptualizations. This does not require that all believers and thinkers to have the same idea of religious principles, for there are many levels of meaning. In classical Islamic texts, it is said that a verse in the Quran has different levels of meaning and is not bounded by only the literal. But these levels of meaning have to be understood within the sacred scripture without destroying the literal meaning.[26]

Hick is surely aware of the difficulties of his epistemological insight into the domain of God, but the most obvious problem lies in the point mentioned above, in which the Real is not a postulation nor is it a human response to the divine presence. Thus, the Real alone is absolutely Real, everything else is a manifestation within a particular spiritual universe, and not a mere human reaction.

It is worth noting that in this interpretation, founded on different divine manifestations instead of various human experiences, the Real possesses the possibility of manifesting itself in different forms including the personal and non-personal.

It has to be said that this notion of Reality has been derived from three main sources, the Quran, Sufism and Islamic philosophy. The Quran describes God as one

that alone has absolute being, totally independent. There are many verses in Quran which emphasize this meaning of Reality.[27] Also from the Sufi tradition, one could see significant exegesis which indicate the uniqueness of Reality that manifests itself in different crystallizations. In addition to the Quran and Sufism, Islamic philosophy is another source out of which this account of Reality has risen and developed. In Islamic philosophy, especially in Transcendent Philosophy, the divine essence which in some schools is called light of the lights is the source of all existence.[28]

The Ultimate Reality and the Uniqueness of Religion

This theory claims to embody an answer to the problem of pluralism in religions, which should be best understood by the principle of the uniqueness of religion. In other words, as the Real manifests itself in different forms and since religion in this assumption is perfectly divine, all religions are considered diverse crystallizations of the ultimate divine Religion. Consequently, the uniqueness of Religion and the plurality of faiths are not only contrary, but also integral to each other, since diversity is intended and willed by God.[29] Indeed, God initiated various religions as the diverse forms of Religion in order to reveal the different aspects of the unique Religion. This principle could be called unity in diversity and diversity in unity, which has played a crucial role in Islamic philosophy, as regards the description of existence and its ambiguity. In this respect, the Absolute is absolute, but each manifestation of the Absolute in the form of revelations such as Christianity, Judaism and Islam creates a world in which certain determinations of the Absolute, like the Quran in the case of Islam and Jesus in the case of Christianity, appear absolute without being the Absolute in itself. The term relative Absolute which first has been used by Schoun could explain the relationship between the Absolute and its crystallization.

The strength of such an account lies in fact that since all religions are manifestations of the ultimate Reality, every religion possesses the element of truth and presence.

One might criticize such an Islamic pluralistic attitude toward religions by referring to Quranic verses, which could be and have been employed to conclude exlusivism.[30] To find a solution I would like to mention two important Quranic principles with regard to the issue of religious pluralism. Or, more precisely, clear teachings regarding Pluralism in Religion.

First, the Quran explicitly endorses the universality of God's revelation, which plays a significant part in the Islamic understanding of other religions. This implies the validity of all divine religions and consequently the veridical diversity of truthfulness among all religions.[31]

Secondly, and more importantly is the Quranic emphasis on the uniqueness of Religion. One interesting point, in the Quran the term religion is never used in a plural form that signifies the importance of the uniqueness of Religion which manifests itself and its truthfulness in forms of different religions.

In these verses, "The Religion before God is Islam" (3:19), or the verse "If anyone desires a religion other than Islam never will it be accepted of him" (3:85), the word Islam refers to the general meaning of Islam which is the submission to the will of God.[32]

Conclusion

Thus, such a plurality, which is considered the manifestation of the Absolute, is not contrary to uniqueness, nor is it distinct from it. Consequently, in this revealed pluralism of religions or precisely Religion, the divine exclusivist claim of faiths is to be understood veridically within the principle of the truthfulness of all crystallizations of the ultimate uniqueness of Religion.

This theological foundation is the main entrance to the Global Theology whereby plurality and unity, pluralism and exclusivity, as well as dialogue and understanding can come together.

That is why I do believe this theory, which is based on the plurality in unity and unity in plurality, possesses the essential premises for achieving the main objective of such efforts.

This interpretation of Global Theology, which is founded on faith in the inclusive and plural truthfulness of religions, requires substantially and essentially the tolerance and respectable understanding, not only on religious aspects, but also in other relational forms of diversity.

References

[1] For more detailed discussion of this matter, see Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *The Heart of Islam Enduring Values for Humanity,* Harper San Francisco, 2002. Pp. 1–20.

[2] Hosseini, Seyyed Hassan, *Religious Pluralism or Pluralism in Religion,* Sorosh Press, 2002. Pp. 215–230.

[3] Wittgenstein, Ludwing, *Philosophical Investigation,* Trans, G.E.M Anscombe, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1953. Pp. 193–210.

[4] Hick, John, *God Has Many Names,* Macmillan, 1988. Pp. 40–50.

[5] Hick, John, *An Interpretation of Religion, Human Responses to the Transcendent,* Macmillan, 1989, and John Hick, *Disputed Questions in Theology and the Philosophy of Religious,* Macmillan, 1997. Pp. 164–179.

[6] Hick believes that the distinction between the Real and the Real as it is conceived, is found in all religions. For detailed discussion, see John Hick, *God Has Many Names*.

[7] Consequently Hick States that the Real is beyond all properties, therefore can never be conceived, as, for Kant, the noumena can never be perceived by human being. See John Hick, *An Interpretation of Religion*. Pp. 241–245.

[8] Hick, John. "Ineffability" in *Religious Studies,* Volume 36, 2001.

[9] In *Philosophy of Religion,* Hick has tried to argue for the existence of God philosophically, while in his recent papers and books, Hick is trying to substitute Natural Theology with the Theology based on Religious Experience.

[10] As has been mentioned, Kant's structure of sense perception has played a crucial role for Hick in reconstructing his religious experience epistemology on this epistemological foun-

dation. For example see John Hick, *Disputed Questions in Theology and the Philosophy of Religion,* Macmillan Press, 1997. Pp. 17–31.

[11] Hosseini, Seyyed Hassan, *Religious Pluralism or Pluralism in Religion*. Pp. 100–120.

[12] Wittgenstein, Ludwing, *Philosophical Investigation*. P. 210.

[13] As it was mentioned, for Kant the Reality or God is postulated by moral obligation. See Kant's main source in this regard, Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* Werner S.Pluhar (Translator), Hackett Publishing Company, 1997, and Immanuel Kant, *"God as a Postulate of Practical Reason*" in John Hick ed., *The Existence of God,* Macmillan, 1967. Pp. 137–143.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Wittgenstein, Ludwing, *Philosophical Investigation*. It has to be mentioned that Hick's theory of Religious Experience has been strongly influenced by Schleimacher's account. For example, see Friedrich Schleiermacher *On Religion,* Translation and Notes by Richard Crouter, Cambridge University Press, 1988.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Hick, John, *Problems of Religious Pluralism*, St. Martin's Press, 1985. P. 27.

[18] Hick, John, *An Interpretation of Religion*. P. 159.

[19] Hick, John, *Problems of Religious Pluralism*. P. 37.

[20] Hick, John, *Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion,* Pakgrave, 2001. Pp. 15–16.

[21] Hick has seriously tried to generalize the criterion of transformation to all great religions. For details see John Hick, *Problems of Religious Pluralism, p*. 37, and also John Hick, *An Iinterpretation of Religion*. Pp. 40–60.

[22] Hosseini, Seyyed Hassan, *Religious Pluralism or Pluralism in Religion*. Pp. 150–180.

[23] Ibid.

[24] That is one of the fundamental distinctions between Hick's interpretation of pluralism and author's theory of pluralism in religion in which the uniqueness of religion is the main source for plurality and diversity. Schuon and Nasr have played a crucial role for such an account even though they are not identical. See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Knowledge and the Sacred,* Albany: State University of New York, 1989.

[25] Hosseini, Seyyed Hassan, *Religious Pluralism or Pluralism in Religion*. Pp. 190–195.

[26] See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Islamic Spirituality Foundations,* Crossroad, 1997.

[27] For example see these versus in Quran: (3:64), (23:59), (24:55).

[28] The uniqueness of existence and its relationship to the plurality is one of the controversial discussions among scholars, especially between sufists and philosophers. Regardless this difference, the principle of uniqueness has affected strongly all Islamic sciences to be benefited by the mentioned principle, even within various interpretations.

[29] See Quran: [25/Hadid], [167, Aleomran], [2/Jomee], [151/baghare], [67/maede].

[30] Such as (3/ 19).

[31] See 29.

[32] Much Quran's exegesis has emphasized this meaning, for example see Alame Tabatabayi, Almizan, Volume 2, Tabligat Press, Iran, 1995. P. 240.

РЕЛИГИОЗНЫЙ ПЛЮРАЛИЗМ И ГЛОБАЛЬНАЯ ТЕОЛОГИЯ: УНИКАЛЬНОСТЬ РАЗНООБРАЗИЯ И РАЗНООБРАЗИЕ УНИКАЛЬНОСТИ

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Согласно классическому пониманию религиозного плюрализма, значительные различия между главными объектами поклонения в основных религиозных традициях во многом являются результатом различий в способах переживания и отображения отдельной трансцендентной реальности в жизни человека. И хотя принятие подобной гипотезы предусматривает наличие необходимой базы для религиозной, культурной и социальной терпимости, понимания и диалога, я попытался продемонстрировать, что данная теория едва ли может подтвердить «плюрализм истинности», который является основным условием достижения того, что действительно требуется и ожидается от теории плюрализма в эпоху глобализма. Она также не может быть применена для подтверждения необходимости логических отношений между двумя важными направлениями плюрализма («плюрализм спасения» и «плюрализм истинности»). Таким образом, необходимо предложить новую и более фундаментальную интерпретацию религиозного плюрализма, несомненно, влияющего на другие сопоставимые виды социального и культурного разнообразия. Это важно не только для поиска доступных и приемлемых форм понимания и диалога между религиями, но и для создания прочной основы глобальной теологии, которая, по мнению автора, является неотъемлемым следствием наивысшей уникальности религии, проявляющей и раскрывающей себя в многочисленных и разнообразных формах. В работе приведено описание упомянутой теории, разработанной автором на основе исламской эпистемологии, и сравнение ее с теорией более ранней.

RELIGION IN AN AGE OF CIVILIZATIONAL CRISIS

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Introduction

Most social scientific approaches to the role of religion in modern society have taken one of two positions. The dominant position has been to argue that as modernity, capitalist or socialist advances, the role of religion will decline. This thesis has been argued on a number of different grounds. Historical materialists regard religion as fundamentally a reflex of humanity's dependence, either on nature or on social forces beyond our comprehension and control. The scientific and industrial revolutions, by bringing nature under rational human control, set in motion the process of secularization; socialism, by bringing human society under similar control would complete it (Marx 1844/1978, 1867/1976). Functionalists who followed the early Durkheim looked at the problem rather as one of changing forms of solidarity. Premodern societies, in which most people did the same thing, and were thus materially more or less self-sufficient, were held together by a "mechanical solidarity" based on shared beliefs and values. Dissent was a real threat to social cohesion and could not be tolerated. As population increases, human activity differentiates, culminating in the complex social and technical division of labor characteristic of modern societies, which are held together by the resulting "organic solidarity" or material interdependence, and which therefore no longer need a shared religion. Religion may not disappear, but it becomes privatized, serving increasingly narrower functions (Durkheim 1893/1964, Parsons 1957, 1964). Some Weberians regard secularization as the final result of a process of religious rationalization which began with Ancient Judaism and culminated in the secularized Calvinist culture of the United States (Weber 1920/1958, 1921/1968). In its most recent form this tendency has given birth to the "End of History" thesis advanced by Francis Fukuyama, according to which capitalism, democracy, and secularism, having demonstrated their superiority with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, are now all but uncontested, and not only religion, but any sort of fundamental ideological struggle, will fade from the global scene (Fukuyama 1989).

This view was always problematic. It was unable to account for the prominent role of popular religious ideologies in the mass movements for socialism and national liberation throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries or for the persistence of religious belief and practice in what is arguably the very homeland of modernity — the United States of America (Sarkisyanz 1965, Lancaster 1987, Mansueto 1988, 2002a). The displacement of the socialist opposition to capitalist modernity with a fundamentalist Islamic opposition in the 1990s gave currency to an alterna-

tive, more pessimistic strain of Weberianism. According to this view human civilizations are *constituted* by certain fundamental complexes of meanings and values, meanings and values which can be and often are irreconcilably in contradiction with each other. The most recent product of this tradition is Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* thesis, which argues that the West (Christian and more specifically Protestant) is locked in irreconcilable conflict with the rest — and most especially with *Dar-al-Islam* and the "Confucian" civilization of East Asia (Huntington 1993).

This approach, I would like to suggest, contributes no more to an understanding of the current situation than the several variants of the secularization thesis. First, the whole idea of a "Western Civilization" stretching from Ancient Greece and Israel up through the present is highly problematic. Even if one allows — and I think a case can be made for this — that a diverse complex of cultural traditions, mostly Indo-European and Semitic, flowed together to form an at least partially unified Western civilization during the middle ages, this cultural sphere must be understood to include *both* Christendom and *Dar-al-Islam* as well as a distinct Jewish minority culture. And *modernity* was constituted first and foremost by a *rupture* with this civilizational complex, which was unified by a common Aristotelian philosophical language in which disputed questions of meaning and value were hashed out. Neither modern Europe and North America, nor the modern Islamic world can really be regarded as faithful to this heritage. Second, the thesis fails to even describe correctly, much less really explain, the main lines of global conflict in the present period. The Jews and Christians who are most committed to sustained conflict with *Dar-al-Islam* are not, for example, secularized liberal interpreters of their tradition, but fundamentalists who actually *agree* with the fundamentalist Muslims with whom they are at war on a broad range of cultural questions, from the proper approach to the interpretation of the sacred scriptures (literal inerrancy) through the nature of God (absolutely transcendent and sovereign) to church/state relations and the role of women in society. At even a rudimentary level of abstraction, in other words this supposed *clash of civilizations* turns into a cultural convergence among groups who are, nonetheless, really and truly in conflict with each other. East Asia, meanwhile, has embraced capitalism in a way which is hardly coherent with a traditional Confucian worldview and must be read either as representing a rupture towards modernity or a mobilization of other elements in their cultural heritage — e.g. a longstanding mercantile tradition and a static authoritarianism associated more closely with Buddhism and Legalism respectively than with anything even remotely resembling a Confucian *ru xue*.

Finally, both the *end of history* thesis and the *clash of civilizations* thesis miss the complex, at least three-sided culture wars which divide the West in the present period: a conflict not between (fundamentalist) religion and "secular humanism" but between fundamentalism, secularism, and a pluralistic, tolerant, and eclectic spiritual culture characterized by dialogue and seeking rather than dogmatism and certainty.

An Alternative Framework

In view of these criticisms, I would like to suggest an alternative analysis of the current situation and of the role of religion therein. This analysis is rooted in a broadly dialectical sociology, but departs from historical materialism and the rest of modern social theory in taking seriously the role not only of ideology and culture, but also of the transcendental principles about which ideology and culture speak in shaping sociohistorical development. Let me explain.

Historical materialism regarded human history as driven by the interaction between the *forces* and *relations* of production — between technology, on one hand, and ways of centralizing and allocating surplus for production, on the other. Various combinations of forces and relations of production, i.e. *modes of production,* in turn gave rise to a political and ideological superstructure. When the relations of production became an obstacle to further development of the productive forces, the result was economic crisis and, eventually, social revolution.

Now Marx, I would like to suggest, was quite correct to point out that human beings, however else they might be distinguished from other animals, distinguish themselves through the act of production (Marx 1846/1978). What he failed to recognize is that the act of production is, from the very beginning, an *intellectual* act. Whatever impact technology may have had on human intellectual development, and that impact is no doubt significant, it was made possible to begin with by human physiology — by our big brains and our opposable thumbs, as well as by the absence of fangs and claws or stomachs which can digest grass. Human beings survive by transforming our environment and by bringing into being entirely new forms of organization. The intellectual processes involved in production are, furthermore, never purely *technical;* they do not, in other words, involve simply methods of transforming a raw material. They also involve *science* or at least an *empirical lore*, which provides us with an understanding of how the raw material (which is often the whole ecosystem itself) is organized, and thus of its latent potential. Unless we know that plants grow from seeds and require soil, water, and light, agriculture will be impossible. But production also presupposes definite *aims*, and it is not enough to say that this aim is survival. Modern industrial technology, for example, aims at a comprehensive control over the ecosystem — indeed presupposes that this is the global aim of human life generally — in a way that is not true of earlier technological regimes, which aimed instead at tapping into and encouraging existing dynamics of growth and development. These immediate technological aims are, furthermore, embodied in larger complexes of religious and metaphysical ideas in the context alone of which they make sense. Technologies that tap into and attempt to catalyze and further already existing dynamics of growth and development, such as horticulture, agriculture, and medieval handicraft and alchemical technologies, presuppose that such dynamics of growth and development are present. They presuppose, that is, a broadly teleological worldview. Modern industrial technology, which breaks down existing

forms of physical, biological, and social organization in order to release and harness raw energy in order to do work, implicitly assumes that order is something imposed on inert matter from the outside, whether by a sovereign God, as in the case of early modern theologies, or by humanity itself.

Because of this, I would like to suggest, the historical materialist sociology centered on *forces and relations of production, base and superstructure,* must give way to an enlarged dialectical framework which takes seriously a far broader range of factors, including, especially, the transcendental ends to which humanity is ordered, as understood and interpreted by particular societies. The *material* basis for the development of human society is the human organism and the ecosystem or ecosystems it inhabits which constrain profoundly the range of survival strategies that are open to it and thus the whole pattern of social development. The *formal* cause of human civilization is social structure. Social structures include: technological structures, i.e. particular ways of reorganizing physical and biological matter; economic structures, i.e. particular ways of organizing human labor and centralizing and allocating resources; political structures, i.e. particular ways of building and exercising power; ideological-cultural structures, i.e. particular ways of organizing our experience of the universe, including ways of approaching fundamental questions of meaning and value; and psycho-social structures, i.e. particular ways of organizing the human psyche to serve the aims of the society in question. The *final* cause of a human society is its *civilizational ideal,* the common aim which all competing ideologies take for granted: e.g. spiritual development in the case of the great post-axial (Jaspers 1953) civilizations of the Silk Road; global control over nature and society in the case of modern civilization. Such civilizational ideals are, furthermore, particular ways of understanding and pursuing the ultimate aim of all things, which is simply to Be, in the way proper to and to the extent permitted by their specific nature.

Such an analysis permits us to speak meaningfully of *both* the sort of *structural* crises on which historical materialism has generally focused, but also of more profound *civilizational* crises. Social structures are distinct ways of realizing a particular civilizational ideal. Structural crises occur when the social structure becomes an obstacle to so doing. In the case of *modern* societies this has meant that structural crises occur when the social structure generally, and the economic structure in particular, holds back technological development and thus obstructs realization of the civilizational ideal of modernity: rational control of the ecosystem and of human society. Under such circumstances, if the hegemonic structure (e.g. capitalism) cannot adjust, it may be displaced by another structure (e.g. socialism) better suited, at least at the moment, to realizing the civilizational ideal. In other civilizations, however, with different civilizational ideals, structural change may result from an inability of the hegemonic structure to realize ends other than technological progress. Thus, at the end of the Chacoan era the Anasazi civilization experienced an ecological crisis that left it unable to realize the religious ends to which it was ordered. The

Puebloan peoples continue, on the basis of a rather different social structure, the civilizational tradition of the Anasazi, but by very different means.

A *civilizational crisis*, on the other hand, takes place when, generally after a succession of structural crises, people actually lose faith in a civilizational ideal and stop pursuing it. Such a civilizational crisis seems to have occurred at the end of the Bronze Age, at which point humanity seems to have lost faith in the god-kings who were the principal focal points for surplus centralization and civilizational development. And in some cases — Israel (Gottwald 1979) and China (Yao 2000) — seem actually to have overthrown them. The crisis of Roman civilization shows how a structural crisis can lead ultimately to civilizational transformation. Rome ran into a structural crisis because its basic strategy — using the surplus generated by chattel slavery (in the West) and tenant farming (in the East) to buy into the Silk Road trade — ran into insuperable limits. Logistic and ecological factors made further expansion impossible, bringing an end to the wars of conquest that provided a steady supply of slaves. The empire was forced to shift from the use of chattel slaves to the use of settled, dependent peasants, known as *coloni* and to significantly increase rates of exploitation. This exploitation was legitimated as service to the common good using Christian religious ideals, something which allowed the empire, but not, perhaps, Roman Civilization, to persist in parts of the East, where elements of the old structure served a new ideal. In the West and in the *Masreq* and the *Mahgreb,* this system lacked credibility and Roman Civilization was displaced by the religious civilizations of Christendom and *Dar-al-Islam,* both of which were inspired by ideals radically different from those that shaped Rome. Structural crises can, in other words, but need not, lead to civilizational crises.

A Civilizational Crisis

What can this model tell us about the current situation? First, it should be clear there is absolutely no room in our analysis for either of the two current dominant analyses of the global situation: i.e. an "end to history" as a result of the global victory of capitalism, liberal democracy, and secularism; or a "clash of civilizations" driven by irreducible conflicts over fundamental questions of meaning and value. The first analysis can, in any case, be excluded on empirical grounds. While the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War did, in fact, seem to spell the end of historical socialism as a live alternative to capitalism, and suggests that socialism was probably simply a way for colonized countries or countries without colonial empires to modernize, the present period is one of broad resistance to the logic of the global market and to the consumerist culture which accompanies it. It is in this context that Islamic fundamentalism — and indeed the whole complex of fundamentalisms which has emerged in the past quarter century — must be understood. At the same time, our analysis equally excludes the idea of an unavoidable clash of civilizations. This is because, as we have shown, human beings in fact pursue a common end, and

merely understand that end differently, something which makes authentic dialogue among civilizations at least a possibility.

Historical materialism is, however, also unable to make sense out of the current situation. The long term stability of neoliberalism as a regime of accumulation constitutes a fruitful topic of investigation and debate, but it should be clear that more is at work in the present period than economic crisis or temporary stabilization which will eventually open up into a revolutionary situation as understood in the Leninist tradition (Lenin 1921/1971). People all around the world are calling into question not only our way of centralizing and allocating resources but the ultimate aim of modern civilization: material progress based on an ever better understanding of and thus control over the physical, biological, and social world. This questioning is reflected by the widespread resurgence of religious ideologies — not only fundamentalist but also "New Age" which aim to recenter humanity on the task of spiritual development, and to rethink the project of material progress in a way which serves this higher end. And this questioning is seconded by a gathering ecological crisis that may well demonstrate that the modern ideal was, in fact, unworkable after all.

I would, therefore, like to suggest what we are facing is not merely a structural, but rather a *civilizational* crisis. It is not just that capitalism — or even capitalism *and* socialism — are no longer able to advance the ideals of modern civilization. It is that the ideal of modernity — the idea that by understanding the universe, we can bring it under rational human control, and thus make it serve human needs — is losing its appeal. Indeed, it is quite possible to argue, as I have elsewhere (Mansueto 1988, 2002a) that the *mass* socialist movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were, in fact, first and foremost movements of *resistance* to capitalist modernization. When modernizers seized control of these movements and the states they created, socialism rapidly began to lose its appeal.

A note is in order, in this regard, with respect to the relationship of the current wave of fundamentalisms to this civilizational crisis. It is useful, in this regard, to make a distinction between fundamentalism as such, and the leadership core of most fundamentalist movements, on the one hand, and the mass base for fundamentalism on the other hand. Fundamentalism, I would like to suggest, is actually a distinctly *modern* and even *modernist* phenomenon. Christian fundamentalism, for example, originated in the nineteenth century and was based on a distinctly modern, empiricist theory of knowledge which took the testimony of the scriptures as just that: a faithful account of a set of *facts* and constructed a complex theology intended to reconcile what it acknowledged to be the manifest contradictions among those facts (Marsden 1980). More broadly, Protestantism generally (and Christian fundamentalism is an overwhelmingly Protestant phenomenon) is rooted in a radically intensified focus on the notion of *divine sovereignty*. It is precisely this notion of sovereignty, understood as total control, which defines modernity and frames the contest between secularism and fundamentalism as a struggle between advocates of human

sovereignty and divine. At least some strains of Islamic fundamentalism, such as the Wahabi movement, similarly, represent a rejection of the medieval compromise with Hellenic philosophy and other cultural traditions in favor of a "purified" vision focused more narrowly on the idea of divine sovereignty, even to the exclusion of veneration of the Prophet and Islamic saints (Esposito1984). Other fundamentalisms (Catholic, Jewish, Hindu) may be less modernist in their theology, but are set apart from anything like the traditional practice of their religions by a whole-hearted embrace of the modern state and other modern technologies of control as means of advancing their cause.

The mass base of fundamentalist movements, on the other hand, is attracted to these movements precisely because they appear to offer a way out of the prison house of modernity: they promise meaning and discipline at a time of nihilism, despair, and social disintegration. At the same time, unlike authentic spiritual disciplines, which require a commitment to excellence, fundamentalisms demand only submission and conformity to a certain external discipline, and thus appeal to people whose sense of worth has been crushed by centuries of oppression and who, in any case, lack the time to devote to authentic spiritual development.

A Road Forward

The question, of course, is how one responds to such a crisis. For those of us who are carriers of ancient wisdoms — wisdoms which always understood themselves as growing and developing, learning from the special sciences and from the experience of humanity generally — the task is threefold. First, we must develop a new vision — or visions — adequate to the present period, which can overcome the nihilism and despair of the present period and advance a new civilizational ideal. An ideal which embraces fully the idea of progress and the full development of *all* human capacities, but does so in a way which orders this whole process to a higher ideal of spiritual development. Such an ideal would represent an *authentic* recapturing and extension of the civilizational ideal of the middle ages and great Silk Road Era, which regarded spiritual development as an extension of human creativity generally and understood that humanity has a common end but pursues that end through many different routes.

Second, we must reconstitute a spiritual leadership or leaderships capable of leading an increasingly literate and engaged *laos*. Such a leadership must — like the spiritual leaders of the old Silk Road Era — have fully mastered the special sciences and practical wisdoms as well as engaging in the study of philosophy, theology, and the advanced spiritual disciplines. They must be sufficiently at home in the corridors of power to hold accountable the tyrants and moneymakers who would oppress the people, while themselves having transcended any attachment to mere worldly rule.

Third, we must build a new kind of public arena. This public arena must be democratic, in the sense of being characterized by the very broadest participation and in

the sense of being the site of authentic power, but must eschew the modern concept of sovereignty in favor of authentic respect for first principles. Rather than making laws, such a democracy would understand itself as interpreting and applying to local and current conditions the fundamental principles of a revitalized natural law ethics. At the same time, because of the diverse paths along which humanity pursues its common ends, the character of those first principles would itself be regarded as always and only in question. So that the public arena, rather than being secular (either rejecting the existence of transcendental principles of meaning and value) or agnostic (regarding such principles as unknowable) *or* confessional (hegemonized by a single doctrine), would be *constituted* by debate around fundamental questions of meaning and value. A debate in which no answers were excluded and in which it was understood that the debate never ends.

The role of the reconstituted spiritual leadership would be, above all, to lead the people in this debate, informing it with their teaching, holding it accountable to the highest standards, while at the same time respecting the right of the people to make their own decisions.

Such a public arena would, once again, recapture and extend the spiritual pluralism of the Silk Road Era — the *convivencia* of old *al-Andalus,* in which Jews, Christians, and Muslims engaged in passionate but civil debate while collaborating in the affairs of state. The spirit of the old South Asian centers such as Nalanda, where Buddhist and Hindu schools vied with but also learned from each other. And the spirit of Tang and Song China, in which the debate between Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism produced a series of competing syntheses which demonstrated that even as each side learned from the other it refused to be absorbed or negated. Today any such dialogue must be global and it must include the representatives of secular modernity while refusing to allow them or anyone else hegemony.

This is a difficult task, but it is the only road forward. The only road beyond the current impasse between a secularism which slips more and more into nihilism and despair, for the simple reason that its ideal — human sovereignty over the natural world — is at once empty and impossible, and a fundamentalism which joins dogmatism with the technology of control in ever more frightening ways. It might be useful to conclude with a brief report on an attempt to actually implement this strategy, which *Seeking Wisdom* has forged in the years since the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1991. I will leave to one side the first, theoretical dimension of the task, with which readers can acquaint themselves by reading our published works (Mansueto 1995, 2002a, 2002b, forthcoming), or our journal (www.seekingwisdom.com), and simply note the extraordinary enthusiasm we have met, not so much from funders or established cultural institutions but from the people themselves for the practical side of the task. Since the late 1980s we have run grassroots programs, usually based in local congregations or community organizations, designed to train leaders in methods of social analysis and philosophical/theological reflection, as well as in political strategy and basic organizing techniques. At first this was simply an

extension of the see/judge/act methodology developed in the mid-twentieth century by Catholic Action and radicalized by the liberation theologians and the *Iglesia Popular* in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. Increasingly, however, we have come to see this program as an extension of a profound dynamic of democratization reaching back behind the modern democratic revolutions to the cultural revolution of the axial age, which first began to open up full participation in public life *religious* as well as *political* (for the two were never really separate) to the ordinary people, those who did not claim descent from the gods — i.e. the *demos*. The present period is marked above all by a reclaiming and extension of this dynamic as ordinary people demand to be included not only in debates around public policy, but in the deeper discussion regarding fundamental questions of meaning and value on which public policy decisions are based. As we realized this we have broadened our efforts, emphasizing not just the sort of training which would enable a grassroots leader to exercise some autonomous political judgment, but extending to the working classes and other oppressed communities the sort of liberal arts education which has historically been the condition for full participation in debates around fundamental questions of meaning and value. It is our conviction that the new spiritual leadership we need will emerge not so much out of existing elite institutions as out of grassroots efforts to cultivate the intellectual and moral capacities of the people themselves, who are, at long last, moving to make the debate over the meaning of humanity and its future their own.

At the same time, in the wake of the events of 11 September 2001, we initiated a series of dialogues aimed initially at containing what might well have been very serious interethnic conflict in the community in which we currently have our headquarters — Gallup, New Mexico. This community has a large Islamic (mostly Palestinian) merchant community and is located on the border between the Navajo Nation and Zuni Pueblo, both of which have very strong pro-military traditions. We began simply, in the Spring of 2002, by having representatives of local religious communities speak to each other about their religious traditions. The result was the first serious grassroots debate about monotheism I have ever witnessed, as Din (Navajo) and Islamic leaders engaged each other over a question which most members of Western religious communities take for granted. The next year we hosted a debate around the Clash of Civilizations thesis in which leaders of local Jewish, Christian, Islamic, Bahai, Native American Church communities spoke to each other and to the people about the meaning of difference around fundamental questions in the global arena. In the Spring of 2004 we focused on a matter of local concern — the relations between the various "fireplaces" or sub-traditions within the Native American Church and their relationship with both federal authorities and the Navajo Nation. This autumn, with the help of a grant from MacNeil-Lehrer Productions *By the People* program we are looking at the links between fundamental questions and the election debates.

We are, to be sure, still very far from either organizing a new spiritual leadership or constituting a new kind of public arena. Awakening the dormant intellectual and moral capacities of people long oppressed and challenging existing spiritual leaders to play a new, more active and authoritative but non-dogmatic and dialogical role in the public arena is difficult. But we have taken the first steps and, I think, developed some promising models that merit further testing and adaptation elsewhere. We look forward to dialogue and collaboration with other organizations engaged in this important work. Perhaps together we can, at long last break the nihilism, despair, and injustice of the present period and chart the path towards a new civilizational ideal that makes possible the full development of human capacities.

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РЕЛИГИЯ В ЭПОХУ ЦИВИЛИЗАЦИОННОГО КРИЗИСА

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Данная работа посвящена исследованию роли религии в текущей мировой ситуации. А именно, здесь предложена критика двух основных (и противоположных) тезисов, на которых основывалась в последнее десятилетие внешняя политика США: тезис Френсиса Фукуяма о Конце истории и тезис Сэмьюэла Хантингтона о Столкновении цивилизаций, а также, представлено утверждение о том, что мир переживает крупный цивилизационный кризис. Данный кризис отличается принципиальной неспособностью реализовать идеал современной цивилизации, следствием чего является и утрата веры в этот идеал: понимать мир для того, чтобы контролировать его, — идеал, который, в действительности, сводит все проблемы к научным и техническим задачам, а рассмотрение фундаментальных вопросов о смысле и ценности отодвигает на второй план. Крушение этого идеала привело к глобальному возрождению потребности в духовности и религии, а также возобновило «культурные войны» между религиозными и светскими силами. Подъем религиозного фундаментализма является симптомом кризиса, а не его решением. Сам фундаментализм существует непосредственно в рамках современности. Он стремится использовать современные технологии и средства социального контроля для укрепления традиционных религиозных норм (зачастую, их искаженной версии). Для преодоления текущего кризиса необходимо создать новый вид общественного пространства для дискуссии, которое подразумевало бы обсуждение фундаментальных вопросов о смысле и ценности бытия. Подобная дискуссионная арена не должна быть ни светской, ни конфессиональной. Базисным принципом и руководящим ориентиром должна стать духовность, при полном отказе от любой идеологической, светской или религиозной гегемонии. Только такая общественная площадка для дискуссий может преодолеть секуляризм и фундаментализм и сформировать новую идеальную цивилизацию, уважающую оба пути развития человечества, в его обретении мудрости и сохранении уникальной судьбы каждого человека.

THE SEARCH FOR ISLAMIC RENEWAL

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(Originally published in *FrontPage Magazine*)

My grandfather was a very devout, pious Muslim. When I was about age 10, and during a summer holiday, he called me to his and my grandmother's house in order to give me some Islamic education. He taught me how to perform the regular Muslim prayers and some very basic knowledge of Arabic. I enjoyed this gracious summer school; besides all the warm family values, I was happy to learn about God, my Creator, and the religion He had revealed.

One day, among my grandfather's books, I came across a prayer book that had three quotes at its back cover. The first two quotes were from the Koran and they were about how and why God created us. I was deeply touched to read the very words of God and was moved by their message. But the third quote was very shocking. "If your children do not start praying at the age of 10," the quote said, "then beat them up." I was horrified. I knew that my grandfather — such a kind, compassionate man — would never ever beat me up or even talk rudely to me. However, to see that this is what "Islam" ordered parents and grandparents to do was very disturbing.

Yet, I noticed an important detail: This third quote was not from the Koran. So it was not God's word. It was a *hadith,* a term I had never heard before. I asked my grandfather what *hadith* means. "They are the words of our Prophet," he said. But I wasn't satisfied. "Are you sure," I asked, "that he really said these words?"

More than two decades have passed since this conversation with my grandfather. And in time I realized that my juvenile suspicion about the hadiths, the sayings and deeds attributed to Prophet Muhammad, was not inaccurate. Of course there are many beautiful hadiths, giving noble moral truths. But there are also many disturbing, bizarre, irrational ones. The more I noticed these, the more I felt certain that a re-evaluation of traditional Islamic sources is necessary.

In fact, this view is shared by some notable modernist Islamic scholars. Important figures, like Sir Sayyed Ahmed Khan (d. 1898) and Pakistani scholar and reformer Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988), have argued that the collection of hadiths that we have today needs a revolutionary re-examination. This collection was compiled up by Muslim scholars who lived at least two centuries after the death of the Prophet. To distinguish the true sayings of the Prophet from the many fake and distorted ones, these scholars developed a method of defining the degrees of reliability in the chains of transmitters. Yet their method had a major flaw. As also noted by some Western scholars, "the content of the hadiths known as the matn (text) was rarely subject to critical examination" and, as a result, "even the best-attested hadiths ...are anachronistic in content, contradict each other or are at variance with the spirit or letter of the Koran."[1]

So, in short, hadiths are problematic.

And you might wonder why this is so important.

The status of hadiths is extremely important, because most authoritarian, puritan and medieval aspects of the Islamic tradition are based on hadiths and other "secondary sources" of Islam — such as the ijma, i.e. the consensus of Islamic scholars — not the Koran.

Let me give you just a few examples:

> – According to the secondary sources, apostates from Islam must be killed. There is no basis for this in the Koran and in fact several verses which emphasize religious freedom, such as "let him who please believe, and let him who please disbelieve" (18:29) render such killings impossible.
>
> – Secondary sources ban all fine arts, especially painting and sculpture. There is no such commandment in the Koran, and instead, the statues that Prophet (King) Solomon had built for himself are praised. (34:13)
>
> – Secondary sources define a very strict dress code for women and this is generally applied to all women under Muslim rule. The Koran orders a dress code only for Muslim women and it is open to interpretation. No verse explicitly orders the headscarf — let alone the all-covering burka.[2]
>
> – Secondary sources favor the seclusion of women from men. There is no basis for such segregation in the Koran. Instead, Koran tells about civilized dialogues between prophets and women. (28:25, 27:44)
>
> – Secondary sources try to punish every sin and supposedly immoral behavior. There are, for example, punishments for drinking alcohol or refraining from prayer. These, again, have no basis in the Koran, whose penal code is focused mostly on crime, not sin or immorality. The stoning of adulterers, a brutal command of the secondary sources, is also totally unsubstantiated on a Koranic basis.

My contention is that the extremely puritanical teachings — such as we see in the barbaric reign of the Taliban or of the Wahhabi Saudi Arabia — emerged during the centuries-long process of the over-ruling of the Koran by secondary sources. (Wahhabis are in fact the product of a "reform," which made things even worse, and I will explain the reason down below.)

Even the rise of anti-Semitism in the Islamic tradition — although less fervent than that of Medieval Christianity — is related to this process. Prof. Khaleel Mohammed, Assistant Professor at the Department of Religious Studies at San Diego State University, notes, "(while) the Koran viewed Judaism as the chief monotheistic religion ...It was the Hadith, the revisionist interpretation of the Koran from the medieval period, that demonized the Jews and Judaism."

The problem is so acute that some traditional Islamic scholars even argue that hadiths may abrogate verses of the Koran.

The solution seems to be to abrogate much of the hadiths and build a new interpretation of the Koran. We should, of course, use many noble elements of the secondary sources, and borrow from the great intellectual and spiritual achievements of the traditional Islamic literature, but we should not be strictly tied to them.

The Islamic Reformation Revisited Indeed

I thought about this when I read a recent article by my dear friend Stephen Schwartz, titled "The 'Islamic Reformation' Revisited." I agree with most of Mr. Schwartz's arguments. He wisely mentions the risks of drawing a simplistic analogy between Christianity's Protestant Reformation and the renewal that the Islamic world needs today.

This analogy is indeed uninspiring. First of all, the Protestant reformation has not been a very pleasant episode at all — with all the violence, chaos, and anti-Semitism it fostered. Secondly, the contemporary Islamic world is different from the time of Luther. We don't have a central authority such as the Catholic Church to reform; instead, we have a very atomized *umma* (global Islamic community) that desperately needs some centralization and canonization. Which is why recently Paul Marshall argued for an "Islamic counter-reformation."

Mr. Schwartz is also right in reminding us that there have been several "Reformations" in the history of Islamdom, which claimed to return to the "original sources" of Islam, but produced quite intolerant, repressive and aggressive doctrines such as Wahhabism.

However, with all due respect, I disagree on one point: A return to the "original sources," especially if that applies exclusively to the Koran, does not necessarily mean a Wahhabi-style fundamentalism. Islamic modernism, the struggle to build a new interpretation of Islam compatible with modern world, arose from the same sources but arrived at very different conclusions. One of the most notable theorists of this modernist school, Fazlur Rahman, explains why pre-modern revivalists such as the Wahhabis used ijtihad — the process of making a legal decision by independent interpretation — to foster zealotry while others used it open-mindedly:

> If these early revivalists were unwilling or unable to do much by way of ijtihad, the more forward lands of the Muslim world — Turkey, Egypt, and the Indian subcontinent — gave birth (about the middle of the nineteenth century) to the phenomenon of Islamic modernism whose representatives wrote a brilliant new chapter in the history of Islamic thought. The essence of this new thought was the creation of positive links between the thought of the Koran and modern thought at certain key points, resulting in the integration of modern institutions with the moral-social orientation of the Koran ...The great difference between the situation of the pre-modernist revivalists (or fundamentalists) and that of the modernists is that whereas the revivalists either did not find much that needed to

> be resolved by ijtihad, or were unwilling to exercise it, the modernists confronted entirely new situations which they were bold enough to attempt to resolve. [3]

In other words, social conditions had an important effect in shaping the utterly different "reform" attempts. We should also note that, among the Wahhabis and their ilk, "the rejection of intellectualism," was a powerful sentiment and this tendency, "ultimately undermined (their) calls for ijtihad, so that even these reformers became muqallidun, indiscriminate imitators of precedent." [4]

But the early modernists also had a flaw. According to Fazlur Rahman, they lacked "a methodology for a systematic and comprehensive interpretation of the Koran and the (hadith)." [5]

Today, I think, the time has come to overcome this flaw with an extensive renewal in Islam. This, as Mr. Schwartz again wisely points out, in fact has its roots in the Islamic tradition. The very word renewal, i.e. tajdid, is a part of Islamic literature.

For an extensive tajdid, there are two big steps to take. The first is to question the whole hadith tradition and abandon some of the allegedly sahih (trustable) hadiths which are against the overall spirit of the Koran and also common sense, which refers back to what I explain earlier in this article.

The second step is about the Koran. We need a hermeneutical re-reading of the Scripture, "to discover the spirit or the objectives of the Koranic teaching rather than holding mechanically to its literal meaning."[6]

Let's take a closer look at what this means.

Re-Reading the Koran

When I explained that the secondary sources of Islam are very harsh when compared with the Koran, some readers might have been suspicious. They might have thought about the "war verses," which seems to encourage violent action against non-Muslims. These verses have been a reason for deep concern among Westerners, since terrorists who act in the name of Islam quote these verses to justify their bloodshed.

But, in fact, the terrorists' interpretation of the Koran is defective. As I have explained previously, the terrorists rely on the doctrine of abrogation, which gives them false permission for neglecting the many tolerant and peaceful verses of the Koran. A better interpretation of the Koran would be to reject abrogation and accept all verses as parts of a single whole. Then we would realize that tolerant and peaceful verses ascribe to the normal state of affairs — such as that we have in the modern world — and war verses describe an abnormal situation wherein Muslims were faced with the threat of annihilation by hostile enemies.

Yet, still, there are points in the Koran that might seem unacceptable to a modern reader. These would include penalties such as lashes for adultery and libel or amputation of hands for theft. There are also verses that give women a second-class status in issues like inheritance and witnessing.

The question is do we need to seek the implementation of these verses to be good Muslims?

I have been quoting extensively from Fazlur Rahman, because he made a very refined analysis on this question and, at the end, concluded "no." Fazlur Rahman was a Pakistani born Islamic scholar who spent his later years in the University of California. He was a devout, practicing Muslim and tried to find a doctrinal solution to the clash between Islamic tradition and modernity. His major insight was the "historicity" of some parts of the Koran.

This idea of historicity means that some verses of the Koran were meant to be implemented literally only at the time they were revealed. How can one conclude that? Well, there are many self-evident cases. For example, the verses that include specific orders for the Prophet or the Prophet's wives, or tell Muslims how to speak to the Prophet, obviously have no practical field of implementation today. The verses that instruct Muslims how to treat their slaves can't be implemented since we no longer have those customs and — thank God — there is no longer slavery in the modern world. Such verses still teach us some important ethical principles, but there is no way we could effect their literal accomplishment. Similarly, Muslim armies can't build "cavalry" today, as the Koran proposed (8:60); rather we can accept this as a metaphor for military power.

This logic constitutes an innovative line of reasoning. Based on this reasoning Fazlur Rahman has argued that the Koranic verses about the legal code should be interpreted in a "from verse to principle, from principle to new legislation" formula. Such an approach is needed, he said, because there are huge differences between the time of the Koran's revelation and the modern world.

The penal code of the Koran was a perfect fit for the former time. All Koranic punishments have one feature in common: death or implementation of instant physical pain. Why? One answer might be that in central Arabia in the seventh century this was the only possible way to punish a crime. There were no prisons, and when a thief or a killer was apprehended, one could either give him some instant punishment or let him go.

But times have changed. We have correctional facilities today, and "theft" exhibits many different types and degrees that should be punished accordingly. What should we then do? According to Fazlur Rahman, what we have to infer from the Koran is that theft is a crime, and it should be punished, but the punishment can vary according to the degree of the crime and the contemporary social conditions.

This approach has in fact some roots in Islamic tradition: It is well known fact that Caliph Umar, the third most respected figure in Islam after the Prophet and Abu Bakr, did not implement the Koranic ruling on land distribution in the conquered territories of Iraq and Syria. His reason was that, if conquered lands were distributed among the conquering soldiers, as the Koran suggests, those soldiers would devolve into peasants and local peasants would starve. By this judgment, he exemplified that changing social realities can change the way we implement the Koran.

It behooves us Muslims to discuss this way of understanding the Koran. In Turkey, some modernist Islamic theologians, who publish the academic journal Islamiyat, are doing exactly this. In the footsteps of Fazlur Rahman, they are calling for a complete renewal of the shariah (Islamic law), including the Koranic rulings on the penal code, the status of women and the doctrine of war. Their work deserves attention and we Muslims should ponder on it.

The "Why" Question

Much of what I have written indicates that there is both a need and a hope for an extensive Islamic renewal.

However there is a final, and in fact, most crucial question: What for? Why in the world should we Muslims seek to renew Islam?

To prevent fanatics from killing innocents in the name of Islam? To thwart their zeal to turn our religion into a threat to humanity and civilization? Of course, these questions point to powerful answers that will appeal to every sane person in the world.

However, I have an additional answer — exclusively theist. I believe that an Islamic renewal is desperately needed to give Islam back its original and ultimate aim: leading human beings to their Creator, God. The medieval traditions or the radical interpretations in current Islam are obstacles to this sacred aim. For the religious, they are distractions of the mind from God, since hearts and minds need freedom, joy and love to praise Him, not bigotry, repression and hatred. For the non-religious, they are an obstacle to God and reason to embrace a totally profane, materialistic life. Many modernized Turks, my fellow countrymen, are just in that oblivion: Displeased with what they tend to see as a medieval, intolerant and backward religious practice, they choose to live as practical atheists — as if atheism was a tenable creed to hold.

The truth is that atheism — both in theory and practice — is an utter falsehood and a life without God is nonsensical. To give life its meaning back, at least for the 1.2 billion Muslims in the world, whether they are practicing or nominal, we must give Islam its meaning back too.

Then the ultimate message of Islam, so beautifully given in the verse below, will echo in many hearts and minds:

> Mankind! Remember God's blessing to you. Is there any creator other than God providing for you from heaven and earth? There is no god but Him. So how have you been perverted? (35:3)

References

[1] Malise Ruthven, *Islam in the World,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. P. 132.

[2] Verse 24:31, which is taken to be the basis for headscarf, in fact orders Muslim women to cover their bosoms, not their head or hair.

[3] Fazlur Rahman, "Roots of Islamic neo-Fundamentalism," in *Change and the Muslim World,* (edited by David C. Cuthell, Philip H. Stoddard, Margaret W. Sullivan), Syracuse University Press, New York, 1981. P. 27.

[4] Tamara Sonn, *Interpreting Islam: Bandali Jawzi's Islamic Intellectual History,* Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, P. 32.

[5] Fazlur Rahman, "Roots of Islamic neo-Fundamentalism," in *Change and the Muslim World,* (edited by David C. Cuthell, Philip H. Stoddard, Margaret W. Sullivan), Syracuse University Press, New York, 1981. P. 31.

[6] Ibid. P. 29.

ПОПЫТКИ ОБНОВЛЕНИЯ ИСЛАМА

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Одна из причин кризиса современного исламского мира заключается в том, что вера, как таковая, оказалась заложницей средневекового контекста. В Коране, исламском Священном Писании, в основном, речь идет о Боге, жизни после смерти и обязанностях человека перед его Создателем, то есть излагаются общие принципы. Способы применения этих принципов в жизни открыты для интерпретации, что предопределило динамическое развитие религиозной мысли в эпоху становления ислама. Однако, со временем, в исламском мире стали преобладать ортодоксальные черты, вытеснившие динамизм. Комментарии и экспертные мнения некоторых исламистов приобрели форму неоспоримых священных источников — хотя, изначально, не претендовали на это. Согласно трактовкам, выдержанным в ключе строгой ортодоксальности, были описаны все правила жизни человека, причем внимание уделялось форме, а не содержанию, в результате чего понимание отошло на второй план. Ортодоксальная традиция процветает и сегодня. Подавляющее большинство современных мусульман не имеют осмысленного отношения к Корану, беспрекословно следуя ранее сформулированным интерпретациям. Такой подход неизбежно приводит к конфликту с современным миром. Разрешить кризис может помочь обновление ислама, основанное на новом прочтении Корана. Необходимо выразить критическое отношение к политическим выступлениям радикально настроенных исламистов, в которых они используют искаженные цитаты из Корана, преследуя собственные цели. Тогда мы, мусульмане, сможем сформулировать новый, современный, толерантный и непредвзятый взгляд на традицию ислама.

THE SCAPEGOAT COMPLEX: ARCHETYPAL REFLECTIONS ON A CULTURE OF SEVERANCE

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Introduction

Troubled times bring us together under one tent. Within this canopy of nations we hear the sounds of revelry, the chants of war, the lamenting of our irretrievable losses. We bow to the mystery that brings us together because of — and in spite of our vast differences. We tune our hearing to the symphonic and cacophonic sounds of our many voices. Into this collective reverie I offer my own small voice that has been honed in the tradition of archetypal psychology.

Archetypal psychology is a psychology of the soul. It is concerned with the primal forms that inhabit our personal and collective stories. These forms or archetypes are revealed in culture where the dreams, customs, arts, rituals and myths of all peoples are manifest. The archetypal eye looks for soul — not only in beauty and peace, but in the shadows: in melancholy, tragedy, loss, disturbance and death — in the destruction of temples, the fall of towers and in the terrors of the night. In an era of extreme polarization the archetypal psychologist becomes curious about the territory framed by opposite forces.

While many psychologies look at the symptom as a personal matter, archetypal psychology is interested in collective and global symptoms as well. While many psychologies are interested in the eradication of pathology, archetypal psychology is interested in what symptoms are here to say about the forgotten or forsaken material of the psyche. This is a perspective that invites a poetic encounter with the world in all its pathos.

I come to this conversation in the hope that we might approach a global discourse with a mythic rather than a literal consciousness — that we might throw ourselves upon the practice of hearing one another with a mind tuned to the poetics of expression. Let us set aside, just for a while, the strategic, evaluative mind, focused on agreement and disagreement, right and wrong, left and right, religious and secular. We may choose to unburden ourselves in this way, not because we do not honor these discriminating aspects of mind, but because our thinking and our conversations in the context of the polarizing atmosphere of the times, are critically over–weighted in this direction. I offer this suggestion not as a solution, not as a way out of our nightmare, not as a sentimental or transcendent spin on matters of grave concern, but as a way to enter more deeply, for the sake of soul, into the foreboding and grief we share as members of a species that seems to have its sails trimmed toward destruction. In defiance of that woeful trajectory we come to willingly occupy the

forgotten corners of the global psyche. The American poet, T. S. Eliot, offers assistance in holding this quality of presence when he writes in the *Four Quartets:*

> *In order to arrive there,*
> *To arrive where you are, to get from where you are not,*
> *You must go by a way wherein there is not ecstasy.*
> *In order to arrive at what you do not know*
> *You must go by a way which is the way of ignorance.*
> *In order to possess what you do not possess*
> *You must go by the way of dispossession.*
> *In order to arrive at what you are not*
> *You must go through the way in which you are not.*
> *And what you do not know is the only thing you know*
> *And what you own is what you do not own*
> *And where you are is where you are not.*

It is my fantasy that in our sincere gatherings we might find a way to quiet our polarizing, political, literal discourse for the possibility that some new poetic might rise in our midst. At the same time it is helpful to remember that polarization is not an aberration, but an essential part of a larger process. In the ancient art of alchemy it was known as the operation of *Separatio*. Like the mythic separation of earth and sky, which provided a space for the growth and development of sentient beings, the alchemical *Separatio* evoked a psychological severing, offering space for the germination of consciousness. Edward Edinger echoes Jung when he says "one becomes conscious as one is able to contain and endure the opposites" (p.187).

With this prologue in place, I present to you, the Scapegoat as a primary archetype of severance and polarity found center stage on the world theater. I begin with the myth.

The Story of Azazel

Azazel was originally a pre-Hebraic goat god honored by herdsmen. He was connected to nature religions, and so was bound to the feminine, to the instinctual, and to sensuous beauty. When he was first introduced into the Hebrew biblical rites, he was considered a companion or aspect of Yahweh. He had a particular affinity for mortals. It was believed that he provided women with recipes for cosmetics and revealed to mortals the secrets of war. These were two divine treasures not intended to be passed on to mortals. Aggression and vanity were the prerogative of the god.

The historic Yahweh was a complex god. He was both an angry and destructive deity *and* a god of compassion and faithfulness to his people. As Yahweh transitioned to an all-loving god, the myth of Azazel, by necessity, changed as well. Someone had to take the rap for the dark aspect of the divine. An old goat makes as good

a candidate as any. As religions separated their divinities from aggressive and erotic instincts, associated with sexuality, seduction, weaponry and war, Azazel became an adversary of Yahweh, and was further distorted by Jewish patriarchs in much the same way that Christians mutilated the images of pagan figures. We can see here where the divine figure has been split off from a significant aspect of his nature. This signifies the projection of a patriarchal culture uncomfortable with its own identity. The god has lost his shadow. Azazel became Yahweh's scapegoat and was re-storied as a rebel, and reduced from a god to a fallen angel. Now Azazel, like Lucifer, is a demon, and thus a split off aspect of the god.

Once the split between the all-good god and the devil was accomplished the image and story of Azazel was further embellished. Now he approaches Yahweh with disdain for Israel. "Why have you mercy on them when they provoke you so? Rather, you should destroy them." The compassionate Yahweh replies, "If you would be among them, you would also sin." Azazel takes on the challenge and descends to live amongst humans. He becomes prey to his own instincts, falling into lust, and is punished by being sent to the wilderness, living neither with god or mortal.

Here was an aspect of the god who represented all things instinctual, feminine, juicy, sensual, beautiful, a god of the herd, deeply connected with the earth. Now with the psychological need for an utterly good and transcendent god, Azazel, now split off, comes to represent the absolute demonic, the arrogant, righteous, condemning, critical judge of human beings, whom he holds to an ideal he is unable and unwilling to live himself.

The new myth now takes him far from the earth god who understood and championed the rootedness of human beings in nature and instinct — who actually gave the secrets of the god to humans, so that they might nurture their own impulses. He has become radically evil, and now stands on the other side of divine mercy. He is an accuser devoted to a simplistic and one-sided sense of justice. He has now shifted from the scapegoat to the scapegoater. He is dogmatic, perfectionistic, contemptuous, and sadistic — projecting his own appetite for libidinous instinct onto mortals.

Out of this story rises the ancient scapegoat ritual or Yom Kippur rite. Two goats are chosen. The first is sacrificed to Yahweh for the propitiation of Israel, and offered as a blood sacrifice to cleanse the ritual space. The blood appeases the god and atones for the transgressions of the community or state. It assures a return of the spirit and the sacred ideals, which sustain the community and its relationship with the divine. This is atonement by blood. The second is sacrificed to Azazel. The sins of the people are poured onto the head of this goat. It is then taken away and sent into the desert or wilderness, bearing all the evil and guilt incurred by the community. One might say that the guilt is ritually returned to the shadowland — or the unconscious. It represents everything that has been rejected or repressed by the collective: untempered impulses, greed, aggression, and sexuality. All that is unacceptable in the eyes of a loving god is projected onto Azazel. The community can then return to a blissful and one-sided state of righteousness. This is atonement by banishment.

The Scapegoat Complex

A complex is a cluster of emotionally charged material that gathers around an archetype. It is originally formed out of the conflict between the true self and the inauthentic, socially-determined self. It is then lived out unconsciously in the individual or the culture in which it was generated.

Looking at the scapegoat complex clinically we see an individual who carries the shadow material for the family. She is burdened with the split-off, repressed and devalued aspects of the parental psyche. Growing up in a bacterial pond of shadowy perfectionism, concretism, moralism and righteousness, she identifies with the punishing and isolating elements of exile. Not having experienced a compassionate and protective containment within the family she grows up longing to be adequately held, but the guilt she carries for the collective prohibits her from feeling worthy. To add further suffering, the family member bearing the scapegoat complex often has a vision attuned to the deeper levels of the psyche. This combined with her profound connection to the Shadow in particular make her dangerous to the scapegoating parents who must at all costs, keep this material at bay. Hence some kind of banishment — physical, mental, emotional, or spiritual — or any combination of these becomes necessary.

She who carries this complex is not likely to have access to a great deal of her own memories because she has been flooded with the unacknowledged material of her forbears that will often appear symbolically in the dreamtime or in her unconscious brooding. Without an adequate therapeutic container or its equivalent, the scapegoated individual is likely to go through life recreating this family tragedy, which is now internalized in the depths of her own psyche.

Ancient rites and ceremonies of atonement were meant to excise the diseases and evils of the community to wipe away or purge sin through sacrifice, which would magically transfer the evil and guilt to another — an animal, object or person. Disposable guilt. The scapegoat ritual restored the sense of wholeness to the community and its relationship to a single patriarchal divine figure. Often it was the ugly or deformed person, the sinner or the criminal who was chosen to be sacrificed — always someone who possessed some strong attribute of otherness from the agreed upon aesthetic or ethical standard.

In family life and cultures, throughout much of the world, the scapegoat role has fallen onto girls and women. The feminine values they carry must be kept in the shadows if the patriarchy is to be sustained. Hence we experience in our culture and in many cultures throughout the world the banishment of women, the exile of the archetypal feminine to the underworld and the proliferation of a one-sided patriarchal view. The collective expels powerful feminine values, which are necessary for the proliferation of life: sustainability of cultures and food and water supplies, the freedom to collect seeds and to farm for ones family and community, the proper care of children and the elderly, fair distribution of medicine and medical care, expression in the arts and the very act of creation itself.

Because of this banishment of the feminine and the instinctual, many of our revered institutions have nurtured and embellished this one-sided approach to god and culture. The result has been a distortion and oppression of the feminine, crimes against girls and women, the proliferation of a multitude of wars, and a disregard for the animate presence of our natural world. An article by Peter Landesman in the New York Times Magazine entitled "Sex Slaves on Main Street" estimates that there are "30,000 to 50,000 teen age sex slaves in captivity in the United States at any given time." He names New York, Los Angeles, Atlanta and Chicago as the "major sex-trafficking hubs" in the country. A senior State Department adviser on trafficking says, "We're not finding victims in the Unites States because we're not looking for them." (New York Times Magazine, Jan.25, 2004) Now I ask you, what kind of homeland security is this? To banish and torture the children anywhere in the world is a grievous sin against the human spirit and the culture. It negates the power and the possibility of *eros* in the realm of the psyche and the world.

The enactment of the scapegoat ritual lives on, though secularized in the personal, familial, communal, national and global stage. Since it has lost its sacramental character it rises in the culture in the form of a complex. The Scapegoat complex has touched us all at one or more levels. Some of us grew up in scapegoating families or communities. All of us have access to both the scapegoater and the scapegoat archetype, and it is certainly alive in the on-going history of politics and world conflict. It behooves us to examine it carefully. To establish a deep understanding of any complex we must know the myth that lives behind it.

Azazel may be seen as a psychopomp, that is, one who bridges the gap between mortals and their god or gods. The Hebrews knew they were not going to be able to overcome or suppress their instinctual impulses. Yet because of Hebrew law they would endure guilt. The sins must be carried away in order for the community to thrive. This is a task, clearly too big for mortals to assume. The original intent of the scapegoat rite was to send mortal guilt on to the transpersonal realm and thus to accomplish atonement. This was sacramental enactment, which is to say that it made an actual change in the energies of the individuals participating and transformed the community itself.

The wilderness is a transitional and initiatory space, in which the individual is stripped of the old persona, meets with other-worldly emissaries, is touched by transpersonal forces, takes on a new life direction and prepares to return to the community transformed. When entered unconsciously or unwillingly it is a curse, a wasteland, a place of profound alienation, rejection, and exile where the individual or community feels outside of the realm of acceptance — homeless. They long for the containment of community and a connection with the transpersonal. It is the realm of the dark Azazel. The scapegoater has stolen the scapegoat's authentic voice and the autonomy so necessary for an engagement in a creative life. This story is psychologically relevant for families, religions, and institutions, nations and their governments, especially those ruled by a strict sense of virtuosity and moralism, perfectionism and

dogmatic justice. In these often deadening environments spontaneity, creativity, curiosity, experimentation, sensuality, expression and instinctual knowledge are banished to the wilderness. Compassion is often forgone. Under these conditions human instincts either go underground into repression or explode into aggression. The desacralization of ancient rites and the manipulation of the mythology behind them lead to distortion and pathology. So now we are left to excavate the pathologies in search of the original god or archetype. Jung said, "The gods have become our diseases."

The human being performs ritual by nature. He will always do this. If we remove the transpersonal element from our rites we will still perform them ritually through our complexes and our symptoms.

I suggest that the story of Azazel is a primary mythos of the global culture, and very particularly, the current American culture, so dominated by attitudes of righteousness, so ready to attribute blame — so unconscious of the need for atonement for its long empirical history. It is a complex gone wild in the European, American and Global psyche. It makes its way into every aspect of government, politics, and religion. It seeps into our educational systems, our day care facilities, our mental health agencies, and even into practices of birthing, parenting, and dying, once thought to be instinctual. Consider the enormous range of current literature promising to teach us how to do these things right — and thus creating entirely new categories of guilt.

To cast or project blame is to protect ourselves from our own shadow. We stand in the place of righteousness, and fail to acknowledge those aspects of ourselves hidden in our own shadow.

The scapegoating of another person or nation allows us to feel guiltless, atoned. It inoculates us against blame. Now unburdened, we can turn to our ego ideal and reestablish our place among the chosen. We are then free to place goodness in one corner (ours) and malevolence in another. Only when we catch ourselves stepping into a righteous, one-sided stance are we in a position to begin to observe our own shadow. This is a very painful thing to do. Why would we do this? Because what we keep in the shadows, in a place of forgetfulness, turns to symptom. A symptom is an untended memory. It is the voice of a forgotten or banished part of ourselves. Much of the hype of this culture is intended to steal our memories. We are drugged by distortions in media, advertising, technology, science, politics, and religion. When the conglomerate corporate media speaks for us, who will speak in our authentic voice? Each time we are seduced into the consensus reality of forgetfulness, we are further removed from our own vital story — our own memory of something embodied — something primal. Memory is the medicine of the psyche, even, and especially when the memories are dark.

This symptomatic one-sidedness lives in America in the same way it lives in the individual. From an archetypal perspective it is greatly responsible for the dis-ease that is ravaging the body and soul of America. The current structure, put solidly in place at the very founding of our country looks like: right / left, liberal / conservative, rich / poor, war / peace, liberty / oppression, freedom / terrorism, democracy / imperialism, spirit / matter, good / evil. Whatever side we are on, we know we are on the side of

right and we deny its opposite. But if we look deeply into the soul of American Democracy and into our own souls we will have to see the imperialism that has always lived side by side with our generosity of spirit and our moral strength. Oppression and terrorism over others has always been at the heart of American liberty and freedom.

Just like the patient in analysis, a nation has no hope of healing its complex unless it turns its glance to its own symptoms and pathologies. We might then notice how quick we are to project our own individual and collective darkness onto other people and nations. Not until that awareness kicks in will we begin to do the difficult work of containing the tension of opposites.

The radical fundamentalists who attacked this country on September 11th came from a one-sided position of righteousness, projecting the face of the demon onto America. The tenor of our reaction has been radical, fundamentalist, one-sided and righteous — perhaps not as much because of the content of our decisions — but because we have not stopped to look at our own demons before projecting them back. In the post 9/11 heat of a jingoistic fervor over the goodness of America, we failed to hold in equal proportion the images of our own darkness.

A psychology of the soul is highly suspicious of the one-sided view and finds meaning in the multiplicity of experience and the intimate relationship of opposites. Our American political drama values the one sided approach. It requires certainty, taking a firm, unbending position — even a dogmatic or rigid one, disseminating the factual even if the facts are incomplete, incorrect, or untrue. The notion that one might stay in the question in a state of not knowing long enough to allow multiple possibilities to unfold is becoming more and more rare on the national and world stage. If you are a public figure and you don't have an immediate answer, you had better find one or make one up fast because we are rapidly losing our tolerance for ambiguity and not-knowing. The word ambiguity comes from the Latin *ambigere,* meaning "to wander about, to lead." Some of our great leaders in the past have understood this profound connection. Buddha and Christ, Mother Jones, Martin Luther King, Gandhi and Vandanna Shiva come to mind.

On the political stage, it seems that judgments must be made quickly and acted upon quickly. Any inclination to the contrary is seen as weakness. Hence we find ourselves making irreversible choices for the world without having used the traditional avenues of careful deliberation and consultation, collaboration, contemplation, self-reflection, and sustained consideration. As a nation, we seem to have lost our capacity to tend the question. We seem to be unwilling to explore the interior regions of our own collective psyche where we would surely find the putrid fragments of a dark history unattended.

In an era as deeply unbalanced as ours, we might turn to the wisdom of the poets. John Keats promoted an attitude of "negative capability" which he understood to be our capacity as humans to reside inside uncertainty, doubt, ambiguity, and mystery without reaching for the literal, the reasonable, the factual. If we hold opposing images and ideas long enough they will surely begin to speak to us. We know this from our own deep inner-personal work. Robin Morgan speaks of this in her truly groundbreaking work entitled *The Demon Lover: the Roots of Terrorism* where she exposes the

link between militarism and the subjugation of women. As she approaches the end of the book, her writing becomes an induction — a calling forth of the banished parts of the individual, communal and world soul. She speaks from inside the mind of the collective archetypal feminine:

> Oppression, she suddenly recognizes, always structures itself along the same monotonous pattern. Oppression is predictable. What we are, she flashes, is unpredictable. Like freedom. And what we must dare become is *more* unpredictable. ...So it is not merely the absence of war but the presence of peace, not merely the absence of tragedy but the presence of comedy, not merely the absence of hate but the presence of love, not merely the absence of ignorance but the presence of intelligence, not merely the absence of death but the presence of life. And it is not merely the absence of fear but the presence of trust (p. 341).

It appears as though the spirit of our times is inviting us into a renewed relationship to the opposites and a radical change of consciousness, the likes of which Christopher Fry describes in his 1951 war drama, *A Sleep of Prisoners*:

> *The human heart can go to the lengths of God.*
> *Dark and cold we may be, but this*
> *Is no winter now. The frozen misery*
> *Of centuries breaks, cracks, begins to move;*
> *The thunder is the thunder of the floes,*
> *The thaw, the flood, the upstart Spring.*
> *Thank God our time is now when wrong*
> *Comes up to face us everywhere,*
> *Never to leave us till we take*
> *The longest stride of soul man ever took.*
> *Affairs are now soul size.*
> *The enterprise*
> *Is exploration into God.*
> *Where are you making for? It takes*
> *So many thousand years to wake,*
> *But will you wake for pity's sake!*

Those of us who have been called to a vocation in psychology know how to sit reverently and tenderly with a patient. We know how to hold the shadow — to witness the confessional material, the ravages and ruptures inherent in a particular human story. Might we, then, find it in our hearts to sit in stillness with the soul of our shattered and beloved nations? Might we witness their brutality and kindness, their grief and their joy, their greed and their generosity, their neglect and their care, their inertia and their ingenuity, their sheer stupidity and their utter brilliance, their corruption

and their integrity? Might we, by way of our collective memory help them embody their original dreams to accomplish something great on this planet?

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КОМПЛЕКС КОЗЛА ОТПУЩЕНИЯ: АРХЕТИПИЧЕСКИЕ ЧЕРТЫ «КУЛЬТУРЫ РАЗРЫВА»

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В эпоху взаимных обвинений и поляризации, охватывающих весь мир, архетип «козла отпущения» возникает из глубин коллективного бессознательного и выступает с осуждением, требуя возмездия. Когда мы проецируем обвинение на *других*, мы отгораживаемся от возможности раскрыть собственные темные побуждения и воспоминания. Лишенное религиозного смысла воспроизведение иудейского ритуала, восходящего к мифу о козле отпущения, разыгрывается сегодня на частной, национальной и мировой сцене. Для понимания любого психологического состояния, нам необходимо знать миф, который за ним стоит и ритуальное поведение, служащее ему основой. Человеку свойственно совершать ритуалы. Если совершаемые нами ритуалы будут лишены надличностного/сакрального смысла, мы по-прежнему неосознанно будем воспроизводить их в качестве индивидуальных и коллективных симптомов. Симптом — это своего рода амнезия, когда наша психика забывает о том, что существенно для ее истинной природы и связи с миром. В период мирового кризиса мы испытываем острую потребность в актуальной мифологии, отвечающей нашей потребности понимать психологию *полиса*, воспроизводящего мириады возможностей для созидания и разрушения. Подобные архетипические парадигмы раскрываются в культуре и религии, отражая мечты, обычаи, ремесла, ритуалы и мифы всех народов. В своем исследовании комплекса козла отпущения, я использую методы архетипической психологии для изучения этого устрашающего мифа, который лежит в основе наших ритуальных моделей отрыва от корней и который дает нам сегодня возможность для восстановления утраченных связей.

PSYCHE AND THE SPIRIT OF THE TIMES PANEL: TOWARDS A JUNGIAN POETICS OF CULTURAL INTIATION

Opening Remarks

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I and the three following presenters have all been involved in a community service project called "Psyche and the Spirit of the Times" initially organized around the American election of 2004. The mission statement for this series of evening discussions reads as follows:

> Electoral democracy was founded as an alternative to revolution and violence. (The recent presidential election showed that) America is highly polarized over fundamental issues of war, the economy and the environment. Most analyses of the current state of America use political and economic categories to understand what is happening. Valuable as these analyses are, they seem to miss an important level of human experience. The psychologist C.G. Jung named this level of experience "The Psyche" and provided a set of psychological categories that would allow us to enter this territory. While Jung's work is best known as a psychotherapeutic approach to individual suffering, he also provided powerful tools for understanding and addressing the suffering of the collective psyche. As Jung once said,
>
> *Our personal psychology is just a thin skin, a ripple on the ocean of collective psychology. The powerful factor, the factor which changes our whole life, which changes the surface of our known world, which makes history, is collective psychology, and collective psychology moves according to laws entirely different from those of our consciousness. The archetypes are the great decisive forces, they bring about the real events, and not our personal reasoning and practical intellect. .... The archetypal images decide the fate of man (CW 18, 371).*

Psyche and the Spirit of the Times is a series of conversations designed to help us discover analytic tools that we can use to understand the current dynamics of collective psychology and to shape our choices in response.

During these discussions we heard from practicing psychologists whose understandings of the American election are grounded not in politics or economics, but in the psyche itself. This approach can be quite disorienting to audiences who do not regularly traverse the terrain of the psyche. It locates the problems of our country not in the

killing fields of Iraq or in the polarization of our electorate or the wanton destruction of our environment or in the needs of our children, but squarely in the soul of each American. The soul is the place where imagination creates the need to exterminate "the enemies of freedom;" where we are divided between our desire for security at any cost and our desire to help our neighbors; where the environment is both an impediment to economic progress and the refuge of our soul; and where our concerns about children conflict with an urge to commit infanticide. Psychotherapists are witness to these primitive urges on a daily basis, just as they are privileged to observe how, in the most unexpected moments, grace descends upon a tortured soul and a healing occurs. However, in these community discussions we wanted to take psyche out of the privacy of the therapy room and into the public domain where we could discuss how the structure and dynamics of the psyche were operating in the American election.

The other members of this panel will share understanding of how the collective psyche influences the dynamics of contemporary culture. As for me, I want to share a dream that has guided my understanding of the transition that our global culture is undergoing. As every Jungian psychologist knows, dreams are the most direct window into the soul, and some dreams are not about our own souls, but about the soul of a people, a nation, a world. It seems appropriate that I am telling this dream at a conference organized on behalf of a UNESCO Chair, since the dream is titled "The UN Dream." It goes like this:

> *It starts with a conference dinner at the United Nations. The dignitaries are at a table on the stage, while the rest of us are at dinner tables on the main floor. As a kind of necessary diversion, the coordinators of the event decide to do a quick honoring of the sacrifice of the UN soldiers who have died in the line of duty. A camera pauses to show a snapshot of a young man in his UN uniform, surrounded by his family. Then it pulls back to show another soldier, a woman, surrounded by her loved ones. The camera continues to pull back, showing more and more pictures of soldiers who have sacrificed their lives to the cause of world peace. The conference room is filling with tears. The organizers realize that things are getting out of control, emotions are too high. Finally, in the midst of this atmosphere of profound grief, a well-respected UN leader stands up and gives a stirring speech. He says, "We are all, myself included, held in bondage by forces which we must begin to identify and break free of, that we must give form to and consume. <u>The time is now for huge international shifts of consciousness</u>." There is a final line to the speech, a real zinger that I can't make out. And then the lights go out and the room is plunged into darkness. When the lights come back on, there is confetti flying from the ceilings, a band is playing and champagne flows. It is as if nothing had happened. The people at my table look at each other with puzzled expressions. "Did you just experience what I experienced?" I tell them that I think this whole thing is part of some larger lesson plan*

As a Jungian-oriented counselor and a professor of liberal studies, I have taken this dream seriously since it came to me in 1988. This dream tells me that I am living in bondage and that only through a careful analysis and consummation of the energies that enslave me will I break free. At the same time, the culture in which I live is engaged in huge international shifts of consciousness.

One of the few places that I have heard language similar to this is in the literature of rites of passage and initiation. Often, the only way an uninitiated individual will come to therapy is when they are in terrible pain. The same is true of a culture that is seeking the redemptive power of initiation. The most recent opportunity presented to the American psyche to undergo a rite of passage was after the painful events of September 11, 2001. You may recall that the tragedy of 9/11 blew open the heart of America and a river of love poured forth. Strangers held hands and the nation was one. Soon thereafter, our leaders used their rhetorical skill to return us to the same old story of good and evil, of blame and punishment. But for a moment, a window into the soul of America exposed the potential for huge international shifts of consciousness.

And what kind of transformation of human consciousness was being called for in these events? Using the language of rites of passage, what consciousness are we being asked to die to, so that we can be reborn into something new? I tend to agree with Richard Tarnas in his book, *The Passion of the Western Mind* where he says that the trajectory of the Western mind has been an overwhelmingly masculine affair. Torn out of the feminine matrix of the earth, the questing ego of the Western mind has been founded upon the repression of the feminine in all its forms, whether as nature, mystery, imagination, ambiguity, emotion, community, or women themselves. The one-sidedness of this position is calling for compensation. The ego longs for reunion with what has been lost, the ground of its own being. In words akin to those used by the vision quest, Tarnas says,

> *...to achieve this reintegration of the repressed feminine, the masculine must undergo a sacrifice, an ego death. The Western mind must be willing to open itself to a reality the nature of which could shatter its most established beliefs about itself and about the world. This is where the real act of heroism is going to be. A threshold must now be crossed, a threshold demanding a courageous act of faith, of imagination, of trust in a larger and more complex reality; a threshold, moreover, demanding an act of unflinching self-discernment. And this is the great challenge of our time, the evolutionary imperative for the masculine to see through and overcome its hubris and one-sidedness, to own its unconscious shadow, to choose to enter into a fundamentally new relationship of mutuality with the feminine in all its forms. This is the great challenge, but I believe it is one the Western mind has been slowly preparing itself to meet for its entire existence (p. 444).*

My question to participants in this track on "Being in Transition" track is how can we create the cultural containers in which this kind of initiation can take place without the violence that tends to accompany such transitions? Images of liberation abound in the mythologies of our culture, which all demand a sacrifice, an ego death. How do we prepare the initiatory threshold for such a sacrifice?

Terrill GIBSON
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> *If the U.S. can find ways to turn arrogance into humility, I think it will take a step toward a dramatically new psychological attitude, probably the only one capable of stopping the persecutory scapegoating of everything which is American* (Zoja, 48).

Last summer I walked over a hundred miles along the Camino — the archaic path to Santiago de Compestello taken by pilgrims from Paris, Arles, Vezalez, Lisbon, Seville since the Middle Ages to seek healing for bodily, psychological and spiritual wounds. The Camino is a medicine path known to the venerable Celts who walked due West in Northern Spain to see the sun set in the Western seas at the solstice. Believing that in being bathed in the azure flash of those days at Finnesterra (Land's End) that the Goddess would grant special healing favors.

The Camino traverses the fault line between four tectonic plates of culture — Celtic, Muslim, Jewish and Christian. At the height of Saracen Spain and its cultural preeminence, there was a mood of theological tolerance where a remarkable blending of the best of the softer, feminine, mystical side of the Western mysticisms permitted themselves to be influenced by the ancient goddess of these soils. The precious tri-petal lotus of Catharism, Kabbala and Sufism flourished here in the Andalusian sun. Its violent end in the medieval "Reconquista" let loose laments and sorrows that I could still feel in every step on this sacred ground. It was a loss of tolerant Islamic Andalusian beauty that Hechmi Dhaoui, the one Jungian Muslim analyst I know of, says modern Muslims still grieve the deepest, perhaps, of all their modern losses and wounds (Zoja, 117–180).

I walked this ancient route, as I have various portions of it for over two decades now, to grieve with that landscape. For I believe the Camino was an initiatory path, a path that allowed the soul — both individual and collective, to open up and heal. And I believe as Jung did that we have lost this way. We wander no longer able to find the doorway into ancient precincts of individual and cultural soul. Further, I believe that unless we rediscover these portals and enter them with transparent humility — again both individually and collectively — the species and maybe the planet are in grave danger. We are at the front end of a massive shift in these mythic, psycho-spiritual, and cultural telluric plates of being. This shift will probably last

a thousand years or longer — if we can stay awake and calm enough to serve its destiny.

Such deep, tectonic initiation demands sacrifice. It demands that we integrate the opposite, unexplored aspects of our being. For some, this means intellect (*sacrificium intellectus*) must be sacrificed to body. For others body (*sacrificium vagina / phalli*) to intellect. For some, masculine must surrender to feminine. For others, feminine to masculine. For some, the warrior function to the poet. For others, poet to warrior. And all of this submission is done in the service of revealing the molten, regenerative sorrow that lies at the heart of Jung's vision of the Psyche. It all costs blood. It is all bathed in blood. It demands whatever is most precious of us. It demands payment in full. Ultimately, it demands our life.

> The soul first made itself through killing. It killed itself into being. That is why I consider sacrificial killing as primordial soul-making (Wolgang Giegerich [Beebe, 287]).

Again, I repeat blood sacrifice is apparently necessary — at both individual and collective levels — to constellate this healing alchemy of Psyche. We must surrender voluntarily what is most precious to us. The reality and necessity of such redemptive suffering gets our attention often in moments of extreme crisis. The cultural catastrophes surrounding the Nazi Shoah, the Cambodian holocaust, the recent Tsunami, and, in this country, the loss of Martin Luther King, Abraham Lincoln, both Kennedy's, and now 9/11 produced Zen moments of harsh Satori. Moments that got under our Chronos (clock-time)-dominated logos, and dug deep beneath our driven, cruel rage and terror, to a Kairos (numinous-time)-bathed moist, Eros-rich, redemptive sorrow. Apparently only such vibrant, strenuous sacrifice gets under the iron of our brooding contempt for ourselves, for others, and this world. The only way through this savage wilderness of self-and-other hate is an initiatory way. The American culture is still in the fresh thrall of just such an initiatory moment of opportunity — 9/11 — that we are rapidly squandering. But there is still time for us to make the required voluntarily sacrifices of blood and soul.

Sylvain Chomet last year presented a wonderful animated cinema confection entitled *The Triplets of Bellevue*. It is the story of a grandmother's dogged efforts to bring her orphaned grandson back to life after his trauma of enormous primal loss. She tries everything — toys, activities, a dog — nothing avails until she notices his attraction to a bicycle. Imaginatively and creatively grasping (as Crones are wont to do) at any slender thread thrown up by fate, the grandmother becomes her grandson's road-cycling coach. She enters him in an event like the Tour de France. Though he slogs far behind the field, he nonetheless slogs on. Silent — but slogging. Like the crushed-core wounded patriarchy he signifies, the grandson is silent and overwhelmed throughout the entire film. But he faithfully slogs. That is, until he is snatched from the race by Mafia guys in a sinister van.

I won't trouble you with the incredible details of how our invincible Crone impounds a recreational pedal boat to follow, across the seas, the giant freighter carting away her beloved grandson. But I do want you to join me envisioning her peddling into the harbor of Bellevue — a very thinly veiled analogy to New York City and our post 9/11 crisis. The Crone and her faithful dog find no food, friends, or fellowship in this bustling, manic place whose Chronos pace hides its homeless Kairos sorrows. Darkness falls and the starving pair hovers under a bridge abutment around a fire she has scratched up from the earth. A ship glides by and sounds it harbor horn — wooonnnggg, wooonnnngggg. The Crone likes the sound. She picks up a bent Chronos bicycle wheel and sights it twisted edges. Then she picks up two sticks and mimics the sound — woooonnnggg, wooooonnnnnnggg. She begins a little rhythm. Soon a nice breezy spoke-reggae is whirling magically from the now transformed Kairos wheel.

Then shadowy figures are drawn to the light of her fire and the music. Big, dark feet begin to tap. The camera rises slowly to show the visages of three, tall, lithe ancient crones. They begin to snap their fingers and intone. It is the harmony of the reggae gods. It is crone street doo-wop and we are transported. There in the bowels of our feckless postmodern urban hells, crones still have the courage and body to sing and boogey joyously. That is what initiated people do for lost cities and cultures. That is what I hope they are doing for us as we struggle to find our way back to Kairos, divine time, the pure heart of love and peace in our sometimes very dark times.

The crone is the initiating mentor waiting at the back of this conference room today. She offers us an opportunity for a redemptive martyrdom. She ask us to let our self-and-other contempt die. She asks us to convert it into wonder, awe... into song and fire under a lonely, inner city bridge.

Initiation, Her initiation, offers syn-thesis [Zoja, 36] — something more than just uniting the twin poles of the opposites (eg. life and death, masculine and feminine). Initiation offers the potential hopeful visitation of the alchemical *tertiam non datur* — the third unseen, the Crone. Can we hold on to Her Compassionate visitations in recent years and not convert it back to our old defensive rages and terrors — both personally and culturally? The Gods are eagerly awaiting our reply.

The full-globed moon arose, and then
The women stood
As though around an altar.

Sappho

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IN THE SHADOW OF POWER AND EROS: THE CASSANDRA COMPLEX AND PSYCHIC NUMBING

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Premise: Psychological / Spiritual experience seems to be taking place in a different dimension than the concerns of material culture — but to what extent does this dimension shape / affect our inter-relation with the material realm and action in the realm of political concerns?

I would like to address one of the outcomes of participating in the Psyche & Spirit of the Times series of community dialogues. The intention of this series was to examine the psychic tensions, archetypes, and shadows constellating in the American culture prior to and just following the Nov. 2nd, 2004 election. One outcome was an overwhelming feeling of lament for what was not valued in the culture at large. There was a feeling of helplessness, a sense that it was not possible to share our experience of what was happening in the collective with those who did not have an orientation in the dimension of psyche and the soul of the world. In a conversation after the November 5th meeting of Psyche and the Spirit of the Times, Randy Morris, one of the organizers, reflected that when talking to those who did not share an orientation to the psychic dimension of collective experience, he felt like Cassandra. At that moment I think those present realized that Randy had identified a psychological complex, and if these discussions had, in fact, constellated a complex, this was an invitation to explore the persona and voice of Cassandra.

In Jungian terms, a complex represents an archetype, or psychic form, which has developed to such an extent that it "possesses a value that sometimes exceeds that of our conscious intentions." As Jung says, we do not 'have' a complex, the complex 'has' us. A complex is

> ...the *image* of a certain psychic situation which is strongly accentuated emotionally and is, moreover, incompatible with the habitual attitude of consciousness. This image has a powerful inner coherence, it has its own wholeness and, in addition, a relatively high degree of autonomy, so that it is subject to the control of the conscious mind to only a limited extent, and therefore behaves like an animated foreign body in the sphere of consciousness. The complex can usually be suppressed with an effort of will, but not argued out of existence, and at the first suitable opportunity it reappears in all its original strength (Jung *CW* 8, par. 200–201).

Complexes are psyche's way of restoring wholeness and so point to an imbalance which is an inevitable result of a consciously willed one-sidedness (*CW* 8,

par. 255). Complexes are accompanied by psychological suffering, a "symptom of a wrong attitude assumed by the total personality" (*CW* 8, par. 684). I would like to suggest that the "wrong attitude" currently assumed in the American culture, which is inducing the Cassandra archetype, is an inability to integrate the shadow aspects of power and eros. Power and eros are vast shadow realms and impossible to fully explore here, but I will briefly outline what this shadow realm looks and feels like so as to better recognize the attitude which, by resisting transformation, intensifies the conflict of opposites within the personal and collective psyche.

Cassandra represents the tension between Psyche and Polis. Cassandra's vision of WAR and TERROR at home (Troy and Mycenae) cannot be seen by those who live there. Cassandra's vision is direct, unmediated by Apollonian constraints, but her truth-filled vision (a type of clairvoyance) is not believed. Cassandra attributes this lack of her culture's affirmation of her truth to her inability to engage in a rhetorical, i. e., Apollonian, speech of persuasion, and she understands this to be her curse. So the wrong attitude or disbelief in the collective psyche is represented as the incapacity to believe Cassandra's truth, which results in the polarization of two different embodied states of reality. Transformation from one embodied state to another (in modern culture, from a strictly materialistic awareness of reality to an awareness that includes the psychological / spiritual dimension) requires an expanding, deepening perception that envelops one's whole being, including senses, intellect, imagination, soul. The 'light' of this shift from the shadows of unconsciousness can be somatically unbearable, and this subtly experienced apprehension contributes to the pain and horror so feared by the chorus of the Polis.

The most fully explored version of Cassandra's persona and extraordinary visionary capacities is found in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, a tragedy that is part of the *Oresteia* trilogy, first performed in 458 B.C. at the Athenian tragic festival.

Briefly, Cassandra represents a continuum of prophetic insight in the royal house of the Trojan king, Priam. Cassandra warned the Trojans about the true identity of Paris, her brother, as the destroyer of Ilium, as had the dream of Hecuba, her mother, just prior to the birth of Paris. Hecuba's prophetic knowledge was in the form of a dream...not her daytime consciousness. Hecuba's dream was believed; Cassandra's warning was not. In the first phase of her legend, Cassandra's knowledge (rejected by the *Polis*) is that the Gods are not on the side of the state (Troy) and that the destruction of the state comes from within. In the second phase, Cassandra's visionary powers reveal the terrible history of infanticide within the family (the descendants of Pelops) as well as the immediate future of Clytemaestra's murderous revenge on Agamemnon and herself. Aeschylus characterizes Cassandra as manic and mantic. Cassandra's prophetic knowledge is not believed by others because of the Apollonian curse, which is a rage against what is felt to be a betrayal of eros by the feminine. Apollo cursed Cassandra when she refused to be his consort after she had received his gift of mantic skill.

Why is Cassandra's truth so fiercely resisted? According to Jung, sensation, feeling, thinking, intuition are the four possible orientations of consciousness. Truth is a confluence of all of these orientations and so has an affective (sensation & feeling) level. Intuition detects what takes place in Space-Time relationships (*CW* 8 par 257). Intuition is the orientation that Cassandra follows. Cassandra gives voice to what cannot be seen, the darkest intuitions of the human soul, and she is not believed because of fear, a natural human fear of Death, of Terror, of Madness, of Murderous Rage. This fear results in Psychic Numbing. In the life and psyche of the *Polis*, represented in the play by the Chorus, pseudo-rationality takes the place of the intuitive capacity in consciousness. Psychic numbing is a response to the horror of the human psychological shadow — the horror of war, ecological devastation, and inhumane economic and social policies. To end this numbing and enter the shadow evokes perplexity, pain, and wonder.

How does Cassandra eventually convince the chorus of the truth of her words? Cassandra's role is to be unheard, but by living in the lacunas or emptiness of the cultural forms, her role also gives shape — mantic, feminine, and 'alien' shape — to an emergent consciousness, thus creating transformative energy for those around her. As one follows the experience of the chorus, one experiences Cassandra's pain and stays in the terror of the visionary threshold, which opens the realm of truth and belief to include the horror of murderous rage and the betrayal of love. The numbness melts into a new attitude. In the play, the pain of disintegration is poetically represented in changing rhythms of song and word in the interchanges between the chorus and Cassandra who are embodying the changes in the morphic field of presence performed on stage.

What can we learn from Cassandra's experience? In the space-time dimension of intuitive awareness, the Polis learns to bear the RUPTURE OF CHRONICITY[1] and the Psychic Manifestations of the Imaginal which bring light to a Universal History.[2] The reception of the new consciousness is painful — there is such emptiness where the soul cannot permeate — but once the soul is able to permeate this rupture, there is health and wholeness.[3] In the liminal threshold, reality is experienced as a dream, as *alter*. When the Chorus shares and endures the horror, they can see the shadows and the denseness, the unordinary in the light of consciousness. The Chorus now shares with Cassandra the same qualitative state of space and time. From this we learn that individuals cannot be contemporaneous if they are in qualitatively different states of space-time, because the difference in *qualia* results in different embodied states of affect. If one is speaking from psyche's dimension, one will not be understood/heard in a culture that does not share an awareness of a reality that mediates shadow. The non-egoist forms that echo in the crevices are passed over by Power and Eros.

Cassandra compensated the attitude of the Polis and brought forth a new attitude. In the American culture, who or what are the carriers of the compensatory role of psychic intuition? What do we, as modern citizens of the world, represent when we enter this role, which seems to emerge as a type of complex? How can we be in this place and still be an integral part of the world? A question worth exploring, be-

cause without a hermetic connection between consciousness and shadow material, consciousness becomes deluded, one-sided, and vulnerable to reversals of fortune, catastrophe, and other events that undermine and overthrow the tenuous sense of order. An order that naturally defends itself against the reality of forces that become greater the more they are resisted.

How can two individuals occupy the same space and yet be having two completely different experiences of reality, to such an extent that there may be a sharing of the material cosmos but no consensus reality? There may be a sharing of the dimension of space, but a disjunction in the qualitative dimensions of time. This qualitative aspect in time is experienced by psyche as a feeling of past, present, and future. Without an agreement on what constitutes past, present, and future, there can be no sense of shared identity or community life.

What does it feel like to be living in a culture that says "no" to a vision of reality that encompasses and affirms the personal, individual psyche in its inter-relationship to the collective psyche as well as the soul of the world?[4] If Cassandra's experience is analogized as a collective predicament, how is it possible to release Cassandra from living a life in disjunction from her culture, the world? What are the barriers between two qualitatively different experiences of reality? In order for Cassandra's vision — which represents the shadow of war, of familial bonds, of power and the feminine in relation to the male — to be integrated into collective consciousness, there must be a change in the collective capacity to experience the impersonal, shadow aspects in a subjective way.

To enter consciously into the experience of fear, betrayal, and death is to reverse the regressive effects of terror which paralyze the will to follow the life flow of the 'dark' instincts once loosened from the stasis of one-sidedness. Just as Cassandra does not deny the fluidity of her vision, a lived experience, it is possible for a healing development to take place by qualitatively experiencing psyche's presence as it manifests in her spoken visions. Visions that say the psyche speaks in signs and symbols and creates the adaptive forms which draw human nature into the rich abundance of the *qualia* of subjective reality, individually and collectively.

Archetypal and depth psychology provide the forms for the modern person to stay in connection with the shadows that are cast by our attachments and longings, the unconscious gods that bring health and illness. A consciousness of the dimension of personal and collective experience called psyche is the antidote to a consciousness that is caught in a recursive complex of opposing visions of past, present, and future. It is in this psychic dimension that subjective experience can be shared. A different quality of time also creates a different space: for Cassandra, spirits are visible, tangible, and manifest. It is essential that collectively the subjective experience of psyche be shared if this is the dimension that informs the objective experience of the natural world. The willful choice of turning away from the mantic feminine and surrendering to Apollonian constraints ultimately results in a regression of consciousness, and we enter the chamber of soul's murder and betrayal.

NOTES

[1] Gilbert Durand, "Exploration of the Imaginal," *Spring* (1971):89.

[2] See Rupert Sheldrake, "Part I: Mind, Memory, and Archetype: Morphic Resonance and the Collective Unconscious," *Psychological Perspectives* (1997):<<http:www.sheldrake.org/articles/pdf/44.pdf>> . Memory as morphic resonance is not 'stored inside the brain', complementing Jung's postulation of the collective unconscious.

[3] Also see p. 89, Wolfgang Giegerich, "Advent of the Guest," *Spring* 51 (1991):86–106.

[4] See Henry Corbin's description of the *no* that is spoken against consensus reality in "The Time of Eranos," *Man and Time: Papers from the Eranos Yearbook*, Bollingen series XXX, 1957. Translated from the French by Willard R. Trask. (First presented at the 1951 meeting of Eranos.)

"The caricature of our own Image (Ivan Karamazov seeing himself in the looking glass) fills us with all the more terror because we have nothing to oppose to it except precisely our own features, which it mirrors to us in caricature. Now, it is impossible to compete with and against a scientific, materialistic, and atheistic socialization by a conformism of well-meaning people who can find no justification for their being except in their social activity nor any foundation for their knowledge except the 'social sciences.' The *no* that must be cried aloud proceeds from a different imperative. It draws its energy from the lightning flash whose vertical joins heaven with earth, not from some horizontal line of force that loses itself in a limitlessness from which no meaning arises. For what is called "evolution" would have *meaning* only on the cosmic scale; but our philosophers are too serious to make themselves responsible for the curiosity that is, at most, excusable in Gnostics and Orientals." (XVIII)

Closing Remarks

George McGrath CALLAN
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What is the soulful song of a society in transition? I begin with one of my favorite stories of how the divine feminine moves in the presence of *eros*. I found it in Robin Morgan's classic feminist text, *The Demon Lover: The roots of terrorism*.

In Kausani, a small Indian village in the Himalayas, mountain women have organized to preserve the environment and to make themselves self-sufficient (which they understand to be one and the same thing). This is a poor region where there is one gynecologist for 300,000 women. In 1974 the Chipko Movement originated when 24 women began embracing trees to protect them from commercial logging. These women have mobilized against deforestation, mining, and the sale of liquor in the hills, which they say promotes battery. They have persisted and succeeded in many ways with tactics that have been called both magical and mad.

The story goes like this: To support the loggers, the government sent in troops to shoot anyone embracing trees. The women did not budge and the troops, ashamed to fire, retreated. Next the government, in collaboration with the loggers, sent in elephants to trample them. The mammoth animals moved forward on command. The women left the trees and approached the elephants singing a ritual song that Hindu women sing at the festival of Ganesha, the elephant-headed god. These were military elephants, not temple elephants. The women embraced the elephants trunks and legs, singing.

Morgan asks:

> Was this a tactic or a prayer? Did the women believe in an elephant god? Did they think they were performing a religious ritual and might evoke a miracle? Or did they hope pragmatically that their actions would shame the elephant drivers as it had the soldiers? Or did they act in this manner simply because retreat was unthinkable and they saw no other option? (p. 339)

Well, the women just won't say. But witnesses tell us that the elephants stopped and knelt. They could not be moved. The troops and the loggers drew back, humiliated, and acknowledged defeat in the face of a small band of women hugging trees. Bina Kala, a women's organizer from the region explains "When awakened, Hindu goddesses are known to be more powerful and awesome than their male counterparts. Women here have now become conscious of their *shakti* (energy). They will exercise it whenever necessary." (p. 239)

Maya Angelou, our beloved African American poet, says, "Women should be tough, tender, laugh as much as possible, and live long lives. The struggle for equal-

ity continues unabated, and the woman warrior who is armed with wit and courage will be among the first to celebrate victory." (p. 7)

A patriarchal state is one that is recovering from war, at war, or devising war. Its primary value is power, automated by greed, and its gains and losses are concrete and marketable. There is a high correlation between a violent society and the oppression of women and feminine values.

A culture that honors the feminine aspect of psyche would be one that welcomes the gifts of both feminine and masculine principles. It would sustain a politics of aesthetics and hospitalit*y*. A society which relies on the feminine spirit would be a planetary society — one that protects, with wisdom and care, its brilliant civilizations, its vital ecosystems, its ancient and progenerative seeds, and the genetic structures of life. It would be one that deeply honors local self-sufficiency, farming practices, and other life-affirming enterprises, and promotes self-respect among nations and peoples. It would never presume to deny a nation or village sovereignty over its own land and water. It most certainly would be one that strives to provide food and shelter, health and education for all the world's children. A society imbued with the feminine spirit would evoke, with the fire of the chanting beads and the power of Elephant, a politics of *eros*.

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ПСИХИКА И ДУХ ВРЕМЕНИ: К ЮНГИАНСКОЙ ПОЭТИКЕ КУЛЬТУРНОЙ ИНИЦИАЦИИ

Дискуссия «Душа и дух времени: к юнгианской поэтике культурного перехода» посвящена подведению итогов работы группы американских исследователей над проектом «Душа и дух времен».

Целью проекта было изучение современного американского общества не в системе политических и экономических категорий, а на уровне опыта человеческого существования. При постановке этой цели ученые руководствовались тезисом К. Г. Юнга о том, что «мощным фактором, оказывающим влияние на всю нашу жизнь, на облик известного нам мира, значительным в деле претворения истории является коллективная психология, и коллективная психология строится на совсем иных законах, чем законы сознания».

Анализ роли архетипов в судьбах современной американской культуры и явился основной задачей группы исследователей в рамках данного проекта.

Первым из четверых докладчиков выступил Рэнди Моррис. Он представил публике общую информацию о проекте, он охарактеризовал современную ситуацию в американской (и европейской) культуре как внутренний конфликт между мужским и женским началом, возникший вследствие их дисгармонии на заре европейской культуры и продолжающий нарастать до настоящего времени. По мнению Р. Морриса, в настоящее время происходит переход к новому соотношению этих начал. Как следствие указанного перехода, возникает потребность в жертве, подобно тому, как это бывает во время обрядов инициации. Задачу, стоящую перед современным обществом, Р. Моррис видит в поиске наименее болезненных способов подобного перехода.

Следующий докладчик — Тэррил Гибсон — говорил о том, что механизмы переходности утрачены в современной культуре, и их отсутствие несет потенциальную угрозу гибели всего живого на планете. По его мнению, в кризисные моменты истории человечество получает шанс постижения своих ошибок и просветления через некую искупительную жертву — это самое дорогое, что у нас есть...

Проблему американского общества следующая докладчица — Констанс Айхенлауб — видит в неспособности проникнуть в теневые сферы силы и эроса, которая проистекает из дисгармонии в познании действительности. Постигаемое интуитивно, но не воспринимаемое чувственно начало жизни вызывает недоверие и неверие у людей в силу их склонности делать сознательный выбор. Согласно мнению К. Айхенлауб, необходимы перемены в сознании, которые приведут к исцелению души современного человека. Чувство времени должно быть освоено наравне с чувством места, и тогда познание — чувственное, разумное и интуитивное — окажется гармоничным.

Джордж МакГрэс Келлен — последний из докладчиков — предлагает альтернативу современному маскулинному обществу, которое «оправляется от прошедшей войны, воюет или замышляет войну, обществу основанному на власти, движимой алчностью; обществу, достижения и потери которого ликвидны и подсчитываемы». Этой альтернативой является общество с гармонизированными маскулинным и фемининным началами — гармоничное общество будущего.

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY CULTURE

The discussion involved live video conferencing with the Russian Humanities University in Moscow

Moderators:
Liubava Moreva: National Officer of Culture, Moscow UNESCO Office
Steven Shankman: Director, Oregon Humanities Institute, University of Oregon
Stephen Erickson: Professor of Philosophy, Pomona College

Co-moderators in Moscow :
Mr. Philippe Quéau, Director, UNESCO Moscow Office
Mr. Kuvshinov Serguey Victorovich, Professor, Vice-Rector, Department of Computer Education and New Technologies, Russian State University for Humanities
Mrs. Astafieva Olga Nikolaevna, Professor, Deputy Director, Chair for Cultural Studies, Russian Academy for Civil Service under President of RF

List of participants

MOSCOW, RUSSIA

[English-speaking section]

Delokarov Kadyrbeck Hadjumarovich — Professor, Deputy Director, Chair of Philosophy, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Horuzhiy Serguey Sergeevich** — Professor, Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences; **Namiestnikova Irina Victorovna** — Professor, Chair of Philosophy, Moscow Social-Humanitarian Academy; **Nazaretian Akop Pogosovich** — Professor, Institute for Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences; **Nikanorova Ekaterina Vasilievna** — Professor, Deputy Director, Moscow State Library; **Siliaeva Elena Grigorievna** — Professor, Chair for Practical Psychology, Moscow Social-Humanitarian Academy; **Sayko Eddy Victorovna** — Professor, Chair of Acmeology and Psychology of Professional Activities, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Serebrianiy Sergey Dmitrievich** — Professor, Russian State University for Humanities; **Zhidkov Vladimir Sergeevich** — Professor, Chief, Department of Human & Social Sciences, Russian Foundation for Basic Research; Head of Department, Institute for Arts Studies at the Ministry of Culture; **Pelipenko Andrey Anatolievich** —

Doctor of Philosophy, Russian Institute of Cultural Research; **Timashkov Aleksey Yurievich** — Researcher and Interpreter, Russian Institute for Cultural Research, St. Petersburg; **Luniaev Euvgeniy Viktorovich** — Researcher, Russian Institute for Cultural Research, St. Petersburg; **Yaroslavtseva Elena Ivanovna** — Institute for Human Studies, the Russian Academy of Sciences.

[Russian-speaking Section]

Avanesova Galina Alekseevna — Professor, Chair of Cultural Studies, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Akilina Maria Ivanovna** — Head of Department, Russian State Library; **Andriyanenko Svetlana Nizamievna** — Post-graduate Student, Chair of Cultural Studies, The Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Afanasieva N.V.**- Post-graduate Student, Chair of Cultural Studies, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Bogatyriova Tatyana Georgievna** — Professor, Deputy Director, Chair of Cultural Studies, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Bulavina Dina Maratovna** — Post-graduate Student, the Chair of Cultural Studies, Russian Academy for Civil Service: **Vasilenko Liudmila Aleksandrovna** — professor, Deputy Director, Chair on Social Systems and Antimonopoly Policies, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Volovik I.V.** — Post-graduate Student, Chair of Cultural Studies, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Godovanets Yury Anatolievich** — Deputy Director, Ministry of Culture and Mass Media of RF; **Dashdamirov A.** — Professor, Chair on Regional and Federative Policies, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Didenko F**. — Post-graduate Student, Chair of Cultural Studies, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Dyachenko Lidia Nikolaevna** — Deputy Director, Department of National Policy, Ministry for Regional Development, RF; **Esayan Edgar Aramovich** — Post-graduate Student, Chair of Cultural Studies, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Zamay Vera Vasilievna** — Adviser, State Committee on Statistics of RF; **Zacharova Oksana Aleksandrovna** — Post-graduate Student, Chair of Cultural Studies, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Ivasheikcov D.**; **Kamishev E.** — Post-graduate Student, Chair of Cultural Studies, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Kolodovnikov Vladimir Ivanovich** — Director of International Center, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Maligina Irina Victorovna** — Head, Chair of Aesthetics and Theory of Culture, Moscow State University of Culture and Arts; **Mamiedov Nizami Mustafaevich** — Professor, Deputy Director, Chair on Ecology, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Matveeva Zhanna Aleksandrovna** — Post-graduate Student, Chair of Cultural Studies, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Munkozhangalov Dashi** — Post-graduate Student, Chair of Cultural Studies, Russian Academy for Civil Service: **Nickulichev Yury Vladimirovich** — Researcher, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Pavlovich Anna Aleksandrovna** — Post-graduate Student, Chair of Cultural Studies, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Raykova G**. — Head of Department, Russian State Library; **Razmustova Tatyana Olegovna** — Researcher, Russian Institute for Cultural Studies; **Ryba-**

kova Irina Nikolaevna — Assistant Professor, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Sayko Elena Anatolievna** — Assistant Professor, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Samutina Irina** — Chief Editor, Magazine "Herald of Eurasia"; **Surina Tamara Michailovna** — Professor, Russian Academy for Civil Service; **Skudnova O.U.** — Assistant Professor, Russian Academy for Civil Service; Stolyarov A., writer; **Yaroslavtseva Diana Aleksandrovna** — Student, Moscow State Pedagogical University, and others.

List of participants

SEATTLE, USA

Sadruddin Boga — Core faculty, Antioch Center for Creative Change, Antioch University Seattle; **Erica Lilleleht** — Professor of Psychology, Seattle University; **Seyyed Hassan Hosseini** — Professor of Philosophy of Science, University of Technology, Tehran, Iran; **Rev. John Boonstra** — Executive Minister, Washington Association of Churches; **Constance Eichenlaub** — Educational Programmer, Seattle Jungian Society; **Thao Nguyen** — Professor of Psychology and Asian Studies, Seattle University; **Peter Saeverin** — Lecturer, Private University Witten/Herdecke, Germany; **Louay Safi** — Executive Director, ISNA Leadership Development Center; **Skye Burn** — Associate member, UNESCO Chair on Comparative Studies of Spiritual Traditions, Their Specific Cultures and Interreligious Dialogue; Project Director, Network for Peace, **Mustafa Akyol** — Intercultural Dialogue Platform, branch of the Journalist & Writers Foundation, Turkey; **Roger Alan DeWitt** — Anthropology Chair, Aims Community College, Iowa; **David Marshak** — Professor in College of Education, Seattle University; **Stephen Rowe** — Professor of Philosophy, Grand Valley State University, Michigan; **Stanley Tweyman** — Professor of Philosophy and Humanities, York University, Toronto, Canada; **Jeff Shires** — Assistant Professor of Communication, Purdue University North Central; **Donald Mihaloew** — Licensed Marriage & Family Therapist, Western Institute of Family Practice; **Mehret Mehanzel** — Graduate student, University of Washington School of Social Work; **Anthony Mansueto** — President, Seeking Wisdom; teaches philosophy, religious studies, and history at the University of New Mexico — Gallup; **Carol Hiltner** — Artist and writer; **Stephen Jacobsen** — Pastor and "reflective practitioner" in the area of spirituality, culture, and society; **Ryan Laine** — Student, Evergreen College; **Alicia Batten** — Community member; **Harley Arnold** — Community member; **Pauline Erickson** — Community member; **Patricia Bruce** — Graphic artist; **MaSanda LaRa** — Founder and President, HeartVisions; **Nathaniel Burn** — Civil Engineer; **Rev. Joyce Manson** — Presbyterian Clergywoman, Interfaith Relations; **Mrinal Roy** — Asia Pacific Task Force, Church Council of Greater Seattle; **Adam LeMieux** — Student,

Central Washington University; **David Laws** — Graduate student, Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington; **Irene Diamond** — Professor of Political Science, University of Oregon; **Erin Markel** — Student of Political Science, University of Oregon; **Randy Morris** — Core faculty, Antioch University/ Seattle, in the history of ideas and depth psychology; **George Callan** — Depth psychologist, educator, mentor and writer; **H. Skip Bassford** — President; Professor of Philosophy, University College of the Fraser Valley, **D. Spivak** — Director, St.Petersburg branch, Russian Institute of Cultural Research.

ROUND TABLE INITIAL CONCEPT

1. One of the main tasks of today's thought is to realize clearly where we are in the on-going process of evolution. Who we are? Where we are going? The various definitions of our time as the era of the "new world order", "clear–cut frontier" or "the age of bifurcation" merely point to the fact of change but do not show its essence. Civilization as a system of certain basic principles (as opposed to the principles of the primeval stage of human development), having a distinct vector of development and distinct stages of historical development, such as antiquity, middle ages, modernity, etc., does crumble. The present civilization began some 6,000 years ago and it is coming to its end in our times. What are the main trends characteristic of the emerging society?
2. For philosophers, there is no doubt that the first *philosophical challenge* in making sense of the dynamics of contemporary culture is the dynamics itself, which are not yet interpreted or understood philosophically. The traditional view conceives of cultural dynamics as a projection of social and historical dynamics, which in the present-day situation means the dominant cultural phenomena and mechanisms are primarily attributed to the globalization processes. Such an approach is neither mistaken nor fruitless: it can explain quite well, for example, the growth and encouragement of multiculturalism. However, this understanding is incomplete, for mainly the outer features of the cultural dynamics are rooted in globalization. As for the inner features, the essence and nature of the dynamics of contemporary culture, to my mind, are connected more intimately, not with the globalization, but rather with anthropologization or an «anthropological turn»: i.e. passing of the principal role in world dynamics to its anthropological level: to *what happens to Human Person*. The era of primacy of Big Systems — tribes, states, nations, or macroeconomic monsters — is coming to its close. The challenge of the Third millennium is the anthropological challenge.
3. Today we observe the fact that in the "engine of change", with its dialectics of differentiation and integration, the processes of integration become much more active than the processes of differentiation.
4. In today's world we clearly observe that the universal trends of integration and disintegration are represented by the paradigms of *globalization and postmod-*

ern. They act together, in each specific case forming a unique cultural entity with its own values and ideas.

5. One of the fundamental challenges of the modern world is that of globalization which has radically transformed the basic "meanings" of modern civilization. Under the influence of globalization, the very notion of scientific rationality as well as its place in culture are changing. The process also involves such basic "meanings" and structures as the idea of progress, of national state, etc. What is most alarming, however, is the marginalization of spiritual and moral values. Today these values are quite often "just not anymore in demand" in the commercially oriented paradigm of globalization.
6. There is a universal sense of crisis permeating even the air that we breathe. It is evident that the crisis is not even structural, — it is a systemic crisis. Its cause lies in the fact that the logo-centric paradigm of our culture, which determined the formation and the evolutions of the main religions of salvation, seems to be almost totally exhausted.
7. It also should be remembered that these new phenomena embrace only a part of the modern world leaving outside a whole range of traditional societies. There is no single and monolithic humankind as an actor in the worldwide scene. Postmodernism and globalization embrace only the European-Atlantic parts of the world and, also, in some other parts which have gone through the processes of modernization.
8. The crises of the modern logo-centric civilizations manifest in the crisis of the traditional European humanistic anthropology (in its liberal and neoliberal versions). The erosion of the old values and traditions, the growing tempo of this process, which prevents the society from adapting to change.
9. The present conditions of society are transitory and therefore chaotic and dynamic. The institutional structure is superceded by the subjective structure. The subjective, personal factor becomes more and more active both at the individual and group levels. The indications of this are the transnational mechanisms of the human activities, for instance in economics.
10. The growing importance of the emotional factor and the collapse of stability in society with the growing number of its ethnic conflicts are predetermined by a confluence of subjective and objective factors, including psychological ones.
    a) Due to the information explosion we today perceive the world around us in a quite new way, more actively as ever before adapting to the new spatial and temporal characteristics of society (it seems that quite often we do not give proper consideration to this important circumstance). We constantly "feel pressed" both at the conscious and unconscious levels. This "psychological destabilization" demands proper correction in our everyday lives, which we rarely give proper thought in our evaluations.
    b) Every fact of destabilization feeds *resistance* and the trend towards conservation of the status quo in the same way that migration strengthens the need

to preserve former ties with the core of the system. This breeds the ground for "provoked" ethnic and group self-determination — an additional factor of aggressive self-determination at the political and economic levels.

11. The crumbling of old paradigms and values provokes the "reflex of self-protection". On the other hand, people more actively than ever before search for their own "Me", for a new identity. Quite often this leads to the strengthening of religiosity, which is not only a form of self-protection but also of self-determination. This is also a special form of a personal identification with the most stable traditions in society. However, the efforts of the Pope to find some common ground for the solutions of global problems have not as yet been a success. It seems that religions in culturally divided societies could not be radically changed by way of mutual concessions. But still the global religions are nevertheless able to overcome their differences — at the level of extrareligious system realizing certain spiritual values, but also including Faith in the framework of a new worldview.
This new worldview should include both objective natural components and subjective psychological dimensions specially constructed by society. Faith, intuition, rational and irrational, conscious and subconscious elements of human experience should find their proper place in this new worldview. It should be constructed in a way that does not exclude different ways of accumulating human knowledge and experience. What should be a key element of this endeavor? Evidently, it should be a product of intellectual elites of the global society — their solutions for environmental, space, economic and information problems of the world.
12. One of the most important mechanisms in a new self — determination of humankind is identification and identity creation. This process can be and should be influenced by specially created international organizations. We also have many examples of such gradual creation of identities. These are the American experience in the development of a special "American identity" and the European efforts to find a new "European identity" for the peoples of the continent.
13. The philosophic comprehension of the situation in the Russian and world cultures does not allow us to evaluate it either as crisis or progress. In it we clearly see both negative and positive trends. These trends reflect contradictions between global and local, "we" and "they", traditions and innovations. The most evident among those trends are following the dominance of mass media in all spheres of culture, which underlines the role of "gatekeepers", those who "distribute" culture among people.
14. The changing role of the ways culture is consumed — the individualization of cultural consumption (the transition to "individual worlds"), which also is connected with the progress of mass media. The radical changes in the basic structures of culture, the growing role of interactivity, technologies of "virtual reality" replacing the "real reality".
15. How to overcome this crisis? One of the ways is to stimulate intracultural dialogue between "high" and "low" cultures, which will give additional momentum

to the development of culture as a whole. It's quite possible that now we find ourselves at such a juncture of history when the whole world is moving towards a completely new culture, which is going away from local cultures and approaching some integral quality that reflects new means of human communication.

16. It is obvious that modern culture has some features of a rhizome. It per se is not a matrix, i. e. e. not a hierarchically constructed reality, but a set of personal senses assuming their total equivalency.
    This, in turn, causes, firstly, the model nature of modern knowledge, since none of the cultural concepts has "true" advantages over the others. Secondly, the clipped nature of the culture, which is mainly restricted by the scope of self-sufficient individuals. And thirdly, the excessive and redundant nature of cultural variety, which does not allow even in principle for the separation of essentials from the secondary items.
17. The *creation of common cultural space* will facilitate social and economic, as well as social and political development of mankind as polyethnic and multinational or to be more precise a multicultural entity. We understand cultural space as intellectual one, i. e. space based on studying and knowing the history of different countries, their cultural peculiarities, psychology of people and ethnoses inhabiting these countries. By such space we also imply multilinqual and multicultural space that unifies compatriots of all people living in different countries.
    Such an approach requires wide collaborative educational and research activities in which libraries play an important role. Since libraries, in being cultural insitutions and safeguarders of cultural heritage, are able most effectively to use information technology to integrate this heritage into eduacational and research activities and to unify education and science with the richness of culture. And with values and meaning without which further development of human civilization is impossible.
18. *The problem of dialogue in the plural world*. A dialogue can spring up at any point — as a form of correlation of interests of subjects, if we consider dialogue as developing in an autopoetic fractual reality, as a systemic process. The main problem lies not in producing a rich and diverse dialogue but in *seeing* and *realizing* the already existing diversity of dialogues and communications. To see it and recognize this fact. To learn not to stand in it's way. A human person is not always able to be open to diversity and keep his/her identity at the same very time! In the problem of diversity the human person encounters his/her (and also of their own group) life limits, quite often fearing to loose his/her identity. From this point of view, it should be said that humans should learn to perceive the diverse world and open themselves to it; that is letting the world enter their inner world. And at the very same time preserving the balance of their identity. It's important to understand if we are able to free communication of conflicts. The identity of humans is preserved not when they are isolated or exist in a limited life space but when all their components are able to function in a balance.

19. *The problem of virtualization of culture*. The contemporary stage of development of the IT's enables modelling a special type of spaces: the interactive informational — communicational environments. They make for the transformation of a human's value system resulting in changes in his "socio-psychological, ethic and aesthetic nature". Thus the special patterns of interpersonal relations are set up, "sign and sense entity of the contemporary culture being altered".

Convening questions

1) What are three main trends of contemporary culture?
2) What are the primary characteristics of these trends, from a psychological and / or philosophical perspective?
3) Can human beings influence these trends? If so, in what ways?

КРУГЛЫЙ СТОЛ

ПСИХОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ И ФИЛОСОФСКИЕ ВЫЗОВЫ СОВРЕМЕННОЙ КУЛЬТУРЫ

Материалы телемоста между Москвой и Сиэтлом, проведенного 29 января 2006 года в рамках конгресса

Участники Круглого стола «Психологические и философские вызовы современной культуры» искали ответы на следующие вопросы:

1. Назовите три основные тенденции современной культуры.
2. Охарактеризуйте эти тенденции с психологической и философской точек зрения.
3. Возможно ли по Вашему мнению влиять на эти тенденции? Если да, то каким образом?

В обсуждении приняли участие авторитетные ученые России, США, Канады, Германии, Франции, Турции и Ирана (всего около 90 участников). Предварительные дискуссии велась в Москве и Сиэтле, после чего между Россией и США был организован телемост.

По итогам круглого стола сделаны следующие выводы.

1. Существующая цивилизация, зародившаяся около 6000 лет назад, гибнет.
2. Основными тенденциями динамики современной культуры являются: а) глобализация; б) антропологизация или «антропологический поворот»: единицей мировой истории становится человек, а не такие крупные системы, как племена, государства, нации, транснациональные корпорации.
3. Процессы интеграции преобладают над процессами дифференциации.

4. Глобализации и постмодерну соответствуют интеграция и дифференциация.
5. Глобализация радикально изменила основные значения современной цивилизации. Трансформации подверглись: научная рациональность, идея прогресса, национального государства и др. Вызывает опасения маргинализация духовных ценностей, которые в коммерчески ориентированной парадигме глобализации теряют свое значение.
6. Современная культура находится в ситуации системного кризиса, причины которого коренятся в исчерпанности логоцентрической парадигмы, на основании которой формировались и развивались базовые религии спасения.
7. Человечества как единой силы истории не существует. Постмодерн и глобализация охватывают исключительно Европейско-Атлантическую часть мира. В некоторых других частях Земного шара идет процесс модернизации.
8. Кризис современных логоцентрических цивилизаций находит выражение в кризисе традиционной европейской антропологии (в ее либеральном и неолиберальном вариантах).
9. Общество существует в условиях перехода, хаотичных и динамичных. Это находит отражение в переходных механизмах человеческой деятельности, примером чему может служить развитие экономической сферы.
10. Вследствие бума информационных технологий, сегодня мы воспринимаем окружающую действительность иначе, чем раньше — более активно, чем когда-либо прежде. Мы адаптируемся к новым пространственным и временным характеристикам общества. Любой факт нестабильности подпитывает волну сопротивления и тенденцию к закреплению status quo (например, при усилении миграции растет потребность в сохранении прежних связей). Все перечисленное приводит к дестабилизации в обществе.
11. Крушение прежних парадигм и ценностей приводит к реакции «самосохранения». С другой стороны, люди все более активно ищут свое «Я», свою новую идентичность. Они обращаются к религии, однако различные конфессии не всегда расположены к контактам, и, похоже, что религии в культурно разделенных обществах нельзя серьезно изменить путем компромисса. И все же мировые религии возможно сблизить путем создания внерелигиозного мировоззрения, в котором реализовались бы определенные духовные ценности, в рамках которого нашлось бы место Вере.
12. Конструирование идентичности имеет свою историю (вспомним хотя бы американскую идентичность или европейскую идентичность). В этом процессе особую роль играют международные организации.
13. В условиях современной культуры особую роль играют СМИ и отдельные личности-культуртрегеры.

14. Процессы потребления культуры индивидуализируются. Повышается роль так называемой интерактивной виртуальной реальности, которая ориентирована не столько на массу, сколько на конкретную личность.
15. Преодоление кризиса представляется возможным через установление внутрикультурного диалога, между «высокой» и «низкой» культурой. Вероятно, теперь мы живем в эпоху, когда мир движется к обретению культуры нового типа — глобальной культуры человечества.
16. Структура современной культуры не иерархическая, а ризоматическая, что влияет на природу знания, определяет клиповость культуры, не позволяет из культурного многообразия выделить основное и второстепенное.
17. Культурное пространство — это интеллектуальное пространство, основанное на изучении и знании истории разных стран, понимании их специфики и культурных особенностей, психологии людей и народов, эти страны населяющих.
18. Проблема диалога в мультикультурном пространстве заключается не в необходимости его организации, а в потребности обнаружения свершившихся актов общения и поощрении существующих контактов. Необходимо разобраться, возможна ли коммуникация без конфликтов.
19. Знаковая и предметная целостность современной культуры изменяются под воздействием современных информационных технологий. Наблюдается виртуализация культуры.

ГЛОБАЛИЗАЦИЯ В ПРЕДКРИЗИСНОМ МИРЕ

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Современна культурная ситуация характеризуется диффузным взаимопроникновением культурно-цивилизационных систем, что размывает не только традиционные геополитическое фронтиры, но и сам привычный дискурс рассмотрения этнокультурных и цивилизационных различий в оппозиции Восток — Запад. Соответственно любой разговор о цивилизационных взаимоотношениях Востока ми Запада в современном мире не может вестись вне контекста глобальных процессов. Глобализация вовсе не является чем-то уникальным и присущим исключительно современной эпохе. Стремление к неограниченному росту, экспансии и бесконечной ассимиляции любого инокультурного материала свойственно всякой культурной системе, что и было многократно явлено в человеческой истории, начиная с древневосточных империй, кончая совсем недавним прошлым. Разве Советский Союз не пытался осуществить глобализаторский проект в рамках идеологии мировой революции, а затем «программы-минимум» — мировой системы социализма?

Чтобы адекватно оценить и осмыслить современную ситуацию, мы должны, прежде всего, определиться с тем, какие черты современных глобальных процессов наследуются из исторического прошлого, и в чём состоит их инновационная специфика.

До пошлости банальным является стремление к языковой, экономической, аксиологической, политической и др. *унификации* разнообразных культурно-исторических форм на основе некоей базовой модели. Реализация этой тенденции в истории всегда выглядит одинаково: на тактическом уровне она создаёт удобства для управленческих процессов и манипуляций. На стратегическом же уровне, она приводит к гибельной *гомогенизации культурного пространства,* т. е. истощению внутренней разнородности (разности потенциалов), что, в свою очередь, неизбежно приводит к угасанию, распаду и смерти культуры. Кроме того, этнос метрополии — автор базовой культурно-цивилизационной модели, этого «общего знаменателя» глобализации всегда платит за гегемонию блокировкой развития национальной культуры. Так было всегда — и у древних персов, и у византийцев, и в СССР. И ничего удивительного, что в такой же ситуации оказываются современные США. Вполне исторически преемственным является и то, что современный глобализационный процесс не имеет *имманентной конечной цели*. А это, в свою очередь, означает, что рубежи глобализации могут быть поставлены только *извне*.

Вместе с тем, мы должны отметить и ряд совершенно особенных черт, присущих современным глобализационным процессам.

Все прежние глобализационные проекты в истории осуществлялись, образно говоря, *в эпоху идеалов*, и, следовательно, по своим формам носили *идеократический* характер. Главным средством реализации такого проекта было прямое военно-политическое насилие, а его историческим воплощением — теократическая империя. Теперь же, когда эпоха *идеалов* сменилась эпохой *интересов,* прямое военно-политическое насилие оказывается средством неадекватным. Ему на смену приходит *неолиберальный* проект глобализации. О том, что это такое — написано уже достаточно много, и пересказывать это нет необходимости. Однако, при анализе современных тенденций, которые несомненно отражаются и на выстраивании межцивилизационных отношений по линии Восток — Запад, следует учитывать следующие факторы.

Прежде всего, то, что важнейшим фактором современного культурного климата является постмодернизм, который давно перестал быть узкой интеллектуальной модой, а является главной формой стихийного мировоззрения большей части образованного человечества.

Здесь, впрочем, следует избегать коварных аберраций и не уподобляться «просвещённому европейцу» 19в., для которого понятие «человечество» совпадало с понятием «цивилизованный мир», представленным соответственно всё той же Европой. И хотя наивный евпропоцентризм вроде бы давно осмеян и изгнан из научного обихода, примеров такого рода аберраций, тем не менее, предостаточно. Рассуждая о глобализации и постмодернизме, мы ни на минуту не имеем права забывать о том, что и то и другое относится к меньшей части человечества, в то время как за пределами ближней цивилизационной периферии, поверхностно затронутой этими процессами, существуют традиционно ориентированные общества, практически изолированные и от того, и от другого. И это вполне естественно: противоположности зримо сталкиваются и взаимодействуют только в зоне фронта развития, точнее сам этот фронт собственно и возникает в результате этого взаимодействия. А почва для этих процессов была подготовлена в ходе модернизации на протяжении всего 20в. Человечество как целое не существует. Во всяком случае, пока. И платой за размашистые обобщения выступает неадекватность понимания другого, несостоятельность прогнозов, нереализуемость крупномасштабных социально-политических программ, ориентированных на некий усреднённый человеческий стандарт.

Постмодернизм и глобализация манифестируют борьбу центробежных и центростремительных тенденций, прежде всего в ареале евро-атлантической цивилизации, а также на её ближней периферии и в регионах успешно прошедших модернизацию и удерживающих (а в некоторых областях задающих темп) социокультурной и технологической динамики. Переплетение этих тенденций проникает во все поры и клетки культуры и, по сути, определяет идейную и духовную атмосферу современности. Отражается это буквально на всём. Так приходящее на смену умершим (или латентно существующим) социально ориентированным формам и видам искусства новые его виртуальные и интерактивные формы, ориентированны, вроде бы на внутренне свободную и творчески продуктивную лич-

ность. Но те же виртуальные и интерактивные технологии выступают также и необычайно эффективными средствами зомбирования и оболванивания субъекта. Коммуникативное поле творчества с одной стороны сузилось до локальных субкультурных, (часто полумаргинальных) групп, а то и до виртуального мира в одном отдельно взятом PC, а с другой стороны, параллельный мир виртуального пространства бурно разворачивается, наподобие того, как в раннепервобытную эпоху мир артефактов разворачивался параллельно с миром удаляющейся природы.

Взаимодействие вышеозначенных тенденций всякий раз порождает специфический культурный контекст, характеризуемый по крайней мере, такими параметрами как относительная устойчивость и особые ценностные диспозиции. А динамика его изменений зависит от того, какая из тенденций тактически преобладает.

Нет ничего удивительного в том, что тема глобалистики обычно окрашивается в алармистские тона. Действительно, глобальные процессы в ближайшем историческом будущем обещают, что вполне очевидно, обернуться глобальными угрозами. И если глобализация, как бы её понимать, так или иначе связана с формированием новых макрокультурных систем, по отношению к которым инкорпорированные в неё элементы будут функционально сведены к подсистемам, то особую важность в интерпретации этих процессов представляет необходимость выхода на внешнюю по отношению ко всяким этим подсистемам позицию.

Здесь мы наталкиваемся на краеугольную проблему *границ понимания* и интерпретации процессов с позиции традиционного европейского (точнее, евро-атлантического) сознания. Дело не только в том, чтобы преодолеть максималистские аберрации и разобраться в том, что глобализуется, а что нет. Здесь, как и везде, действует закон *гармонизированной разнонаправленности*. С одной стороны — глобальные процессы, с другой дальнейшая атомизация и наращивание самодостаточности отдельного субъекта и малых групп. Пример — Интернет. Здесь и вовлечение в единый информационный космос и, в то же время, освобождение от целого ряда социальных связок. Всякая глобализация имеет обратной стороной дифференциацию. Процессы эти взаимосвязаны и речь может идти лишь о выявлении доминанты в тех или иных конкретных ситуациях.

Главная же проблема, кроется, в другом, а именно, — в нарастающей *неадекватности традиционной евро-атлантической культурно-антропологической доктрины современным цивилизационным процессам*. Думается, что её борьба за продление собственного существования а также судьбы её наследия станут ключевыми вопросами проведения культурно-цивилизационных фронтиров в 21 в. А процесс прочерчивания этих фронтиров в значительной степени может изменить традиционные представления о разграничениях между Востоком и Западом.

Специалисты справедливо отмечают, что традиционная (для 20в.) капиталистическая система хозяйства, выполнив свои исторические задачи, пришла к самоисчерпанию. А это, в свою очередь означает, что пришла к исчерпанию и сама *культурно-антропологическая доктрина,* лежащая в её основании (а не наоборот). Эта ренессансно-просвещенческая и производная от неё либеральная ант-

ропологическая доктрина, отбив на рубеже 19-20вв штурм ницшеанства и фрейдизма, в целом устояв перед современными атаками постмодернизма, продолжает оставаться мировоззренческой доминантой современного мира, или, по крайней мере, той его части, которая ориентирована на широко понимаемый европеизм. Обозначу, прежде всего, те положения этой доктрины, которые обнаруживают наиболее острую неадекватность сегодняшней ситуации и вольно или невольно способствуют углублению глобального кризиса.

Мифология прогрессизма, в духе которой составляются официальные проектные документы солидных международных организаций (например, ЮНЕСКО) породила мифологию равенства. Поскольку принцип развития оказался однозначно связан с линейным поступательным движением в сторону европейских ценностей, то разница между различными цивилизациями оказалась сведена к *чисто количественным* характеристикам приближения к этим ценностям и нормам. А если различения носит чисто количественный (стадиальный) характер, значит субъектом истории выступает некий *абстрактный человек вообще*, универсальный homo sapiens. И все кто отстал в развитии обязательно, рано или поздно, догонят. На научно-философском уровне прогрессистская модель развития давно разгромлена и осмеяна. Но мифология культурно-антропологического равенства отнюдь не желает сдавать своих позиций. Либеральный интеллигент приходит в ужас от пугающей статистики жизненных стандартов бедных стран, не желая понимать (несмотря на многократные объяснения), что если голодная смерть для европейца — ужас, то для жителя, скажем, Эфиопии — обыденная вещь. Постмодернистский штурм добил идеологию европоцентризма и она, прикрывшись словесными декларациями о полицентричности, релятивности ценностей и равноправии культур, ушла вглубь. Но про себя, европейское (и, разумеется, американское) сознание всё равно полагает себя главным и лучшим, на которых должны равняться все остальные. Но вот уже давно витающую в воздухе идею стратификации и типологизации культурных субъектов по принципу доминирования той или иной цивилизационной парадигмы либеральное сознание на дух не переносит. О том, что социо-культурные субъекты *органически* различаются по своей культурно-антропологической конституции, вопиют тысячи очевидных фактов. Но говорить об этом нельзя. Тут же наклеят ярлык фашиста, или кого-нибудь в этом роде, хотя культурно-антропологические страты никоим образом не совпадают ни с расовыми, ни с национальными различиями. Если война либеральной мифологии равенства со здравым смыслом будет продолжена, то ни о каком выходе из цивилизационного тупика, в который загнали человечество глобальные процессы, говорить не придётся. (После терактов 11 сентября, чаще всего по инерции говорили о зависти бедных к богатым. Не в бедности дело! Иначе оружие «голодных и рабов» было бы направленно, не куда-то за океан, а, прежде всего, в сторону своих собственных отнюдь не бедствующих правителей. Однако этого не произошло, потому что для постсредневекового традиционалиста правитель-деспот, ведущий разнузданно паразитическую жизнь, вполне вписывается в картину мира. Так, по его представлениям, и должно быть. А

вот заокеанский дядя Сэм (извините за грубые публицистические упрощения) эту комфортную картину мира безжалостно ломает, чем и вызывает животную ненависть традиционалиста, со всеми вытекающими отсюда последствиями). Кстати, одним из наиболее простых и надёжных критериев цивилизованности, является способность общества контролировать своих правителей.

В современном мире налицо очевидная *асинхрония цивилизационных процессов*. И в этой связи, именно перед евро-атлантической цивилизацией, как обладающей наибольшим влиянием на ход глобальных мировых процессов и в наибольшей степени склонной к рефлексии стоит задача осуществить фундаментальную мировоззренческую трансформацию, столь необходимую для выживания человечества перед лицом глобальных угроз ближайшего будущего.

Это значит, что либерально-гуманистическая антропология должна быть окончательно отброшена. Это значит, не учить всех своему языку и своим ценностям, а *с каждым субъектом говорить на его языке и в его системе ценностей*. Это можно было назвать доктриной «**НОВОЙ ЕСТЕСТВЕННОСТИ**».

Первоначальной естественности единства с природой и космосом, от которой цивилизации неуклонно и целенаправленно удалялась на протяжении всей своей истории, вопреки романтическим грёзам некоторых философов и экологов достичь никогда не удастся. Что ушло, то ушло. Но можно попытаться достичь новой естественности. Естественности, снимающей в себе весь опыт исторического бытия культуры, являющейся на сегодняшний день завершённым пространством второй природы. Это, в частности, включает в себя *невмешательство в имманентную диалектику иного*, что практически означает не мешать умирать нежизнеспособному. Либеральная богадельня — кратчайший путь к катастрофическому исчерпанию ресурсов. Конфликты следует не гасить, а локализовать. С варваром следует говорить по-варварски, т.е. на единственном языке, который он понимает. (Здесь Запад, кажется, начинает демонстрировать относительно разумное поведение.) Следует признать саму неизбежность и в ряде случаев необходимость вооружённых конфликтов и социального насилия, как вполне естественной формы разрешения противоречий между определёнными типами субъектов, даже если для этого придётся пожертвовать такими священными коровами как «Всеобщая декларация прав человека» и др.

Перенося на иные культурные субъекты свои нормы, ценности и стандарты, неолиберальная цивилизация открывает им путь к ресурсам и технологиям жизни, органически не свойственным их собственным цивилизационным парадигмам. Причём, совершенно неважно, во имя чего это делается — во имя принципов гуманизма или ради собственной выгоды. Пока что, однако, не поняты даже такие простые вещи как-то, что нельзя навязывать архаику формы современной парламентской демократии или в ультимативном порядке требовать отмены смертной казни в стране, где цена человеческой жизни сопоставима с ценой патрона. А ведь развитие ситуации заставит, и очень скоро, пойти гораздо дальше. Дай бог, если социал-дарвинизм окажется в 21в. самой жёсткой идеологией.

Разумеется, речь идёт не о старом, раскритикованном и немодном, как и сама классическая теория эволюции социал-дарвинизме. Современная, переосмысленная в духе «новой естественности» редакция социал-дарвинизма будет отличаться от прежней так же, как классический дарвинизм XIX в. от современных эволюционистских представлений. Так, в частности, механизмы и направленность естественного отбора, как и само содержание понятия жизнеспособности будет существенно иным, чем в традиционном дарвинизме. Можно сказать, что стремление к неограниченному росту популяций и экстенсивной экспансии в жизненное пространство с необходимостью перестанет быть доминантой социальной активности. Такой доминанты, вопреки утверждениям Дарвина никогда не было в природе, ибо природа, в отличие от культуры, никогда не забывала о тангенциальной силе. В природе рост всегда ограничивается формой и пределами системного видового качества, а взаимоотношения последних подчиняются закону комплиментарного баланса. По сути, цивилизация, на деле постулировав принцип выживания сильнейшего, переместив этот принцип с позиции одного из составляющих факторов эволюции на место системообразующего стержневого начала, реализовала, или, по крайней мере, попыталась реализовать в истории основное положение дарвинизма. Парадоксальность сочетания дарвинистского принципа агрессивного экстенсивного и ничем *структурно* не ограниченного роста с либерально-гуманистической антропологической доктриной со всеми её постмодернистскими релятивитсткими коррективами, при всей своей очевидности, кажется, никем толком не описана. Мысль теряется в запутанном мельтешении внешних форм. Продуктивного снятия это противоречие не имеет. Классический дарвинизм в социальных отношениях должен быть изжит, а либеральная антропология — отброшена во имя всеобщего выживания.

С некоторых пор стало модно цитировать Дж. Хантингтона с его прогнозами по поводу конфликтов между цивилизациями в 21в. Сами по себе эти идеи цивилизационных конфликтов, собственно говоря, лежат на поверхности и даже несколько странно, что их часто преподносят как некое откровение. Важно однако, что цивилизационные признаки, т. е. *признаки системного цивилизационного качества*, сводятся, как и всегда, к сумме конфессиональных, экономических, политических и иных определений *внешнего историко-эмпирического характера*. А между тем сам геном цивилизационного качества заключен не в них, а в *культурно-антропологическом типе базового для того или иного общества социального субъекта*. Но и это ещё не самое главное. Если мы представляем себе цивилизационный конфликт как некую разновидность *традиционно понимаемого* исторического конфликта, т.е. как конфликт *между обществами,* это значит, что мы совершенно не понимаем, что такое на самом деле есть цивилизационный конфликт. Носители различных до несовместимости цивилизационных парадигм, т.е. различные культурно-антропологические типы сосуществуют диффузно в пределах каждого общества. Пока эти различия не осознаются в собственной форме, а идеология равенства обеспечивает, по крайней мере, в тенденциях и декларациях, равный доступ к ресурсам, противоречия между ними носят точечный и локальный характер. Но,

видимо, вскоре ситуация изменится. И тогда на фоне внешних конфликтов, т. е. конфликтов задаваемых столкновением доминант цивилизационных стратегий на уровне целых обществ, станут разыгрываться драмы цивилизационного раскола *внутри самих этих обществ*. Вот это и будет настоящий цивилизационный конфликт, выстраивающий новую систему человеческих общностей на обломках прежней социальности с её ценностями, нормами и интегративными принципами.

Человечество развивается не от хорошей жизни. Не однажды перед ним возникала дилемма: развитие или смерть. Структурные кризисы нередко приводили к смерти. Системные всегда заканчивались выбором новой стратегии развития. Правда, и здесь никогда не обходилось без жертв, и жертв громадных. Сегодня человечество стоит на пороге системного кризиса. 21 век должен дать ответ на ключевой вопрос: развитие или смерть. Это значит, что в любом случае следует не просто с обречённым видом готовиться к катаклизмам а, прежде всего, к тому, чтобы сознательно пожертвовать привычным и морально комфортным мировоззрением во имя спасения и развития, ибо сегодня мир, как никогда прежде зависит от того, что происходит в конкретных человеческих головах.

GLOBALIZATION IN THE WORLD ON THE BRINK OF CRISIS

A. A. PELIPENKO

Globalization as a historical-cultural phenomenon cannot be regarded as the specific feature of the XXth century. The striving for expansion and assimilation of alien cultures is inherent in various cultural systems, beginning with ancient eastern despotisms.

The modern process of globalization has some features in common with previous expansions. Specifically, the tendency toward the unification of language, economy, politics, and so on follows the same basic pattern.

This tendency leads to destructive homogenization of culture, exhausting its inner variety and resulting in the death of this cultural system.

The specific feature of previous global expansion projects is their ideocratic essence. These projects, realized by means of military political violence, led to the rationale of ideocratic empires.

Nowadays, when military-political violence turned out to be an inadequate means of expansion, the neo-liberal project of globalization came into force. Nevertheless, we can see some important transformations of the neo-liberal project and liberal system of values, which are similar in some aspects to the transformation of ancient Greek police democracy to Hellenistic monarchy and the Roman Empire. Under the impact of globalization the development of a new ideocratic empire on the basis of commercial industry and consumerism is quite possible.

ГЛОБАЛИЗАЦИЯ И ЦИВИЛИЗАЦИОННЫЕ ВОЗМОЖНОСТИ СОВРЕМЕННОГО ОБЩЕСТВА

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Глобализация — становящаяся реальность. Она находится в развитии, имеет множество форм и проявлений. Понять современный этап глобализации — значит понять сущность цивилизационных трансформаций, происходящих в мире под влиянием множества факторов, особенно геополитических, экономических, научно-технологических.

Глобализация затрагивает все страны, но на современном этапе цивилизационного развития она затрагивает их по-разному в зависимости от места той или иной страны в международных отношениях. При этом наиболее значимым фактором вовлеченности той или иной страны в расширяющийся процесс глобализации оказывается фактор открытости экономики и ресурсов данной страны. Поэтому можно утверждать, что при всей значимости, например, такого фактора как уровень развития новых информационных технологий, не он, а потребности мирового экономического развития, определяют вектор и особенности глобализационных трансформаций.

Современный этап глобализации — ответ индустриальной экономикоцентричной цивилизации на вызовы времени, суть которых в желании сохранить достигнутый индустриально развитыми странами уровень жизни за счет расширения экономического пространства, выхода финансовых и торговых рынков за национальные границы, использования природных и интеллектуальных ресурсов всей планеты. Решению этой проблемы в конечном итоге подчинены новые информационные структуры, трактовка демократических форм принятия решения и т. д. Все это, в конечном итоге, должно способствовать поддержанию социального благосостояния индустриально развитой части современной цивилизации.

Глобализация порождена не одной причиной. Она обусловлена множеством различных факторов, взаимодействие которых приводит к формированию нового более целостного поля экономики и финансов, культуры и образования, политики и информации.

Процесс глобализации, открывая границы и существенно ограничивая роль национальных государств, приводит к переосмыслению статуса свободы, демократии, права, образования в мире. Согласно У. Беку, “глобализация означает познаваемые на опыте уничтожение границ повседневной деятельности в разных сферах хозяйствования, информации, экологии, техники, транскультурных конфликтов и гражданского общества, означает, таким образом, нечто в принципе давно знакомое и одновременно непонятное, с трудом понимаемое, нечто

такое, что с неодолимой силой меняет нашу повседневную жизнь и принуждает всех приспосабливаться и отвечать на эти изменения".[1]

Глобализация актуализирует вопрос о ценностных основаниях современной цивилизации, поскольку глобализируются базовые ценности капиталистической системы. Между тем по справедливому замечанию Лестера К. Туроу "Ценности, или предпочтения, — это черная дыра капитализма. Система существует, чтобы нам служить, но нет никакой капиталистической теории хороших или дурных предпочтений, никакой капиталистической теории, как изменять ценности и управлять ими"[2]. Вот почему прежде чем пытаться универсализировать капиталистические отношения, важно еще раз заново поставить вопрос о том, насколько ценности капитализма могут помочь современному миру справиться с глобальными проблемами вообще и разрушением природного основания бытия человека в особенности. Ведь, как отмечает Дж. Сорос, "Капиталистическая система во главу угла ставит конкуренцию и измеряет успех деньгами. Деньги подменяют собой реальные ценности, а рынки захватывают господствующие позиции в чуждых им сферах. В праве и медицине, политике, образовании, науке, искусствах, даже в отношениях меду людьми — достижения или качества, которые должны рассматриваться в качестве самоцели, переводятся в денежное измерение; о них судят по количеству денег, которые они приносят, а не по их реальным достоинствам"[3]. И поскольку именно подобная система ценностей поставила цивилизацию на грань общепланетарной катастрофы, глобализация актуализирует проблему альтернативных сценариев будущего. В этой связи следует исходить из того, что глобализация не априорная данность, а становящаяся реальность. Вот почему глобализация не только дает ответы на определенные вопросы, но и ставит новые фундаментальные проблемы, требующие систематического обсуждения.

На наш взгляд, глобализация — противоречивое явление, которое сочетает в себе два взаимосвязанных процесса. Это, с одной стороны, процесс расширяющейся самоорганизации, или естественной глобализации, которую можно назвать также глобализацией по горизонтали, когда определенные достижения одних культур усваиваются другими культурами по мере установления контактов между народами. С другой стороны, общий процесс глобализации включает в себя глобализацию по вертикали или искусственную, организуемую глобализацию, которая является следствием попыток насильственного внедрения одной страной, партией или религией тех или иных представлений в другие социокультурные регионы и традиции[4]. Между этими двумя аспектами цивилизационного развития существует сложная и противоречивая связь. На наш взгляд, такой подход к глобализации позволяет интерпретировать данный процесс как многоаспектное противоречивое явление, которое включает в себя разноуровневые движения внутри цивилизационного целого. Происходящее усложнение мировых процессов в современном мире связано не только с расширением культурного горизонта современной цивилизации, но и стремлением к доминированию определенных геополитических ценностей и сил.

Глобальный кризис наступает тогда, когда в силу различных причин процессы организации по вертикали начинают доминировать, подавляя процессы по горизонтали. В конце XX в. человечество встретилось именно с подобной ситуацией, когда масштабные цивилизационные вызовы требуют новых ответов. Многочисленные фундаментальные глобальные вызовы свидетельствуют об объективных основаниях сложившейся кризисной ситуации. По сути, речь идет не столько о частных глобальных кризисах, сколько о системном кризисе современной цивилизации, ядром которого выступает антропологический кризис.

Попытки достижения экономических преимуществ в формирующемся глобальном мире любыми средствами приводит в конечном итоге к потере стабильности и устойчивости, поскольку происходит абсолютизация экономического фактора и экономической глобализации. При таком подходе упускается из виду целостность цивилизационных трансформаций, связь экономики и политики, экономики и культуры, роль человека, как центрального, главного звена в глобальных процессах.

Трактовка всего комплекса глобализационных трансформаций на основании экономической составляющей данного процесса, находит отражение в работах многих авторов, принадлежащих разным исследовательским традициям. Так, А. И. Уткин, активно разрабатывающий глобализационную проблематику, под глобализацией понимает «слияние цивилизационных экономик в единую, общемировую систему, основанную на новой легкости перемещения капитала, на новой информационной открытости мира, на технологической революции, на приверженности развитых индустриальных стран либерализации движения товаров и капитала, на основе коммуникационного сближения, планетарной научной революции, межнациональных социальных движений, новых видов транспорта, реализации телекоммуникационных технологий, интегрального образования»[5]. Для подобного видения динамики современной мировой истории есть определенные основания. Этот аспект попытался концептуализировать Ф. Фукуяма в метафоре «конца истории», когда он интерпретировал окончание борьбы идеологии, абстрактных идей и борьбы «за экономический рост, бесконечные технические проблемы, заботы об экологии и удовлетворение изощренных запросов потребителя», как «конец истории»[6]. Эти наблюдения небеспочвенны, они отражают реальные процессы, которые происходят в современной западной индустриальной и постиндустриальной цивилизации, где действительно экономический рост и удовлетворение все возрастающих потребностей потребителей, являются ядром и детерминантом цивилизационного развития.

Тем самым в модели «конца истории», как и в интерпретации глобализации, в первую очередь, как экономической глобализации, за основание глобального мира берутся те отношения цивилизационного характера, которые сложились в определенной, а именно западной части планеты. В этой связи основной вопрос сводится к тому, насколько правомерна подобная экстраполяция той ситуации, которая сформировалась в определенных условиях в рамках западной техногенной цивилизации на мир в целом? Затем, согласятся ли другие народы и культу-

ры с подобной глобализацией неолиберальных принципов мироустройства? Эти и другие многочисленные вопросы все более актуализируются в современном мире и требуют систематического, в том числе и философского анализа.

На теоретическом уровне глобализация открывает новые возможности для всех людей, поскольку она расширяет контакты между индивидами, различными народами и цивилизациями. Человеческая деятельность получает новое глобальное измерение, появляются новые источники развития. Растет число участников конкурентной борьбы, что усиливает активность общества и его динамизма.

Тем самым можно констатировать определенную двойственность следствия данного процесса. Если на теоретико-методологическом уровне, когда мы анализируем процесс глобализации вне реального политического контекста, все страны и цивилизации равноправно участвуют в конкурентной борьбе и имеют равные возможности в получении выгод от данного процесса, то в реальности в силу самых разных причин, глобализация не столько снимает межцивилизационные противоречия, но и во многом обостряет их, усиливая общую напряженность в мире и становясь инструментом проведения определенной политической стратегии, отвечающей интересам небольшого числа стран.

Глобализация, как универсализация идей неолиберальной экономики, ядром которой выступает конкурентная борьба, во всех сферах расширяет сферу противостояния не только между различными фирмами, корпорациями, но и ведущими странами мира. В конечном итоге, это может привести к глобальной катастрофе, поскольку со временем в конкурентную борьбу могут быть втянуто большинство сфер человеческой деятельности во всех странах мира. При этом следует считаться с тем, что орудиями конкурентной борьбы становятся наука и технология, СМИ и культура. Таким образом, наука, технология и культура, равно, как СМИ, начинают выполнять не столько антиэнтропийную функцию, сколько играть дестабилизирующую роль.

При интерпретации глобализации в контексте «однополярного мира» во главе с США следует считаться с возможной реакцией других ведущих стран на этот сценарий вообще, и опасностью силового решении проблем, которые могут встать на пути реализации данного сценария. Суть проблемы в том, что современный мир существенно отличается от мира в недалеком прошлом. Имеется одно принципиальное обстоятельство, с которым необходимо считаться аналитикам, предсказывающим «столкновение цивилизаций» и возможность построения «однополярного» глобального мира с помощью силы.

Обстоятельство, о котором идет речь, широко известно. Суть его в возможности самоуничтожения человечества во время подобного «столкновения цивилизаций» Тем более что известные политики Запада не исключают возможность использования ядерного оружия в предстоящих столкновениях цивилизаций. Так, по мнению М. Тэтчер, высказанного ею в 2002 г., «в конечном итоге, ядерное оружие, вероятно, будет использовано»[7]. Не комментируя столь опасную по своим возможным последствиям мысль бывшего премьер-министра Великоб-

ритании, отметим, что М. Тэтчер не только поддерживает идею однополярного мира, но и считает решенным вопрос о лидерстве в этом однополярном мире. Как и видный американский политолог З. Бжезинский, М. Тэтчер выступает за лидерство США в современном мире. По ее мнению, «окончанием «холодной войны» и развалом Советского Союза мы переместились от «двухполярного» к «однополярному» миру. На сегодня Америка — единственная сверхдержава. Ни одна из сверхдержав прошлого — ни Римская империя, ни империя, созданная Габсбургами, ни Британская империя — во времена своего расцвета не обладала таким превосходством в ресурсах и размахе над своим ближайшим соперником, как современная Америка»[8]. Подобная трактовка динамики мировых событий свидетельствует об истинных целях многих западных идеологов глобализации, которые прямо не отождествляют данный процесс с «американизацией».

Принципиально значимым результатом геополитических трансформаций в мире в конце XX века был переход от двухполюсного «устойчивого нестабильного мира» (Н. Н. Моисеев) к неустойчиво-стабильному однополюсному миру, лидером которого выступают США. В результате этих трансформаций формируется новый облик цивилизации, правила бытия которой зависят от трактовки мировых событий одной страной, которая, по мнению З. Бжезинского, осуществляет мировое господство. В работе «Великая шахматная доска» З. Бжезинский, обсуждая вопрос о «способности Америки осуществлять свое мировое господство», пишет: «Поражение и развал Советского Союза стали финальным аккордом в быстром вознесении на пьедестал державы Западного полушария — Соединенных Штатов — в качестве единственной и действительно первой подлинно глобальной державы»[9]. В этой связи «вопрос о том, каким образом имеющая глобальные интересы, Америка должна справляться со сложными отношениями между евразийскими державами и особенно сможет ли она предотвратить появление на международной арене доминирующей и антагонистичной евразийской державы, остается центральным в плане способности Америки осуществлять свое мировое господство»[10].

Таким образом, американский политолог исходит из нескольких положений, которые принимаются им за основу как нечто само собой разумеющееся. Во-первых, З. Бжезинский считает США единственной, первой и подлинно глобальной державой, а потому у глобальной державы имеются глобальные интересы. Во-вторых, по мнению американского политолога, США могут осуществлять мировое, господство, если они смогут предотвратить появление на международной арене другой глобальной сверхдержавы с антагонистическими интересами.

Для З. Бжезинского рассуждения о мировом господстве логичны, поскольку, по его мнению, стремление к гегемонии так же старо, как сам мир. И потому в стремлении США к мировому господству нет ничего предосудительного. Речь идет не о моральных и геополитических основаниях претензий на мировое господство, а о том, как предотвратить появление других сверхдержав с глобальными интересами. И это обоснованно в том плане, что если США выступают подлинно и единственной страной, предзадающей правила игры на великой шахматной до-

ске Евразии, то не следует допускать появления других глобальных сверхдержав, поскольку на одной «доске» двум глобальным устремлениям будет тесно. Отсюда «жизненно важно, чтобы на политической арене не возник соперник, способный господствовать в Евразии и, следовательно, бросающий вызов Америке»[11].

Между тем подобная трактовка динамики мировых событий принципиально уязвима. И не только из-за разногласий по поводу однополярности или многополярности мира, но и потому, что постиндустриальная цивилизация по своей сути должна быть децентрализованной как экономически, так и в социокультурном отношении. Постиндустриальная цивилизация еще больше, чем индустриальная нуждается в открытости мира, открытости национальных экономик, технологий, информационных процессов в мире. Эта кажущаяся естественной тенденция мирового развития из-за глобализации мирохозяйственных, технологических, информационных связей выгодна в первую очередь развитым странам мира, поскольку, во-первых, именно эти страны задают «правила игры» в самых разных областях, направляя весь процесс в нужном им направлении и темпе, во-вторых, развитые страны имеют значительный опыт конкурентной борьбы, что позволяет им пользоваться благоприятными моментами, связанными с открытостью и жесткой конкуренцией. Вот почему «глобализация» «глобализации» рознь, поскольку такие проблемы, как экологическая, демографическая и другие проблемы не могут быть в принципе разрешены в локальном масштабе, тогда как экономическое или технологическое сотрудничество только тогда может быть партнерским, когда сотрудничающие стороны находятся примерно на одинаковом уровне развития.

К тому же сам факт лидерства США в мире ставит множество принципиальных проблем различного уровня, во!первых, потому что многие страны оспаривают однополярность мира, а во-вторых, актуализируется вопрос о ценностных основаниях нового единства мира, поскольку многие страны планеты имеют более давнюю историю и традиции. По мнению М. Лернера, чей двухтомный труд «Развитие цивилизации в Америке» переиздавался 200 раз, «в отличие от народов Европы и Азии, где каждый камень дышит историей, американцы — это вообще народ без прошлого. Жить без истории — значит, первым делом, обходиться... без сложных мотивировок и тонких нюансов духа»[12]. Последнее не столь безобидно, поскольку «живущий» без истории не сопоставляет свои действия с уроками истории, не «советуется» с историей. Ему в определенном смысле легче, но это не значит, что ему лучше, тем более это не означает, что он прав и, главное, что это хорошо для истории. Он просто не знает, что значит жить в истории, не знает, что он теряет, живя без истории.

Отмеченную М. Лернером особенность американцев, разумеется, нельзя воспринимать «буквально», поскольку у большинства американцев есть собственная история становления страны, у них своя литература, своя наука и тем более своя технология. Вместе с тем, М. Лернер прав в главном, принципиальном. У американцев нет такой истории, как у французов или китайцев. И потому у них иное настоящее.

Принципиальная проблема заключается в том, что индустриально развитые страны мира, и особенно США, не просто хотят сосуществовать в сотрудничестве и конкуриренции со странами, у которых другой уровень экономического и технологического развития, и самое важное в контексте современности, — иные цивилизационные установки, но они стремятся доказать, что ценности западной цивилизации превосходят и более предпочтительны, чем ценности других стран. По сути, речь идет о попытке доказать ошибочность всех других ценностных представлений, кроме ценностей западной, техногенной цивилизации. Ситуация особенно обостряется в тех случаях, когда те или иные страны пытаются сохранить свою цивилизационную идентичность. Тогда ведущие страны мира, пользуясь различными механизмами, в том числе и военными, начинают борьбу против этой страны. В основе этой политики лежат определенные ценностно-мировоззренческие представления, которые наиболее четко сформулировал Патрик Дж. Бьюкенен в работе «Смерть Запада». Он пишет: «Согласно Первой поправке, люди имеют право на свободу вероисповедания, однако, в высшей степени нелепо делать отсюда вывод, что все веры и религии равноправны. Цивилизации тоже неравноправны. Запад подарил миру лучшее из того, что было когда-либо сформулировано и придумано. Западная цивилизация и западная культура превосходят все остальные. Демократия одного голоса не является ненарушимым принципом; это утилитарная идея. В мировом масштабе она не сработает. Американцы составляют 4 процента мирового населения и обладают 30 процентами мировой экономической и военной мощи; им попросту не пристало рассуждать о равноправии наций и государств...».[13] Не занимаясь систематическим анализом столь «вызывающих» утверждений, отметим, что при знакомстве с мыслями таких политиков, вспоминаются слова Николо Макиавелли: «Всякая власть развращает, абсолютная власть развращает абсолютно».

Между тем подобная геополитическая установка опасна. Это выражение «самонадеянности силы», если воспользоваться термином Ф. Хайека, и не учитывает, что современный мир радикально изменился по сравнению с прошлым. К сожаленью, многие политики не считаются с этим и мыслят традиционными представлениями, игнорируя сложность современного мира, наличие в нем глобальных рисков и угроз. Для политиков, игнорирующих уроки истории, и живущих повседневными проблемами, традиционным остается стремление расширить свое геостратегическое пространство, подчинить своему влиянию другие государства. Между тем общество как динамическая система может нормально функционировать только тогда, когда с изменением одних подсистем меняются и другие, связанные с ней подсистемы.

Радикальные трансформации привели к возрастанию влияния глобальных проблем, истоки которых уходит вглубь европейской истории. Само появление глобальных проблем свидетельствует о том, что человечество вышло на качественно новый уровень цивилизационного развития, требующий общепланетарного взаимодействия. Глобальные проблемы порождены формой жизнедеятель-

ности наиболее развитых стран, за которыми следуют другие страны, углубляя и расширяя сферу действия глобальных проблем. Тем самым источник глобальных проблем в действиях индустриально развитых стран мира. До радикального изменения целевых установок общественного развития трудно не только решить, но и остановить процесс появления новых глобальных проблем.

Глобальные проблемы — свидетельство кризисности современной цивилизации, ее базовых институтов. При этом принципиальным является то обстоятельство, что человечество встретилось не с кризисом тех или отдельных институтов или форм рациональности, а с системным кризисом. Это обстоятельство отметил известный социолог А. Турен: «Это действительно кризис цивилизации в целом, а не деструкция лишь какой-то определенной области социальной организации».[14] Ситуация осложняется тем, что человечество не только не может выработать эффективный механизм решения порожденных им проблем, несмотря на многочисленные конференции, симпозиумы, встречи на различных уровнях, а продолжает умножать число таких проблем, расширять сферу их действия. В этой связи принципиальным является вопрос о соотношении глобальных проблем и процесса глобализации. Помогает ли процесс глобализации решению глобальных проблем или, наоборот, это процесс усиливает их влияние на динамику современной цивилизации? Возможна и такая ситуация, что эти два явления: глобальные проблемы и процесс глобализации не соприкасаются между собой?! Чтобы ответить на эти вопросы, необходимо выяснить, что мы понимаем под процессом глобализации, каковы основные ценностные установки данного явления и как эти ценности относятся к тем фактам, которые стали источником появлении я глобальных проблем.

В целом не вызывает сомнения тот факт, что глобальные проблемы не могут быть решены в рамках функционирующей цивилизационной парадигмы. Если человечество хочет решить эти проблемы, то необходимо изменить экономикоцентричную парадигму цивилизационного развития.

GLOBALIZATION AND CIVILIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN MODERN SOCIETY

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Globalization is becoming a reality, which involves the development of a new set of forms and displays. Understanding the present stage of globalization first of all requires an understanding of the essence of the civilizational transformations occurring in the world under influence of different factors, especially geopolitic, economic,

scientific-technological factors. Globalization affects all countries, but during the present stage of civilizational development it is affecting them in various ways which depend on the country's place in international relations.

The most significant factor of the involvement of a country in extending the process of globalization appears to be the factor of its economical openness and resources. Therefore, it is possible to assert that despite the importance of such factors as the level of development of new information technologies, for example, the needs of world economic development determine the vector and govern the features of global transformation.

The present stage of globalization can be considered the answer of industrial and economico-centric civilizations to the challenges of the modern time, which aim to preserve the standards of living achieved by industrially advanced countries through the expansion of economic space. As well as allowing them to take advantage of financial and trading markets beyond national borders using natural and intellectual resources of the entire world. Ultimately, the new information structures, the treatment of democratic forms of decision-making, and other broad initiatives are designed to address problems stemming from this situation, while maintaining the social welfare of the industrially advanced part of the modern civilization.

In our opinion, globalization is a contradictory phenomenon that combines two interconnected processes. On the one hand, globalization is the process of extending self-organizing or natural globalization, which can also be named "globalization across the horizontals" when the achievements of certain cultures are acquired by other cultures through the process of communication between peoples. On the other hand, the general process of globalization includes "globalization across the verticals" or artificially organized globalization, which is a consequence of attempts to introduce violently the definite ideas of one country, religion or party into other socio-cultural regions and traditions. There is a complex and inconsistent connection between these two aspects of civilizational development.

Global crises develop when, for the various reasons, vertical organizational processes start to dominate the horizontal suppressing processes. At the end of the XXth century mankind has encountered a crisis situation situation on a scale that demands new answers. The numerous fundamental global challenges facing mankind today testify to the objective bases of the crisis situation that has developed. As a matter of fact, we do not refer here to specific global crises, but rather to the system-wide crisis of the modern civilization, which has an anthropological crisis as a core.

NOTES

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ИНФОРМАЦИОННО-КОММУНИКАТИВНАЯ ДОМИНАНТА СОВРЕМЕННОЙ КУЛЬТУРЫ

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Динамика современных социокультурных процессов во многом определяется развитием информационно-коммуникативных систем и технологий. К их оценке уже не подходят только с позиции научно-технического прогресса. В многочисленных исследованиях, раскрывающих результаты воздействия информатизации и компьютеризации на политические, экономические, экологические, социальные процессы, все отчетливее проявляется культурологический дискурс. Новое видение технологии через призму культуры постепенно меняет отношение к процессу глобализации, получающего «подпитку» для своего интеграционного потенциала посредством мощного информационно-технологического обновления среды, «виртуализируя» и «медиатизируя» социокультурное пространство. Связанные с этими тенденциями изменения, проявились в трансформации ценностно-смыслового пространства культуры, сказались на принципах и формах межкультурного взаимодействия, вылились в процесс антропологизации, направленный на сохранение целостности человека в условиях чрезмерного уплотнения информационно-коммуникативной ткани социума.

Информационно-коммуникативный фактор — один из ведущих в понимании сущности современной культуры. Более четверти века назад Д. Белл предвидел серьезные изменения в социальной жизни, образе и стиле жизни, культуре в целом, которые произойдут в связи с расширением телекоммуникаций, повсеместным внедрением компьютерной техники[1]. Одновременно был поднят вопрос о формировании нового типа культуры, но серьезно о нем заговорили сравнительно недавно.

Ставшая классической типология культур, завершающаяся констатацией перехода к «экранной» культуре, уже в полной мере не отражает реального состояния культуры в современном обществе. Человечество вступило в новое «осевое время», характеризующееся становлением «электронно-компьютерной» культуры. Она выступает маркером информационного общества. Развитие нового типа культуры основано на взаимосвязи и взаимозависимости научно-технических достижений и трансформации ценностно-смысловых кодов, интегрирующих/дифференцирующих социокультурное пространство. Сегодня реальные проявления информационной культуры — это скорее еще только «зоны переходности» от одних коммуникативных форм к новым интерактивным взаимодействиям. Контуры инновационных технологий очевидны на всех социокультурных уровнях, влияют на образование разных культурных про-

странств, которые «движутся» в социуме с разными скоростями и по разным траекториям.

Далеко не последнюю роль в их становлении играют каналы распространения новых смыслов и образцов культуры, прежде всего средства массовой информации (СМИ) и различные сети — телефонные, радиорелейные, телевизионные, спутниковые, электрические и т. д., обеспечивающие коммуникативное взаимодействие. Они являются не только факторами ускорения технологического прогресса, но и «провокаторами» многих инновационных тенденций, ценностно-смысловых и рефлексивных проявлений в культуре. Формирование транснациональной культуры, сближение массовой и классической профессиональной культуры и т. д., как нельзя лучше подчеркивают особое значение информационно-коммуникативных систем в становлении нового типа культуры. Однако из данного утверждения не следует признания технологического детерминизма в объяснении социокультурной динамики. Культурологический дискурс выступает показателем того, что в культуре достаточно сильны механизмы самоорганизации и поиск новых форм, смыслов, свойств в ходе ее эволюции — это далеко не всегда только линейное продвижение в различных областях социокультурной практики, обусловленное техническими прорывами.

В становлении информационной культуры в России можно выделить несколько периодов. Они неравнозначны как по своим временным параметрам, так и по интенсивности происходящих изменений. Первый период охватывает последнюю четверть XX века и условно может быть обозначен как период информационно-технологического обновления российского общества. Фактически, в стране произошла смена парадигмы социокультурного развития, выразившаяся в постепенном отказе от линейного прогрессистского продвижения, признании нелинейности развития культуры, устойчивости и изменчивости культурных форм, закономерностей и спонтанности в эволюции культуры. Это привело к осознанию необходимости отказа от прежних теоретических оснований объяснения трансформаций культуры в обществе.

Второй период может быть условно обозначен, как период «пред-информационной» культуры, плавно перешедший в новую стадию информационного общества — период информационной культуры. Заметим, в других странах этот переход был более интенсивным и менее длительным, завершившись уже на рубеже XX — начала XXI вв.

Одной из основных причин, повлиявших на темпы и динамику данного процесса, можно считать социально-экономические преобразования в России, значение которых нельзя как не преувеличивать, так и не учитывать. Более того, их влияние на развитие культуры в России также не должно оцениваться негативно, с позиций «пользы» и «вреда» рыночной экономики для будущего культуры. Нельзя отрицать того, что новые социально-экономические отношения способствовали внедрению необходимых технических средств и обновлению информационно-коммуникативной инфраструктуры, без которой переход

к новому типу культуры невозможен. Таким образом, интенсивность процесса обновления ценностно-смыслового ядра культуры России, как показателя «сформированности» информационной культуры в стране связана, с одной стороны, с процессами саморазвития культуры, с другой — детерминируется внешними факторами, прежде всего, социально-экономическим реформированием страны. Естественно, что в период «обостренной переходности» выявить какую-либо иерархию в системе ценностей, доминирующие предпочтения и интересы в обществе достаточно сложно — интегративные функции культуры ослаблены. Поэтому кризис отечественной культуры во многом был кризисом и форм, и содержания культуры — кризисом национально-культурной идентичности в целом. «Ценностно-смысловая неустойчивость» общества отражала деструктивную направленность социокультурной дифференциации, усиливала процессы маргинализации, проявление социокультурных деструкций, аномии, активизации мифа и архетипов.

Признаками сохраняющейся «переходности» в современной социокультурной ситуации выступает параллельное сосуществование разных типов культуры, поддерживаемых различными социокультурными группами, а также слабая сопряженность социокультурных интересов и возможностей удовлетворения потребностей населения. Смена системы ценностей — это не всегда резкий разрыв и полная замена идеалов и ориентаций. Переходность позволяет частичное включение существующих ценностей в новую систему, что соответствует процессу преемственности. Постмодернистская ситуация, также имеющая черты переходности, делает доминирующим принцип сосуществования, формируя сложное ценностно-смысловое пространство со множеством доминантных центров. Из этого следует, что «переходности» свойственна повышенная вариабельность культурных форм в обществе, и, независимо от характера проявления одного из выше обозначенных признаков (или всей совокупности признаков при доминировании какого-либо одного из них), общие процессы развития еще не укладываются в качественно-определенные формы социокультурного[2]. Неслучайно некоторые ученые критически оценивают происходящие перемены, подчеркивая, что особенностью нынешней эпохи является скорость протекания процессов и их антисоциальная направленность и задаются вопросом: «Если будущее — это информационная эпоха, то сумеет ли человечество дожить до ее наступления?»[3].

Временность «переходного» периода не учитывается и другими авторами, в пессимистических прогнозах которых констатируется, что сегодня «вместо общества возникает социотехническая система, в которой люди, сращиваясь с техникой, особенно компьютерной, теряют самых себя, ведут «виртуальное существование». В такой ситуации их надо оплакивать, а не завидовать, заботясь о том, чтобы подобная участь как можно дольше не постигла остальное человечество, а если когда-то постигнет, чтобы это произошло не в катастрофической форме[4]». Но культура обладает адаптационными и защитными механизмами и

подобные сценарии «катастроф» в большей степени носят популистский, чем научный характер. «Переходность», предполагающая повышенную неустойчивость и нестабильность, резкие ценностно-смысловые «колебания» в обществе и культуре, сглаживается путем коррекции и мягких управленческих воздействий со стороны власти и гражданских институтов. Ими снимаются последствия «революционных» скачков, снижаются риски разрастания социальных и культурных конфликтов.

Убедительно и довольно скрупулезно Маршалл Мак-Люен доказывает, что каждому поколению приходилось находиться в состоянии переходности — балансировать на грани радикальных перемен, но впоследствии это легко забывается и неминуемые преобразования уже кажутся вполне естественными. Самое сложное — это понять силу давления технологий, которые обусловили обособление чувств и тем самым ввели общество в состояние гипноза. М. Мак-Люен предлагает формулу гипноза, которую он выражает следующим образом: «В каждый отдельный момент работает только одно чувство» <...> «Всякая новая технология, таким образом, приглушает взаимодействие чувств и сознания и именно в той области нового, в котором происходит отождествление зрителя и объекта. Такое сомнамбулическое приспособление наблюдателя к новой форме или структуре делает людей, максимально глубоко погруженных в революционные изменения, как раз наименее способными осознать их динамику»[5]. Поэтому выводы М. Мак-Люена оптимистичны: как в свое время письмо раскололо аудиотактильное единство сознания племенного человека и выдвинуло визуальную составляющую человеческой чувственности, а печатная технология завершила этот раскол. Таким же образом, совершающийся сегодня переход к «электрическим технологиям», вероятно, позволит преодолеть новый раскол, чрезмерную нестабильность.

Массмедиа-системы используются обществом для постоянного связывания прошлого и будущего, и это обусловливается крайне высокими притязаниями современного общества на избыточность и вариативность, — считает Н. Луман. Если бы не происходило, то «непрерывно реконструируемая реальность могла бы рухнуть под тяжестью внутренних противоречий». Общество, опираясь на массмедийную память, которая функционирует внутрисистемно, использует СМК как мощный селектор, который в свою очередь должен получить защиту посредством обособления и оперативной замкнутости[6]. Поэтому механизмы самоорганизации, как более всего отражающие принципы развития информационно-коммуникативного систем, согласуются с принципами социокультурного регулирования, обеспечивая тем самым переход к качественно новому этапу — фазе инициирования новых культурных форм, когда адаптация к разного рода новациям и преобразованиям сменяется временем проявления инициатив и социокультурного творчества.

Размышляя о последствиях перехода человечества к новому информационному обществу, эксперты ЮНЕСКО заостряют внимание на том, что интенсив-

ное развитие и обновление информационно-коммуникативных систем, расширение межкультурных и межличностных взаимодействий свидетельствуют не только о динамике мировых интеграционных процессов и сближении народов и культур. «Мир уже слышит прекрасную увертюру, означающую вступление в новую эру культурных возможностей. Повсюду, однако, людям приходится сегодня не радоваться наступающей благодати, а сохранять свои традиции, переосмысливать культурные обмены и взаимосвязи с соседями на нашей маленькой планете»[7].

Действительно, в разных странах по ряду направлений, прежде всего в сфере информационных технологий очевидно увеличение дистанции между векторами культурного и цивилизационного развития. Наиболее наглядно это прослеживается по сверхбыстрым темпам внедрения новой техники в повседневную жизнь людей. Количественными показателями подтверждается рост производства информационной техники, но ее распространение увеличивается в основном в развитых странах. Разрыв между развитыми и развивающимися странами невероятно громадный и он увеличивается день ото дня. Например, по мобильным телефонам (в расчете на 1000 человек) — в среднем в 17 раз (при этом по Южной Азии он достигает 180-190 раз, по тропической Африке — в 45–50 раз). Еще очевиднее информационно-технологическое неравенство по персональным компьютерам, разрыв между странами достигает 22 раза (соответственно, в 120–130 раз по Южной Азии и 35–40 раз по тропической Африке). Обеспеченность радио и телевизионной техникой также является показателем трансформации информационно-коммуникативного пространства и фактором, свидетельствующим о расширении глобализационных процессов. Однако можно говорить об информационном неравенстве, когда из 1,000 человек в конце XX в. в Африке только 60 человек имели возможность смотреть телевизор, в то время как в Америке это число достигало 429 человек[8]. Ведь цифры отражают не только наличие технических единиц. Это цивилизационно-культурный показатель, ибо, что касается доли людей, использующих Интернет, то сегодня отставание между регионами уже почти безнадежное, так как достигает примерно 150 раз (соответственно, по Южной Азии — свыше 3000 раз, а по тропической Африке — в 200 раз)[9].

Какие факторы выступают барьером, препятствующим распространению технологий нового типа по всему миру? Не только социально-экономические факторы (такие, бедность, высокая цена новой техники), но и малая величина того, что на языке современной экономики называется «невещественным человеческим капиталом» — т. е. капиталом, материализованном в знаниях, навыках, физическом здоровье населения. К концу XX века в расчете на душу населения невещественный человеческий капитал в развитых капиталистических государствах превышал в 20–25 раз аналогичный индикатор в крупных развивающихся странах[10]. Приведенные показатели косвенно подтверждают необратимость глубоких и сложных социокультурных изменений, когда отставание разных стран по показателям состояния информационно-коммуникативной сре-

ды являются показателем не только отсутствия информационной свободы, но и свидетельствуют о нарушениях прав человека в культуре, катастрофически низком уровне образованности населения многих стран.

Но другую часть человечества подстерегают не менее серьезные опасности. Ф. Фукуяма прав, говоря о том, что «динамичная экономика технологических инноваций может в силу своей природы, разрывать существующие социальные связи»[11]. И это происходит на фоне мощнейших интеграционных процессов, которые, казалось бы, усиливают информационно-коммуникативную плотность социокультурного пространства. С одной стороны, этому, действительно, способствуют глобальная телекоммуникационная система Интернет, электронные системы связи и технологии, повышая значимость процессов информатизации и компьютеризации для всего человечества. С другой стороны, эти процессы сопровождаются не только проблемами технического и технологического характера. Новые принципы создания, распространения и сохранения информации формируют в социокультурном пространстве особые ценностно-смысловые поля, не всегда соответствующие демократическим тенденциям. В связи с этим актуализируется проблема сохранения гуманистических ценностно-смысловых оснований культуры в новом информационно-коммуникативном пространстве, так как современное поколение людей живет в ситуации социокультурных рисков, обусловленных динамикой распространения информационно-коммуникативных систем и технологий.

Это риски распространения определенных ценностей и идеалов, норм и стилей жизни, связанные с нарастанием конфликта партикулярного и универсального в культуре. Они могут быть классифицированы по следующим группам:

а) риски «запаздывания» культурного развития, приводящие к информационно-коммуникативному неравенству;
б) риски превышения объема и роли информационных потоков;
в) риски утраты базовых характеристик этнических культур и, соответственно, трансформации моделей этнокультурной идентичности, «рассеивание» идентичности;
г) риски активизации негативной самоорганизации и упущенных возможностей развития в отсутствии концепции общенациональной (государственной) культурной политики[12].

Избежать всего комплекса рисков достаточно сложно, но для каждой культуры принципиально важным становится достижение динамического равновесия между открытостью/закрытостью, как показателям включенности в мировое информационно-коммуникативное пространство при сохранении своей национальной самобытности. Причем сегодня, когда понимание национально-культурной идентичности уже не исключает множественности ее форм и уровней, а самобытность проявляется на разных этапах социокультурной динамики в различных вариантах, то в процессах интеграции/дифференциации значительно повышается роль средств массовой коммуникации. Ими выстраивается соот-

ветствующий дискурс, способствующий укреплению национальной идентичности в эпоху усиления транскультурных обменов и виртуализации социокультурного пространства.

Формируемая новая культурно-коммуникативная система с особым информационно-коммуникативным пространством — символическим универсумом, инсценирующим некую реальность, — один из показательных примеров. В определенном смысле возникает новая мифологическая реальность с особым набором экстралингвистических признаков, способствующих закреплению в массовом и индивидуальном сознании людей того, что описывается словами (или передается текстами) и принято понимать как миф. Но виртуальная реальность современной культуры — это не столько идеальное пространство, основанное на «новых мифах» и носящее сакральный смысл, сколько «поглощающая» человека медиасреда, компьютерная «виртуальная реальность», дигитальное (цифровое) поле современной культуры. Это — сетевая культура, новый интегративный сверхсложный феномен.

Сетевая культура выстраивается стихийно и спонтанно на основе разноуровневых контактов людей, нелинейных взаимодействий разного рода субъектов. Это культура, основанная и на знании, и на виртуально-мифологическом сознании. Она включается в картину мира тех людей, существование которых сегодня в большей или меньшей степени связано с современными информационными системами. И в данном случае мифология в силу ее мощной логической организованности выступает программой регуляции. Так, человечество совершает переход от реального к виртуальному обществу, исполняя надежды и желания решительно «невзрослеющего общества», — считает П. Вирилио. Найденный им образ людей, предпочитающих обманчивую виртуальную реальность социокультурной реальности, свидетельствует о развитии автоматизма, когда по мере развития технологий замещаются «ошибочные действия» принципиально «невзрослеющего общества»[13].

“Мы уже не в состоянии отделить развитие сети от технического прогресса, который в ближайшие десять лет выразится в отцифровке всей аналоговой информации, составляющей знание. Цифровые коды грозят стать основой всей коммуникации», а конкуренция между картинками — всеобщей, ибо «нарушает общий временный режим образной информации. Экран против экрана, монитор домашнего компьютера и кинескоп телевизора станут местом борьбы за первенство на всеобщем рынке восприятия, с появлением контроля за которым начнется новая эра и в этике, и эстетике»[14]. В образующемся сетевом пространстве складываются собственные процессы самоорганизации и самоуправления, во многом альтернативные социальным. Взаимодействие между субъектами осуществляется на основе новых коммуникационных принципов, что приводит к закреплению «виртуальных» идентификационных моделей.

Виртуализация общества приводит к «цифровым разрывам», нарушению иерархической связи между поколениями. И не только потому, что историчес-

кие личности и связанные с ними реальные события вырываются из контекста культуры и в одном времени-пространстве сосуществуют с мифологическими героями и виртуальными субъектами, но и вследствие того, что взаимодействие между людьми в реальном пространстве-времени утрачивает истинную значимость для развития человека. «Вытеснение» и замещение представлений, символов и знаков, формирующих ценностное сознание и фиксирующих преемственность поколений, особенно отчетливо проявляется на обыденном уровне культуры.

По своей сложности современное информационно-коммуникативное пространство значительно превосходит все, ранее известные человеку (мифологическое, религиозное, эзотерическое пространство, пространство традиционных культур, и др.). Благодаря сочетанию мощной логической организованности, глубоко сокрытой, зачастую никем не декларируемой и не контролируемой, и механизмам самоорганизации сетевая культура «выстраивает» особые программы регуляции поведения и деятельности человека за ее идеальными пределами, вторгаясь в сферу социокультурного пространства, оказывая сильное влияние на индивидуальное и общественное сознание, мистифицируя (или искажая) картину реального мира.

В связи с активным освоением человеком искусственных информационно-коммуникативных сред изменяются фундаментальные структуры сознания (эмоции, память, воображение, рациональность и поведение в реальном мире), разрушается субъектность, возникают серьезные этические проблемы (перлюстрация корреспонденции, внедрение спаммеров и т. д.), психологические деструкции и «компьютерное отчуждение», изменяются формы и направленность процессов социализации и инкультурации, трансформируется жизненный мир человека.

Появление новых информационно-коммуникативных каналов в системе социокультурных взаимодействий свидетельствует о подмене непосредственных контактов между людьми интерактивными взаимодействиями, коммуникативный формат которых не столько сближает людей, сколько проводит между ними четкую демаркационную линию.

Исследование процесса становления личности в информационно-коммуникативных средах свидетельствует об усиливающихся рисках, связанных с изменениями уровня информационно-психологической безопасности человека в современном мире, ведь «обживая» компьютерную виртуальную реальность человек изменяет свой внутренний мир, духовно-этические установки, в целом — тип *мироотношения и миропонимания*. Ощущение бесконечности информационного пространства, невозможность завершить смысловое передвижение вселяют человеку мысли о легком расставании с жизнью. Резкое несовпадение норм поведения и жизненных правил, ценностей и идеалов в новом ключе раскрывает проблему кризиса социокультурной идентичности, высказывая предположение о формировании нового типа идентичности — «сетевой» идентичности.

Новая культура открывает и новые исследовательские поля, требуя ответов на вопросы, которые еще несколько десятилетий назад не могли быть поставлены.

Как человек чувствует себя в насыщенной информационной среде?

Каковы последствия трансформации моделей поведения человека в условиях расширяющихся каналов передачи информации, изменений норм и правил, целей и содержания процессов взаимодействия с другими людьми?

Способен ли современный человек поддерживать языковую и речевую практику диалога, или визуально-текстовые контакты полностью удовлетворяют его потребности в общении?

Что стоит за процессом «колонизации сознания?

Почему электронная переписка незнакомых людей заставляет не столько думать, сколько переживать, парализуя аналитическую способность и потребность в саморефлексии, возбуждая инстинкты?

Нахождение человека в ситуации переходности, когда формируется новый тип «электронно-компьютерной» культуры, — это попытка его самореализации в противоречивых условиях глобализирующегося мира, когда процессы унификации / индивидуализации в обществе поддерживаются техникой и технологиями.

Информационно-коммуникативная доминанта современной культуры не может рассматриваться только как прогрессивный цивилизационный проект. За его внешними проявлениями сокрыты внутренние глубинные смыслы. В период резкой смены типов, форм и знаков общения, когда вербальное уступает свое первенство визуальному началу в передаче информации, а коммуникативные формы обрастают новыми ритуальными текстами, возникает ощущение, что человечество движется в направлении поиска внешней простоты в культуре, избавляясь от переизбытка и сложности накопленного веками ее ценностно-смыслового багажа. Так ли это, покажет время.

INFORMATION–COMMUNICATIVE DOMINANT OF MODERN CULTURE

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The dynamics of modern socio-cultural processes to a great extent depend on the development of information- communicative systems and technologies a new type of culture is forming as the typology of classic culture is being eclipsed by “screen” culture. However, this does not reflect the real state of culture in modern society, where the digital- computer culture is forming as a marker of the information soci-

ety. The development of this new type of culture is based on the interconnection and interdependence of science and technology, scientific and technological achievements, and the transformation of value-meaning codes, which are integrating and differentiating the socio-cultural space. Today, the real manifestations of information culture are the "transition zones" from isolated communicative forms to the new interactive communication. The intensity of the process of renovating the nuclear meaning of Russian culture can be considered an index of "shaping" informational culture. In Russia, the transformation is connected, on the one hand, with processes of cultural self-development. On the other hand, the transformation is determined by external factors, primarily the socioeconomic reformation of the country. Naturally, during such a period of "sharp transition", as the integrating function of culture is weakened, it is rather difficult to discover the hierarchy of the value system and the dominant preferences and interests of the society. This is why Russia's cultural crisis is, to a great extent, a crisis of culture forms and content, a crisis of national identity in the whole.

Manifestations of "transition" in the modern socio-cultural situation parallel the coexistence of different types of culture, supported by different socio-cultural groups, as well as the weak connection between different socio-cultural interests and opportunities to meet needs of the population. Value system change is not always abrupt, but can be a gradual movement toward the complete change of ideals and orientations. A more gradual transition allows the partial involvement of existing values in the system, which slowly give way during the process of succession.

The postmodernist situation has transition features that make dominant the principle of coexistence. Thus forming a complicated value-meaning space with numerous dominance centers. This situation is controversial. The high variability of culture forms in society is characteristic of the "transition". As M.McLuhan maintains, every generation balances on the edge of radical change, but later the incentive for change is easily forgotten and inevitable transformations seem quite natural. In this most recent transition, the most difficult thing to understand is the force of technological pressure that caused an isolation of feelings and thus set the society into hypnotic state. We can draw encouragement from M.McLuhan's optimistic conclusion. McLuhan points out that in the past the capacity of writing evoked a split from the audio-tactile unity of tribe human consciousness and introduced the visual component of human sensitivity. Printing technology completed the split. Likewise the transition to "electrical technologies" taking place today will probably give the opportunity to overcome a new split, over instability.

However, from our point of view, without the concordance of self-regulation mechanisms and socio-cultural regulation it is impossible to transfer to a substantially new stage in the transitional process. Self-regulation and socio-cultural regulation constitute a necessary aspect of the initiation phase of new culture formation, when the adaptation to all sorts of innovations and transformations occurs with the introduction of new initiatives and socio-cultural creativity.

All around the world different countries are in transition and headed in a number of directions, led by changes in the field of information technology. In human society in general there is definite evidence of increasing distance between the vectors of culture and civilization development. Most vividly this split can be traced to the extra fast pace in the introduction of new techniques into everyday life. Quantitative data cited in this paper show the increase in production and the spread of information technologies equipment. In keeping with the ideas of F. Fukuyama, this paper shows that the dynamic economy of technological innovation, due to its nature, can break existing social connections.

This paper focuses on the problem of preserving the human value-meaning base of culture in the new informational–communicative space, as the present generation of people lives at-risk in the socio-cultural situation caused by the rapidly changing dynamics of information–communicative systems and technological expansion. Among the risks named are a) the risk of delayed or tardy cultural development, leading to information–communicative inequality; b) the risks of over valuing the flow, amount, and role of information; c) the risk of losing basic cultural characteristics and ethnicity, and correspondingly, the transformation of the ethnocultural identity model into disperse identity; and d) the risk of negative self-coordination and lost developmental opportunities due to absence of a national (state) culture policy.

A special part of the paper is devoted to the virtualization of modern culture.

Developing the informational-communicative space (symbolical universe, virtual reality) produces a new reality with a particular set of extra linguistic features which create special value and meaning standards in individual and mass consciousness. In its complexity this ideal space is much more complicated than previously known cultural spaces, e.g., mythological, religious, exoteric, traditional culture media. The new informational-communicative space is the space of net culture, based both on knowledge and virtual-mythological consciousness. Consciousness of this space develops spontaneously, not only as non-linear interaction of numerous people in the Internet-space, creating ideal mythological space, but by "swallowing" an individual into media, into the computer's "virtual" reality, into the digital sphere of modern culture. Thanks to the combination of powerful logical organization, deeply hidden and seldom proclaimed, and to self-organization, the net culture builds up special programs of individual's behavior and activity beyond its borders. These programs, in a social cultural world, greatly influence individual and common consciousness, distorting and hoaxing the picture of real life.

Due to the development of artificial informational-communicative space the fundamental structures of consciousness (emotion, memory, imagination, rationality and behavior in real life) are changing, damaging subjectivity and giving rise to serious ethical problems (per lustration, spammer use etc.). With this psychological destruction and "computer detachment", the forms and direction of the process of socializing and enculturation change, and man's external life is transforming.

The appearance of new informational-communicative channels in the system of socio-cultural interactive relations witnesses the substitution of direct contacts between people for interactive relations, a communicative format which draws the demarcation line between people rather than bringing them together. The author tries to comprehend what an individual feels in the tight inform-space to show the consequences of the transformation of man's behavioral models within the swiftly growing information channels, the change of norms and rules, and the aims and content of interactive processes with other people. In addition, answering the questions: "In this new cultural setting is modern man able to maintain language and speech dialogue practice and the visual and textual contacts to satisfy fully his needs in communication?" "What is behind the process of "mind colonization?" "Why does the electronic correspondence of unknown persons make people experience (worry) rather than think, paralyzing thinking abilities and needed self-reflection, and evoking instincts?"

By studying the process of personality development in the new informational-communicative space one witnesses growing risks due to changes in the level of information-psychological safety in contemporary life. Just as changing the setting in a computer virtual reality changes an individual's inner world, the advent of informational-communicative space is transforming spiritual and ethic norms and the individual's type of understanding and relationship with the world as the whole. The feeling of infinity in inform-space and the impossibility of completing the transformation of meaning give rise to thoughts of easily parting with life. Abrupt coincidences of behavior norms and rules and holding values and ideals in the new light reveal the crisis of socio-cultural identity, suggesting the creation of the new type of identity — specifically, the "net" identity.

The information-communicative dominant of modern culture cannot be considered only a progressive civilization project. Behind the external manifestations internal meanings are hidden. During the abrupt change of types, forms and signs in communication, when verbal gives way to the priority of visual in the information transfer, there is a sense that the forms of communication are surrounded by new ritual texts. As this feeling evolves, there is a strong sense that mankind is moving toward external simplicity in culture, a sense that mankind is getting rid of superfluity and complexity of values and symbols accrued through the centuries. Time will show if this is true.

NOTES

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НЕГАТИВНЫЕ ТЕНДЕНЦИИ СОВРЕМЕННОЙ КУЛЬТУРЫ

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1. Каковы основные направления культуры с философской или психологической точки зрения?

1. Ксенофобия
2. Экстремизм

2. Каковы основополагающие характеристики этих направлений?

Ксенофобия в переводе с греческого означает «страх перед чужим». Вообще говоря, ксенофобия — закон зоопсихологии, порожденный естественным отбором, как известно в животном мире именно чужой несет опасность. Стратегия поведения животных по отношению к чужакам имела и имеет три варианта поведения: избегать, мимикрировать или быть готовым сразиться.

Ксенофобия в современном обществе представлена не только как неприятие Другого, но и как культивирование противостояния Мы и Они. Более того, усиление этнической неприязни происходит на фоне подавление милосердия. И в этом мы повторяем историю Германии первой половины 20 века. Национал-социализм внедрение своей идеологии начал с подавления милосердия.

Рост экстремизма и этнической неприязни выражается не только в муссировании СМИ этой темы, но и проявления в повседневной жизни на бытовом уровне

Ксенофобия опережает противостояние ксенофобии. Более того, ксенофобический дискурс и ксенофобическая проблематика востребованы и доминируют. Ксенофобические настроения носят не только антисемитский характер, они приобрели привкус кавказофобии и этнической неприязни, в целом, к «лицам неславянской внешности». И в этом смысле, природа ксенофобии сближается в своей характеристике с природой фашизма, данной Райхом. Фашизм, с точки зрения Райха, служит выражением иррациональности характерологической структуры обычного человека, первичные биологические потребности которого подавлялись на протяжении многих тысячелетий. «С точки зрения характера человека «фашизм» представляет собой основное, эмоциональное отношение «подавленного» в человеке к нашей авторитарной, машинной цивилизации и ее механистически мистическому пониманию жизни».

Масштаб и широта распространения «расовых предрассудков» свидетельствует о том, что их источником является иррациональная область человеческого характера. Фашизм возникает на основе расовой ненависти и служит ее политически организованным выражением.

«Расовая идеология — это чисто биопатическое выражение характерологической структуры оргаистически импотентной личности».

Райх считал, что расовое начало коренится в природе каждого человека. Проблема в том, артикулировано это начало или нет. Артикулированность этнической неприязни эксплицирует степень ответственности и проблему идентификации. Покинутость человека Богом переживается как трагическая данность, как сиротство. Она предопределяет ответственность быть человеком, ответственность за усилие быть личностью. Понятно, что ответственность за самоосуществление предполагает тревогу за истинность выбранного пути и поиск путей самореализации. Путь к самому себе требует мужества быть. Ответственность за самореализацию выражается в способности отойти от предложенного, а точнее, навязываемого социумом опыта, выражается в преодолении природы расовых предрассудков. Не секрет, что проще найти виноватого, того кто должен стать жертвой искупления, нежели взять ответственность на себя. Акт жертвоприношения призван преодолеть кризис и переломить ситуацию, на худой конец снять социальное напряжение. Такая интерпретация ксенофобии, выявляет такую ее характеристику как страх перед взятием ответственности за состоявшееся и сбывшееся. Движимый интенцией страха ответственности ищет в Другом виноватого, в Другом жертву искупления своих упущений, своей безответственности. И чем выше степень нереализованности и отсутствия жизнетворчества, тем сильнее внутреннее стремление найти виноватого.

На Другого можно перенести ответственность за свою неустроенность, за свое одиночество. Одиночество — одна из самых сложных для современного человека психологических проблем. При кажущейся интенсивности общения, возможной благодаря всевозможным видам транспорта, открытости границ и средств связи, человек безмерно одинок.

3. Может ли человек воздействовать на эти направления и если может, то каким образом?

Ксенофобия, в целом, формирует механизм общественного мнения и формируется для употребления общественным мнением.

Фашизм можно сокрушить только в том случае, если вести с ним борьбу объективно и практически на основе глубокого знания жизненных процессов. В области политической интриги, дипломатии и зрелищ он не знает себе равных.

Международный фашизм невозможно победить с помощью политических интриг. Его победит естественная организация труда, любви и познания на международном уровне. Фашизм — это не политическая партия, а особая концепция жизни, отношения к человеку, любви и труду.

Следовательно, необходимо приложить усилия к формированию концепции, а точнее жизненной позиции диалога, главным императивом ее должно

быть желание проникнуть в культурное пространство Другого. Вектор этого императива должен лежать в плоскости понимания как приятия Другого, в плоскости формирование общего культурного пространства. Критическая осмысленность себя не как ограниченного в своей неустроенной телесности, а осознание безграничности человеческого сознания, позволит выстроить общее диалогическое пространство.

Именно безграничность человеческого сознания позволят быть такому многообразию проявления человеческой природы. Мы все разные и в этом прелесть нашей жизни. Это дает нам возможность расширять горизонты нашего сознания, раздвигать горизонты нашей обыденности.

Возможны два варианта диалога: 1) Диалог — принятие Другого как вежливое выслушивание, что подразумевает под собой лишь касание по внешней границе бытия Другого;

2) диалог как принятие Другого на уровне смыслопорождающих структур повседневности, т. е. глубинного фундаментального уровня бытия человека, на уровне идеологем ментально выстроенного и рационально озвученного мира.

Второй, более сложный, путь — через вхождение, через вживание в культурное пространство Другого. Приятие глубинного интуитивного нерва жизни Другого. Это более сложный, более долгий более затратный и более энергоемкий путь. В первую очередь, потому что предполагает не высокомерное сравнение более развитой своей и примитивной чужой культурами. Речь идет об умении отойти от стереотипов и шаблонов массовой культуры и об искусстве расширять горизонты своего сознания.

Психология современного человека — психология потребителя, человека не способного познавать. Более того, психология потребления формирует человека умственного ленивого, формирует жизненную позицию неприятия всего того, что не разрекламировано и не подлежит продаже в яркой упаковке.

Возможно ли, переломить такую позицию? Возможно ли, изменить жизненную позицию потребления?

Необходимо перейти от этнической мобилизации к межэтнической интеграции, к формированию общности граждан, у которых есть цели и объединяющие идеи, не связанные с этничностью.

Необходимо перепрограммирование массового сознания, необходима программа по преодолению этнофобий.

«Механизмы борьбы с идеологией экстремизма по сути те же, что и его эскалации. Экстремизм не навязывается сверху. Не вырастает он и внизу, поскольку негативные массовые стереотипы — для него лишь сырье. Идеология экстремизма формируется на среднем уровне усилиями так называемых этнических и религиозных антрепренеров. Примерно так же должна формироваться и противостоящая ей идеология толерантности: ее основными проводниками может быть только интеллектуальная элита».[1]

NEGATIVE TENDENCIES IN MODERN CULTURE

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I regard xenophobia and extremism as the major trends of contemporary culture.

Xenophobia is represented in contemporary culture not only as aversion to Another, but also as cultivation of the We-Them-confrontation. Furthermore, ethnic aversion is being reinforced while charity is being suppressed.

The reinforcement of xenophobia outstrips the rise of opposition to xenophobia. Moreover, xenophobical discourse and xenophobical issues are claimed and prevail. The evidence of ethnic aversion explicates the extent of responsibility and the problem of identity. The desolation of Man without God is experienced as a tragic fact and an orphanage. It predetermines responsibility for being a man, responsibility for effort to be a personality. It is obvious that the responsibility for self-fulfillment implies anxiety of verity of the chosen path and quest of ways of self-actualization. A path to self calls for courage to be. Responsibility for self-fulfillment appears in the ability to dodge experience that was thrusted by society; it appears in overcoming racial prejudices. A characteristic feature of both xenophobia and extremism is a fear of being in charge of the realized. The subject of intention of fear of responsibility aims at accusing the Other; he longs to see the Other as a scapegoat for his omissions, his irresponsibility.

These tendencies can be overcome by forming the ideology of tolerance. Two versions are possible. According to the first one, it is necessary to build a concept, or rather a dialogical life attitude of which the major imperative would be the desire for getting in the cultural space of the Other. The vector of the imperative should be found in the plane of understanding the Other as acceptance of him, in the plane of building up the common cultural space.

The second and more complex way lies in entering the cultural space of the Other through accepting his ways, accepting the inner intuitive nerve of the Other's life. It is a more complex, a longer, more laborious and power-hungry way.

NOTES

[1] Паин Э. Аналитический доклад о правовом противодействии этнополитическому экстремизму.

АНТРОПОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ФАКТОРЫ И АНТРОПОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ СТРАТЕГИИ В СОВРЕМЕННОЙ КУЛЬТУРНОЙ ДИНАМИКЕ

Сергей ХОРУЖИЙ

1. Культурная ситуация современного мира давно уже являет собой картину крайней диверсификации и пестроты. Культурный процесс развертывается как художественный и эстетический поиск в открытом и безграничном пространстве, лишенный универсальных ориентиров и вех, не имеющий отчетливо выраженного магистрального русла, неэфемерных ведущих направлений, основательных объединяющих концепций. С тех пор как эстетика стала неклассической, отказавшись от концепта Прекрасного как верховного конституирующего принципа всей сферы художественной активности Человека, никакой замены или альтернативы этому концепту не возникло, и художественная сфера сегодня конституируется лишь как многообразие «практик», границы которого не определяются никакими внятными критериями. Неудивительно, что в подобных концептуальных обстоятельствах речь о культурном процессе и культурной динамике, ее ведущих тенденциях, движущих факторах становилась на львиную долю эмпирической, сосредоточенной на внешних особенностях. На первом плане оказывается роль социоисторической динамики, процессов глобализации, прямо связанных с ними явлений мультикультурализма; усиленно также изучается, акцентируется рост влияния рыночных механизмов, масскультуры, и т. п. Нельзя отрицать важности всех этих процессов и факторов; однако самым существенным, главным остается, несомненно, задача раскрытия внутренней, имманентной природы культурной и художественной активности Человека в столь изменившуюся эпоху.

Сегодня эта задача далека еще от решения, но все же возможно сделать некоторые частичные выводы, увидеть некоторые черты будущего решения. Во-первых, новое понимание окончательно отказывается искать природу и корни рассматриваемой сферы активности Человека на старых путях, в каких-либо отвлеченных принципах, типа прежних начал Прекрасного и Возвышенного; оно нащупывается и строится в ином дискурсе, не эссенциальном, а деятельностном, оперативном. И отсюда — во-вторых — нить ведет к следующей важной особенности. Коль скоро практики, составляющие рассматриваемую сферу, не возводятся, говоря по Вл.Соловьеву, к неким «отвлеченным началам», — остается лишь возводить их — к их совершителям и участникам, действующим лицам художественного акта и художественной деятельности. Иными словами, теоретический поиск должен направляться в область *антропологических* аспектов и измерений художественного и культурного творчества. В этом случае он сохраняет еще возможность раскрытия внутренней природы эстетико-куль-

турной сферы; если же ограничиться лишь социальными, историческими, экономическими и т.п. измерениями, анализ будет неизбежно оставаться редукционистским и поверхностным.

Именно в этом, антропологическом направлении ориентированы наиболее глубокие попытки концептуализации современного эстетического опыта. У истоков этой антропологической тенденции стоят великие практики современного искусства, Джойс и Эйзенштейн, утверждавшие сутью и целью художественного акта достижение определенного, точно рассчитанного воздействия на человека — то есть достижение существенно антропологического результата; и ставившие во главу угла работу с восприятием, с перцептивными модальностями антропологического опыта. В последующем эта работа с восприятиями еще более выдвигается в центр как художественных практик, так и эстетических разработок; основательный пример таких разработок дает, в частности, рецептивная эстетика. И нельзя не отметить, что подобная антропологическая направленность полностью согласуется с ведущей тенденцией развития во всей сфере гуманитарного знания. Главной чертой этого развития является *антропологический поворот*: постепенное, но неуклонное продвижение к переводу всей данной сферы в антропологически фундированную эпистему. Этот процесс глубинной эпистемологической перестройки стимулируется и направляется как внутринаучными факторами, так и ситуацией глобальной реальности современного мира, где также имеет место антропологический поворот: здесь он означает, что решающая роль в глобальной динамике переходит к динамике антропологической, к происходящему с человеком.

2. В настоящем тексте мы опишем еще один из возможных путей антропологической трактовки художественных и культурных явлений. Он возникает в рамках *синергийной антропологии* — нового подхода к феномену Человека, который учитывает как исходную данность негативные вердикты современной мысли о необходимости преодоления «метафизики», классической традиции эссенциалистского философствования, а с тем и отказа от классической европейской антропологической модели — эссенциалистской и субстанциалистской модели человека-субъекта Аристотеля-Декарта-Канта. В энергийном мышлении Православия и Востока, в духовных традициях и практиках, созданных в этих культурных мирах, синергийная антропология обнаруживает содержательную альтернативу классическому руслу. Исследуя опыт этих традиций и практик, оказывается возможным извлечь из него целый ряд антропологических установок, понятий, принципов — и препарируя, обобщая их, создать эпистемологический и концептуальный фонд, способный служить фундаментом антропологической модели нового типа.

Две определяющие черты характеризуют эту модель: *энергийность* и *предельность*; так что синонимическим названием синергийной антропологии может служить «энергийная предельная антропология». Первая черта означает выбор определенной альтернативы классическому философскому, а вместе с

ним и антропологическому дискурсу европейской мысли: отказываясь от базовых понятий субстанции, сущности, субъекта, мы следуем за тем антропологическим видением, что культивируется в духовных практиках. Здесь человек не рассматривается как субъект, не характеризуется какими-либо отвлеченными сущностями, принципами, началами. Вместо этого, он выступает для самого себя как поле развертывания некоторой специфической ауто-трансформирующей стратегии: он берется в совокупности всех своих разнородных, разноприродных проявлений (как внешних, так равно и внутренних, телесных, психических, интеллектуальных...) — и эта совокупность тщательно, зорко анализируется его сознанием, ставится под контроль и определенным образом, по строгому методу последовательно преобразуется. Согласно словоупотреблению, сложившемуся в Восточнохристианском дискурсе с византийской эпохи, все подобные антропологические проявления именуются энергиями[1]; и соответственно, Человек представляется здесь как энергийное образование.

Далее, во всей совокупности антропологических проявлений выделяется определенный их класс, за которым утверждается особая, конститутивная роль для феномена Человека. Всякое явление получает свою определенность, конституируется своей границей (ср. у Гегеля: «Лишь благодаря своей границе нечто есть то что оно есть») — откуда следует, что и человек как энергийное образование, феномен, рассматриваемый в измерении энергии (бытия-действия), определяется своей «энергийной границей», всеми теми проявлениями, что составляют границу горизонта человеческого существования. Они называются предельными, а полная совокупность их — Антропологической Границей. Антропологическая Граница — та область в энергийном измерении, в которой начинают изменяться фундаментальные предикаты человеческого существования; предельные же антропологические проявления суть те, в которых отражаются отношения Человека с Иным ему, внеположным горизонту человеческого существования.

Антропологическая Граница — центральный концепт синергийной антропологии, и первая проблема, которую эта антропология ставит и разрешает, заключается в описании ее строения. Упомянутое выше понятие Иного оказывается эффективным инструментом решения проблемы. Это понятие также фундаментально для антропологии, и не только синергийной. Оно обозначает нечто, что по тем или другим основаниям нельзя уже полагать лежащим в горизонте человеческого существования, однако отношения с чем определяют человека и формируют его границу. Входя в отношения с Иным, человек осуществляет свои граничные, предельные проявления, и в них он совершает *размыкание* себя, своего горизонта навстречу Иному.

Дальше мы замечаем, что Иное человеку, внеположное горизонту его существования, может носить разный характер. Если человек выступает носителем, репрезентантом некоторого рода, образа бытия, тогда иное ему — это иной род бытия, «Инобытие»; и коль скоро бытие человека («здесь-бытие», Dasein) харак-

теризуется конечностью и смертностью, то Инобытие — бытие абсолютное, а отношения с Иным — не что иное как отношения с Богом: религиозная жизнь, духовная практика. Но отлично известно, что отнюдь не всегда и не обязательно определяющее, конституирующее отношение человека — отношение к Богу. Напротив, для этого требуются непростые условия: надо, чтобы человек был «онтологически полномочен» — был подлинным репрезентантом, «полномочным представителем» здесь-бытия, — а это, в свою очередь, значит, что для него не должно быть никаких закрытых, недоступных областей, лакун, дыр в пределах соответствующего бытийного горизонта, не должно быть границы нигде в этих пределах. Меж тем, такая граница очень даже может иметься.

Фундаментальные характеристики человека — мышление и сознание, и горизонт человеческого существования — горизонт сознания. И, начиная с Фрейда, современная мысль приняла и усвоила новое базовое понятие — понятие *бессознательного*: некоторой сферы, отнюдь не относимой к иному, абсолютному бытию, но тем не менее недоступной, непроницаемой для сознания. Прочно усвоено и то, что существуют целые классы, виды человеческих проявлений (а именно, неврозы, психозы, фобии, комплексы и т. д.), в которых реализуются отношения человека с этой сферой. Т. о., бессознательное — также Иное человеку, еще один род Иного; проявления, с ним связанные, входят в состав границы Человека, образуя еще одну ее область, или «топику»; и отношения с ним — еще один способ размыкания Человека. И наконец, можно обнаружить и еще одну область границы, еще один, последний уже, способ размыкания. Этот способ своеобразен, он заключается не в завязывании отношений с Иным, не в выходе к Иному, а в выходе в недостроенное, недовоплощенное существование — в виртуальную реальность. Ее трактовку с позиций синергийной антропологии мы представили в упоминавшейся уже статье «Род или недород?». Философия и наука отчетливо отличают этот род реальности от обычной, «актуальной» реальности человеческого существования, так что виртуальные практики, в которых осуществляется выход в виртуальную реальность, тоже надо рассматривать как принадлежащие к границе Человека. Помимо того, надо учитывать также, что человек — сложное, смешанное существо, и в ткани его существования различные способы его активности, самореализации легко налагаются, перекрываются, совмещаются. Соответственно, возможны также и совмещения, сочетания описанных стратегий размыкания; мы именуем их гибридными стратегиями.

В итоге, мы указали, перечислили основные элементы границы. Этим мы решили, если угодно, задачу, сходную с расшифровкой генома человека; но, как и в случае генома, главное еще впереди: надо расположить эти элементы в осмысленную картину и увидеть их в работе — то есть в диахронии, в реальном историческом существовании Человека. Прежде всего, мы замечаем некую упорядоченность найденных элементов, или «топик» границы: в их серии налицо последовательное убывание того, что можно назвать формостроительной энергией или способностью Человека. С переходом от первой топики — естест-

венно ее называть онтологической — к топике бессознательного утрачивается «онтологическая полномочность» человека, его способность собрать воедино весь ансамбль своих проявлений, репрезентирующий здесь-бытие как таковое, и совершить устремление, размыкание этого ансамбля к Инобытию. Виртуальная же топика отличается утратой, так сказать, уже и эмпирической полномочности человека: ее проявления не суть полноценные, актуальные феномены, им всем недостает до полной актуализации тех или иных элементов формы, структуры внутренней или внешней.

Обращаясь же к реальной истории, мы сразу вынуждаемся к неутешительной констатации: в тех стратегиях, что были определяющими для Человека, в его доминирующих способах размыкания, история являет нам смену, эволюцию — и эта эволюция отвечает именно описанному убыванию формостроительной энергетики. Долгие эпохи в отношениях Человека с его границей царила стабильность: конституирующим Человека отношением незыблемо и неоспоримо служило отношение к Богу. Затем в эпоху Ренессанса это безраздельное господство онтологической топики пришло к концу. Началась антропологически весьма любопытная эпоха, когда Человек мнил себя безграничным: предназначенным к познанию бесконечного Космоса, и в этом бесконечном познании бесконечно же усовершенствующимся. Такое отрицание границы — фирменный знак Ренессанса и Нового Времени — было, однако, простою ошибкой, близорукостью; и эта ошибка зрения открывала дорогу беспрепятственному развитию, усилению проявлений из топики бессознательного (если отношения с Инобытием устанавливаются лишь сознательным усилием человека, то отношения с бессознательным, напротив возникают и развиваются сами, бессознательно — и лишь сознательными усилиями можно воспрепятствовать их разрастанию). Постепенно история подошла к тому, что топика бессознательного стала доминирующей; было наконец открыто, идентифицировано наукой само бессознательное — и взамен «Человека Безграничного» на авансцене истории оказался Человек Психоанализа. (Особенно ярко он себя проявил именно в эстетической сфере, в искусстве, и к этим проявлениям мы еще вернемся.) Для оценки его эпохи надо учесть, что феномены или, как часто говорят, паттерны, фигуры бессознательного суть феномены разнообразных психических аномалий — феномены безумия, в обобщенном, широком смысле. Но эпоха этого человека не была длительной — антропологическая динамика явственно стала ускоряться. После нескольких тысячелетий Человека Религиозного и нескольких столетий Человека Безграничного, под знаком Человека Психоанализа прошел не более чем один XX век. К концу этого века уже появился Человек Виртуальный. Темпы его продвижения необычайны, невиданны, антропология не знала таких — и сегодня мы уверенно заключаем, что если еще не настоящее, то будущее определенно за ним.

3. Из сказанного уже понятно, что появившееся новое структурирование антропологической реальности, как в синхронии, так и в диахронии — собс-

твенно, концептуальный каркас новой модели Человека — имплицирует и некоторый свой подход к эстетической сфере, к художественной и культурной деятельности Человека. Прежде всего, модель имплицирует некую универсальную методологию конституирования и исследования любой произвольной сферы антропологической реальности. Эта методология диктует следующую последовательность стадий:

(A) Мы вводим избранный феномен или область феноменов в дискурс энергии и в контекст антропологии, давая их первичное описание на языке антропологических проявлений и сопоставляя им некоторый класс таких проявлений, выделяемый определенным набором специфических черт и свойств;

(B) Мы устанавливаем, как связан занимающий нас класс проявлений с предельными проявлениями, т. е. с Антропологической Границей. Априори их связь может быть какой угодно, и для ее содержательной характеристики нам требуется предварительно зафиксировать, какие же основные виды ее априори возможны. Эти виды определяются очевидным образом:

(B1) непосредственная принадлежность рассматриваемых проявлений Антропологической Границе;

(B2) некоторая их зависимость от Границы, некоторая причастность, приобщенность к ней. Различные способы, механизмы подобной зависимости, причастности, взаимосвязи описываются в синергийной антропологии посредством понятий «примыкающих» или «ассоциированных» антропологических стратегий и практик. Это — такие стратегии и практики, которые, прямо не принадлежа Границе, в то же время тяготеют, примыкают к каким-либо видам ее проявлений: приобщаясь к их опыту путем установок «участности», «заинтересованного сочувствия», они заимствуют и усваивают их ценности и установки, те или иные элементы их организации и структуры...

(B3) полное отсутствие всякой связи с Границей — антропологические проявления, в которых никак, ни прямо, ни косвенно не сказывается существование Границы. Этот род проявлений мы квалифицируем как «стратегии обыденности».

(C) На базе установленной связи с Границей, рассматриваемая область явлений наделяется *индуцированной структурой*: в нее можно перенести структурирование, отвечающее Границе, понятийный аппарат Границы и т. д. Таким путем эта область включается в икономию принципа предельности, второго конституирующего принципа синергийной антропологии. Она достигает, тем самым, полноценной интеграции в последнюю как в «энергийную предельную антропологию»; а универсальная процедура, намеченная стадиями (A–C), может рассматриваться как своеобразная «*синергийная аналитика*» антропологической реальности. Важно, что эта аналитика включает в себя как синхронический, так и диахронический аспекты: в первом аспекте, изучаемая сфера связывается с топиками Антропологической Границы и концептуализуется на базе этой связи; во втором аспекте, бегло описанная выше историческая дина-

мика топик Границы имплицирует и определенную интерпретацию исторической эволюции данной сферы.

Понятно, что универсальная схема (A–C) приложима и к сфере эстетического; и в оставшейся части текста мы вкратце представим такое приложение. Конечно, лишь в главных тезисах: сколько-нибудь основательная экспозиция затронутой проблематики требует совсем иных масштабов.

4. Исходная проблема — характеризация антропологических проявлений, составляющих сферу эстетического. С отказом от классической эстетики, в которой верховный концепт Прекрасного, полагая эстетические законы и нормы, четко очерчивал эту сферу, проблема становится непростой. Антропология явлений искусства и художественного творчества трудноуловима, она имеет в высшей степени синтетичную и пластичную природу; и, отказываясь от нормативного подхода на базе единого априорного принципа, все неклассические направления лишь выделяют в этих явлениях те или иные ключевые особенности и необходимые признаки, набор которых всегда в известной мере дискуссионен и никогда не достигает достаточно отчетливого определения границ сферы. Эти типологические черты неклассической эстетики неизбежны и в нашем случае, однако спорность выделяемых признаков мы постараемся минимизировать, поверяя их реальным художественным опытом современности. При децентрализованном, подобном ризоме, строении неклассической эстетики, связь с опытом приобретает особенное значение.

В качестве первой черты конституции художественного явления, мы укажем уже упомянутую особенность, прочно удостоверенную сегодня и практикой, и теорией: творческий акт в искусстве должен в своем осуществлении непрестанно представлять и учитывать, *как он воспринимается*. «Эстетические проявления», или «эстетические события», составляющие сферу искусства, характеризуются двуединой структурой, воспроизводящей аристотелеву пару «действие — претерпение»: каждое из них включает элемент (воз)действия и элемент восприятия. Эта бинарная структура эстетического события — очевидная и общепризнанная черта, на которой мы можем сейчас не останавливаться; но от нее сразу же идет нить к гораздо менее замечаемой особенности.

Существуют два весьма асимметричных варианта, в которых реализуется бинарная структура. Когда элемент восприятия встроен в элемент действия как один из его служебных моментов, эстетическое событие квалифицируется как событие (акт) художественного творчества; когда же, напротив, восприятие доминирует, а созидающее, со-творящее действие лишь миметически-виртуально (и зачастую вполне неосознанно) «проигрывается» и входит в фактуру восприятия, — мы говорим о собственно эстетическом восприятии. Подобные асимметричные ситуации в антропологических практиках иногда передаются с помощью метафоры «маленький человек внутри большого». Так, в моем анализе творческого процесса в «Поминках по Финнегану»[2] я находил, что Джойс словно «имел при себе умозрительного дублинца», который воспринимал и оце-

нивал плоды его творчества, — и этот дублинец был, очевидно, не что иное как sui generis эстетический функциональный орган, осуществляющий аспект восприятия, имманентный в творческом акте.

Подмеченная особенность помогает увидеть, что за простой бинарной структурой акта художественного творчества лежит нечто более глубокое: *внутренняя интерсубъективная структура*. Совершаясь при участии «виртуального мини-зрителя», эстетический акт, тем самым, выводится в дискурс интерсубъективности и в определенном смысле, оказывается для творческого, творящего сознания транс-индивидуальным, соборным событием. Больше того, для пристального взгляда бинарная структура эстетического акта расщепляется еще далее. Перцепция сопряжена с рецепцией, от восприятия как такового неотделима реакция на него, которая весьма многомерна, и потому виртуальным соучастником творческого акта может быть не только зритель (читатель, etc.), но также критик, а для тех или иных типов творческой психологии и еще разные персонажи — «муза», «демон»... Интерсубъективное содержание оказывается насыщенней и богаче; и эта внутренняя, имманентная интерсубъективность эстетического акта ведет к дальнейшим особенностям, которые наглядней всего видны в феноменах творческого сообщества, художественной школы. Обычно в практике таких сообществ каждый участник их исполняет отнюдь не одну какую-то роль из тех, что входят в фактуру художественной жизни: ему попеременно случается выступать автором, критиком, читателем, зрителем, и все эти формы его участия в художественном событии важны по-своему. То, что при этом происходит, мы можем рассматривать как своего рода экстериоризацию, развертывание вовне или, если угодно, инсценирование имманентной интерсубъективности творческого процесса в искусстве. Можно предполагать, что, становясь из виртуальных реальными, ролевые фигуры творческого события увеличивают свою креативную действенность, и эстетический акт, реализуемый в лоне творческого сообщества, обретает наибольшие предпосылки к тому, чтобы состояться, исполниться, достичь полноты художественного выражения. Заметим (хотя и не станем здесь углубляться в эту важную тему), что эта экстериоризованная, внутренне-внешняя интерсубъективность художественного акта развертывается в стихии личного общения — сугубо неформализованного и неформализуемого, сверхнормативного.

Анализируя структуру духовных практик, мы в свое время заметили[3], что выстраиваемые в этих практиках специфические конфигурации энергий человека (служащие ступенями восхождения к мета-эмпирической цели практики, «высшему духовному состоянию») достигают прочности и устойчивости тогда, когда в них осуществляется соединение, сцепление энергий разных уровней организации человеческого существа: как, скажем, знаменитое исихастское искусство «сведения ума в сердце» осуществляет особого рода соединение энергий умственных и душевных, эмоциональных. Подмеченный здесь эффект имеет не меньшую важность в эстетической сфере: одно из ключевых свойств

эстетического восприятия именно в том, что оно в своей общей и полной форме не является ни чисто интеллектуальным, ни чисто эмоциональным, но всегда имеет своим ядром некий «мыслечувственный комплекс», в котором нерасторжимо сцеплены мыслительные и эмоциональные содержания, а чаще всего также и чувственно-перцептивные компоненты. Эта «антропологическая полномерность» — образование мыслечувственных комплексов, эмоционально-интеллектуальных агрегатов, синтетических блоков антропологического воздействия — является одним из признаков и критериев сильного, подлинного художественного события. Как и в духовных практиках, ее достижение требует наиболее глубинного проникновения в личностные структуры, и с нею, в первую очередь, связаны те стороны эстетического события, что на старинном языке именовались «тайной искусства».

Последним признаком мы сейчас ограничимся в нашей характеризации сферы эстетических проявлений. В исходный концептуальный каркас эстетического события мы, таким образом, включаем (отнюдь не исключая возможности дальнейшего дополнения) следующие три главные особенности:

1) бинарная структура (воз)действие — восприятие;
2) внутренняя, либо экстериоризованная, внутренне-внешняя интерсубъективная структура;
3) комплексная, синтетическая антропологическая структура — формирование мыслечувственных комплексов.

5. Дальнейшая задача — выяснение связи эстетических проявлений с Антропологической Границей. Определяющая роль Границы реализуется, в первую очередь, в конституции структур (само)идентичности человека. С этими же структурами теснейше связаны и художественные практики — и таким образом, то поле, на котором эти практики встречаются и взаимодействуют со стратегиями Границы, составляет, в первую очередь, икономия (само)идентичности человека. Однако оба рода антропологических проявлений по-разному видят свое место и назначение в сфере идентичности: если стратегии Границы напрямик конституируют, полагают идентичность человека, то эстетические практики скорее артикулируют ее — помогают ее становлению, оформлению, рефлексии; доставляют полигон, театр, сцену для ее (само)развертывания, (само)испытания. Это обстоятельство — главный отправной факт, из которого раскрывается отношение эстетических практик к Границе. Мы видим, что это отношение асимметрично: хотя художественные практики ни в коей мере не являются и не мыслят себя подчиненными, служебными для каких-то иных практик, в том числе и граничных, однако, принимая как данность личностные структуры, структуры идентичности, конституируемые определенными предельными стратегиями, определенной топикой Границы, участвуя в развертывании, артикуляции этих структур, данные практики оказываются в известном смысле, известной мере ориентированными к соответствующей топике, вовлеченными в ее орбиту, тяготеющими, примыкающими к ее основоустройству, ее

икономии. Иными словами, они оказываются принадлежащими именно к тому роду антропологических стратегий и практик, который в нашей терминологии отвечает стратегиям, примыкающим или ассоциированным с определенной топикой Границы. Отношение эстетических и предельных антропологических проявлений, таким образом, проясняется: мы обнаруживаем между первыми и вторыми связь, соответствующую в универсальной схеме (A–C) случаю (B2).

Согласно указанной схеме, связь-ассоциация эстетических практик с Антропологической Границей должна функционировать как методологический принцип — принцип построения некоторого опыта неклассической антропологизированной эстетики. Первым приложением этого принципа является новое структурирование сферы эстетического, индуцируемое топическим строением Границы. В соответствии с этим строением, мы различаем: художественные практики, ориентированные на опыт трансцендирования, приобщения к Инобытию — на паттерны бессознательного — на вхождение в виртуальную реальность — или наконец на те или иные гибридные стратегии; наряду с этим, как мы видели, существует и Человек Безграничный — и по общему принципу, его художественные практики также должны быть примыкающими к его конституирующим стратегиям, пускай эти последние и не являются стратегиями Границы. Описание каждого из названных классов художественных практик — отдельная и объемная задача, и в эти задачи мы не будем сейчас входить, ограничившись самой беглой общей характеристикой.

Когда в основоустройстве Человека конституирующим принципом выступает отношение к Инобытию, этому, очевидно, соответствует конституция эстетической сферы на основе абсолютных начал и ценностей. Онтологической топике в антропологии отвечает эстетика, себя также укореняющая в онтологии: стоящая на принципе Прекрасного, который, в свою очередь, стоит на связи Прекрасного с Инобытием. Но что это за связь, априори отнюдь не ясно, как неочевиден и сам онтологический статус Прекрасного; и потому эстетика в онтологической топике — классические ее образцы дают христианская средневековая эстетика и эстетика ислама — имеет немало принципиальных проблем. Магистральным руслом для развития подобной эстетики служили различные адаптации платонизма к новым религиозным контекстам, и все эти адаптации решали проблемы лишь до известной степени, поскольку скрывали в себе неустранимые различия онтологий. Поэтому сфера художественных практик и их теоретического обоснования всегда здесь несла явную или скрытую печать привнесения неких чуждых принципов, смешения и наложения внутренне расходящихся установок; и оттого ее жизнь сопровождалась имманентною подозрительностью, также то явной, то скрытой, со стороны держателей и ревнителей ортодоксального, пуристического следования базовой мета-антропологической стратегии, конституирующей данную топику Границы.

6. Далее, пытаясь определить антропологическую специфику эстетической сферы, отвечающей основоустройству Человека Безграничного, мы сталкива-

емся сразу с недоопределенным, меняющимся характером этого основоустройства. На поставленный вопрос ответить нельзя, не учитывая эволюции Человека Безграничного, — и ввиду этого, описывая индуцируемое Границей структурирование эстетической сферы, мы не будем особенно разделять синхронический и диахронический аспекты этого структурирования, рассматривая их параллельно, совместно.

Человек Безграничный занимает собою львиную долю всего пространства европейской цивилизации, им создано почти все ее здание — и тем не менее, по своей природе, он — принципиально промежуточная, переходная формация. Его выход из онтологической топики лишь очень постепенно, мало-помалу осознается им во всей своей полноте и радикальности, во всем объеме своих сторон и последствий; и отношение к Инобытию долгое время продолжает признаваться организующим принципом большинства сфер и феноменальной, и ноуменальной реальности. В том числе, и эстетической сферы: сообразованность художественных практик с духовной практикой Человека, с Богочеловеческим отношением (т.е. конституирующим принципом онтологической топики) долгое время почти не отрицалась открыто, и эстетика в своем мейнстриме оставалась идеалистической эстетикой Прекрасного. Однако в основоустройстве Человека безграничного для этого уже не было достаточных оснований. В этом основоустройстве, место верховного полагающего принципа отобрано у принципа связи с Инобытием; оставшийся вакантным трон уже не мыслится вознесенным *онтологически*; и потому на него могут быть разные претенденты. Типологически, это коррелирует с обращением Нового Времени к обновленной античной эпистеме — в свою очередь, коррелирующей с античным политеизмом. Триединство Благо-Истина-Красота неотвратимо расщепляется; принцип познания выступает верховным принципом в картезианском и позитивистском русле, принцип же нравственный — в кантианском русле, хотя и соседнем, но отличном; и ясно, что требовалось лишь время, чтобы явился Кьеркегор, заметивший, что для Человека Безграничного принцип Прекрасного имеет ничуть не менее прав на трон (эстетика Шеллинга представляется в этой логике как опыт архаичный или архаизирующий, стремящийся игнорировать неизбежное расщепление триединства в секуляризованной эпистеме).

Понятно, что топическое структурирование эстетической сферы, индуцируемое ее связью с Антропологической Границей, априори может как совпадать, так и не совпадать с обычно принятым историческим структурированием. Сейчас перед нами случай несовпадения. Утверждение совершенной автономии эстетической сферы знаменует переход к эстетике модернизма; но с наших «топических» позиций модернизм оказывается неоднороден, ему могут отвечать различные антропологические (топические) ситуации. В своих ранних формах, модернизм как эстетизм, как «религия Красоты», вполне вписывался в основоустройство Человека Безграничного, принимая эстетику Прекрасного и близко соседствуя с романтизмом. Однако ранние формы модернизма были уже позд-

ними формами жизни этого человека. Как мы замечали выше, отрицание или игнорирование Границы является установкой, антропологическим режимом, благоприятствующим зарождению, формированию и развитию проявлений из топики бессознательного. Такому развитию можно воспрепятствовать лишь путем сознательного выстраивания защитных механизмов, блокирующих и искореняющих начатки подобных проявлений. В онтологической топике этому выстраиванию посвящаются особые тонкие усилия; однако Человек Безграничный, игнорируя Границу во всех ее топиках, как таковую, отнюдь не предпринимает таких усилий — и потому с неизбежностью совершает продвижение, скольжение к топике бессознательного (в чем и состоит промежуточность, переходность его природы).

В этом процессе скольжения к топике бессознательного и вхождения в нее эстетической сфере принадлежит специфическая, выделенная роль. Давно и неоднократно замечалось, что художественные практики человека — в особой, тесной связи с областью бессознательного. Так, современный французский философ Ж.Рансьер, анализируя усиленное обращение Фрейда к материалу искусства при выработке оснований психоанализа, заключает, что даже сама фрейдовская концепция бессознательного изначально несет влияние эстетической сферы, «вписана в горизонт эстетической мысли»: «Территория произведений искусства и литературы определяется как вотчина, в которой... бессознательное особенно действенно»[4]. Искусство, таким образом, — преимущественная «база данных» топики бессознательного, главная сцена, на которой Человек Бессознательного, Человек Безумный реализует себя; и более того, можно сказать, продолжая идею Ж.Рансьера, что сама конституция этой топики, составляющие ее антропологические паттерны, «фигуры бессознательного» несут черты эстетических проявлений.

Эти общие тезисы полностью подтверждаются материалом художественной истории XX в. Здесь раскрывается указанная выше антропологическая двойственность или переходность модернизма: если его ранние формы еще в ареале Человека Безграничного, то зрелые и поздние демонстрируют богатый спектр чистейших проявлений топики бессознательного. Классический образец — сюрреализм, достаточно прямолинейно пытавшийся трактовать и выстраивать художественную практику как определенный вид антропологических механизмов и процессов, управляемых бессознательным. Но, наряду с ним, связь художественной практики с паттернами бессознательного играет первостепенную роль и в экспрессионизме, и в неопримитивизме, и у многих крупных художников, выходящих за рамки школ. При этом, в самой заметной мере сказывается и то, что паттерны бессознательного суть паттерны безумия, психических аномалий, и они принципиально противятся контролю сознания, который удерживал бы их в пределах некой определенной сферы существования — скажем, сферы профессиональной практики. В их природе заложена экспансия, и в своей главной сфере, эстетической, они властно стремятся снять границу между практикой ху-

дожника и его жизнью; а модернистский художник, воспринимая это стремление как творческий максимализм, приемлет его и содействует ему, с готовностью идя навстречу безумию, ночи, смерти. Так складывается специфический стереотип биографии художника эпохи господства топики бессознательного — топики безумия. История искусства XX в. полна примеров, отвечающих этому стереотипу.

Как мы говорили в разделе 2, в конце XX в. Человек Безумный начинает уступать место Виртуальному Человеку. Опыт его существования приумножается и наращивается весьма бурно, и все же он еще недостаточен для основательных теоретических выводов. По этой причине, наше беглое приложение универсальной схемы (A–C) к сфере эстетического в заключительной, сегодняшней части будет еще более беглым. Эстетику виртуального сегодня никак еще нельзя считать уже созданной, и мы отметим лишь те немногие особенности, что вытекают из самих дефиниций виртуальной реальности. Определяющая черта виртуальной реальности — «дефект формостроительной энергетики», и отсюда — привативный характер по отношению к реальности актуальной, недоактуализованность, недовоплощенность, недостроенность всех ее проявлений. Вследствие этой главной черты, виртуальная реальность не может порождать собственных новых форм, и ее образуют всевозможные «виртуализации», неполные воплощенья явлений из других, актуальных топик. Создается весьма своеобразная, если угодно, фантастическая, картина, которую я называю «катавасией топик»: становясь недоактуализованными, все и любые антропологические проявления оказываются совместимы между собой и присутствуют, толпятся одновременно; и в этой реальности недовоплощенных явлений все ценностные критерии, все иерархические упорядочения прежней культуры теряют почву.

Так позиции синергийной антропологии дают нам возможность увидеть генезис установок постмодернизма, опознавая их антропологические корни в пришествии виртуальной топики Антропологической Границы. Можно сделать и более общий вывод: представленный анализ показывает, что эти позиции открывают еще один, и достаточно перспективный подход к актуальной задаче формирования новой неклассической эстетики на антропологических основаниях.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL FACTORS AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL STRATEGIES WITHIN CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL DYNAMICS

S. S. KHOROUZHIY

Socio-historical dynamics, the processes of globalization, and the facts of multiculturalism, which are directly due to the latter, are all being brought to the forefront in the cultural situation of the contemporary world. Also, the increasing influence of

marketing mechanisms, mass culture, etc. has lately become the focus of interest and investigation. To my mind, the theoretical quest for understanding of these recent trends should follow *anthropological* perspectives, within the space of artistic and cultural creativity. For this perspective retains the ability to discover the inner characteristics of aesthetics and the culture realm.

This paper gives an account of one possible way of anthropological interpretation of artistic and cultural phenomena, within the framework of *synergeian anthropology*. Synergeian anthropology is a new approach to the phenomenon of Man, which considers as given all the negative verdicts of contemporary thought about the need for overcoming "metaphysics". Including overcoming the classical tradition of essentialist philosophizing and therefore the denial of the classical European anthropological model — the essentialist and substantialist model of Man-Subject offered by Aristotle-Descarthes-Kant.

The basic problem in understanding recent trends of contemporary culture is the characterization of anthropological manifestations in the aesthetic realm. Here, the postitions of synergeian anthropology allow us to see the genesis of postmodernism's premises by recognizing their roots in the virtual topia of Anthropological Borders's coming into being. The analysis presented herein shows how the positions of synergeian anthropology open up a promising approach to the actual task of constructing a new Neo-classical aesthetics on the basis of anthropology.

NOTES

[1] Анализ концепта энергии, каким он выступает в Восточнохристианском дискурсе и в синергийной антропологии, дан нами в работе «Род или недород?», вошедшей в книгу: С. С. Хоружий. О старом и новом. СПб., 2000.

[2] См.: С.С.Хоружий. «Улисс» в русском зеркале. М., 1994. Эп. 7.

[3] См.: С.С.Хоружий. К феноменологии аскезы. М., 1998. С. 108–109.

[4] Жак Рансьер. Эстетическое бессознательное. СПб., 2004. С. 11.

ПРОБЛЕМЫ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ В ДИНАМИКЕ СОВРЕМЕННОГО ИСТОРИЧЕСКОГО ПРОЦЕССА

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Человеку свойственно искать свою принадлежность — культурную, социальную, религиозную, профессиональную... — в бескрайнем океане социо-культурных «маркировок», позволяющих ответить на вопрос «кто я сейчас?». Человек умножает и воспроизводит знания и умения путем традиции, и это заставляет его искать в традиции опору своего существования. Привычка, следование образцу, подражание как основа и начало самоопределения лежат в основе ритуальности культуры, механизмов ее воспроизводства и развития. Традиции в культуре наделяются эмоциональной ценностью, они именуются, отождествляются с носителями этих традиций и поэтому могут отвергаться, деформироваться, преображаться под влиянием нового. Только поэтому и возможна identity problem современной молодежи, которая столкнулась с расстройством механизма передачи культурной традиции и ей вдруг стало нечего изменять.

Одновременно процессы глобализации, характеризующие современную культурную ситуацию в мире, требуют изменения привычных ориентиров идентичности, значимых в социальном воображении человека конкретной культуры. Таким образом, можно говорить о кризисе идентичности и необходимости исследовать процессы ее трансформации как в реальной культуре, так и в социальном воображении, функционирование которого обеспечивает набор образов — мифов — значимых ориентиров в том числе в процессе становления и верификации идентичности.

Если принять рабочее определение идентичности, появившееся в рамках теории символического интеракционизма, как набора представлений о себе и идентификацией с социальной группой, участвующей в символическом обмене[1], необходимо рассмотреть символический обмен с точки зрения социального воображения. Метафизически положение человека в мире есть проблема анонимности. Преодоление анонимности нуждается в заполнении пустоты Вне: в назывании себя, определении себя, выявлении себя. Это возможно лишь в труде осмысления своего внутреннего опыта[2]. Опыт является первичным в жизнеосуществлении человека, только благодаря опыту нечто может быть «наличным для меня», только в опыте происходит осознание события как события, то есть как значимого для меня. В таком случае идентичность выступает значимым социально осмысленным внутренним опытом.

Процесс конструирования идентичности непрерывен. Для символического интеракционизма идентичность есть реакция на обстоятельства окружающего

мира, следовательно, она является ситуативным конструктом. Но при этом идентичность есть накопленный индивидуальный опыт, присвоенный воображением и «переведенный» им в образный контекст конкретной культуры. Благодаря ему социокультурная реальность — не виртуальная! — получает смыслы Собственные, как собственные имена, и становится значимым миром для индивидуального воображения. Только тогда вступает в силу символический обмен, и, собственно процесс легитимации индивидуального опыта как идентичности.

Феноменологически преодоление анонимности может быть исследовано именно в социальном плане. Одна из важных форм передачи традиции и функционирования социального воображения — социальное признание. В контексте социального воображения проблема социального признания выходит за узкие рамки социологии, впервые ее поставившей, и обретает новые горизонты. Социальное признание может быть рассмотрено в рамках отношений коммуникации, которые есть отношения власти. Речь идет о символической власти, которая принадлежит тем или иным участникам отношений социальной коммуникации. «Символические системы» выполняют функции легитимации. Власть слов основывается на вере в легитимность слов и того, кто их произносит. Ритуал социального признания также включен во властные отношения именования, которые основаны на признании равенства.

В социальной структуре существуют, во-первых, объективные отношения между инстанциями, институтами, создателями произведений и публикой, и, во-вторых, символические отношения власти, которые устанавливают публичный смысл произведения. Публичный смысл произведение обретает лишь в процессе «публикации» (в смысле «становления публичным»). Автор определен этим публичным смыслом, если он признан как автор этого смысла и, кроме того, сам автор определяет себя по отношению к этому публичному смыслу. Для любого автора культурного смысла, будь то художник, писатель, ученый, важен состоявшийся ритуал социального признания[3].

Именно ритуал признания выступает преодолением анонимности в феноменологическом плане. Социальное признание в поле символических отношений власти — это вневременная категория, которая требует постоянного подтверждения — публичности своего смысла и признания этого смысла как существующего равными, авторитетом, признанным имеющим право давать оценку. Не важно, будет ли этот смысл оценен позитивно или негативно, важно, что он будет оценен — таким образом, «автор» становится социально признан как творец культуры.

Авторитет и принадлежность — две главные точки, непременно присутствующие в воображении «человека социального». С этими вершинами связана и мифология успешности и страхи неудач, которые складываются в любом обществе и изменяются с развитием культуры.

С точки зрения исследования мифологии успешности интерес представляет феномен среднего класса. Это понятие описывает некий уровень стабильности

общества, поэтому для современной России является особенно актуальным. Но и в мире в целом наблюдаются процессы, которые заставляют изменяться сложившийся, стабильный и благонадежный средний класс. В эпоху глобализации трансформируется само социальное воображение, меняются реперные точки авторитета и принадлежности, мутируют сложившиеся социальные мифологии, деформируются ценностные ориентиры. На примере среднего класса это хорошо заметно.

В социокультурных процессах можно наблюдать изменение социального состава среднего класса — от фермеров, торговцев, ремесленников к менеджерам, чиновникам, госслужащим. Соответственно, изменялось представление об успешности, целях, и критериях их достижения. Именно средние слои больше всего теряют в современном мире, когда уровень жизни падает, социальная защищенность становится проблематичной, необходимая для успешности мобильность вызывает затруднения. Одновременно средний класс начинает делиться на две неравные части. На успешное меньшинство, сумевшее включится в новые социальные условия наднациональных корпораций, и на большинство, стремящееся сохранить хоть часть из того, к чему привыкло во времена сильного социального государства.

Внутри среднего класса появляются две разные системы представлений, определяющих самоидентификацию. «Старый» средний класс — это мелкие собственники капитала любого типа, которые самостоятельно включены в рыночные отношения. «Новый» средний класс — это наемные работники, профессионалы, капиталом которых являются их профессиональные знания и умения. Самоидентификация «старого среднего» связана с формулой «время — деньги», ценностными координатами являются умеренность, независимость вплоть до индивидуализма, необходимая для обеспечения конкурентоспособности, стабильность в распределении усилий. Для «нового среднего» формулой, скорее становится «знание — деньги», сетка координат смещается в сторону общения и корпоративности, самостоятельности и ответственности, важным критерием успеха становится мобильность. Здесь наблюдается параллель с теми критериями идентификации, которые становятся значимы в поле виртуальной коммуникации Интернет[4]. Таким образом, «знайство», компетентность и занятость, испытанные на полигоне Сети, где они позволяли позиционировать себя как элиту, сместились в реальную жизнь. По времени это совпало и с повсеместным распространением Сети, которая стала необходимой частью коммуникации любого человека и одним из маркеров процессов глобализации.

С тенденцией к глобализации происходит разрушение прежних инфраструктур и, при слишком большой скорости развития новых, возникает социальный вакуум, который приводит к кризисным ситуациям. В условиях изменения социальной реальности, разрушения и трансформации структур коммуникации по-новому ставится проблема самоидентификации человека, разрушается устоявшаяся система социальной мифологии и появляются новые образы-типы-

критерии, которые должны сложится в новую систему социальных мифов. Возникает необходимость создания каналов трансляции знаний, универсального символического капитала, который позволяет «новым средним» обрести необходимую мобильность и независимость от устоявшейся национальной культурной специфики, с которой было связано сложение «старого среднего» класса.

В России «бывший средний» класс выживает тяжело. Изменение социокультурной реальности вокруг «среднего человека» фатальным образом отражается на его самоидентификации и способах самореализации. Конкурентоспособность интеллигенции падает, молодые люди, более мобильные и не обремененные представлениями об «уже существующем статусе, который необходимо поддерживать», способные получить новое образование и тут же реализовать его в практических навыках, быстрее «вписываются» в социальную иерархию нового общества. В современной европейской культуре — ситуация прямо противоположная, там те, кому за сорок настолько прочно занимают свои позиции, что молодым приходится перебиваться на второстепенных ролях достаточно долгое время, прежде чем представится случай социально реализоваться. Это также подстегивает мобильность поколения глобализации. Те, кто стремится реализовать свою «программу успеха», живут в буквальном смысле слова «на чемоданах», они не стремятся к устойчивым привязанностям, но противопоставляют им желание «увидеть мир», традиционное среднеклассное стремление к стабильности подменяется стремлением к свободе, а полем культурных интересов становится перспективный с точки зрения экономической Восток.

Социальная мифология упрощает систему ценностей, облекает ее в одежды удобочитаемые. Свобода как главная ценность в системе представлений среднего класса связана с массой образов, ее конкретизирующих. Личная свобода, свобода самовыражения и потребления раскладывается на составляющие: это свобода быть, действовать, передвигаться и знать.

Свобода быть затрагивает мифологию времени. Человеку среднего класса (в данном случае речь идет о «новом среднем классе», вписанном в контекст современной культуры со всеми ее тенденциями к глобализации и переменами в коммуникативном поле) свойственна некоторая перспектива, расчет на эту перспективу и жизненная стратегия, с нею связанная. Позиционируя себя как средний класс, человек рассматривает себя как долгосрочный проект — время для него не имеет отношения к небытию, экзистенциальные проблемы ему чужды. Человек среднего класса относится к себе с уважением и собой очень занят. Отсюда — сохранение ценностей «старого среднего класса», как то: здоровый образ жизни, качественное образование, медобслуживание и защита окружающей среды. Второй аспект свободы — это свобода действовать, расчет на собственные силы. Для среднего класса важно, что экономическая независимость и социальная защищенность добыты им самостоятельно, а не достались по наследству и не выиграны в лотерею. Образ self-made является одним из основных в социальной мифологии успеха среднего класса. Индивидуализм как ценность

получает свое воплощение в мифологии среднего класса. «Я могу» — сознание среднего класса работает в модусе аффирмации.

Свобода передвигаться связана с необходимостью мобильности, а свобода знать — это то, что отличает новый средний класс от его предшественника. В современной культуре наблюдается отчетливая тенденция к профессионализации. В том числе и средний класс становится классом профессионалов, капиталом которых является знание. Добыча знаний и проблема понимания, верной формулировки проблемы и определения путей ее наилучшего устранения, определения области незнания становятся важны в социальной мифологии. На смену интеллигенту в классическом понимании (независимость мышления, озабоченность духовным развитием, которое слабо связано с профессией и карьерой, отсутствие материальной доминанты в мотивации), интеллектуал жестко увязывает свои духовные потребности и интересы, профессиональную деятельность и доходы. Его интеллект отличается прагматическим характером, он много работает и не имеет ни сил, ни времени на духовный рост не связанный с карьерой. Только компетентность позволяет накапливать тот символический капитал, который непременно конвертируется в финансовый — таков сюжет мифа. Профессионал принимает решения, и эти решения влияют на деятельность тех, чьи проблемы они снимают. Критерием верности решения выступает практический смысл (П. Бурдье), решение должно быть эффективно, не имеет значение, банален путь к успеху или креативен. Это важный момент, посягающий на образ среднего класса как консервативного — «новый средний» готов к принятию креативных решений, если они будут эффективными. В образ профессионала входит умение творчески мыслить и разумно рисковать — свобода знать предполагает свободу принимать новое.

Свобода знать и принимать новое основывается на ценности прошлого. Однако бережное внимание к прошлому не есть бессмысленная ностальгия, а, скорее, культурологическая хватка, прагматично оценивающая степень востребованности знания о другой культуре — прошлой или современной. Такое представление потребовало переосмысления представлений об истории.

Воображаемое истории подлежит исследованию, как все универсальные концепции, в создании которых воображению отводится координирующая роль. Философия истории интересна с точки зрения анализа работы структур воображения, потому что этот анализ позволяет проследить, каким образом ментальная схема оформляет события, которые должны стать для нас историческими, как функционирует структура, создающая из разрозненных фактов стройную теорию. Осмысление истории всегда включено во временной контекст, поэтому естественно обращение к мифологическим структурам понимания времени. Время картины мира, индивидуальное для меня, становится историческим, если угол зрения расширяется. Обращаясь к изучению концепций, обосновывающих периодизацию истории культуры, мы приходим к выводу, что именно мифологема времени становится определяющей теорию исследователя.

Первым моментом анализа исторического времени становится гипотеза прошлого. Прошлое предстает перед аналитиком веером фактов, неоспоримым критерием анализа которых является их положение на оси времени. Вторым моментом анализа истории выступает гипотеза будущего, равно присутствующая в схемах замкнутого и разомкнутого времени. Смысл закона — в повторяемости и предсказуемости, поэтому любая воображаемая схема истории задана моделями объяснения и прошлого, и будущего. Поэтому главным соблазном изучения истории с позиций синтезирующей деятельности воображения становится соблазн выделения ритма или цикла истории. Гипотеза философии истории, стремящейся увидеть смысл исторического процесса, выявить его закономерность, определить движущие силы может быть любой, однако именно выделение повторяющегося, схема цикла позволяет сделать вывод о существовании закона. И философия истории, исповедующая идею прогресса, и философия истории, подверженная эсхатологическим чаяниям или находящаяся под обаянием идеи вечного возвращения, все они действуют сходным образом, пытаясь выявить повторение временных промежутков и, одновременно, противопоставляя фазы цикла друг другу.

Воображаемое истории, в свою очередь, определяет картину мира и образ я конкретной исторической эпохи, что очевидно особенно в эпоху динамических изменений культуры. Для современной культуры нервом становится анализ настоящего, пропитанный столь стремительно нарастающими тенденциями глобализации и противостояния культур, что гипотезы прошлого и будущего отступают на второй план. В динамике современного исторического процесса социальное воображение оказывается перед необходимостью создания новых структур, достаточно подвижных, чтобы объяснить неуверенное настоящее. В контексте перемен (экономических, социальных, интеллектуальных, экологических) именно настоящее становится ценностью. Именно этим определяется формирование новых образов, которыми оперирует социальное воображение: свобода и знание позволяют достичь авторитета и признания.

ISSUES OF IDENTITY IN THE DYNAMIC OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORICAL PROCESSES

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Cultural traditions are endowed with emotional value. They are denoted, identified with their supporters and therefore they can be repudiated, deformed, and transfigured under the influence of the new. This process underlies the identity problem of contemporary youth which, for want of mechanism, has faced the disorderly trans-

formation of cultural traditions and abruptly realized the lack of what they were supposed to change.

The processes of globalization, which characterizes the contemporary world cultural situation, demands a shift in the customary references of identity that are significant within the social imagination of individuals within a particular culture. Thus, it is possible to argue that globalization is evoking a crisis of identity and there is a need to study the processes of its transformation both in terms of real culture and the functioning of social imagination. The latter provides a set of images, myths, references that are significant in the formation and verification of identity.

Authority and affiliation are two principal points that certainly assist in the imagination of homo socialis. These principals are also bound-up with the mythology of success and fear of failure, which develop in any society and alter with evolution of culture.

This paper also examines the role of the middle class. The middle class can be observed as a sociological fact, a sociological construction or a generally agreed upon term and as the bud of social imagination. It can also be looked upon as a strict term and as an epistemological metaphor. This concept has numerous explanations, and that is why, one can easily say, that any form of discussion about it is short lived. Here, the middle class is investigated as a construction of social imagination. These investigations are not based on realistic economical and sociological facts, the accuracy of which is negotiable, as much as on delving into socio-cultural parameters. The main question is self-identification; its criteria and the main features of the "middle class personality", with which members of society may or may not identify. Another question that enters the field of this investigation is social mythology, which defines the criteria of belonging to the middle class.

NOTES

[1] См.: Бергер П., Лукман Т. Социальное конструирование реальности. М, 1995.

[2] См.: Конева А. В. Воображение себя или проблема идентичности. // Символы, образы, стереотипы современной культуры. Международные чтения по теории, истории и философии культуры. Выпуск 8. СПб., 2000.

[3] Ритуал социального признания не обязательно носит характер позитивного признания заслуг. Например, так называемая «бульдозерная выставка» 1974 года, которая длилась 40 минут, но имела огромный общественный резонанс, также может быть охарактеризована как ритуал социального признания. Она, с одной стороны, высветила социальное противостояние в рамках идеологии, а с другой, определила «круг равных», чье представление, чья оценка, собственно, и сделали смысл акции и смысл творчества публичным.

[4] См.: Конева А. В. Идентичность в социальной мифологии виртуальной реальности // Творение. Творчество. Репродукция. Международные Чтения по истории, теории и философии культуры. Выпуск 16. СПб, 2003.

ВОСПИТАНИЕ «В-ТРАДИЦИИ» ИЛИ «ИСПОВЕДАНИЕ» КУЛЬТУРЫ

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> Кому удалось в юношеские годы хорошо путешествовать, тот вступает в жизнь с незаменимым запасом таких знаний, умственных навыков и душевных сил, каких он не мог бы почерпнуть ни у какого иного источника: годы учения (Lehrjahre) должны быть на самом деле и в собственном смысле годами странствий (Wanderjahre).
>
> *И. М. Гревс*

Определим принадлежность человека к определенной культуре как владение ментальными установками некой общности. Основополагающими здесь будут *эстетические и этические составляющие* — первые выступают в качестве универсального межкультурного языка, вторые контролируют и регулируют человеческие взаимоотношения, отвечают за рефлексию. Думается, что ценностное прочтение окружающего мира позволит Человеку Воспринимающему не потреблять культуру, а «*исповедовать*»[1] ее.

Именно формирование условий для возможности «исповедания» культуры, на мой взгляд, способно оправдать как пафос интеллектуала, так и потребность в постижении мира средствами культуры обывателей.

Как я понимаю тенденции современной культуры, существуют три направления ее развития:

1. Безусловна *тенденция к глобализации*, универсализации культуры — несомненно, снимающее некоторое напряжение межконфессиональных, разно-эстетических установок;
2. В противовес первой тенденции существует позиция, согласно которой основные усилия следует направлять на *развитие национальных культур* — как защита от посягательств на национальное своеобразие, уникальность, вкус и во имя их сохранения;
3. Наконец, третье направление представляет собой попытку найти компромиссное решение — существуют проекты, направленные на создание условий *межкультурного* диалога, при котором как сохранятся уникальность отдельных культур, так и снимаются неизбежные противоречия от недопонимания.

Самые глубокие основания любой культуры, в том числе и современной, на мой взгляд, оказываются сосредоточенными в области воспитания. *Воспитание*

«в-традиции» — есть залог появления будущего Гражданина Мира: человека образованного, живущего сообразно традициям своего этноса и топоса, знакомого с культурами других общностей и, главное, терпимого к уникальности этих других.

> На конференции «Образование в пространстве культуры» (17–18 ноября 2004 г., РИК, г. Москва) я подробно говорил об экскурсионном методе в воспитании и образовании в своем докладе «“Само-любие” в культурной политике: локальные основания “глобального” мира». Согласно этому выступлению, я вижу решение существующих проблем в сфере межкультурного общения в сфере *воспитания* юношества в соответствии с традицией их локальной культуры.

Так или иначе, постижение окружающего мира ребенком начинается с семьи, с дома, в котором он живет, с двора и ближайшей улицы. В 6-8 лет еще нет целостного восприятия города, страны, мирового пространства. И задача семьи, педагогов, школы — *воспитание «в-традиции»,* — сообразуясь с языком, идеологией, религией — но непременно в традиции «места», на локальных конкретных примерах. Реальное сохранение культурных традиций этноса или нации, *думается*, зависит от людей, коренных жителей; именно они в семейных преданиях, традициях способны сохранить genius loci[2], дух места.

В рамках дней европейской культуры по всему миру реализуются замечательные проекты, к примеру, в Санкт-Петербурге, — «Европейский Маршрут». Посредством создания нового экскурсионного маршрута петербуржцам рассказывается о вкладе представителей более 20 европейских стран в развитие культуры Петербурга. Кроме того существует множество исследований, посвященных трехсотлетней истории Петербурга на примере одной национальности (шведы, евреи или немцы), одного слоя населения, конфессии.

В основе экскурсионного метода преподавания истории / истории культуры лежит *системно-деятельностное постижение мира*. Полагаю, что именно с постижения окружающего города, края, локальной местности стоит входить в мир. Чтобы понять ценность шедевра европейской ли, восточной ли культуры, нужно ведь для начала осознать уникальность и ценность исторической области, в которой человек рожден / вырос, и тогда сравнивать и восхищаться (не понимать и осуждать). Любое новое познается в сравнении, а сравнивает человек, как правило, с нечто хорошо знакомым — с традицией, в которой он воспитан. Именно в чистом незамутненном непониманием разуме способна к движению свободная мысль, направленная на постижение Истины.

Мысль о том, что в основе экскурсий лежит целостное телесное, зрительно-двигательное, и душевное, «зримостно-воспринимательное», переживание — в той или иной форме — высказывалась большинством теоретиков и практиков экскурсионного дела (И. М. Гревс, Н. А. Гейнике). «Экскурсия неизбежно координирует познавательный процесс теми мышечными ощущениями, которые

сопровождают процесс обхода, достижения объекта: экскурсия есть один из видов моторного завоевания знаний»[3].

Путешествия и экскурсии тем и ценны, что в них *«родится драгоценная любовь к родине»*, что они помогают «привить себе вкус к странствиям по родине»[4]. А в начале 20-х годов историк А. В. Бакушинский писал[5]: «Исторические расстояния при этом не помеха. Дух путешественности раздвигает горизонты времени и пространства для смотрящего, пережитая художественная ценность прошлого становится настоящим. Для такого переживания нет и пространственно-территориальных, нет и национальных загородок. Утверждается им общечеловеческое — быть может, мировое — над узким и личным».

Небольшие по размеру своих территорий страны Западной и Восточной Европы находятся в странном положении: для активной/продуктивной реализации (читай — «сохранения» и «развития») собственного экономического или культурного потенциала им необходимо вливаться в общеевропейские процессы, то есть, ступать на путь глобализации — будь то вступление в Евросоюз или введение единой европейской валюты. С другой стороны, каждая нация старается сохранить свою внутреннюю культурную самобытность, избежать тотальной унификации. Обыватели, которые в своем большинстве знакомы с политикой только как с феноменом экранной культуры, конечно признают все *экономические* выгоды внешних объединений, однако попытки культурного влияния (речь идет о так называемой «европеизации» культуры) расценивают как экспансию. Эти процессы наглядно подтверждаются несколькими примерами.

В Будапеште — вполне благополучном космополитичном европейском городе — в недавнем времени появился Музей Террора (“Terror Háza”). Идеологический заказ, предназначенный для «патриотического просвещения» жителей постсоциалистической Венгрии, в увлекательнейшей форме рассказывает о столкновениях венгров с фашистской Германией и Советской Россией. Тщательно подобранные архивные документы и кадры кинохроники показывают одинаковую организацию «гитлеровской» и «сталинской» военной машины — марширующие серые орды солдат, агрессивная пропаганда, сильный лидер. В этих залах как Германия, так и Советский Союз одинаково воспринимаются как агрессоры, а венгерский народ — мученически сносящий внешнюю экспансию.

Нагнетающееся депрессивное состояние, сочувствие угнетенному народу, ненависть к нациям-агрессорам — настроение, которое складывается у посетителя, будь он венгр, русский или американец после знакомства с экспозицией, — находит свой «выход» в последнем зале. На большом экране, единственном музейном объекте, мелькают кадры из новейшей мировой истории — выход советских войск с территории Венгрии в 1989 году. Это вздох облегчения. Пожилые мадьяры застывают здесь со слезами на глазах.

Является патриотизм, идеологический заказ на патриотическое воспитание прямым следствием осознания культурной самобытности нации на государственном уровне?

В 2007 году Чехия переходит на европейскую валюту, чему рядовые жители совсем не рады, поскольку следующим шагом будет ощутимое увеличение цен (вернее, их «европеизация», — уравнивание с общеевропейскими). В течение пяти-шести лет до этого страна активно готовится к вступлению в европейское сообщество, делая поступательные политические и экономические шаги. Однако уже сейчас люди озабочены сохранением собственной уникальной культуры. «Евроремонт», «европейская кухня», «европейский уровень жизни» — эти образы, уже ставшие устойчивыми, пугают: останется ли место традициям?

В 2002–2004 годах такие настроения приобретают в Чехии все больший размах. Чешская кухня, став основой коммерческого обслуживания туристов, начала отходить от традиционных рецептов в пользу «европейского» вкуса. Чехи забили тревогу. Стало популярным написание и переиздание кулинарных книг чешской кухни во имя сохранения Национального Вкуса. Таким образом, туризм становится спасительной нишей культуры — национальный колорит привлекает путешественников, и, соответственно, их материальные вложения, «капиталы», позволяющие поддерживать национальную самобытность.

NOTES

[1] Термин впервые употреблен в анонимной статье «Великое царственное искусство масонства как культура исповедания». Издание 1910-х гг., архив БАН, С.-Петербург.

[2] Genius loci — *лат.* «Божество местности».

[3] Хождение к святыням. / Упражнения в сути дела. М.: Русский мир, 1993. / http://hoster.metod.ru:8082/prometa/olegen/publications/86

[4] Гревс И. М. К теории и практике экскурсий, как орудия научного изучения истории в университетах. СПб., 1910. С. 30.

[5] Цит. по ист.: Анциферов Н. П. Душа Петербурга. Л.: «Лира», 1990. С. 15.

THE FORMATION IN TRADITION OR THE PROFESSION OF CULTURE

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> Those who managed to travel much in youth tend to enter their lives with an indispensable fund of such knowledge, intellectual skills and emotional strength, which they could not have gained from any other source: years of studying (Lehrjahre) should actually be years of traveling (Wanderjahre).
>
> *I. M. Grevs*

Let us define the belonging of a person to a certain culture as the possession of mental stereotypes of a given community. Ethic and aesthetic principles would be

basic belongings: the former representing a universal intercultural language and the latter aimed at controlling and regulating human relationships and enabling reflection. It would be plausible to assume that *homo perceptivus* would come not to using culture, but professing it, primarily by means of regarding the outer world via the prism of his or her values.

Forming conditions allowing one to 'profess' culture could provide the justification for both the pathos of an intellectual, and the needs of average people to understand the world by means of culture.

Speaking of the trends of contemporary culture, I would point out three main trends of its dynamics:

1. There undoubtedly exists tendency towards globalization, the universalization of culture, which is certainly reducing some tensions between inter-confessional stereotypes, or different aesthetic positions;
2. To counterbalance the tendency to erase tensions, there exists a position, toward which main efforts should be directed in the development of national cultures, held as means to defend and/or preserve the aesthetic of a given culture;
3. The third tendency is an attempt to find a compromise settlement. Thus there are projects, aimed at the creation of conditions for intercultural dialogue, in the course of which the uniqueness of individual cultures may be preserved, while inevitable contradictions and misunderstandings are removed.

As I see it, the deepest bases of any culture, including contemporary culture are concentrated in the field of upbringing. Upbringing-in-tradition forms a pledge acquired by a future Citizen of the World. With the ideal being a well-educated person leading his or her life according to the traditions of his or her native ethos and topos, knowledgeable of culture of other communities and, what is most important, tolerant of the uniqueness of others.

In my detailed report 'Self-Respect in the Cultural Policy: Local Bases of Global World', delivered at the conference 'Education in The World of Culture' (November 17–18th, 2004, Moscow, Russia), I spoke about guided trips as a method of upbringing and educating. In this report I saw the solution of existing problems of intercultural communication is in the field of upbringing the young according to the traditions of their local culture(s).

Children start understanding the surrounding world from the family situation, the house, the yard, and the nearest street. At the age of 6-8 the integral perception of the city, country, and world space does not yet exist. And the task of the family, teachers, school consists of upbringing-in-tradition, conforming to language, ideology, and religion, also in line with the spirit of the place and local customs. The real preservation of ethnic and national cultural traditions depends on people, on natives. It is them who must preserve the "genius loci", the spirit of place — in their family legends and traditions.

During the course of the Days of European Culture many wonderful projects were realized. For example, in St. Petersburg 'The European Walkway' was initiated. The objective of this Walkway was to relate the contributions of representatives from more than 20 European nations in the development of St. Petersburg. In addition, many investigations were conducted. Including an event dedicated to telling the 300-year-old history of the city from the perspective of different nationalities (Swedes, Jewish people or Germans). Recounting the history a layer at a time, through the lens of one segment of the population, one confession, one profession.

> Systemic and active understanding of the world is the aim of the guided trip method of teaching the history of culture. I suppose that one's entrance into the world should begin from understanding the surrounding city, or country. In order to appreciate the full value of a masterpiece of European or Eastern culture, one should realize the uniqueness and value of a particular historical region, where one was born/brought up. Only then, can one compare and admire (not misunderstand and blame).

New things are learned through comparison. Humans tend to compare new things with something wellknown, primarily with the tradition that one was born into or brought up in. Only pure minds, free from ignorance, a free idea aimed at understanding the Truth can move.

The basis of the excursion method consists of integral corporal, visual and intellectual experience. This concept has been expressed by quite a few theorists and practitioners of guided tours, most notably I. M. Grevs and N. A. Geinicke, who note that 'Excursion inevitably leads cognitive process along the lines formed by certain muscular sensations, which accompany the process of touring, reaching the object; excursion is kind of motor-achievement of knowledge.'

Journeys and trips are widely appreciated just because during them 'the precious love for the Motherland is born', and because they help "cultivate taste in journeys around one's country'. In the beginning of the 1920s, historian A. V. Bakushinsky wrote: 'Historical distances are no obstacles. The Spirit of traveling moves apart the horizons of time and space for a Watcher, artistic values of the past becomes real via one's experience. There are no spatial or national borders for experiences of this kind'.

Medium-size countries of both Eastern and Western Europe are in a strange state: they need to join European processes in order to attain active/productive realization (i. e. 'presentation' and 'development') of their economical or cultural potentials. This means they have to join the process of globalization — whether by means of entering the EU or by introducing European currency. On the other hand, each nation tries to keep its own internal cultural originality, to avoid total unification. Citizens, most of whom perceive politics mostly as a phenomenon of 'screen

culture', admit all economic benefits of external associations. However any attempts of cultural influence (we speak about the so-called 'europianization' of culture) are considered to be sort of cultural expansion. These processes can be proven by some obvious examples.

In Budapest — a rather successful cosmopolitan European city — there is a new museum of Terror ('Terror Hása'). Ideological order, aimed at 'patriotic enlightenment' of citizens of post-socialist Hungary, consists in telling about collisions between the Hungarians and fascist Germany and the Soviet Union. Archive materials and sequences of news-reels present the identical organization of war machines designed by "Hitler" and "Stalin"– marching gray hordes of soldiers, aggressive propaganda, strong leaders. In these halls, Germany and Soviet Union are both interpreted as aggressors, Hungarians as martyr nation.

Forced depression, sympathy for those who are oppressed, hatred toward aggressor nations — that is the mood conditioned by visitors, whether they are Hungarians, Russians, or Americans. In the last hall this mood comes to climax. Part of modern history is shown on film screen, including scenes of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Hungary in 1989. Old Magyars freeze here with tears in their eyes and sighs of relief.

Is patriotism, or the ideological order for patriotic upbringing, conditioned by the need to conserve cultural originality of nationhood at the state level?

In 2007, Czech Republic will adopt European currency. Czech citizens are not very delighted by this fact, because of the associated price increase. (To be exact, adopting European currency is labeled as 'Europeanization', or being equaled with the European prices.) For 5-6 years Czech Republic has been actively preparing to join the European community, taking progressive political and economic steps. But even now, people are worried about preserving their national culture. 'Euro-repairment', 'European cuisine', 'European living standards' — all these images appear scary. (People wonder, 'will there still be place for our traditions?').

In 2002–2004, these moods continually gained momentum. Czech cuisine, which became the basis of commercial tourist services, began to depart from traditional recipes in favour of the alleged 'European taste'. The Czechs grew alarmed, and it has become popular to write and reprint manuals of Czech cuisine — to save the National Taste. Thus, tourism has become the saving niche for culture: local color attracts visitors, and, therefore, their money, 'capitals', which in turn help support national originality.

ЗАДАЧИ КУЛЬТУРОСОФИИ

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Главный фактор, определяющий состояние современной культуры, — это модус реальности, в которой она пребывает. Под реальностью мы в данном случае понимаем тотально согласованную онтологию, доминирующие представления о бытии, где объединены личные, социальные и метафизические его аспекты.

Иерархически структурированная реальность образует **матрицу** — цивилизационную, религиозную, светскую, государственную и так далее. Не структурированная реальность представляет собой социокультурную плазму, где интегрирующие системы отсутствуют.

Пользуясь языками разных культур, которые, на наш взгляд, взаимно комплементарны, эволюцию такой реальности с момента ее зарождения и до наших дней можно, вероятно, обозначить следующим образом.

Пустота или «ничто» — реальности, фактически, не существует.

Дао или «нечто» — существует что-то, о чем мы не можем сказать ничего конкретного.

Хаос — «чистая жизненность», энтелехия, жизнь, еще не обретшая форму. В древнегреческой философии хаосу соответствует дионисийство.

Космос — «структурное бытие», жизнь, обретшая конкретные бытийные формы. В античном мышлении, ставшем потом европейским, это — аполлоническая, эстетизированная реальность.

Хтонос — «структурность, лишенная жизненности», вследствие чего она приобретает монструозный характер. Примером хтонического состояния бытия является, на наш взгляд, «период развитого социализма» в СССР.

Ризома — «вырожденное бытие», полный распад, реальность, утратившая не только жизненность, но и структурность. Это состояние характерно для современности.

Можно, вероятно, не опасаться эклектичности подобной сборки, где представления первобытных народов совмещены с древнекитайской и древнегреческой философией. А она, в свою очередь, сопрягается с новейшими воззрениями о связи хаоса и структурности. Это эклектика — мнимая. Просто для реконструкции подлинного бытия требуются все его гносеологические отражения.

Представляется, что ризома — это совершенно новый модус реальности, ранее в человеческой истории не встречавшийся. Она возникла в результате постепенного вырабатывания и деконструкции христианской матрицы, которые были произведены философиями Просвещения и Постмодерна.

Очевидно, что ризомное состояние современной культуры обладает рядом особенностей. Оно, по сути, представляет собой не матрицу, не структуриро-

ванную реальность, а высоко энтропийную плазму, набор личных смыслов, предполагающий их тотальную равнозначность.

Это, в свою очередь, порождает, во-первых, модельный характер современного знания, поскольку ни один культурный концепт не имеет теперь «истинных» преимуществ перед другими; во-вторых, клиповый характер культуры, ограниченной в основном пределами самодовлеющей личности, и, в-третьих, избыточный, чрезмерный характер социокультурного многообразия, не позволяющий даже в принципе отделить главное от второстепенного.

Для пользователя такая среда превращается в какофонию. Она превращается в набор равнозначных сигналов — и одинаково важных, и одинаково не имеющих никакого значения. Поскольку нет матрицы, нет «абсолютного эталона», то контент, содержание, информацию не с чем соотнести.

Отсюда — эфемерность явлений современной культуры, возникающих из ничего и мгновенно лопающихся, как мыльные пузыри. Без бытийной поддержки, без матричного сопряжения личного с трансцендентным срок жизни таких явлений стремится к нулю.

Возникает закономерный вопрос: что представляет собой ризома в эволюционных координатах? Это завершающая фаза Вселенского цикла, за которой после распада последует начальная Пустота и далее — новое восхождение по ступеням Дао, Хаоса, Космоса? Причем, учитывая накопленный человечеством экзистенциальный опыт, можно полагать, что это будут «другие» Дао, Хаос и Космос. Или трансмутация бытия — это все-таки процесс векторный, подразумевающий последовательный сюжет, и через какое-то время возникнет новая универсальная матрица, интегрирующая собой мозаику личных реальностей? Тогда мир вновь обретет холистическое единство.

Возможен, впрочем, и третий путь. Ускорение исторического процесса, связанное с усилением неравновесности сложных социальных систем, означает, что периоды матричной (парадигмальной) устойчивости в истории сокращаются. Возрастает частота фазовых переходов от одной структурной формации к принципиально иной.

Экстраполируя это явление, можно предположить, что суть когнитивного (информационного) состояния, к которому ныне из страты индустриализма устремлена западная (евро-атлантическая) цивилизация, как раз и будет заключаться в непрерывном производстве фазовых переходов. Ризома — это форма существования когнитива, и мы из «статичной реальности», реальности устойчивых государств, экономик, религий, философий, искусств, профессий, образов жизни переходим к реальности нового типа — динамичной, претерпевающей непрерывные изменения в своих основных параметрах.

Каким образом будет существовать такая динамическая реальность? Возникнут ли в ней механизмы «горизонтального согласования», основанные на «быстрых» коммуникациях, или же начнется безжалостная конкуренция разных моделей, «война всех против всех», сказать пока невозможно. С некоторой

уверенностью можно утверждать лишь одно: биологически человек не приспособлен к существованию в непрерывно меняющейся среде. А это значит, что либо такая среда все-таки не возникнет: мир будет стабилизирован, хотя бы временно, на каком-нибудь новом системном уровне, либо человек, постепенно адаптируясь к новой реальности, будет вынужден обрести свойства «нечеловеческого» характера. Иначе в тотально изменяющейся среде он просто не выживет.

Попытка ответить на эти вопросы, попытка генерализовать возникающую реальность — одна из главных задач современной культурософии.

THE TASKS OF CULTUROSOPHY

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The main factor determining the state of modern culture is the modus of reality, in which it is. In this case, *reality* refers to a totally conformed ontology that dominates conceptions of existence, with its combined individual, social and metaphysical aspects. Using languages of different cultures, the evolution of such reality can probably be designated as follows. Void (nothing) — Tao (something) — Chaos (pure viability) — Cosmos (structured existence) — Chtonos (existence without viability) — Rhizome (degenerate existence). A question naturally arises. What are the rhizome coordinates in evolution? Is the state of modern culture a completion phase of the Universe cycle, which after disintegration will be followed by Void and then ascending anew the stages of Dao, Chaos, Cosmos? Or maybe, the transmutation of existence is a vector process and after a time a new universal matrix integrating the complete mosaic of personal realities will arise? An attempt to answer this question is one of the main tasks of modern culturosophy.

И ВНУТРИ ЭТОГО ПРОСТРАНСТВА РАЗВИВАЕТСЯ ЧЕЛОВЕК

Елена ЯРОСЛАВЦЕВА

Конфликту часто противопоставляется диалог. Но можно сказать, что конфликт это тоже форма диалога, а точнее, это обе формы коммуникации. Системы, как индивидуальные, так и социальные борются за свою самостоятельность, защищают свою целостность, самоидентичность.

Форма отношений с ними, какую хотят иметь субъекты, — уважение и невмешательство. А наилучшая форма коммуникации — бесконфликтный диалог. Но тогда остается вопрос о том, как будет обеспечиваться активность взаимодействия. Статичные субъекты, которые уравновешены в себе, будут аморфны. И всегда возникнет кто-то, кто их будет тревожить. Но это все находится в поле норм. Выходит за эти нормы — агрессивная наступательная, разрушительная деятельность. Собственно говоря, против нее и выступают те, кто хочет автономности и самостоятельности, которую они не чувствуют при агрессивном наступлении. Поэтому постоянно остается актуальной задача «не мешать».

Не мешать — один из важнейших принципов, который обеспечивает приоритет свободного развития. И как порой, кажется, он обеспечивает возможность не создавать конфликтов. А точнее, не вынуждать систему на создание жестких границ. Ведь именно они, их разрушение свидетельствует о развитии конфликта и прекращении существования одной из конфликтующих сторон. Если не мешать, то системы в своем реагировании будут более гибки и могут эффективнее приспособиться друг к другу.

Здесь речь может идти как о группах, так и об отдельных индивидах. А позиция «не мешать», «дать свободу» понимается как управленческая, действующая на субъекта извне. В таком рассуждении выстраивается определенного рода коммуникация, которая лучше, чем авторитарная. Но по умолчанию она так же содержит представление о конфликтности как неизбежной стороне жизни.

И от этого позиция «невмешательства» не предохраняет. В этом смысле конфликта не избежать. И приходится понимать, что это был компромисс, который лишь оттянул некоторые столкновения. В качестве регулирующих через некоторое время стали выступать не управляющие органы, а сами субъекты. При этом они могли демонстрировать свои принципы взаимоотношений, которые нередко могли быть построены на силе. И здесь конфликты становились еще менее примиримыми, поскольку столкновения происходили между непосредственно заинтересованными субъектами, между ними не было такого амортизатора, как общее для них воздействие, руководство.

Вся эта ситуация характеризуется тем, что участники коммуникации делают акцент на внешней силе, но не видят внутренних — собственных — потенций субъекта, что могло бы понизить риск конфликта.

Существует еще один вариант построения отношений — избегать конфликта. Это одна из лучших форм решения многих проблем. Она заставляет повышать степень гибкости взаимодействия и постепенно создает опыт успешной коммуникации. Но все же она показывает, что субъект видит лишь внешние обстоятельства, а на свои способности опирается не всегда.

Как можно полагать, конфликт, по всей видимости, не безысходный вариант развития. Противоречие, которое в нем решается совсем не должно приводить к разрушению или подавлению развития систем. Взаимодействие может быть достаточно хорошо согласованным и это доказывает существование сложных систем как таковых. Однако для самостоятельно действующих систем — индивидов или групп — эти связи должны осуществляться осознанно, что и представляет собой проблему. Решение задачи лежит в возможностях самого субъекта, а именно, в его способности понимать себя как задающего инициативу, норму отношений. Как открыто взаимодействующего субъекта.

Система может сохранять себя и будучи открытой, имея гораздо более благоприятные перспективы для расширения. И чем сложнее система, тем важнее этот аспект в ее развитии. Фактически речь идет об ином принципе, который можно использовать в сознательном построении взаимоотношений.

Человека надо понять как открытую систему! И тогда с ней можно строить отношения, имеющие пониженный риск конфликтности. Сложная система способна защищаться, не выстраивая границы. Ее защищает состояние целостности. Иными словами, она может быть открытой и активно расширяться за счет существования внутренней сбалансированности. Заметим, что целостность субъекта сохраняется не тогда, когда у него жестко изолированное ограниченное пространство существования, а тогда, когда у него все составляющие (части) способны взаимодействовать, сбалансированы. Парадокс, но такая внутренняя целостность более продуктивна в своем развитии. Она как бы **не имеет границ**, в нашем понимании, поскольку никто с ними не сталкивается. Она имеет ядро, внутренне интегрирована, вполне определенна.

Но при этом, у нее развит другой фактор. Будучи открытой к коммуникации, доступной, она — избирательна: не интегрирует в себя всё, что находится вокруг. Это, собственно, и есть проявление границы. Весь окружающий мир во всех его проявлениях и манифестациях не является для нее значимым. Она реализует свою активность через создание зоны конкретного интереса и развитии нужных тенденций.

Иными словами, система открыта во вне, но допуск в себя у нее ограничен именно **избирательностью** к интеграции. Подобное состояние системы усиливает возможности бесконфликтного диалога, **взаимодействия**. От непродуктивных она может просто уклониться. Такой целостности не нужен конфликт как самопроявление, самофиксация. Она открыта, но недоступна, если внешний мир к ней не подходит по каким-либо параметрам. Нейтральность системы, ее закрытость может иметь вполне естественный характер. Во многих случаях это сущес-

твует, но не воспринимается нами как нечто раздражающее, хотя часто и манит как тайна, загадка.

В этом плане можно отметить еще один парадокс: некоторая системная целостность может не давать допуска самой себе, т. е. не строить отношения с самой собой. Ей проще воспринять кого-то другого, чем себя. Это говорит о том, что не всякое существо может дистанцироваться и воспринимать себя со стороны. Здесь нужен особый тип мировосприятия, основанный на созревании структур психики. Последние или филогенетически, или онтогенетически еще не даны как устойчивый тип коммуникативного общения, и их появление не всегда гарантировано, вероятностно, зависит от собственных усилий субъекта. Если говорить о социальных субъектах, то наличие такого вида самопонимания представляется вообще проблематичным.

Животные и дети, являясь целостными системами, еще не могут дистанцироваться от себя и воспринимают только среду вне себя. Это доминирующий тип коммуникации. Взрослеющим детям нужно вырабатывать дистанцирование, учить тому, чтобы они умели ставить себя на место другого. Тогда посредством этого опыта они «от имени другого» строят отношение к себе. Животным такие установки давать бесполезно, хотя некоторые исследования показывают, что они воспринимают себя со стороны, а точнее, свое отражение в зеркале. Но животные слитны с природой, или с человеком, рядом с которым живут (доместифицированные животные). Это их доминирующее целостное состояние, в котором они замкнуты и едва ли когда-нибудь способны будут его преодолеть.

Чтобы понять самого себя, человеку нужен допуск. И не просто отражение в зеркале, которое он должен узнать. Но и — парадокс — желание узнать себя в зеркале. Субъект-индивид должен быть открыт к такому внешнему воздействию, как отражение в зеркале, в котором он должен разобраться и с кем-то его идентифицировать. А, в конечном счете, через которое он должен понять себя, это отражение как «Я» — как ни с чем не сравнимое, уникальное, единственное явление мира.

Но даже к этому состоянию нелегко прийти. Обнаружению себя в зеркале предшествовал длительный опыт презентации себя через вещи. Одевание себя, закрепление своих качеств, социального статуса через предметные, символические реалии позволяло человеку опознавать себя в отражениях, которые дарила ему природа. Через эти возможности у индивида развивалось желание воспринять свою собственную сущность, зарождалась открытость к такого рода информации. Человек обретал свойство воспринимать не только натуральную природу, данную ему вне его самого, но и свою собственную персону, отображаемую в абстрактном идеальном виде. При этом углубление в сей предмет погружает человека в собственную целостность: телесность, область чувствования и переживания — прямо противоположные состояниям, возникающим в процессе познания природы. Впрочем, выделение себя из тела природы так же могло сопровождаться подобными переживаниями.

Одним словом, чтобы развилась человеческая субъективность, у индивида должна была сложиться система самовосприятия, которая сдвинула сбалансированность и замкнутость животного целостного организма в сторону открытого существования. Открытого для самого себя. Открытого таким образом, что возникала тяга к самопознанию, опыт и привычка опираться на самого себя, и даже строить диалог с самим собой.

По существу от человека требовалась способность переходить от взаимодействия с природой к диалогу с собой, к размышлениям. Они становились формой и содержанием рефлексий, и глубина их была не менее завораживающей, чем глубины природы. Открытость человека к самому себе стала точкой роста взаимосвязи человека и мира. Причем, сложность отношений с миром должна быть адекватной сложности самого человека, они должны быть соразмерны. Слишком значительное, чрезмерное углубление человека в природу или в самого себя лишало его возможности развития, динамичного расширения своих связей, реализации способностей.

Человек может строить диалог, усложнение самого себя только через «встречу» с самим собой, через рефлексию. Но это достаточно сложный процесс. Человек встречается со своей природой, с собой как целостностью и ему важно, так же как при знании внешнего мира, иметь достоверные знания про себя. В каком-то смысле человек даже учился на себе познавать природу, поскольку был вполне обозримым и конечным объектом. Всегда можно было создавать знания о прошлом и будущем, подкрепляя их достоверность большим количеством свидетелей. Человеку всегда было важно правильно понимать самого себя, обрести самоидентичность. Тогда он мог жить в согласии с миром.

При углублении в самого себя через создаваемые образы, в рефлексии человек осознает себя и создает определенную систему координат, которая позволяет ему себя идентифицировать. Эта «улитка рефлексии» является не обычной — линейной — системой, выстраивающей последовательные причинно-следственные связи, а представляет собой спираль — систему углублений в онтогенез и даже в филогенез, в свое родительское и собственное прошлое.

Чем больше знаний ребенку доступно о нем самом, тем большей успешностью будут отмечаться его попытки достичь цели, создать свой образ и т. д. Он продвигается в онтогенез через владение собой с помощью знаний. И это продвижение к себе — рефлексия помогает установить как (1) достоверность имеющегося знания, т.е. идентичность себе, так и (2) практически нарастить свой опыт использования знаний. Эти два момента сопряжены в одном действии и развивается по циклу, постоянно усложняя задачу самоопределения.

Проникновение человека в свой онтогенез позволяет ему строить свой диалог, успешно сотрудничать с собой, Не случайно считают, что познание самого себя придает силы, человек всегда находит в себе **дополнительные возможности, новые ресурсы**.

Человека можно определить как самовозрастающий ресурс, способный через механизмы рефлексии получать **прибавление силы.** По существу такой но-

вой потенцией, объемом возможностей становится новое соотношение, которое возникает при рефлективном углублении человека в самого себя. Он открывает себя. И не фигурально, а вполне реально, когда его образные построения пересекаются с нелинейными онтогенетическими или филогенетическими факторами. Происходят внутренние расширения.

При этом интересно, в каком виде происходит этот типичный процесс. Можно ли его определить как мотивационный? Хотя надо заметить, что на любом пути получения ресурсов мы будем фиксировать усиление мотивации и желание продолжать следовать этим путем. Но одновременно человек ощущает и всегда будет чувствовать, что сам процесс познания требует немалых сил. Его сомнения, поиски, переживания неуверенности — все относится к этому процессу. Он должен выбрать, какое знание о себе ему больше всего нравится, какое он более всего склонен класть в основу своих расширений.

Внутренние расширения.

Улитка рефлексии, как она здесь изображена, закручивается необычно: она направлена против хода этапов онтогенеза, как и вся наша логика, логика отталкивания от точек опоры. Можно сказать, что у нее образуется много мест пересечения линий онтогенеза и траектории знания человека о самом себе, в результате чего возникает много **точек расширения** внутреннего континуума. Здесь подходит образ фонтана с брызгами. Человек и на самом деле при избытке эмоций может их выплескивать, особенно если на открытие собственных возможностей он потратил меньше, чем приобрел.







Если человек получил допуск такому углублению в себя, созиданию своего внутреннего континуума, то он должен научиться правильно использовать найденный источник силы. Это можно назвать **ответственностью** перед ресурсным усилением, По существу, путь познания самого себя не однозначен, он будет благоприятен и длителен, если человек правильно — оптимально и сбалансированно — использовал предшествующие ресурсные прибавления.

Если углубиться в контекст ответственности, то надо понять, что человек как система в каждом своем новом расширении должен осуществить обратную связь. Всякая приобретенная свобода связана с ответственностью. И естественно, что эту весьма серьезную работу человек осуществляет за свой счет, вкладывая собственные силы. Лишь на ранних этапах, в процессе воспитания, его ответственность может быть не полной, она создается за счет ресурсов родителей, которые прикладывают силы к обучению ребенка нормам морали и нравственности.

Моральные нормы всегда имели прямое отношение к правильности — гармоничности — развития, отражая уровень сбалансированности системы. В свою очередь, сохраненность баланса системы является основным условием получения допуска для углублением во внутренний континуум. Только в этом случае человек способен инвестировать свои силы в продуктивные расширения, создавать новые потенции развития. Здоровье как интегративное состояние организма человека так же является результатом его ответственности и необходимым условием дальнейшего развития.

В целостном организме человека все является важным, как ментальные способности создания соотношений, так и телесные. Мысленные образы часто вдохновляют человека, строят перспективу, создавая соотношения с будущими точками опоры. Тело человека выполняет другую роль. Оно позволяет в текущем времени создавать способы самоукрепления. Во-первых — физически, через чисто мышечные тренирующие упражнения, усиливающие устойчивость стабильных связей. Во-вторых, посредством создания множества фигур-соотношений, которые как временные функциональные органы (Ф. О.), существуют ограниченное время, но при этом позволяют человеку регулировать баланс своих систем. К таким можно отнести позы, создаваемые руками со всем телом (1) или просто руками (мудры-2), между частями тела.

Человек как самоподобная (фрактальная) система, перемещая тело, манипулируя своими конечностями, создает движущееся поле, динамичную структуру. Ее при этом без противоречий можно описать и как анатомический процесс; и как функциональный процесс (бег — для ноги, цепляние — для пальцев; повороты — для туловища); и как метафизический процесс постоянной перестройки = пересамоорганизации.

С помощью этих телесных возможностей человек может достаточно успешно поддерживать свой баланс при образовании новых нагрузок. Если же они дополняются эмоционально-психологическими, духовными соизмерениями, то у чело-

века возникает достаточно высокий уровень устойчивости организма, поскольку возникает много потенциальных точек опоры. В этом случае человек может даже требовать новых нагрузок, чтобы тренироваться в практике балансирования.

Человек — воплощение расширений. Каждый является локальной системой, а при успешном взаимодействии все вместе образуют сеть. Эта сеть являет собой иное качество по сравнению с каждым человеком в отдельности. Все вместе образуют определенное социальное единство, групповой функциональный орган. Поскольку в этой структуре встретилось много тенденций, то возникло множество новых соотношений, среди которых может быть немало продуктивных, создающих новый ресурс. Такие молодые группы могут быть чрезвычайно активны, поскольку обладают самовозрастающей потенцией. Но как функциональные органы они могут работать с разной длительностью, в зависимости от того, выделяли ли системы ресурс на воспроизведение. Сверхактивные группы быстро выгорают, не успевая восстановиться.



Обнаружить функциональные органы (Ф. О.) можно практически везде, в любом «месте встречи» сети. Тенденции развития определяются их топологической характеристикой, местонахождением точек роста, в которых пробуждаются филогенетические потенции встретившихся течений.

Так во взаимоотношениях индивидов будут играть роль возможности их телесно-психологической организации; в контактах технических сред (объектов) — потенции творческой мысли человека, заложенные в их конструкции; в соединении коммуникативных потенций компьютерных технологий — все это вместе взятое, усиленное гибкостью и свободой сочетаний. Во всех этих вариациях культуры проявляют себя расширенные потенции человеческой природы, которые насыщены порождающими моментами. Это пространство, по существу, живое, состоящее из разных соотношений и соизмерений, имеющее (внутренние потенции) развития, которые могут создавать новые феномены, качественно преобразующие все (*топологическое пространство, весь топос), придающее ему новый статус*.

Обращая внимание на современное развитие компьютерных технологий, можно отметить, что они являются продолжением развития природы человека. Их инаковость — техничность и виртуальность — быть может непривычна по своей форме и скорости развертывания, но они все имеют свои корни в природные естественных способностях человека, являются его продолжением. Можно сказать, что сетевые компьютерные координационные процессы — это наращивание своеобразной «телесности» человечества, в форме **сетевых со-**

отнесенностей! В них — суть функциональных органов, которые могут иметь многообразные формы воплощений, существующие в мире, в космосе взаимоотношений. Человеческая воплощенность — одна из близких нам природных форм. Поэтому новые явления мы чаще всего интерпретируем через устоявшиеся формы, соотносим их с известными и понятными с практической точки зрения. В этом, заметим, соотношении, не создается никакой познавательной ошибки, поскольку в практике человек опирается затем на третий фактор, получаемый из этого соотнесения известного с неизвестным, создает новый Ф. О., где первичность и вторичность исходных элементов не играет ведущей роли, но преобразуется в точке роста по своим закономерностям.

Человек определяет новое через свои собственные способности. И это может быть достаточно точной характеристикой новых сетевых пространств, компьютерных технологий. Особенности и возможности этой среды познаются через качественную соотнесенность с человеком.

Более того, человек — непосредственный, а нередко и ведущий участник этого процесса изменений. Он является партнером природы, творящим сеть. И при описании этого процесса необходимо все больше обращать внимание на процессуальную сторону.

Аудио-визуальные, опирающиеся на способность человека видеть и слышать, коммуникативные технологии можно рассматривать в двух аспектах, через разные познавательные подходы. Первый — восходящий, который определяет, **ЧТО** складывается в результате интенсивного развития различных средств коммуникации. Сеть становится и результатом, и целью этого развития, оправдывая саму себя. Она превращается в **сущностное** явление, привлекая своей глобальностью и нескончаемостью.

Второй подход — процессуальный, который определяет **КАК** складывается эта сеть, выявляет ее участников, точки роста в их расширяющейся деятельности. Обнаруживается автопоэтический процесс расширения и воспроизводства участков сети по фрактальным закономерностям. Именно в ней развертывает (КАК-то) себя сущность (ЧТО-то) и вне ее она не существует. Развивающаяся сеть — это соотношения. А во времени они вместе со-существуют. Со-бытие со-отношений.

AND INSIDE THIS SPACE, MAN DEVELOPS

Elena YAROSLAVTSEVA

The possibility of surmounting conflicts is not in making the dialogue diverse but in seeing and becoming aware of the already existing diversity of dialogues and communications, as well as in learning not to impede the realization of the dialogue. Dia-

logue can potentially arise at every point in the communication network as a form of correlating the interests of the subjects. Through such dialogue, in the "meeting points" system, functional agencies having some developmental potential emerge.

Man is capable of becoming open to diversity while preserving his integrity and self-identity. He must be able to perceive the diversified world, opening himself as a system, letting the world in and recreating in himself the inner balance as a basis of identity. Balancing is necessary in connection with the permanent reflection on the extensions of one's own system and in connection with realizing one's identity. This is the inner dialogue of man.

Inwardly balanced integrity is stable and has no rigid boundaries, so it is the least conflicting and more productive in its development. But while accessible and open to communication, inwardly balanced integrity is selective. It does not integrate everything around it into itself. Properly speaking, inward integrity is the manifestation of boundary. This state of the system, having inwardly preserved clear boundaries, increases the possibility of creating the model of a dialogue without conflicts and that of expanding interaction.

THE LEGITIMACY OF THE PAUSE: ASPECTS OF THE 'EPOCHAL THRESHOLD' DERIVED FROM THE WORLD OF HANS BLUMENBERG

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Introduction

Every age is a sphinx, which plunges into
the abyss the moment one has solved its riddle.
Heinrich Heine

An epoch is the sum total of all the interferences
between actions and what they 'make.'
Hans Blumenberg

In times of transition the question of unity and diversity becomes significant insofar as both are true at the same time: Diversity is represented by the appearance of different potential paths of development that are competing with each other and that cause pressure to the situation and the individuals involved. Unity on the other hand is represented by ongoing change that provides continuity and permanence. During transitions the issues of unity and diversity melt down to a paradoxical process that is only resolved by ending the transition phase, by having crossed the threshold.

The issues of transition and change, of movement and dynamics are receiving increasing attention in Philosophy and Cultural Studies. This may be due to the fact that an increasing amount of people think and / or perceive that we are currently living in a substantial phase of transition.

Nevertheless it is not necessary to start at the basic foundation. Other Philosophers have discussed the issue of transition before and there are good reasons for focusing not only on contemporary questions of transition, because we do not know yet what the present process has brought. In other words: Transitions indicate a rather difficult and complicated topic because the only reliable way to observe and describe a transition is to observe it in historical retrospective.

This paper aims to contribute to the discussion of transition by re-introducing last century German Philosopher Hans Blumenberg, who formulated the term 'epochal threshold' (*Epochenschwelle*). In his major work, Blumenberg analyses the epochal threshold from the Middle Ages to the modern age and by his rendering the reader learns general aspects of the epochal threshold as well. The aim of this paper is to synthesize general aspects of major cultural transitions from the work of Hans Blumenberg.

Hans Blumenberg — the person

German philosopher Hans Blumenberg was born in L beck in 1920 and died 1996 in Kiel near the Baltic Sea, where he worked and lived as distinguished Professor of Philosophy. A starting point to characterize him is to note that he is a highly reputed author but only a modestly recognized philosopher. A second characteristic of Hans Blumenberg is that we know much from Hans Blumenberg, but only little about him (Wetz, 1993: 7).

These two hints show that Hans Blumenberg does not fit into the regular scheme of 21st century academics. One of the 'myths' that spread after his death was the story that he neglected any contact with the outside world, that he did not respond letters, that he did not answer the phone, even that he instructed his wife to inform any uninvited visitor that he is dead already.[1]

It is important to know that Blumenberg, who was not affiliated with any of the dominant philosophical schools in Germany, "had clearly assimilated all of them, together with the historiography of philosophy, science, and theology" (Wallace 1985: x).

Blumenberg's major contribution to Philosophy can be seen in two fields. First of all in the history of philosophy and secondly in his theory of metaphors, his 'metapherology.' The two fields are not separated from each other. They are joined in Blumenbergs 'phenomenology of significance,' which he attempts to formulate outside the analytical paradigm of Philosophy.

Blumenberg's first major work was *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* which has been translated into English as well, and which Richard Rorty called "A great sweeping history of the course of European thought." The theory of 'epochal thresholds' as it will be presented here is basically an extract from the *Legitimacy of the Modern Age*. Blumenberg's early work on that great turning known as the Copernican Revolution (1965, 1975) provided the ground for observing general aspects of epochal thresholds, because Blumenberg's interest was not only the transition but the transformation of meaning as a matter of phenomenology. Indeed Blumenberg wrote his Habilitation in 1950 based on Husserls Phenomenology, in which he elaborated his own phenomenology out of the crisis in Husserls phenomenology. Following Blumenberg, phenomenology unfolds the picture of a 'ultimate world of experience' that is without any contingency and that is a-historic (see Liebsch 1996: 87).

Hans Blumenberg survived the Second World War in Germany in the underground because he was "half Jewish," as it was labeled under the regime of the Nazis. After the war he completed his Ph. D. and his habilitation within 5 years. Blumenberg's theory of the modern age as a time where the yet impossible has become reality reflects the influence of the war and can be seen as a representation of the philosophical-intellectual landscape in Germany. Similar to Adorno and other representatives of the post-war intellectual milieu, Blumenberg illustrates the modern ages as doom or as kismet.

However, Blumenberg does not stop with describing the fatal outcome of modern times. He explains how our modern times are legitimate and without alternative. He

speaks about a "qualitative change" that became necessarily along with technical progress.

The terms 'epoch' and 'epochal threshold'

The word 'epoch' derives from the Greek word *epoché,* which means "caesura, cut, or break." However, the word 'epoch' has become a term to describe not the cut, but the extended time between the two sides of the break. About the term epoch, Blumenberg states: "What is more important is that periods of time have taken the points in time" (Blumenberg 1985: 458).

Hans Blumenberg has reflected deeply on the term epoch and he beings the fourth section of *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* by clarifying the difference between epoch and history. Epoch, in the sense of a cut, marks a new beginning. To be precise the new beginning is only a historiographical construction comprising the whole scheme of an epoch. But how does this new beginning in history start to happen? Blumenberg states: "At some particular time, here and now, a 'new epoch' of world history begins. That one could have been present at the event — as Goethe wanted to make the disappointed combatants believe on the evening of the cannonade of Valmy — is never a secure historical fact. Perhaps Goethe's was not really such a big talk as it sounds to our ears; it may have been intended to be ironic exaggeration. We acknowledge as an 'epoch' only what has been summoned up by rhetorical hyperbole that speaks of the 'epoch-maker'" (Blumenberg 1985: 457). So the first important finding is that epochs are a manmade construction, not a historical fact. And the so-called epoch-maker is an invention of scholars, who live in the future seen from the perspective of the time which we call an epoch (or who write about the past, seen from the present).

Blumenberg speaks of the "individualization of historical periods as complex unities of events." But what is the use of doing so? By abstracting what has been into the idea of an epoch, it is possible to reduce the complexity. "The event becomes a historical magnitude by virtue of the state of affairs that it gives rise to and defines" (Blumenberg 1985: 459). Thereby the notion of an epoch represents the collective memory of an event that is of historical and present importance for those who use the term epoch. But by reducing complexity one must also take some simplifications or variations into consideration. Hans Blumenberg 'warns us': "This concept of an epoch leaves historiography's chronological needs behind... Epochs are not only, and not primarily, divided from one to another; they are seen as comparable. The difference between different epochs can be conceptualized" (Blumenberg 1985: 460). Through comparison we gain the attribution of a quality seen from the point of view of the comparison. The process of history which 'just happens' thus becomes a quality that is stated by the mode of observation and the consequences this mode has for the concept of the individual epoch. Blumenberg describes the quality of the epoch "as the summation of those features that protect the historian from leveling-off the course of history into a monotony of what is always the same, and thus from the error of thinking that anything can happen at any time" (Blumenberg 1985: 460f). The paradox we face here is that of similarity and

differences. It is the embeddedness in the historical context that makes us speak of different epochs, although similarities do exist. The term 'epoch' gives semantic order to the paradox of identity and non-identity in the process of history. Epoch sums up events into a mode of perception that we agree upon by using the term. "The periods of time that are separated by it (epoch as punctuation) begin to determine the concept of an epoch. As a result, the question of the dates of the turning points is overlaid by that of the circumstances and features of the formations that are merely contiguous at those points" (Blumenberg 1985: 461).

Blumenberg explains it is more important to look at the context and the patterns that enabled the shift rather than trying to find an exact date when the transition took place. When he speaks of "points" he is referring to certain events of the past where decisions have been made. For example, turning points such as wars, deaths, conversions, agreements, or any point that shapes history, as noted by another important historiographer of the 19th century, Jacob Burckhardt, who elaborated the concept of "Crisis."[2] Such special points represent a paradox, which Blumenberg illustrates by the example of Martin Luther: "One imagines one perceives that history happens neither atomically nor by chance when Luther lifts the hammer to nail up his theses" (Blumenberg 1985: 461). Again the perspective that must be taken into consideration (and which Blumenberg does not explicate) is the question of who perceives. If we imagine standing in Wittenberg on October 31, 1517, when Luther nails his 95 theses on the door, we might think "what a strange man doing strange things," as we do when we see someone doing something that does not fit into our normative sense of perceiving the present. However, looking backward at Luther's action from our presence in this conference in Seattle in 2005 we perceive an important event that changed the whole world. The paradox of the epoch-making event is the indeterminacy of subject and object.

As a courageous proposal I would like to state that in the crucial moment of change there is no separation of subject and object, if we take subject and object as still relevant categories of description.

Blumenberg also refers to the difference between subject and object in this respect. For him there is a distinction between the subject of history, who is supposedly able to "make history" and his object, which is supposedly "made" by him. This distinction can be clarified in the following way: Man does indeed make history, but he does not make epochs (Blumenberg 1985: 478). To illustrate the argument we can come back to a historical example: Luther acts as an active subject when he lifts the hammer and at the same time he is the object of a movement that emerged out of the crisis of the established framework of the Catholic Church.[3] How can we deal with such paradox in a constructive way? Blumenberg notes that mysticism would be another different way of dealing with this paradox, but which will not be taken up here. "The dismantling of the mythicized roles assigned to historical actions and events threw doubt on the admissibility of the 'epoch' as a means of historical ordering. What matters here is not primarily the self-understanding expressed in the original sources" (Blumenberg 1985: 462). Here again we see that the concept of an epoch is a highly problematic one. The

statement made is about those who construct and employ the term 'epoch' and not the figures that are involved in the event, which in retrospect we call a historical event.

The 'epochal threshold,' a term introduced by Blumenberg, refers to the ambivalences and paradoxes that come into sight during the overlapping phase of transition and particularly in the punctuated moment of change.

One constitutive element of the epochal threshold is the "impossibility of substituting one system for the other due to their respective relations to the epochal threshold" (Blumenberg 1985: 479). *The epochal threshold marks the point of no return in the historiographical perspective* would be another way of describing what makes the singular quality of the threshold. The threshold marks the end and the beginning of a system. For Blumenberg, an established system produces for itself the instruments with which to secure itself thoroughly and to extend the sphere of objects that it comprehends or encompasses. In the process of securing and extending itself the system continually refines the forms in which it is justified and applied. With the result that the system itself brings to light and accentuates the data that go beyond what it is able to master and enclose within the prescribed frame of its accepted assumptions (Blumenberg 1985: 465). This describes a logical situation that Aristotle already classified under the heading *aporia* (difficulty of passage, lack of resources) and that Kant discussed as the fundamental "transcendental dialectic." In both cases the process of cognition itself forces the abandonment of its presuppositions and the introduction of new elementary assumptions, which ends the situation from which there was no way out, but also shatters the identity of the overall movement that gave rise to the situation" (Blumenberg 1985: 465).

The question of identity as it relates to the epochal threshold is fundamental to understand and describe. The identity of an old system erodes and finally comes to a downfall, while at the same time a new system is being constituted and building its identity. The image that a threshold invokes is a certain moment without expansion where both systems do have identity and non-identity at the same time, where the one is and is no more and the other is not and not yet. The dialectical truth about the epochal threshold makes this issue an uncertain one. Blumenberg clearly focuses on the risk in describing epochal thresholds: "He who speaks of the reality of a change of epoch takes on the burden of demonstrating" (Blumenberg 1985: 468).

Nevertheless the challenge in speaking of a change of epoch still is not reason enough not to do it, as Blumenberg exemplifies in his work *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*.

The Legitimacy of the Modern Age: Blumenberg's example of an 'epochal threshold'

The Legitimacy of the Modern Age was first published in 1996. It was translated into English in 1985 by Robert Wallace and published by MIT Press. This book is considered the most important work of Hans Blumenberg and is one of the most elaborated books on the history of European thought. Robert Wallace characterizes

the book as follows: "Hans Blumenberg's *The Legitimacy of the Modem Age* is a book that rethinks both the substance and the process of Western intellectual history in a remarkably thorough and original way, shedding light on some of the most difficult questions of our time" (Wallace 1985: X).

The book itself consists of four parts. "Part I is devoted to a fundamental critique of theories, including Löwith's, that describe central modern phenomena as products of the secularization of Christian ideas. It also describes how the appearance of secularization, in such cases as the idea of progress, arises. Part II presents a comprehensive alternative account of the genesis of what Blumenberg takes to be legitimate modern concepts and attitudes, as a human response to the late-medieval crisis of the Christian relation to the world. Part III then traces the history of interoperations of the human interest in theoretical knowledge of the world ('theoretical curiosity') in order to bring into better focus the nature and status of modem science. Part IV examines 'the epochal threshold' from medieval to modern in still greater detail as it appears in the thought (on opposite sides of the 'threshold') of Nicholas of Cusa and Giordano Bruno" (Wallace 1985: XIV).

Blumenberg states it is impossible to explicate the epochal threshold because it is an unrecognizable boundary that is only recognizable after it is crossed. The focus on the opposite sides of the threshold is a method Blumenberg uses to look at what has been before the threshold and what is after the epochal threshold.

Other scholars have widely acknowledged *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* and it has encouraged many to contribute to the issue. Blumenberg's reading of the Modern Age as a "second overcoming of the Gnosis" inspired, for example, Odo Marquard to elaborate on the thought that the Philosophy of History is the revenge of the second overcoming of the Gnosis (Marquard 1982: 16). Schulz, with reference to Kurt Flasch, acknowledges that Blumenberg gives a detailed instruction in how far the Middle Ages and the Modern Age overlapped and converged in a "cryptic division of the ages" (Schulz, 2001, 159). Methewes also refers to the second overcoming of the Gnosis when he discusses Blumenberg: In *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* Hans Blumenberg has well described what I am gesturing at here. He sees the history of western thought since antiquity as two successive attempts to overcome "the Gnostic challenge," which is "the problem of the quality of the world for Humanity." That is, our faith in the goodness of the world (whether thematized theologically or naturalistically) in the face of the problems of evil and suffering. "Medieval Christianity, which is essentially (for Blumenberg) an extended elaboration of the Augustinian program, attempted to 'ward off' Gnosticism's challenge (which appeared to it as the attempt to separate the God of Creation from the God of Salvation) by imputing responsibility for evil to humanity, and thereby imputing to humans (as a 'side-effect' of the desire to acquit God) responsibility for an evil power of free agency heretofore unimagined — a power, ironically enough, which humanity possessed only under the condition of having always already lost it" (Methewes 2001: 31).

Philosopher Kurt Röttgers answers the question of whether or not there is rational transition in epochal thresholds that can be observed and described. For him the answer to all of Blumenberg's works is no (Röttgers 2002: 191). Röttgers refers to the statement of Rorty who wrote that the history of thought "works at the level of problematics rather than of solutions to problems" (Rorty 1984: 57). An imprecise and ambiguous transition certainly is a problem and not a solution, unless we understand ambiguity as a challenge that offers insights employing contradictions and not excluding them, as is the case in *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*.

Aspects of the epochal threshold from the Middle Ages to the Modern Age

Now that we have looked at formal aspects of *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* and how it has been received, it is essential to look at its thesis to get a distinct picture of what Blumenberg was actually working on. In other words, it is time to let Blumenberg speak for himself to see if his work is as significant and outstanding as some scholars claim. Once again, the primarily focus of this paper is aspects of the epochal threshold and not the particular knowledge systems and secularization that Blumenberg's book also addresses.

Blumenberg's most important statement about the epochal threshold is that there are no witnesses to epoch changes, which he amplifies by adding that the epochal turning is an imperceptible frontier bound to no crucial date or event. "A threshold marks itself off, and can be ascertained as something either not yet arrived at or already crossed" (Blumenberg 1985: 469). This description brings us to the title of this paper and the topic of the pause. In the quality of being no more and not yet we have a different state of affairs that stands above the two and has a quality of its own, which connotes a pause. This connotation of a pause will be addressed at the end of this essay, since here we want to focus on Blumenberg's major theme. Blumenberg identifies two witnesses. This might be confusing, because as noted above Blumenberg states there are no witnesses to the particular changes during the transition. Therefore, Blumenberg concentrates on one witness who stands right before the threshold and another witness who stands right after the threshold. "It is necessary, as will be done here for the epochal threshold leading to the modern age, to examine at least two witnesses: the Cusan (Nicholas of Cusa), who stands before the threshold, and the Nolan (Giordano Bruno of Nola), who has left it behind. The Cardinal, who relates to the threshold through his concern for the endangered continuance of his system, and the heretic, who is certain, in his triumphant backward glance, of having crossed it" (Blumenberg 1985: 469).

Any investigation of an epochal threshold must focus on the two sides that constitute the threshold. The threshold is therefore a category of knowledge that exists only due to its perception. This perception Blumenberg calls a *historiographi-*

cal cognition, which "is ill-disposed toward the notion of absolute beginnings: To understand history as a result of history means that every phenomenon has to be traced back to what was there all along" (Blumenberg 1985: 470). In his example, Blumenberg illuminates the embeddedness in the historical context right before and right after the threshold from the Middle Ages to the Modern Times. But again, the risk of looking at history in this manner implies a certain ambiguity. "The attempt to localize in history the moment of the original beginning, the larval stage of what is to come, is ambivalent. The larval stage always contains an element of justification of the final transformation, the upshot of things that terminate with ourselves; but at the same time it also contains an element of mistrust of the reliability of a rationality that became engaged in such detours and dead ends. Which consequently does not escape the suspicion that its latest certainty of itself will have to submit to the 'epoch' and the future retrospective vision of a reason that has come to itself anew" (Blumenberg 1985: 472).

The epistemological uncertainty of demonstrating an epochal threshold is a matter for the observer to decide. Following Blumenberg, the criteria for an epochal threshold is that something is definitely decided. "It must be possible to show that something is present that cannot be disposed of again, that an irreversible change has been produced" (Blumenberg 1985: 468). But how, and most of all when, can such be declared? Blumenberg gives the example of the epochal threshold from the Middle Ages to the Modern Times and identifies Nicolas of Cusa and Giordano Bruno as figures standing on either side of the threshold. However, neither of Cusa nor Bruno made or constituted the change; it was Blumenberg who did and who by so doing made himself the creator of the knowledge category of that particular epochal threshold.

"Neither (Cusa nor Bruno) 'made an epoch'; neither is a founding figure. However, both are distinguished by their relation to the epochal threshold" (Blumenberg 1985: 478). It is Blumenberg who sets the relation and thus creates the epochal threshold that he himself describes. But Blumenberg does so for good reason, because, as is shown above, the scheme of epochs requires the good judgment of decision, which Blumenberg certainly provides. His final remark on the change of epochs in his case is about the comprehension of the epochal threshold: "That threshold is comprehended not with them or in them (Cusan and the Nolan) but by interpolation between them" (Blumenberg 1985: 478f). *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* is about this interpolation seen from Blumenberg's point of view.

Blumenberg's Criteria for Epochal Thresholds

Besides describing what the epochal threshold is within the context of the transition from the Middle Ages to the Modern Times, Blumenberg also presents implicitly a way to identify epochal thresholds in general. His most prominent criterion is

the so-called "seriousness that is always 'new'." Blumenberg writes: "This description of the indicators of epochal thresholds includes a phenomenon that I would like to describe as that of the "seriousness that is always 'new'" (Blumenberg 1985: 473). He further explains: "The consciousness of a new seriousness puts the totality of the preceding attitudes, sympathies, and actions under the suspicion of frivolity; one had not yet found it necessary to take things so to heart, to be so particular, to want real knowledge" (Blumenberg 1985: 473).

The empirical evidence for such criteria is hardly ever visible. As Blumenberg speaks about an attitude of seriousness it can only be explained by the reader's agreement and, for example, by representations of art and culture. Blumenberg refers to "forgetfulness with regard to transcendence" as an aspect of seriousness: "Comparable evidence for the change of epoch from antiquity to the Middle Ages would be easy to produce. Here, unexpectedly, a lack of concern about one's own happiness (or salvation: *Heil)* appears as characteristic of ancient life: a frivolous credulity toward the world, insofar as, through a failure to recognize its stigmata of unhappiness *(Unheil)* it has been trusted as the 'cosmos'. Early Christian literature is saturated with scorn for the false serenity of distrust in the world and of its forgetfulness with regard to transcendence" (Blumenberg 1985: 474).

Here, the opposite of seriousness would be frivolity and dizziness. Both of these are characteristics that introduce a form of change, because things are not secure anymore and thus have gained certain lightness. After the change has happened, the lightness and flimsiness disappear and a new beginning with significance and immensity emerges. However, Blumenberg also notes that the process of history can be canalized and directed too: "The attitude with which 'history' seems to turn away from what is definitively a thing of the past, as its former frivolity, can be 'fabricated'" (Blumenberg 1985: 475). The conclusion to be made here is that the change taking place does offer different modes of behavior. The one thing that can not be altered is the 'seriousness that is always new' *(der jeweils neue Ernst)* when a major change is underway.

The special importance here is the quality of being 'always new'. The seriousness alone does not qualify the epochal threshold. It is the contextualized seriousness interrelated with frivolity, which the seriousness counteracts.

The Pause

The pause is another significant characteristic of the epochal threshold. This is the final feature of Hans Blumenberg's theory that will be presented here. And it is the most important one, since 'pause' also is a translation of the word *epoché*. "Regarding its linguistic derivation, 'epoch' is better suited to designate a punctuation-form event than the period of time that is, say, introduced by this event and is characterized in terms of it. The Greek word *epoché* signifies a pause *(Innehalten)* in a movement, and then also the point at which the halt occurs *(angehalten wird)*

or a reversal of direction takes place" (Blumenberg 1985: 459). When Blumenberg speaks of the Legitimacy of the Modern Age, he focuses on the quality of a change. In the process of change there is one particular moment, which we call the point of no return. Once that point is reached, the decision is made and a new acceleration in the path-creating environment will be set free. At this particular moment, which does not have any extension, a singular quality can be perceived: this is the quality of a pause, acknowledged as an interim that has its own value.

Stephen Erickson speaks of the pause (he also calls it the comma) in terms of his notion of "thresholding." Eirckson's example, which can be seen as an epochal threshold, is the fall of the Berlin Wall. "In the interim — during the time of the wall's existence — there was a pause of sorts: a brief hiatus which was both a "no longer" and a "not yet." ...What if the turn of the twenty-first century marks another transition? Are we living in a very significant and in fact epoch anticipating comma? What then? Over what threshold might we be crossing and into what new clause?" (Erickson 1999: 103). Erickson's idea of the comma is very close to Hans Blumenberg's notion of a pause. Eirckson continues: "A threshold can be thought of as that point at which a location is available for exit, and another location made accessible for entry. ...It is the region of maximal vulnerability. In some respects a threshold much like a temporal pause, an 'after' (something) which is also 'before' which precedes something else" (Erickson 1999: 118).

The pause, which constitutes the (epochal) threshold, following Blumenberg and Erickson, first of all indicates a movement. Secondly, the movement is a specified movement of change. Finally, the pause represents the mediating third between the two sides, before and after, that are connected as well as separated by the pause. Erickson writes: "Construed grammatically, thresholds are like commas, separating a clause (now completed) from another clause which is soon to be brought into existence and connected. At the point of the comma however, the latter clause has not yet commenced. There is a temporary pause and an openness, but one of an ambiguous nature, both seeking and not seeking closure, for the comma signals incompletion and provokes continuation on its other side" (Erickson 1999: 118). Here we learn a new quality of the pause, which is the quality of openness and which corresponds with the stage before the 'always new seriousness' that Blumenberg describes.

Thereby, a pause in respect to fundamental change is a compulsory requirement for conducting the transformation. The pause is the beginning. Now the title of this paper can be elucidated. Analogous to Blumenberg's title *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* the title of this paper signifies on the level of philosophical reflection that the pause as constitutive element of the epochal threshold is a characteristic that forms the threshold as a mean of perception. Whereas Blumenberg is the observer who constructs the epochal threshold and speaks of legitimacy, the pause constructs the threshold as a perceived precondition and thus legitimates the epochal threshold in the eye of the observer. Only there.

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NOTES

[1] F. J. Wetz indeed is right in stating that there is merely any information about the person Hans Blumenberg. Therefore I owe great thanks to Prof. Dr. Jürgen Werner, who did correspond with the late Hans Blumenberg and who shared his memories of Hans Blumenberg during many fruitful discussions and who let me see Blumenberg's unpublished Habilitation.

[2] Especially Chapter 4 on the 'Crisis of History' in his book 'Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen'

[3] In other words the paradox is also the one of choosing and being chosen at the same time. In retrospective there is no way of making out a either / or preposition of the event.

ОПРАВДАННОСТЬ ПАУЗЫ: АСПЕКТЫ СМЕНЫ ЭПОХ ПО МАТЕРИАЛАМ ТРУДОВ ГАНСА БЛУМЕНБЕРГА

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Данная работа продолжает тему, предложенную философом прошлого века Гансом Блуменбергом в его основном труде под названием «Легитимность современного времени» о смене эпох от средних веков до Нового времени, который Ричард Рорти назвал «великой масштабной историей развития европейской мысли». Отвечая запросам конгресса, данная работа имеет целью сформулировать общую теорию смены эпох, которая основывается на «аспектах смены эпох», сформулированных Гансом Блуменбергом. Вначале речь идет об этимологических и исторических предпосылках возникновения философского и историографического термина «эпоха», введенного гуманистами раннего Ренессанса. Далее внимание уделяется Блуменбергу, его личности и его философским трудам. После рассмотрения «аспектов смены эпох» делаются выводы относительно того, могут ли они быть применены в целом к проблеме смены эпох. И в заключении рассматривается эстетическая формулировка проблемы изменения, которая соединяет труд Блуменберга, посвященный философии истории, с его «метафорологической» работой.

SOUL-KEEPING IN A DIGITAL AGE: THE ROLE OF SPIRITUAL PRACTICES AND TRADITIONS IN A HIGH-TECH WORLD

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Introduction

Like an unseen behavioral force-field, high-speed digital technology is changing our lives. Personal computers, the Internet, and cell phones are reshaping our personal, family, and communal lives in ways that we can see and ways we cannot. Consider the following three situations:

In Silicon Valley, California, the cultural anthropologist Jan English-Lueck has been tracing the effects of digital culture on family life. She was sitting down at a dining room table one evening to interview a family. This was, by most contemporary standards, a well-functioning, healthy family with solid relationships. As they gathered, the mother realized this was the first time in weeks the family had been together face to face around the dinner table. Each family member had, in his or her bedroom or separate room in the house, a personal computer with high-speed Internet access, cable television, and a personal phone. They had fallen prey to what English-Lueck dubbed "the centripetal effect" — the tendency of technology to increasingly draw people away from time together in favor of digitally-dependent time alone.

In Bangalore, India, a human resource director of a computer technology firm notes that becoming a software engineer in India not only offers an opportunity for rapid advancement in the globalized economy, but also enables him to expect a higher dowry from the family of a potential bride. Yet this comes at a price. A young engineer must work long hours and many weekends, a pace that is often only sustainable for a limited time before a younger replacement takes the job away. Also, one must be willing to relocate far away from one's extended family and age-old networks of support.

A teenage girl in Santa Barbara arrives home from school and enters her room. She has been deaf since birth. At school, she experiences a degree of isolation due to her disability, but in her room, life is different. She sits down at her computer and begins "Instant Messaging" with friends. A conversation using a screen instead of sound minimizes her disability. In her room she has a smoke alarm that will shake her bed at night if a fire is detected, an alarm clock that flashes her bedside light in the morning, closed captioning on her television, and a battery charger for a recently developed, surgically installed cochlear implant. Technology has radically decreased the isolation she would have known a decade ago.

High-speed digital technology is changing the world. Are the changes for the better or the worse, or a complex mix of blessing and curse? How can individuals, families, spiritual communities, and nations respond to these changes with integrity and wisdom?

In 2000, I received a grant to pursue these questions as part of a sabbatical leave. During this time, I was invited to serve as a Visiting Scholar in the Department of Religious Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. I conducted a "Delphi study," in which twenty-three diverse and well-informed individuals participated in a focused exploration of the topic. I made field visits to Silicon Valley and four cities in India, interviewing journalists, scholars, theologians, and people in the technology industry. Following my sabbatical, I received a second grant to study four focus groups for a year as they reflected on the evolving relationship between their spiritual lives and digital technology. This paper summarizes what I have learned.

Part One: What are the Larger Trends and Questions?

The primary task of my first project was to identify major trends and viewpoints regarding the growing influence of technology. To do this, I chose to conduct a "Delphi study." Delphi studies, first developed by the Rand Corporation, have been used in many disciplines to predict future trends. In a Delphi study, a limited group of qualified informants is created through the recommendations of a panel of identified experts. In the first round, these nominees are invited to respond to a series of questions. The researcher summarizes the responses. In the second round, this summary is sent to the participants seeking concurrence or comment. With the resulting feedback, a summary of conclusions is created and distributed. While the participants are aware of each other's involvement, at no point during the process are they aware of who has made any particular comment.

In this project, the "Panel of Experts" was formed of twelve people who have a wide range of contacts in this particular area of inquiry (panelists listed in Appendix A). Each "Expert" nominated 3–5 people whose personal or professional experience qualifies them as persons knowledgeable about the interplay of globalization, technology, and spirituality. These fifty-eight nominees were invited to respond to eight open-ended questions. Twenty-three responses were returned (respondents listed in Appendix B). I summarized the responses for each question. In the second round, I sent participants these summaries and gave them the option of concurring with each summary or adding additional comments, including noting any disagreement or qualifications. Twenty-one participants returned the second round questionnaire. These comments were incorporated into revised statements, which became the findings of the study. The panelists and participants represent a variety of men and women in business, academia, and spiritually based organizations, many with international experience. (Below is a summary of the findings. For a copy of the complete report, contact the author at sjniche@cox.net).

1. As the forces of globalization, high-speed technology, and the Internet increasingly impact the human community, *what changes do you see occurring* in people's personal, family, and communal lives?

The changes occurring are many:

- More isolation in personal life and more opportunities for relationships[1];
- The loss of genuinely private space;
- More materialism, consumerism;
- Accelerating expectations of productivity and use of time;
- Traditional religions may be more able to sustain adherents regardless of physical distance, yet may lose authority due to the proliferation of spiritual options available and an increased sense of personal freedom;
- There will be a blurring of personal and professional life;
- There will be a greater chance of cross-cultural understanding;
- There will be more sharing of information and a continued drive towards democratization;
- There will be less time spent in face-to-face encounters;
- There will be more collaborative decision-making;
- There may be less patience with human and technological processes, at least in the short term;
- There will be an increased sense of not being able to "keep up" due to the sheer amount of information and communication, at least in the short term;
- The "digital divide" may grow larger, perhaps not as much between the "haves/have-nots" as between the (technological) "know/know-nots."[2];
- There may be a continuous increase in the influence of Western/American culture;
- There is a potential for people losing their sense of local identity and life, but also a possibility that communication technology will make travel and dislocation less necessary[3];
- There will be higher expectations of what people can do, be, and deserve;
- There will be a rise in fundamentalism as a way to resist rapid change and cultural meltdown, at least in the short term;
- There will be an increase in the use of dispersed/virtual working teams, bringing with them their own advantages and challenges.

2. From the perspective of your own spiritual or personal values, what *possible benefits* might result from these changes? (*Note:* some participants are skeptical there will be any genuine benefits.)

- More educational opportunities as geographical distance becomes less significant and information more accessible;
- Family and cultural ties can be sustained more easily across greater distance;

- An extraordinary increase in the availability of knowledge, including medical knowledge;
- More collaborative leadership possible;
- Information hoarding will be more difficult;
- There will be an increasing interest in non-tangible realities such as spirituality;
- The growth in awareness and understanding of global problems such as the environment;
- An increase in cross-cultural understanding, including different spiritual traditions;
- The anonymity of the Web can lead to more openness and exploration;
- People who are geographically distant or isolated can find greater community through the Internet and can support each other in their spiritual paths and practices;
- The possible emergence of a global consciousness.

3. From the perspective of your own spiritual or personal values, what *possible harm* might result from these changes?

- Increased loneliness and depersonalization;
- Loss of family influence;
- An "ungrounded spiritual presence"[4];
- If commercialism exercises a dominant influence, there will be an increasing emphasis on doing/having instead of being;
- There may be a deification of technology in education, the economy, and society;
- There may be a decline in the physical aspects of human life, including the physical aspects of spirituality;
- It is possible that less time will be spent in "authentic encounters," i. e., encounters that include a rich and honest revelation of each participant[5];
- There may be more short-lived relationships;
- The destruction or dying-out of traditional cultures;
- Overall, the changes may be good for economies but will be bad for people;
- The more world-views are provided by and through technology, the more such visions will become ends in themselves, blinding us to reality as it truly is;
- There may be an increasing destruction of the global environment;
- An increase in the influence of corporations and technologically empowered states, or states where those with technological ability are in power;
- Traditional religions will be over-simplified and appropriated without regard to their historical and cultural contexts[6];
- People may get "ripped off" by unscrupulous "Techno-Terrorists";
- Power may be concentrated in persons who have great technological ability but little human empathy;

- The potential dangers in the convergence of genetics, nanotechnology, and robotics;
- As technology becomes more deeply a part of everyday life, there is an increased vulnerability to viruses and over-reliance ;
- The substitution of facts and information for knowledge and wisdom.

4. One trait of the new reality is a tremendous increase in the availability of information in terms of both quantity and speed. What *spiritual practices might become* significant for individuals and communities to engage this new world without being overwhelmed by it?

- Silence and meditation;
- Practices that reconnect us with physical reality such as yoga;
- Living with a greater awareness of nature;
- Group spiritual practices;
- Deep participation in face-to-face communities which center on focal practices that keep us attuned to a vision of the world that is not mediated by technology (such as a church, synagogue, mosque, etc.);
- The use of online support / prayer / learning groups;
- Practice "culling" in personal life — not trying to do everything;
- Developing "personal filters" which strain out the irrelevant and inconsequential information while insuring that what is important receives attention;
- Cultivate clarity of thinking, mindfulness, awareness of inner self and outer world and their connection;
- Practice developing meaningful loving relationships across space, time and culture;
- Learn how to use the Web as a spiritual discipline / practice;
- Keep in constant contact with marginalized people as a reality check;
- Live simply;
- Immersion in the "meta-narrative" of the established traditions that can make the data of life meaningful;
- Seek, recognize, and work towards a common good;
- Develop Sabbath times and practices that include the discipline of "unplugging".

5. What *leadership qualities* will be important for those who seek to respond with spiritual integrity to the challenges of this new reality?

Some leadership qualities called for in the new reality are timeless:

- Humility, vision, a sense of service, open-mindedness, flexibility, patience, wisdom, compassion, self-knowledge, and humor;
- Persistence in the pursuit of personal and social challenges;

- Personally living in accord with espoused values;
- Openness to spiritual guidance in all areas;
- Guarding and sharing the "grand stories" and purposes;
- Boundary setting;
- Cultivating the "fruits of the Spirit" and our capacity to engage one another face-to-face in graceful and truthful ways;
- The ability to create a sense of community without regard to social status;
- Recognize the difference between and importance of leadership and management.

Some leadership qualities called for in the new reality will be new or will be even more important than before:

- An ability to share leadership and work collaboratively;
- A knowledge of the advantages and the limitations of various technologies in communicating with others;
- Mindset versatility: being able to make decisions guided by considerations that emphasize long-term, creative, global, both/and thinking, learning and being as opposed to decisions guided only by considerations that are short-term, reactive, local, framed in either/or thinking, blaming, and doing/having.

6. What should individuals and communities be doing *to prepare our children* for this new reality?

- Provide limitations and boundaries for technology use in recognition of children's' developmental stage and capacities;
- Help them find and live by deep values and with integrity;
- Teach them to think critically — how to judge information when there are no "filters";
- Help them attain a "media literacy";
- Demystify globalization and the Internet;
- Cultivate a reverence of the natural, non-technological world;
- Teach them how to recognize and resist consumerism and marketing;
- Nurture the poet within them;
- Pray and read a lot together;
- Ensure that they are not defined or judged by technology;
- Create work and households that are full of joy and adventure ;
- Engage in family and communal rituals and celebrations that convey deeply held values;
- Help them to understand and appreciate other people, cultures, and traditions;
- Help them to begin asking the bigger picture, longer time frame questions from elementary school onward.

7. Are there *any images, metaphors, or stories* that capture the nature of this new reality for you?

- The infinity of the transcendent;
- There are none, because the reality is too new and different from anything we've known before[7];
- Maps at the time of Magellan which showed dragons at the edge of the known when in fact there were no dragons;
- The noosphere (Teilhard de Chardin)[8]
- The Global Brain (Peter Russell)[9]
- The popular interpretation of the Chinese character for "crisis" which denote both opportunity and danger, or any other similar symbol;
- Being a "*logos*-formed" community in a logo-world;
- Hologram[10];
- The Great Turning (Joanna Macy);
- A Cyber-labyrinth with multiple entries and exits;
- People losing their livelihoods to technology;
- "We are living in a world without a why" — i. e., the emerging world does not have a guiding sense of meaning;
- The self as a virtual image instead of an embodied, organic being;
- The need to bring opposites together, as seen in the resistance of Einstein and Bohr to speak to each other at a conference (as reported by David Bohm);
- Toffler's "future shock";
- Juggling many plates.

8. New technologies, such as the Internet, offer an opportunity for people to develop and maintain relationships that are not limited by physical presence. What do you believe is the potential value of such "virtual" communities and relationships? What are the dangers or limitations?

The value:

- Sharing information;
- Can become a rich place of deeply shared lives;
- Can be a wonderful support in times of crisis and isolation;
- Makes rapid growth in relationship building, networking and information sharing possible;
- Has the potential for forming a global consciousness;
- The Internet encourages frequent communication due to its low cost and speed;
- Can be an advantageous place to work out some disputes using some emerging models.

The danger or limitations:

- Will never be a substitute for face-to-face communication;
- Anonymity and naiveté can lead to unrealistic self-images and projections;
- Not always effective at working out disagreements;
- Feelings and intuitions may not be as easily shared as in face-to-face encounters.

Part Two: Following the Influence of Technology on the Spiritual Practices of Individuals

Following this first project, I wanted to explore the larger themes on a more personal scale. I received a second grant to support a study with groups of parishioners over a two-year period. Dorothy Bass and her colleagues have identified twelve spiritual practices that are particularly meaningful in contemporary life (for a complete description, see www.practicingourfaith.org). I chose seven for an experiment in which people would see how technology might be affecting them as they seek to engage in these practices. The seven I chose were "honoring the body, household economics, saying yes and no, keeping Sabbath, discernment, shaping communities," and "healing."

I also decided to focus primarily, though not exclusively, on the interplay between these practices and some specific communication and information *devices* — personal computers, the Internet, and cell phones. As described by the contemporary philosopher Albert Borgmann, a *device* is more than just a tool. On the surface, it is a technological product that appears to simply give us what we want in a more effective way. But in actual use, devices change our relationship to the natural world, our selves, and other people. So the question became: What effect are these new devices having on our lives, and what is the relationship between their increasing use and spiritual practice?

With these considerations as background, I formed four focus groups that involved 33 people. Three adult groups met over a nine-month period and one group of teens met over a three-month period. In each meeting, one of the practices was presented and discussed in relationship to the possible influence of technological devices. Each participant was given a menu of specific activities to try before the next meeting. From the list they chose one or two of the activities. The next meeting began with a discussion of their experiences, followed by a presentation of the next practice. A survey was given at the end of the study to determine which, if any, practices were found to be helpful in making the use of technology more intentional.

Nine months later, I polled participants to see what long-term effects the project had had on them. The insights included the following:

- Actions involved in "honoring the body" — savoring a bath or shower in quiet, taking walks without being "plugged in" to a device, taking time to wear a

piece of clothing that had personal meaning — helped people move from the typical distracted reality to a more vividly personal and physically grounded one.

- When asked, during the "household economics" session, to make an inventory of how many technological devices they had in their homes (including discarded items in the garage), many people were stunned at the length of their lists.
- The groups had discussed the practical truth that saying "yes" to one activity (say, television watching or aimless computer use) often means saying "no" to something else (for instance, time in solitude or with others). People discovered that devices often lure them into private, technologically dependent worlds, particularly in the evening. One husband said, "My wife and I used to talk in the evenings... now she comes home and spends time on the Net keeping up with all these 'friends' she's never seen." "Saying yes" to being constantly immersed in devices makes it difficult for children to learn to rely on their imaginations; one mother realized her younger daughter was virtually incapable of being alone. "I have to be entertained!" the daughter shouted during an argument. An increasing reliance on technology at work or at home also exposes us to fear and trembling when a computer crashes or e-mail fails.
- The Sabbath unit asked people to take a day or part of a day to intentionally be "off line" and avoid the use of devices. Many found this to be both challenging and rewarding. "I make more of a conscious effort to save Sunday as a day of rest, away from paying bills and TV," said one participant. In another family, the youngest daughter sat down at the computer and began to play a game. Her father reminded her that they were going to keep the computer off that day as a Sabbath practice. She was not happy. He suggested she call one of her friends to play. She told him she had not been getting along with this friend. Parental authority prevailed and she left the computer. A little while later, boredom led her to call her friend anyway. She called, and they decided to get together. They ended up having an enjoyable afternoon playing imaginative games.
- Technology was not judged particularly helpful in discernment. There is, of course, an extraordinary amount of information accessible through the Internet, and some information can be helpful. However, when people have to make significant decisions, there is no substitute for turning devices off and spending time in silence, journaling, and prayer. "Being quiet and finding the inner peace and stillness is where all the 'answers' have come from...not while I'm on the computer, my cell phone, the palm, etc.," said one participant.
- While technology usually eliminates the face-to-face encounters that are essential to a deep sense of community, technology was found helpful in making connections that would not otherwise be possible. One person noted that e-

mail has enabled him to create several mini-communities with people whom he could not see in person, such as regular contact with members of his old high school car club and fellow practitioners of a particular form of meditation. Also, people contact him after finding samples of his original music on the Web. At the same time, as someone who works professionally with computer technology, he is able to work at home and misses, occasionally, the face-to-face sense of community of his prior workplace.

- In terms of "healing," many had stories of how useful the Internet is in medical situations. Information on the Web helped them understand diagnoses, find highly specific groups of people experiencing a particular illness, and sources of prayer support with people who were acquainted with the unique challenges they were facing. E-mail kept people in touch with loved ones during an illness or after a loss. We heard frequently stories of people amazed at "what they can do now" with advances in medical technology.

At the end of the full study period, participants gathered for dinner, discussion, and evaluation. The majority agreed that the experience had raised their awareness of the effect of technology on their lives. The practice of Sabbath and the mindfulness of "saying yes and no" received the best marks. "I have more awareness of how technology is neither good nor bad, it is more how we choose to let it into our lives... having a faith to guide those choices is helpful," said one participant. "I focus on using moderation with technology, just as I would with sugar, alcohol, or anything that can be addicting," said another.

The teen group, of course, lives in another world. Those of us who were not raised in a culture with personal computers, the Internet, and cell phones are like recent immigrants — we may learn new practices and achieve some competency, but we will never be "native born." Most American teens are totally immersed in digital culture, and this focus group was no exception. They are fluent "multi-taskers," able to simultaneously follow five Instant Message conversations on a screen while doing homework, listening to downloaded music, answering a cell phone, and fending off adult questions about their ability to concentrate. Even so, they reported that the very act of raising the question of how technology affects their lives and faith was an important one. The most spiritually powerful times for them are the times at retreats away from so many screens — listening, reflecting on life, finding moments of silence, and singing with full hearts and no amplification. But their practice of community is marked by an extraordinary degree of digital communication.

Concluding Reflections

After five years of continued study and reflection, I have come to a few basic conclusions.

I am continually struck by **the deeply ambiguous nature of the changes created by globalization and technology**. There is, on one hand, an extraordinary increase in the availability of information, which can have beneficial effects in such areas as education, democratization, the monitoring of the environment, the possible range of enriching human contacts, and the sharing of medical support and treatment. One of the respondents in the first study, Lynne Bundeson, commented that "I have over 30,000 documented stories of lifetime friendships made online, marriages from meeting in religion chat rooms, healings of cancer, birth defects, unemployment, marital discord, and childhood illness — all from prayer offered and received online." On the other hand, the momentum of this globalization and technology is creating a speeded-up, more individualized life-style that does not bode well for more traditional family, community, and ecological relationships. It is also creating the possible concentration of enormous power in individuals, corporations, and nations that may be used for selfish and exploitative purposes as well as beneficent ones. As respondent Bryant Myers put it, "Overall, the changes may be good for economies but will be bad for people."

This potential power for good or ill calls for a clear, mindful, perspective in defining the greater aims of our common life, as well as upholding the personal and communal practices that form and strengthen our ethical sensibilities. Spiritual beliefs can be an antidote to the absorption of values created solely by and for a consumer-driven, free market, globalized culture. These values are nurtured in spiritual communities and traditions, and the role of spiritual practices becomes paramount. Respondents in both studies identified spiritual practices that have become particularly important in our age: prayer and meditation, spending intentional time in nature, working with and for marginalized people, and shared, intergenerational rituals (weekly worship and study, annual events such as Ramadan, Passover, Lent/Easter, tribal festivals, etc.),. These practices, while hardly novel, take on new meaning as a way to step outside the stimulus-overloaded, complex world that is taking shape and find more lasting and transcendent purposes.

I also find it significant to listen to **the variety of images and metaphors people create to describe the changes we face**. For instance, the Internet is something more than just an "information highway." During a dinner in Bangalore, India, I had with a dozen faculty members of a local graduate school, I asked them to offer their own metaphors for the changes that are occurring. One person offered the image of a boa constrictor that will slowly overpower India's traditional culture and squeeze the life out of its people. Another offered the image of a banyan tree, with the broad root system of a worldwide culture offering an extraordinary capacity for the human community to reach skyward. These are two very different metaphors with contradictory outcomes. Which will prove to be the more accurate? What are the best metaphors for what we have begun to experience?

From the beginning of the study, I realized globalization and high-speed technology are extraordinarily potent forces. **Whether the forces of technology and**

globalization lead ultimately to an increase in human suffering and alienation or can be guided to increase the quality of human life and the health of the earth will be determined not by technology but by the wisdom, convictions and actions of all of us. As far as I can discern, there will never be a software program, system, or new product that will do the ethical work for us. What will guide us is our awareness of the long-term implications of what we are doing, evaluated in the light of our highest values and purposes. These values and purposes are at the heart of the great religious and wisdom traditions and kept alive through personal commitment and practice.

Appendix A: The Panel of Experts

Steve Aizenstat — author, founding President, Pacifica Graduate Institute;

Nancy Ammerman — Professor of Sociology of Religion, Hartford Seminary;

John Cobb — Claremont Graduate School, author of *For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy Toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future*;

Grace Dyrness — Associate Director, Center for Religion and Civic Culture, USC;

Tilden Edwards — author, Director of the Shalem Institute for Spiritual Formation, Bethesda, Maryland, USA;

David Jones — consultant, President, Sentient Systems, Santa Barbara;

Marianne LaBarre — Director of the Executive Leadership Program, Seattle University;

Laura Nash — Visiting Professor in Religion and Society, Harvard Divinity School;

Marilyn Hay-Lit Tam — former CEO, Aveda Corporation;

Bill Underwood — cofounder, Catalyst Consulting, Santa Cruz, California;

Peter Vaill, University of St. Thomas, author of numerous books and articles including *Spirited Leading and Learning: Process Wisdom for a New Age*;

James Wind, President, The Alban Institute.

Appendix B: List of Participants

John D. Adams — Eartheart Enterprises, San Francisco;

Gay Bradshaw — National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis, UCSB ;

Lynne Bundeson — Coordinator for religion chat rooms for Microsoft;

William R. Cunitz — Executive Director, Pilgrim Place, Claremont;

Andre Delbec — Business and spirituality, University of Santa Clara;

Lawrence W Fagg — professor of physics, Catholic University;

Jerry Garber — Seminarian with extensive background in media;

Sean Gerrity — Catalyst Consulting Team Bozeman, MT;

David Gill — Professor of Applied Ethics, Northpark University, Chicago;
Laura Hartman — Assistant Vice-President, DePaul University;
Ned Hulbert — Growing Edge, Peterborough, NH;
Phil James — Professor, computer technology and business, Long Beach State;
Loretta Jancoski — Dean, Theology and Ministry, Seattle University;
Ton Meijknecht — Catholic chaplain, Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands;
Leslie Miller — *USA TODAY* writer on technology / computer issues;
Russ Moxley –Center for Creative Leadership, Greensboro;
Bryant Myers — World Vision International, Monrovia, CA;
Judi Neal — Founder of Spiritatwork; University of New Haven;
Barbara Parker — Albers School of Business, Seattle University;
Nelson Stringer — Methodist pastor, San Luis Obispo, CA;
Scott Thumma — Scholar, religion and technology, Hartford Seminary;
Mary Watkins –Pacifica Graduate Institute;
David Wood — Associate Directory, Louisville Institute;

NOTES

[1] One respondent noted that the potential for relationships will be stronger.

[2] One respondent noted this may be less true if the cost, ease and availability of technology improve dramatically.

[3] One respondent suggested there may a reverse effect: the more relationships that develop across culture and distance through technology, the more likely people will be to visit each other.

[4] Two respondents question what this means. We take it to mean that spiritual symbols, beliefs, and practices will be increasingly appropriated without regard to the historical and communal contexts from which they have arisen.

[5] Two respondents question this statement, asserting that "authentic" relationships can be developed on-line.

[6] Several respondents take exception to this statement, saying that traditional religions have always been subject to simplification or the adding of complexity in response to cultural influence and change — the emerging challenges will be simply another stage in this process.

[7] Some respondents feel that change of the type that is coming is not unprecedented in human development.

[8] The "noosphere" is a term created by Teilhard de Chardin describing an emerging web of global consciousness created by human thought and culture which is a natural step in the evolution of life on the planet

[9] The "Global Brain," as postulated by Peter Russell, is a reality that will emerge when communication and computational technology links human mental activity to create a collective awareness and intelligence, perhaps creating something like a new conscious, global organism.

[10] A hologram can represent the way in which a three-dimensional reality can be fully and simultaneously present at multiple points in space; "the message is in the whole and every part contains the whole".

СОХРАНЕНИЕ ДУШИ В ЦИФРОВУЮ ЭПОХУ: РОЛЬ ДУХОВНЫХ ПРАКТИК И ТРАДИЦИЙ В МИРЕ ВЫСОКИХ ТЕХНОЛОГИЙ

Стив ДЖАКОБСЕН
Пастор, Санта-Барбара, штат Калифорния, США

Данная работа посвящена исследованию того, какое воздействие оказывает на нашу жизнь присутствие в ней компьютеров, Интернета и других средств связи, какие задачи ставятся перед нами в эпоху цифровых технологий. Работа состоит из трех частей: первая часть посвящена описанию результатов исследовательского проекта, проводимого под моим руководством, когда я принимал участие в качестве приглашенного специалиста UCSB в 2001 г. Проект «Глобализация, Технологии и Духовность» осуществлялся международной группой участников, включающей ученых, теологов, руководителей таких компаний, как «Мфйкрософт», и журналиста газеты «*USA Today*», которые благодаря своему личному и профессиональному опыту могли выступать в качестве экспертов, способных оценить взаимодействие глобализации, технологий и духовности. Участники проекта делились мнениями по таким актуальным вопросам как: Какие изменения в жизни людей вы наблюдаете? Какие из них будут полезны, а какие принесут вред? Какие духовные практики и лидерские качества будут иметь особое значение? Как следует воспитывать детей? В каких образах, метафорах и сюжетах отображается новая реальность? Во второй части работы представлены результаты моего последующего исследования, проведенного в 2002–2003 гг., в рамках которого пять фокус-групп анализировали влияние технологий на такие духовные практики как внутреннее видение, исцеление, соблюдение священного дня отдохновения. В третьей части работы приведены заключительные рассуждения о роли духовных сообществ, традиций и практик в сохранении целостности и равновесия жизни людей в мире высоких технологий.

THE EMERGENT UMBILICAL IN PSYCHOANALYSIS AND CONTEMPORARY FILM

Irene DIAMOND
Erin MARKEL
University of Oregon

Umbilical cord: 1.noun: a tough cordlike structure connecting the navel of a fetus to the placenta. 2. Noun: flexible, detachable cable serving to tether or supply.[1]

The physical umbilical cord is the essential lifeline of three braids through which oxygen, nutrition, and waste flow when the developing fetus is nestled in the amniotic fluid of the womb. This state of being continuously tended to without the exertion of effort must be wondrous. Yet with birth and the transition to autonomous breathing and digestion, it must come to an end. Whether the pulsating cord is cut or allowed to wither away on its own, soon after birth the only trace-memory that remains on the visible physical body is the navel. With birth and separation, the spinal cord continues as the internal physical lifeline, miraculously connecting the support systems that shelter our uniquely human, sensuous mind. And as this pulsating cord synchronizes with the earth's vibrations, we humans can attune our hearts to the overflowing abundance of creation.

In the cosmologies of many indigenous or tribal nations the trunk of the sacred tree of life — the energetic life-line between worlds — is understood as the umbilical. We might hypothesize that the ability to "see" this invisible lifeline derives from the thickly textured ritual practices that sustain such nations. With the severing of the physical cord that nurtured life in the womb, evolving humans are taught to deal with this loss by bonding with the life force or "chord" that brings the breath of life. While the process of autonomous breathing begins as a reflexive response, it is conscious bonding with the umbilical chord that opens the sensuous mind to creation. In short, nations that acknowledge the umbilical resolve the deep sense of loss that accompanies birth by enabling humans to tap into the deep sense of belonging available to all creatures who breathe.

In the contemporary world, the Jewish nation is typically seen as having little connection or commonality with the cosmologies and practices of oral cultures. Over the course of their nearly two millennia long exile, many of the stories that sustained this diasporic people of wanderers, were transmitted to text. The study of written texts became the life-blood of the people, and Jews came to be understood as a people of the book. Yet within this nation, among practitioners of kabbalah and chassidut where a strong oral tradition still lives, the tree of life connecting the four worlds of action, emotion, intellect and spirit, is foundational. Here we also find a cosmology of perpetual creation where the resonance of the initial cutting

continues in every moment as the G-d who is everywhere is creating the world. And here the ancient city of Jerusalem — nestled by the Judean hills and fed by an underground spring that flows toward the lowest point on earth, the Dead sea — is understood as the navel of the world.

In the contemporary world questions are being raised about the relationship of the physical umbilical to the health and psychic well-being of newborns and to our very understanding of the potential human lifespan. With the quest for modes of birthing and early infant care that permit a smoother transition from the womb, how and when the cord is severed is increasingly a subject of discussion and is no longer an invisible medical matter. And now that the discovery of life generating stem cells in the cord-blood promises the regeneration of bodily organs and extension of the human life span, the "civilized" practice of simply treating the cord as waste is being challenged by biotechnological advance. It is important to attend to the emergence of such issues and questions, not merely because they are provocative and challenging on the level of science, medical practice, and ethics. What is involved here is considerably more profound and uncanny. The healing possibilities of the cord-blood that are within our grasp suggest that the sacred tree of life, intrinsic to the lore of indigenous nations, is materializing in the contemporary world. Thus we see how the umbilical marks the connection, abundance, separation, energetic flows, and transformation inherent to the unfolding of life. As phallocratic Hellenism colonized the Western imagination this basic reality was veiled over and independence, scarcity, stasis, and control became both normative and descriptive. We propose that the new visibility of the umbilical indicates that we are in the midst of a historic transition that changes the very meaning of history.

The focus of our attention here is the emergence of the umbilical in psychoanalysis and contemporary film. We begin at the beginning with Freud. One of course cannot ignore Freud's role in bringing the world of the unconscious and infantile bodily experience into the West's understanding of the relationship between psyche and civilization. Yet Freud has been rightly taken to task for his phallocentric view of psychic development. Drawing on women's bodily experiences, feminist psychoanalysts, philosophers, and theologians have elucidated a variety of different critiques that challenge conventional psychoanalysis. The work of the French psychoanalyst and philosopher Luce Irigaray is especially valuable in regard to our argument, for she explicitly discusses the umbilical cord that sustains life in the maternal womb. Freud never even hinted at this fundamental physical reality of human development for he was not interested in pre-birth experience. Sensuality for Freud was tied up with sex desire and sexual genitalia.

We want to draw on Irigaray's work to bring the emerging umbilical and feminine subjectivity into focus. However, we will also point out how Irigaray becomes stuck in the same phallocratic, over-sexualized discourse she is trying to avoid because of her simplistic reading of monotheistic religion. Irigaray, in an interview conducted in 1994 described her work through three phases. The first phase was

a critique in which she showed "how a single subject, traditionally the masculine subject, had constructed the world and interpreted the world according to a single perspective."[2] The second phase was exploring ideas that permit feminine subjectivity. And the third is finding new models of relations between men and women without repression of one or the other.[3] Her ideas about sexual difference, materiality, and belonging allow her to open new conversations about subjectivity. Thus it is not surprising that we find references to the umbilical in her work. For Irigaray the oedipal triangle of Freudian theory is based on matricide — "The phallus is a displaced symbol of desire veiling the lost umbilical cord, the lost place of wholeness of intrauterine experience in which the whole child was sheltered in the womb of a whole mother." This wondrous pre-birth state is a time of wholeness and plentitude, rather than the lack, scarcity, and singularity of the Freudian model. The very idea of envy (for Freud penis envy and its counterpart, womb envy, first articulated by Karen Horney)[4] is predicated on comparison and lack. Yet what if yearning is not about comparison and scarcity, but the yearning to re-experience abundance? Irigarary answers that the privileging of the phallus "veils" this yearning. Her suggestion of the importance of focusing on the desire to re-connect to this feeling of wholeness and abundance is interestingly similar to a central theme of the contemporary Matrix trilogy.

These immensely popular films have clearly struck a powerful chord in the contemporary cultural imagination. This genre of mainstream science fiction films that explore questions of alternate realities and the body's relationship to technology began with Stanley Kubrick's 1968 "2001 A space odyssey." The uniqueness of the Matrix films is its extensive use of umbilical imagery and its serious exploration of spiritual matters. Produced and directed by the Jewish Wachowski brothers the film has been heavily discussed in terms of its Christian, Gnostic, Buddhist, and Hindu themes and this inter-spiritual mélange clearly has something to do with its popularity among spiritual seekers.

The Matrix is a virtual reality that the machine world has created to control humans. When Neo, the film's hero, chooses to take the red pill and enter into a world of truth he finds himself choking on goo from inside a huge placenta. When he finally releases himself and tries to breathe, he finds himself looking at millions of others similarly trapped. The machines are able to power the matrix by robbing humans of their abundant source of energy. The machines tap into this energy by multiple umbilical cords tied to placentas. Yet the films are in no way anti-technology diatribes, for the spiritual redemption of humankind is facilitated by the employment of technology in the war against enslavement to the machines. A clear message of the film is that the success of this war was accomplished through effective use of advanced digital tools, harnessed by faith in the spiritually enlightened Neo. Neo, who his followers call, "the One," attains enlightenment by realizing he can attain freedom from the machine world and instead use machines to serve life.[5] His transformation of consciousness, and ability to fly and move beyond the limits of

his body, occurs when he establishes a connection with the unlimited, unnamable deep force. The transformed Neo who is no longer tethered by the umbilical cords of the virtual world can move easily between worlds and tap into the abundance that is available to all. His ability to see the light is so powerful that he can even see it when he is blind.

Another contemporary film with important umbilical imagery is eXistenZ directed by David Cronenberg and released in 1999, the same year as the first Matrix film. Both The Matrix and eXistenZ focus on pre-birth experience, alternate realities, and technology. However, eXistenZ, unlike the Matrix films, shows the body as vulnerable, connected and forever grounded. In eXistenZ, Jude Law plays Ted Pikul, a rookie in the virtual game industry who attends a test demo of a new important game release designed by Allegra Geller (Jennifer Jason Leigh). During the virtual game release there is an attempted assassination of Allegra in order to steal her multi-million dollar game idea. Allegra and Ted accidentally wind up together because she mistakes him for her bodyguard. The movie exults in the fact that bodies are both delightful and disgusting. We see the gooey, bloody nature of the body each time a character must insert a "bio-port" in order to turn-on the game. The bio-port is an opening in the spine that plugs into the pod or the monitor of the game. The bio-port looks similar to other orifices of the body and is also sensitive to disease.[6] Each time one wants to participate in the game one must insert the gooey "umbi-cord" into the body. The "umbi-cord" is the lifeline that connects the body's reality to the reality of the game. Here, unlike the Matrix's virtual reality, the body's connection to the pod is an actual, physical lifeline. If the "umbi-cord" is broken or the body has not received enough sleep or nourishment the game will not process and the mind will not be able to escape into the reality of the game. It is through the "umbi-cord" that the person receives continual information from the pod and the pod receives continual energy from the body. The "umbi-cord" is a sensual fleshy, lifeline that does not function correctly unless it is in contact with bodily fluids. For example the tip of the "umbi-cord" must be licked and made ready for entry in to the body. The sexual reference is clear. eXistenZ's focus on erotic, gooey, and umbilical images speaks to the importance of physicality — or what we might term the "full corporeal porous body" in all its delightful, soothing, and sometimes repellant aspects — to the mind's perception of what is real.

Returning to Freud, we know that his focus on eroticism, brought questions of human identity back to the physical body. Again, Irigaray's approach to psychoanalysis gives some attention to the umbilical and pre-birth experience. Unlike many other feminist critics she is not hostile to psychoanalysis; her project is to reform it so it will provide a truer account of female subjectivity. In contrast to Freud, Irigaray believes that birth and the cutting of the umbilical cord constitutes the initial break from the mother and the first breath of individuality. Yet despite her awareness of this physical reality she ultimately fails to employ this insight to describe an alternative model of the development of the human unconscious. Her

project is animated, like so much of second wave feminism and contemporary critical theory, on rectifying patriarchy's misconception of female sexuality. Irigrary is insistent on articulating female sexual difference. It is the gentle touching of the vaginal lips that reminds her of the connection to her body.[7] It is this awareness that will permit a different sexual ethic between women and men that is not governed by the phallus.

Irigaray often speaks quite eloquently of the cosmos and the elements of creation, and speaks longingly of the lost feminine divine. She is irritated by the race of men and their religions "that has broken the relation to the natural universe."[8] Yet she, like Freud, is focused on the sexed couple. There is little intimation in her work of the overflowing abundance and joy humans can experience through opening to the unknowable source of creation and bonding with the invisible umbilical chord. Like so many secular intellectuals, Irigaray's profound insights are weakened by a false and simplistic reading of monotheistic religion.

We would argue that the emergence of the umbilical we have outlined in this short exposition is a manifestation of feminine rising and the eventual restoration of the diminished moon that is alluded to by Isaiah and Jeremiah in the Hebrew bible. Such a focus on the umbilical makes it very clear that this rising is considerably more complicated than any simple ascendancy of women or the feminine divine. Feminine rising is more usefully understood as the rising of women, the natural world, previously scorned feminized peoples such as Jews and indigenous peoples, and new modes of doing science and cosmology that bear an uncanny resemblance to the cosmologies of indigenous peoples. This rising is not for the purpose of attaching to power, but rather to bring forth the joy, wonder and healing that can be attained in bonding with the both the transcendent and in-dwelling presence of the divine.

Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi, the 18th century founder of the Chabad-Lubavitch strand of Chasidism explained that "in the navel enters the inner secrets of the torah."[9] This statement was a commentary on a passage in Proverbs (3.8) where we are admonished not to rely on our own understanding. The promise is that if we acknowledge G-d in all our ways "there will be a healing of the navel." In effect, by bonding with G-d through daily practices that shape our experience of our body and very way of life, there will be a healing or fixing of the loss all persons necessarily experience when they enter the world. Jews, who today are more typically associated with religion and/or the values of Western civilization and science than with indigenous cultures, actually provide a vital umbilical bridge of memory and learning between seemingly opposed modes of making sense of the world. The sadness is that in the name of advancement and progress many contemporary Jews actively seek to rupture their link to a tribal heritage that acknowledges the power of magic, peoplehood through mothers, and bodily practices that enable humans to experience the over-flowing abundance and sensual connectivity of life.

NOTES

[1] Webster's New World College Dictionary (2004) (2nd ed.) Cleveland: Wiley Publishing, Inc. p. 1552.

[2] Lorraine, Tamsine, *Irigaray and Deluse: Experiments in Visceral Philosophy*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. P. 20.

[3] Lorraine, Tamsine, *Irigaray and Deluse: Experiments in Visceral Philosophy*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. Pp. 20–21.

[4] Sayers, Janet, *Mothers of Psychoanalysis*, New York: WW Norton & Company, 1991. Pp. 100–105.

[5] One might well argue that this attitude toward technology is one of the most distinctively Jewish aspects of the film. Jewish theologians and ethicists, for example, are generally more receptive to biotechnologies that Christian ethicists.

[6] Freeland, Cynthia, "Penetrating Keanu: New Holes, but the Same Old Shit." In: Erwin, William, ed., *The Matrix in Philosophy*, Chicago: Open Court, 2002. Pp. 205–215.

[7] Irigaray, Luce, *This Sex Which is Not One*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1985. Pp. 28–33.

[8] Irigaray, Luce, *Sexes and Genealogies*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. P. 191.

[9] Torah Ohr.

ПУПОВИНА В ПСИХОАНАЛИЗЕ И СОВРЕМЕННОМ КИНЕМАТОГРАФЕ

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Пуповина: 1. сущ.: пупочный канатик, анатомическое образование, соединяющее у человека (и всех плацентарных млекопитающих животных) плод с плацентой и через неё — с организмом матери, 2. сущ.: канал связи или поставок. Биологическая пуповина является важным каналом из трех канатиков, через которые происходит доставка кислорода и питания и вывод нечистот, когда плод располагается в околоплодной жидкости внутри матки. Жить так — без каких-либо усилий — должно быть чудесно. Однако с рождением и переходом к автономному дыханию и пищеварению подобное существование подходит к концу. Пуповину вскоре после рождения перерезают или позволяют ей самой отделиться, и единственным напоминанием о ней остается пупок. После рождения и отделения от матери спинной мозг продолжает служить внутренним биологическим каналом, чудесным образом соединяя системы организма, поддерживающие и сохраняющие нашу человеческую память и чувства. Благодаря способности этого канала улавливать вибрации Земли мы, люди, можем настроить наши сердца на волну бескрайнего разнообразия творения.

В космологиях аборигенов и родоплеменных народов ствол мирового древа — энергетического канала, связующего миры, — понимается как пуп Земли. Можно предположить, что способность «видеть» невидимый канал укоренена в сложных ритуалах, поддерживающих существование таких народов. После разрыва биологической связи, дававшей человеку жизнь внутри матки, люди в процессе своего развития компенсируют эту потерю, приобщаясь к жизненной силе, дающей чувство жизни. С того момента, как появляется автономное дыхание, именно память о пуповине является толчком к поиску связи со всем сотворенным. Народы, сознающие связь с пуповиной, восполняют ее нехватку более тесной духовной связью «со всяким дыханием», со всем живущим.

Part 2. Notions of Truth // Часть 2. Представления об истине

MORTALITY, DENIAL AND TRUTH: DIFFUSING THE RANCOR IN CONFLICTING CULTURAL WORLDVIEWS

Daniel LIECHTY
Illinois State University, USA

Introduction

Death is a complex psychological symbol for human beings, and fear, anxiety and even terror in the face of death lay at the heart of human motivation. This has long been recognized by our most penetrating philosophers and literary figures. "The whole root of [human] trouble is that we will sacrifice all the beauty in our lives in order to deny the fact of death," wrote Baldwin. Said Camus, "There will be no lasting peace either in the heart of the individual or in social customs until death is outlawed". Samuel Johnson concurred, "All of life is but keeping away the thoughts of death." Henry Miller adds, "Life moves on to death and to deny one is to deny the other." Thus the Mahabharata: "Everyday men see others called to their death, yet those who remain live as if they were immortal." Thus Democritus: "By avoiding death, men pursue it." Heinrich Boell emphasizes creativity: "The artist carries death in him like a good priest his breviary," while Kardiner emphasizes the psychological, "The struggle for success becomes such a powerful force because it is the [psychological] equivalent of self-preservation and self esteem." Typically to the point, Tom Robbins notices: "Most of the harm inflicted by man upon his environment, his fellows and himself is due to greed. Most of the greed (whether it be for power, property, attention or affection) is due to insecurity. Most of the insecurity is due to fear. And most of the fear is, at bottom, a fear of death." Likewise Riviere: "It is ultimately the fear of death which is behind our cravings to acquire, possess and incorporate, behind our greed and sadism and the predatory aspects of our modes of life." And Norman O. Brown: "The distraction of human life to the war against death, by the same inevitable irony, results in death's dominion over life." But finally, as we have come to expect, it is Hegel who provides the summary statement: "History is what man does with death."

When such great observers of the human pageant, across time and across cultures, produce such similar remarks on a topic, it certainly draws our attention.[1] Yet, are these simply random observations, for all their remarkable similarity? Or is

there a theory of death in human life that draws these observations into the weave and warp of a tapestry of understanding? I submit that there is indeed such a theory, broadly interdisciplinary in scope and critical in intent. A theory I have characterized in my writing as the *Theory of Generative Death Anxiety*.[2] In what follows I will briefly outline the basic contours of this theory. After which, the absolute importance for building inter-religious and inter-cultural understanding (unity) within a basic framework of respect for differences (diversity) will become clear as an important step in the further evolution of the human species.

I

The *Theory of Generative Death Anxiety* (GDA) begins with the simple observation that all living creatures have a strong, even overwhelming urge to continue living. Philosophers, prone to literary grandeur and reification, have sometimes called this overwhelming urge the *Life Force*[3] and they have built various systems around its ubiquitous dynamism. Biologists and other life scientists have noticed this overwhelming urge no less than the philosophers, but have preferred more pedestrian designations such as the survival instinct, without capital letters or italics.[4] In terms of explicating the Theory of Generative Death Anxiety, there is no reason to take sides here. *Life Force* or survival instinct will both work equally well. The important point to notice is that the urge to continue living is an overwhelming urge shared by all living things and it is very unlikely that a species of life without this urge would be successful within the evolutionary process. The urge to continue living is the foundational dynamic, or active, force of the evolutionary process. Yet, we observe further, were it not for the fact that all living things die, the entire ecosystem of our planet would quickly collapse. Life sustains itself on the energy of killing and incorporating other life. Our cosmos is one in which continued life is predicated on universal mortality. Thus, we might say, there is a *basic paradox* at the heart of the living cosmos.

Human beings are animals, first and foremost, sharing completely in the evolution of species on this earth, and large chunks of human emotions, social life, and basic physical and nervous makeup deeply reflect this shared animal heritage. Whatever truth is in the observations of sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists, is rooted in this basic fact. No matter how loudly the Cultural Human Being wants to scream out "We are not animals!" we cannot escape recognition of our fundamental animal heritage. In the ways we organize ourselves in groups, in our passion to follow leaders, in our courting and mating habits, in the powerful emotions that well up from our 'reptilian' brain, in the autonomic 'fight/flight' response we experience in the face of danger. When we look into the eyes of other higher primates, we know intuitively that we are looking into the eyes of our cousin species.

And yet, it is also true that human beings are not 'merely' animals. We are indeed set apart from even the most intelligent of our cousin species in ways that can only

be described as qualitative difference. And, human folly notwithstanding, intelligence is the qualitative difference. Human beings have the intelligence to think abstractly. This is in essence what sets human psychology and cognition apart from animal psychology and cognition. Our great writers and thinkers have found many ways to finish the statement "...but only humans..." — e. g., have a concept of zero, have language, do mathematics, understand negation, practice religion, create cultural institutions, and so on. All of these attempts to focus on the essence of our human uniqueness in the world of species can be boiled down to the simple observation that only humans (as far as we know) possess the ability to think abstractly. This ability is the prerequisite for language, mathematics, science, literature, religion, and cultural life.

This ability to think abstractly has also been the main survival mechanism of our species.[5] Compared to other species we humans have pitiably small litters. The human (male) fantasies, fully potent, with a thousand wives, could never produce the offspring in a lifetime that the common housefly produces in a season! All of our glasses, contact lenses and laser surgeries can never give us the eyesight of an eagle. The smallest puppy puts our senses of hearing and smell to shame. We have no sharp claws, no speed, and our meaty flesh is without the protection of a tough exoskeleton. When one thinks about it, it is a wonder that proto-humans were anything other than short-lived, shivering carnage for hyenas on the African sierra.[6] But we not only survived, we thrived. We became the dominant hunters of other species, moved across the earth into areas and climates very different from the environment that nurtured our beginnings. This is all due to the enormous survival value contained in the ability to think abstractly. A number of higher species may learn by rote experience that fire is warm and a cave offers shelter from storms. However, only humans are able to put these two bits of knowledge together, and in their mind's eye see a cave with a fire in it, and imagine themselves sitting around that fire, and then create this environment that heretofore existed only in the human imagination. Thus we learned to harness the characteristics of other species for our own purposes. Thus we became the *crown* in the order of species.

Our position as the *crown* in the species order is, however, not without cost. For the ability to think abstractly, to view oneself in the third person, we might say, also inevitably brings one up against the basic fact of human mortality. And not just human mortality; but personal, very personal, mortality. Each and every human being, even those of lower than average intelligence, must inevitably at some point confront the fact that "I will die!" As far as we know, we are the only species that confronts this fact. We are, in this perspective, something of an evolutionary fluke. The very powerful survival mechanism that has allowed us to survive and flourish, like no other species, also forces us toward the knowledge and recognition that we will die, thus running us headlong up against that equally powerful, fundamental and overwhelming survival instinct we noted earlier. Like all sentient species, when we confront danger, the survival instinct kicks in and our very bodies go into flight/flight response. Yet even the most skittish of our cousin species responds in this way to real dangers in

its environment. When the danger passes, the animal relaxes. But because human beings think abstractly, and thus see a never-ending sequence of dangers, both real and imagined, actual and potential, all things being equal human beings would be in a constant heightened state of bodily tension akin to the fight-flight state.[7]

This state would obviously be untenable. Experiments with animals demonstrate that if an animal is never allowed to relax from the heightened and tense bodily state that results from danger arousal, the animal eventually loses its ability to respond to any stimuli whatsoever, becomes extremely depressed, and cowers in a puddle in a corner of its cage. Clearly, then, the human ability to think abstractly, and thus be at the mercy of all manner of imagined and potential dangers made necessary the development or qualitative enhancement of other psychological mechanisms not shared by our species cousins.

A central assertion of GDA, therefore, is that the most important features in human psychology and behavior that are unique to our species are directly born out of the clash between the overwhelming urge to continue living and the cognitive awareness of universal mortality. This recognition of the inevitability of death creates a reservoir of potentially immobilizing, debilitating anxiety, for which development or qualitative enhancement of psychological defense mechanisms were a necessary corollary.

II

Human psychology is characterized by an array of defense mechanisms; that is, habitual patterns of individual behavior aimed at defending against potentially threatening information. The most prominent of these psychological defense mechanisms are denial, repression, projection, displacement, dissociation, rationalization, intellectualization, identification, reaction formation, sublimation, and humor. Most professional sources enumerate about 20 such psychological defense mechanisms, though some of the specialized literature list many more than this.[8]

Each of these psychological defense mechanisms manifests itself in both creative and destructive forms.[9] When employed in the face of anxiety-provoking situations, the psychological defense mechanisms act to prevent becoming paralyzed into inaction, and facilitate the continuation of social behavior. Because human beings live in a world rife with real and potential dangers, a life without recourse to defensive psychological mechanisms, far from being a picture of mental health, would be simply intolerable.[10] Individual mental health is best characterized as an ability to match the level of psychological defense to the actuality of the situation being confronted. Inadequate psychological defenses, on the one hand, leave the person vulnerable to reckless exposure and helplessness. At the other end of the continuum, massively overloaded defensives leave the person vulnerable to isolation, depression and paranoia.[11] A person learns an habitual style or pattern and level of defensiveness as a means to survive and thrive in response to early environmental factors.

This learning of habitual responses is an integral aspect of what is called the *socialization* process.[12] A person whose habitual responses are toward the middle of the spectrum (i.e., who can employ an array of defenses at a level more or less appropriate to the actual situation) is considered adequately socialized. A person whose habitual responses are far toward the ends of the spectrum (i.e., who has only a very circumscribed reserve of defenses, at a level widely inappropriate to the actual situation) is seen as being inadequately socialized. At the very extremes of the spectrum, the person may be described as clinically sociopathic/psychopathic (aggression turned outward) or clinically depressed/suicidal (aggression turned inward.)

Every viable culture also stands as a buffer against death anxiety. In that a viable culture offers a wide variety of avenues by which people can feel themselves to be valuable actors in a human pageant of transcending significance.[13] This cultural narrative of transcendence is basically what we mean when we speak of a "shared cultural worldview." Analogous to the defense mechanisms in individual psychology, GDA theory suggests that there are social defense mechanisms, habitual patterns of collective behavior aimed at defending against threats to established social formations and the shared cultural worldview. The most obvious of these are *ritual*, by which common meanings, values and beliefs are celebrated through ceremonial (re)enactment; *scapegoating*, by which the source an anxiety-provoking situation is displaced and reified in the form of an internal or external enemy; *segregation*, by which a people will create physical separation between itself and the source of an anxiety-provoking situation; *denigration*, by which the source of an anxiety-provoking situation is deflated by disparagement; *assimilation*, by which the source of an anxiety-provoking situation is partially incorporated or converted; and finally, *annihilation*, by which the source of an anxiety-provoking situation is exterminated. Each of these defense mechanisms manifests in prosocial/creative and antisocial/destructive forms, both of which have been on public display in America in reaction to the assaults of September 11, 2001.[14] As GDA theory suggests that the paradigm anxiety-provoking situation is mortality itself and that specific historical intimidations to a people are mirrored as annihilation/mortality threats, here in this situation one sees the wisdom in Hegel's dictum, cited above, that "History is what man does with death."

The array of individual and social defense mechanisms are employed to maintain individual and social equanimity in reaction to actual threats of death, but also in reaction to the symbolic threats of death contained in recognition of the paradoxical mortality principle. Such defense mechanisms probably originated in, but certainly were strategically contoured in their contemporary form by, this need for anxiety control in the face of mortality awareness. At the heart of GDA theory is the proposition that our highly developed intelligence caused the anxiety problem in the first place, and also comes forth with at least the provisional solution to the anxiety problem[15] in the form of these psychological and social defense mechanisms.

One very key and ubiquitous anxiety-compensatory move is to *transfer the urge for continued living from the physical realm to the symbolic realm*. The

organismic urge for continued living becomes channeled into the urge for immortality in the symbolic realm.[16] This urge for symbolic immortality is the source of very large chunks of human creativity and life-affirming energies. Furthermore, the underlying function of culture and religion is to serve as venues through which people achieve and maintain an individual and collective sense of participation in symbolic immortality. This may be accomplished directly, through cultural and religious institutions that reinforce narratives of immortality, such as the idea of soul survival. This appears to be the strategy of most pre-modern cultures, in which the energies of the society were largely consumed by creation of overtly religious monuments such as pyramids, palaces or cathedrals, which undergirded the social narrative of direct or vicarious life after death. Modern societies, in contrast, may be less characterized by channeling social energies into overtly religious monuments, but are no less vigorously committed to the project of transcending the 'merely mortal' through the creation of larger-than-life buildings, ideologies and piles of wealth accumulation. In this sense there is a direct connection between the cultural projects of pre-modern religious and postmodern secular societies. The connection is that the creative cultural energies driving both types of societies stem from the universal human experience of mortality awareness and the ensuing defensive drive to denial and transcend that judgment of fact about the human situation.

Thus we see that all cultural narratives (*Weltanschauungen*) and the religions that support these narratives are on one level *fictional* (mythological); that is, they all in one way or another promise something (immortality, transcendence of the 'merely human') on which they cannot possibly deliver. Simultaneously, however, they are also all pragmatically *true*, in that each in some way provides functional viability for easing anxiety and transcending the mundane in the face of actual and symbolic threats, whose ultimate symbol is death or mortality.[17] Our cultural worldview assures us that we are engaged as meaningful actors in a meaningful pageant of transcendence, with cosmic significance. That we follow our roles correctly is noted and granted approval even by God or the gods, whose own lives ours reflects. In this sense, every person cuts an heroic figure simply by fulfilling the roles and duties expected of them in their own culture. In short, simply knowing that you are adequately fulfilling the roles and duties expected of you within your cultural is itself a powerful buffer against feelings of insignificance and finitude, feelings that, according to GDA, are the existential manifestation of death anxiety. Human individual and social life without such cultural prescriptions (though in one sense arbitrary — socially constructed, rather than divinely bestowed — and therefore *fictional*) would be unbearable and impossible. We see this clearly in situations in which the heroic narrative of a given cultural narrative is rendered utterly implausible. For example, by natural disaster or by massive exposure to a more powerful culture: in such cases, even mass suicide (a final purposeful act) may be preferred to continuing purposeless living in the face of a totally exposed cultural narrative.

III

In their most elemental form, our myriad cultural and religious narratives (mythologies) serve in some way to assure us that, individually and collectively, we are valuable actors in a worthy pageant of transcending and cosmic significance, thus answering our strong desire for life to have *meaning*. This is a strong force for sanctioning social conformity. But even the rebel or the criminal must assume the essential transcendent power of the dominant cultural/religious myth in order for chosen deviance itself to have meaning.

Because of their fundamentally fictitious character, human beings are always vulnerable to having the transcending claims of their cultural and religious narratives exposed to them. Such exposure is the threat that Socrates, for example, posed to Athenian society. Society will always resist those posing too many questions. In a very real sense, the essence of socialization is the process by which we take a potential Socrates and train him or her in habitual behaviors and responses that reinforce, rather than challenge, the plausibility of the dominant cultural narrative.[18] There is power in numbers in terms of sustaining the plausibility and viability of any particular social and cultural narrative. The more you rub shoulders only with people who believe the same social and cultural narrative as you, the more plausible that narrative becomes. It appears to be *natural* (God-given, in accord with the way things *are*), and its claims, values and admonitions for behavior form the *hegemony of common sense*, to use Gramsci's term.[19] We say, in effect, this *must* be true, we all tell the same stories.

In contrast, close exposure to people who do not share the common social and cultural narrative assumptions is potentially a big problem. By their very existence, such people cast doubt on the absolute certainty of our Truth, thus revealing its 'fictional' nature to us, and thus exposing us again to the repressed anxiety our social and cultural narratives function to allay in the first place. Hence, those who are culturally and religiously Dissimilar Others may be encountered as a creative source for helping us widen and enhance our own vision of human life and its possibilities. They may be encountered as our buffer against stagnation. However, it is also clear that an ability to encounter Dissimilar Others in this way assumes a relatively high level of personal and social maturity that does not appear to characterize most people and societies. In most cases, exposure to Dissimilar Others creates potential doubt about the transcendent Truth of our assumed narrative, thus exposing us once again to the anxiety this narrative functions to allay. We immediately call up the social defense mechanisms (ritual, scapegoating, denigration, segregation, assimilation, annihilation) to fend off the anxiety-provocation and reassure us the we are Right and they are Wrong. In a very real sense, as GDA theory so graphically demonstrates, Dissimilar Others may be encountered, quite literally, as *mortal enemies*.

The problem, furthermore, is made even more acute by the very conditions of modernity.[20] We can assume that the inhabitant of a medieval village would go an entire lifetime without ever once encountering another person who seriously differed in terms

of a basic cultural worldview. The Dissimilar Others such a person would have had any likelihood of encountering would have been Jews or Romani. In both of these cases, the relatively small differences were only magnified (and at times became points for severe discrimination and persecution) by the much larger areas in which their cultural worldviews coincided. Conditions of modernity place each of us in close encounter with those significantly dissimilar to ourselves on a regular and even daily basis.

Modern, post-Darwinian human beings, educated in a science-privileging culture, are probably more likely in the first place to suspicion the 'fictional' character of their cultural/religious Grand Narratives than those of previous generations. Simply because these narratives have been subjected to scrupulous investigation guided by empirical principles and have been found largely wanting. This erosion of the cultural/religious Grand Narrative is further aggravated by improvements in communications and travel technology, which, figuratively through mass media, and very literally through massive migrations, have turned the modern world, for better or worse, into a truly global village. In which those of significantly different cultural assumptions live side by side, work together, and have children growing up together.

In short, viewing the global village through the light cast on human nature by GDA theory, it is quite easy to see that modern human beings must shoulder a burden of raw, existential anxiety perhaps unprecedented in human history (or perhaps equaled only by those who lived during periods of collapse of civilizations and empires). The demise of a transcending 'sacred' vision of the universe and our place within it is at least temporarily undermined by the cacophony of competing cultural worldviews.[21] This demise of the sacred was foreseen and even welcomed in the past few centuries by anticlerical and antireligious theorists, who thought that this demise would finally leave to field open to a political culture of reason and tolerance. GDA theory helps us see why analytical schema in which political cultural options are a dichotomy of either sacred/transcending or reason/tolerance is woefully inadequate. In light of GDA theory, we see clearly that all cultures perform what is an essentially 'sacred/religious' function, of maintaining a plausible cultural narrative that acts as a buffer against existential death anxiety. Whether the cultural narrative promises actual physical immortality (of the soul, by bodily resurrection, and so on) or symbolic and vicarious immortality (through the nation, party, social movement or other larger-than-life project) the psychosocial-cultural function is the same. From the French Revolution to the Communist states, the political and cultural milieu of self-consciously 'secular' societies ends up being pathetically imitative of the religious cultures they intend to replace.

Likewise, we have recently been informed that the triumph of the market economic system over communist and socialist alternatives constitutes the "end of history" — modernity's central characteristic.[22] However, under the system of market capitalism the widely diversified options for the fulfillment of roles and duties, which a truly viable culture offers as avenues for 'heroic' self-value, become extremely narrowly focused on material accumulation and consumption. All transcending values finally must suc-

cumb to the only value the market system can recognize, which is money value. Even our most cherished aspects of being human — family, aesthetics, health, religion, recreation — are finally subjected to the flint-eyed squint of the numbers crunchers and the accountants' cost-benefit analysis.[23] We finally find ourselves enmeshed in a cultural narrative exalting the extremes of being rich and famous. Thus effectively excluding the largest majority of people from roles and duties that allow for feelings of heroic transcendence in the everyday world. It is no wonder that here, amidst the most fabulous affluence humanity has ever enjoyed, we wind up continually dissatisfied and depressed, and stockpiling evermore destructive weapons to be used against enemies we haven't even been able clearly to define and identify. Again, GDA theory helps us understand the deeply psychological nature of these cultural contradictions.

IV

Future human well-being and quite possibly even basic human survival will depend on our ability to substitute more creative and pro-social manifestations of the individual and social defense mechanisms for the more destructive and antisocial manifestations that we, as a species, have been so prone to employ. A very key place in which this maturing social learning can occur is in the meetings of people of different faiths. To state this more provocatively: I want to suggest that, in face of modernity, concerted inter-religious dialogue is one of our most important avenues for creating a positive human future and for the further psychological and moral evolution of our species.

Using GDA theory as our lens for viewing the human predicament, we have seen that cultural worldviews act to enhance self-value and thus as a buffer to existential death anxiety. But because our cultural worldviews are always in some sense fictional, that is, a socially-constructed narrative of heroic meaning and transcendence over the *merely* mortal, all cultural worldviews are, under the right circumstances, vulnerable to deflation, exposure and deprecation. Maintaining the *plausibility structure* of a given cultural worldview is a daily and ongoing task.[24] In a viable culture, this task of maintaining the plausibility of the transcending cultural narrative is accomplished mainly by people going about their lives fulfilling the roles and duties assigned to them by the cultural system. That everyone acts according to the script of the cultural narrative is its own proof that the cultural narrative itself represents Truth. Ironically, as noted above, within a viable cultural system, even deviants, criminals and malcontents contribute to the overall plausibility structure of the cultural narrative, especially as their lack of happiness and prospering can be used as an example to others. Real problems in maintaining the plausibility structure of a given cultural narrative occur mainly as a result of intercultural contact, upon prolonged exposure to others who live according to a very different narrative and script. That is when the fictional, socially-constructed character of the narratives begins to poke through and be recognized.[25]

Much sociological and anthropological work on religion proceeds from the assumption that religion is itself the product of a given culture, is seamlessly embedded

within a culture, and basically exalts the highest values of a culture by projecting onto the heavens the origins in divine order and divine sanction. In this view, there is no maneuverable space between a given cultural worldview and its dominant religious ideas. One is completely reflected in the other.

There is certainly plenty of evidence for this view. In its favor, we only need observe how quickly the rhetoric emerging from a clash of cultural worldviews blends into a moral narrative of a clash of evil with good, and from there into a political-theological narrative of true God(s) versus false God(s) or Satan himself. The dramatic increase in apocalyptic images, rhetoric, and patterns of thought since 9/11, not to mention the skyrocketing sales of books such as the Left Behind series are all evidence of this tight connection between religion and cultural worldview.[26]

Yet I don't think this Durkheimian influenced view is the entire story. Religious images, language and thought emerges from within culture, to be sure, and largely reflect the values and sense of meaning contained within that culture's worldview. The initial assumption is certainly that God's power is like dominant political power, and that we are God's friends, they are God's enemies. However, religious images, language, and thought also point toward categories of transcendent meaning that in countless examples has become the basis for criticism of the dominant culture and its values. The image of the young prophet standing before the mighty King, with the accusation "You are that man!" (2 Samuel 12: 7–12), i. e., the one who deserves condemnation and punishment according to these divine standards of justice, is a strong symbol of the ability of religious images, language, and thought to transcend simple identification of divine power with dominant political powers. Many of our most progressive movements for equality and justice are simply unimaginable apart from the religious images, language, and thought that gave them birth.

We begin with a very strong attachment to the *in-group* and *out-group* perspective. GDA theory helps us understand why we are so attached to this perspective, since the very existence of an identified out-group mobilizes many of our social defense mechanisms (denigration and scapegoating in particular) that confirm us in our in-group identity, with all of the self-enhancing power that brings. Certainly much of our religious images, language, and thought serves as a reinforcement of those prejudices. However, once our religious images, language, and thought formulate a universal God of love (and I contend that all religious thought, because of its transcending character, always reaching further toward the sublime, will arrive at that image of God eventually) they will from then on always carry the potential power of undermining exclusionary righteousness and will instead privilege as a higher morality acts of inclusion, reconciliation, and the extensions of in-group love towards those who had been excluded. Though those representing dominant political powers, often assisted by institutional religious leadership, will continue to try to tame and domesticate this image of a universal God of love, and for a time may even do so rather successfully, it will always remain an unstable taming. The image of a universal God of love, before which all human beings stand in 'catholic' equality, will always

tend toward deconstruction of the *in-group* and *out-group* boundaries. In short, this image of a universal God of love is the most powerful symbol we have yet seen in human history for transcending the tribal gods contained within particular cultural boundaries and which require divine *protection* against the threats and incursions of other gods.

Although it is easily ridiculed by the establishment *realists*, we carry within us an intuitive awareness that the presence of God is not felt in the violent rebuff and conquest of an enemy, but in the gesture of reconciliation between those who had been enemies but are now brothers and sisters. This is the location of religious awe, when we stand in silence before Divine power.[27] This is the heart of true faith, and the heart of interfaith dialogue and understanding. Here is where we stop merely spinning wheels in an endless spiral of violence, and where human history and evolution can move forward. Only this image of a universal God of love, contained in some form within all major religious traditions, is worthy to serve as the icon of that awesome gesture. And it is exactly in conscious efforts to foster interfaith dialogue and understanding that this image of the universal God of love is nurtured and expanded. So that increasingly people will be able to approach the culturally Dissimilar Other, not with suspicion as a potential threat, but as a welcomed source for opportunity to grow more deeply in the universal love of God.

NOTES

1. These are all quotes appearing under the heading "Death" gleaned over the past few years from various dictionaries of famous quotations.
2. Cf. Liechty (2002).
3. In Western philosophy, this phrase *Life Force* is most often associated with *Vitalism*. It is now also becoming a prominent phrase in translations of Eastern philosophical texts to express concepts in Chinese Tai Chi and Qi Gong.
4. Cf., for example, Mayr (2001).
5. Use of the term survival *mechanism* is only meant to point toward a factor involved in an historical process, it is not meant to privilege a mechanical metaphor for describing this historical process.
6. Ehrenreich (1997) makes the strong point that for all but a very short and recent piece of our species history, it is most likely the we were a prey species rather than a predator species. It was the mastery of technology, first tools and then weapons, that facilitated the rapid transition from *man the skittish scavenger* to *man the hunter*. Ehrenreich suggests that echoes of this transition are still found in our disproportionate fascination with high-tech weaponry in the modern world.
7. The fight-flight mechanism is a colloquialism for what is called *acute stress response* in the specialized literature.
8. Cf. Conte and Plutchik (1994); Sandler (1985); Laughlin (1979) lists 25 major ego defenses and 30 lesser defenses. Essays in Swanson and Campbell (1988) offer a sociological reading of the ego defenses.
9. The final works by Ernest Becker (1971, 1973, 1975) are drawn on repeatedly in what follows.
10. Cf. esp. Becker (1973), pp. 178ff.

11. Liechty (1995).
12. Cf. Becker (1962).
13. The central role of culture in providing meaning and acting as a buffer against anxiety is the guiding thesis of *Terror Management Theory* in social psychology, an ongoing, sophisticated program of empirical research intended to test key hypotheses generated from Ernest Becker's work. For summary articles on this research, see Greenberg, et al., (2002), and Solomon, et al., (1998).
14. This is vividly outlined in Pyszczynski, et al. (2002).
15. In short, development of psychological mechanisms for anxiety control were no less necessary as a tool for survival than was the development of the large brain capacity of our species.
16. Becker (1973), pp. 24–25.
17. I develop this pragmatic approach to understanding religious truth more fully in Liechty (2003).
18. Introduction of the term *plausibility* here is a conscious nod to the many works of Peter L. Berger and the tradition within sociology he represents.
19. Cf. Gramsci (1957).
20. My understanding of the cognitive and psychological conditions of modernity strongly reflect my reading of Berger and Luckmann (1966), Berger (1977) and Berger, et al. (1973).
21. Cf. Berger and Luckmann (1966); Lifton (1969, 1976 and 1993).
22. Fukuyama (1992).
23. The "icy waters of egotistical calculation" is the apt phrase of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels put it in the *Communist Manifesto*.
24. Berger and Luckmann (1966).
25. Malise Ruthven (2004) writes brilliantly on the 'scandal of difference,' as a potential threat to social meaning.
26. Cf. Lifton (1999); Liechty (2001).
27. Schneider (2004).

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СМЕРТНОСТЬ, САМООТРЕЧЕНИЕ И ИСТИНА: СНИЖЕНИЕ ВРАЖДЕБНОСТИ МЕЖДУ КОНФЛИКТУЮЩИМИ КУЛЬТУРНЫМИ МИРОВОЗЗРЕНИЯМИ

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Опираясь на психологические теории Отто Ранка, Роберта Дж. Лифтона и, особенно, теорию Эрнста Беккера, а также теорию управления страхом, существующую в социальной психологии, мы выдвигаем в данной работе тезис о том, что представления, сформированные мировой культурой, играют перед лицом

эмпирической реальности смерти определенную роль, смягчая чувство опасения, беспокойства и даже страха, свойственное самоосознающим существам с образным мышлением, которые, как и все другие виды, отличаются мощным и, возможно, инстинктивным стремлением к самосохранению. Отражающийся в культуре комплексный механизм защиты является тем отличительным элементом, который проводит границу между психологией человека и представителей животного мира. Это то наше «особенно человеческое» свойство, которым мы больше всего дорожим. Убеждая нас в том, что мы значимые актеры в осмысленной драме космического масштаба перед лицом вечности, сильные жизнеспособные идеи культуры дарят нам символическое ощущение бессмертия, уберегая, таким образом, от настигающего и парализующего беспокойства, которое охватывает нас в нашем противостоянии реальности смерти. В этой теории мы видим, что в то время как все аспекты культуры, включая искусство и символические аспекты политической экономики, направлены на снижение подобного волнения, посредством религии, люди, наиболее открыто выражают свое стремление к бессмертию и причастность к вечному (образному продолженному существованию). Столкновения различных культурных идей очень скоро могут свестись к «смертельной схватке» соперничающих идеологий бессмертия, и в некотором смысле, подобное столкновение на любом уровне непреложно несет в себе элемент священных религиозных войн. И точно также, примеры терпимости и мирного сосуществования представителей конфликтующих культур непременно содержат элемент святости. Подобная терпимость и умение сосуществовать в мире дают нам надежду на будущее рода человеческого, и именно благодаря религиозной преданности (в традиционном и нетрадиционном понимании), терпимость и желание мирного сосуществования могут быть укреплены и представлены как хотя и ограниченная, но и принципиально достижимая возможность бессмертия.

TRUTH AND STRANGIFICATION: RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE BETWEEN BUDDHISM AND CHRISTIANITY

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I. Truth, Strangification and Contrast

The idea of Truth, if true at all, should be very comprehensive and enjoys a common ground, not only in science, but in all domains of human experience with affectivity, knowledge and belief system, especially in the domains of science, culture and religion. Today we are facing a time of radical change of science, in which no single discipline can supply us with a complete image of any object or an adequate solution to any problem. Interdisciplinarity has become a necessary method for the mosaic of human knowledge as well as the solution to practical problems. As to culture, with the on-going process of globalization, we're facing today a situation of multiculturalism both on national and international levels. Frequent encounter, confrontation and even conflict with other cultures have become not only a specific feature of this period of history, but also part of our everyday life. On the level of religion, we see more or less the same situation, in which it is still necessary for each religion to claim an absolute truth of its own, but meanwhile, this truth is relativized by confrontation against or dialogue with other religions.

In responding to today's urgent situation, which is full of conflicts created by the self-enclosure of different parts, such as different scientific disciplines, cultural communities, political and religious groups etc., we humans should be more concerned with the other and the possibility of mutual enrichment. In order to overcome antagonism by appealing to effective dialogue, "strangification" and "language appropriation" should be taken as viable strategies. The term "strangification," a neologism that might appear strange in English, yet much more understandable in Chinese — *waitui* — means etymologically an act of going outside of oneself to the other, or going outside of one's familiarity to strangeness, to strangers. This act presupposes an "appropriation of language" by which we learn to express our ideas or values in language of others or understandable to others. "Strangification" and "language appropriation" in their turn presuppose an original generosity towards the other, without limiting oneself to the claim of reciprocity, quite often presupposed in social relationships and ethical golden rules.

The concept of strangification was first proposed by Constructive Realism as an epistemological strategy for interdisciplinary research and then was extended by myself as a strategy of cultural interaction and religious dialogue[1], applicable not only to different scientific micro-worlds, but also to different cultural and religious worlds.

In the world of science, different scientific disciplines, because of their difference in methods and languages, construct accordingly different micro-worlds, to be bridged possibly only by the strategy of strangification. There are three types of strangification:

The first is linguistic strangification, by which we translate one discourse about the findings or supposed truth in the context of one particular discipline or research program into the language of or understandable to other disciplines, to see whether it works there or, on the contrary, thereby becomes absurd. If in the latter case, reflection must be made concerning the methodology and principle by which the first discourse was established. If one discourse is translatable into and thereby understandable to other disciplines, it should be said as having more truth because of its universalizability and communicability with other micro-worlds.

The second is pragmatic strangification. Since science is also culturally and socially bound, if we can draw the truth of one particular discipline from its social and organizational context and put it into other social and organizational contexts, we can make clear thereby its pragmatic implication and enlarge its applicability in different social context. If it still works there and develops in the new context, this means it has more universalizable truth. Otherwise, if it does not work any more in the new social context, this means it is limited to a particular socio-practical context and not to be seen as universalizable.

The third is ontological strangification. When an act of strangification is conducted with a direct experience with Reality Itself as a detour to understand other micro-worlds, then there is an ontological strangification.[1] This means our direct experience with Reality Itself can nourish our language and our dialogue with others.

When extended to the cultural and religious worlds, if a value / cultural expression / religious belief is translatable into a value / cultural expression / religious belief understandable to other cultural or religious communities, then it has a larger or universalizable validity. Otherwise its validity is limited to its own world and reflection must be made on that limit. If one value / expressions / belief is universalizable to or applicable in other social and pragmatic contexts, it has thereby a larger validity than in its own original context. Finally, a value / expression / belief, when universalizable by a detour of experiencing Reality Itself, for example a direct experience with other people, Nature or Ultimate Reality, by the same token will be capable of promoting mutual understanding with other cultural and religious worlds. When we come to religious dialogue, which presupposes by its own nature ontological strangification, one's experience with Ultimate Reality is very helpful for understanding others' religious discourses and practices.

Strangification presupposes language appropriation. As we can see, a person, from his / her birth to maturity, has to learn various kinds and different levels of language. In the beginning of our life, we learn language through the generosity of our significant others who are generous in talking to us. Because of language appropriation, we begin to open up a world of meaningfulness. When grown-up, we learn all

kinds of discipline, knowledge, technique and cultural expression; all these belong to some sort of language appropriation. Language appropriation enriches our life with knowledge and meaningfulness. By appropriating a language understandable to others we'll be able to strangify ourselves via that language. This is also applicable to collective process of learning. For example, when China began to open itself to Buddhism in Han dynasty, or much later, to Christianity in Ming dynasty, they should go thorough a process of language appropriation in order to recontextualize in China.

I would propose "strangifiability" as a new criterion of truth, especially valuable in the interdisciplinary, intercultural and inter-religious contexts. Since there is no single scientific discipline capable of offering us a complete image of any reality or solving any particular problem, those old criteria of truth attaching to the idea of science limited to discipline become obsolete. For example, Karl Popper's idea of falsification could be done within any discipline or research program without the need to go outside of itself and be open to the other, is therefore improper to the idea of interdisciplinarity. In contrast, strangifiability is more suitable for the context of interdisciplinary research. I tend to think Habermas' idea of truth as consensus is more applicable for the pluralistic society and to different parts in communication, such as different political parties, interest groups and ideological settings. Still, the idea of strangification is more feasible and fruitful than Habermas' concept of "communicative action," limited to the process of argumentation in which the proposition-for and proposition-against, by way of *Begründung*, search for a consensus in a higher proposition acceptable for both parties. Although Habermas has proposed some ideal claims for communication such as understandability, truth, sincerity and legitimacy, unfortunately in the actual world of communication, there happens very often either total conflict or compromise, without any real consensus. The Habermasian argumentation tends to fail if in the process of *Begründung* and in the act of searching for consensus, there is pre-linguistic and therefore pre-argumentative mutual understanding and no effort of strangification, without which there will be no "understandability" and no self-reflection. Therefore, strangification could be seen as prerequisite for any successful communication and coordination.

For me the most fascinating phenomenon about Buddhism and Christianity is their strangifiability or universalizability, now already into the whole world. Christianity and Buddhism are two World religions with long traditions of belief systems, philosophies and spirituality, one essential to Western culture, the other essential to Asian cultures. What I am going to do here is to put Christianity and Buddhism into dialogue one with another, dialogue as conceived under my philosophy of contrast and the strategy of strangification.

In this dark valley of nihilism that today's world is suffering, both Buddhism and Christianity can, based upon their spiritual resources, contribute together ideas, values and practices capable of rendering human life meaningful. Under the impact of modernization and the challenge of post-modern deconstruction, human existence, despite differences in cultural expressions, is under the menace and torturing

of domination, alienation and meaningless life. "Nihilism" is now deprived of its profound meaning of "re-evaluations of all values."[3] It denotes now the superficiality, frivolity and meaninglessness, in which people have no more long term ideal to devote their life for, instead they indulge themselves in the pursuing of immediate pleasure and interest.

Seen from this perspective, both Christianity and Buddhism can cooperate and nourish each other in reconstructing a meaningful human existence, both in distilling the best from their spiritual traditions and in facing together the destiny of humankind probing for an outlet through the nihilistic darkness.

I am saying this in reference to my philosophy of contrast, which is a fundamental way of thinking and practice by which mutual complementarity is to be discovered out of multiplicity or dualistic oppositions respecting their differences. By "contrast" I understand the interplay between difference and complementarity, continuity and discontinuity, distantiation and co-belongingness, which constitute the fundamental structure and dynamism of objects under investigation. Structural contrasts and dynamic contrasts constitute the dialectics of experience, history and Being.[4] I propose the philosophy of contrast as an alternative to all dualistic ways of thinking which underline too many oppositions but neglect complementarity. It serves also as remedy to Hegelian dialectics, which emphasizes too much negativity and thereby forgetting the creative positivity of Being. The wisdom of contrast has its origin in traditional Chinese philosophy. The *Book of Changes* says, "The rhythmic interaction between yin and yang constitutes what we call the Way (Dao)." Also Laozi in the *Daodejing* said something similar: "All things carry the yin and embrace the yang, and through their blending interactions they achieve harmony." Put it in a simpler way, the philosophy of contrast demands us to see always the other side of the coin, both in its structural aspect and its historical aspect.

With this contrast way of thinking in mind, I tend to see Christianity and Buddhism as different but complementary, distantiating yet co-belonging. In this paper, I will deal with the following doctrinal positions of each tradition: their common concern with human suffering and virtue ethics; their contrasts in fulfillment of being versus emptying of emptiness; the principle of transcendence versus the principle of immanence; and in all, focusing on the dialogue between Buddhist enlightenment and Christian salvation, seeing both as essential for helping humankind get through the darkness of this nihilist modern/post-modern world.

II. Human Suffering and Human Nature

My point of departure is the common concern for human suffering in Christianity and Buddhism. These are two world religions with highest concern regarding the suffering and evil faced by all human beings. It is within the context of saving humankind from suffering and evil that it is pertinent for Christianity to talk about salvation. Also Buddhist enlightenment is a way of self-awareness that liberates hu-

mankind from all suffering and evil. Both Christian and Buddhist teachings explain the origin of suffering and evil in referring to human nature.

When thinking of the Christian concept of human nature, one is reminded of the doctrine of original sin. For some theologians, original sin represents the original darkness in human nature inherited from Adam and Eve after they acted against a prohibitive rule of God. But my reading of the narrative of Adam's fall in *the Genesis* tells me that human nature is originally created good, as situated in the ontology of goodness and theology of Imago Dei. The environment of human existence is constituted by all things, which, after being created by God, were proclaimed good by Him. This is the ontological foundation upon which human beings emerge. Human beings are created according to the image of God. "God created man in the image of himself, in the image of God he created him, male and female he created them."[5] Since God is supreme Good, his likeness should also be good, not evil. Also, human beings are created with cognitive faculty and free will and are responsible for their own action. This is the transcendental foundation of all morals, good and evil.

Evil came when human beings abused their free will and interrupted his/her intersubjective relation with God, relation as represented by a covenant of rule of action. By this interruption of relation, human beings were enclosed in the arrogance of their own subjectivity, cut off from relation with God, after which human beings began to suffer. Evil and suffering were then consequence of the degeneration of human nature and the ungrateful refusal of one's relation with God.

In Christianity, human nature as created in the likeness of God is originally good, but in the empirical exercises of free will, human beings could both possibly and actually choose to be self-enclosed to the point of denying good relationship with God, and thereby the fall.[6] Christianity accords more liberty to human free will, and therefore more responsibility to human action. It recognizes much autonomy of human subjectivity, to the extent that human beings might seclude themselves from all others, even to the point of rejecting God. The so-called "hell" is the state of existence in which a human individual refuses God, cutting himself from all relation with the other, and thereby excluding himself from his own salvation, not to mention his own possibility of perfection. This is where human beings suffer the most. But even if man could exclude himself from God, the love of God is infinitely immense so that such a state of existence could not refuse the penetration of God's love. St. Augustine explains, "Even if I were in Hell, You would be there *for if I go down into hell, Thou art there also*."[7] The reading of these words suggests to me that God's love would penetrate also into hell.[8] Personally, I tend to think that, even if human beings could refuse God arrogantly, since they are finite beings, their refusal of God, no matter how arrogant it is, is still a finite refusal and thus there will be always the possibilities of penetration by divine love, which is infinite. It is reasonable to think that God's love will never abandon any being whatsoever.

Similarly, Buddhism emerged as a religion that offered enlightenment to human beings to liberate them from all sufferings. This is the original meaning of the four

noble truths. The first two noble truths explain the suffering of man and the formation of the world. Human conditions consist in suffering of all kind, including giving birth, getting old, getting sick, dying. There are other sufferings such as separation from what is pleasant, not obtaining that which one desires, being sad and especially those sufferings caused by impermanence and by the gathering and separation of conditions. Although Buddha proposed the noble truth of gathering as the origin of human suffering, it could be interpreted also as having some cosmological implications. The formation of the world could be seen as determined by the gathering or separation of elements according to the arising of their interdependent conditions or relationship, as an interpretation extended from the doctrine of dependent causation, originally limited to human experience. Starting from the initial ignorance, the twelve links, either by simultaneous coordination or by temporal causation, determine the formation of life and world.[9] In short, suffering resulted from the dependent causation initiated by ignorance, and only enlightenment, a self-awareness of the causation process, could liberate human beings from it.

Liberation could be effected by the other two nobles truths, cessation and paths. "Cessation" means liberation from the original darkness and all suffering in the state of nirvana. "Paths" means the practice of eightfold right paths, leading thereby to the achievement of a virtuous man. The possibility of enlightenment and liberation presupposes that human nature must in itself be pure and good, so as to make enlightenment possible. Therefore, a pure and good human nature, or the concept of Buddha nature developed later by Mahayana Buddhism, is the transcendental condition of possibility of enlightenment and liberation.

We could discern from the above a certain contrast between Buddhism and Christianity. In the both cases there is a radical darkness in human nature causing all suffering. On the other hand, in Buddhism there is the affirmation of an originally pure and good Buddha nature. The tension created by this contrast gives a more balancing and dynamic vision of Buddhism to take care of human suffering by encouraging the unfolding of his good nature.

In short, enlightenment in Buddhism is the self-awareness and unfolding of one's Buddha nature. Whereas salvation in Christianity is the process of divine grace corroborating the self-transformation and enhancement of human spirit towards divine perfection, from which all human being exist in a state of self-exclusion rooted in finitude and selfishness.

III. Salvation through God and Enlightenment of Buddha Nature

For the Christians, there is no salvation without God. As St. Augustine puts it, "our hearts find no peace until they rest in you."[10] He means that the human heart could not be calmed down until it finds itself in the presence and grace of God. This sets up a principle of transcendence in the fulfillment of human potentiality. The human soul is still related to God inside the most profound being of itself and thereby

the principle of immanence is still recognized by Christianity to a certain degree. On the one hand, the dynamism of human nature is important for salvation, because this demands his free will and virtuous efforts. On the other hand, this dynamism is not to be kept enclosed within itself, without openness to the other, and ultimately to an absolute Other, otherwise human being finds no fulfillment and therefore no salvation. In this sense, Christianity embodies also this wisdom of contrast that has profoundly grasped this dynamic tension within human nature and the relation between God and man. Jesus Christ clearly articulated this truth when he said,

> *The hour is coming when you will worship the Father neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem. You worship what you do not know; we worship what we do know; for salvation comes from the Jews. But the hour will come — in fact it is here already — when true worshippers will worship the Father in Spirit and truth: that is the kind of worshipper the Father wants. God is spirit, and those who worship must worship in spirit and truth.*[11]

Here Jesus refers to two modes of salvation history, one is general salvation history, and the other is special salvation history. Special salvation history is that of the chosen, the elite. But general salvation history is to worship God in spirit and truth. Those who worship God in this way could have their salvation, not limited to external factors such as place or racial or cultural groups. In this sense, "worship" means to bring out what is most sincere in one's own spirit, and to experience truth as revealed to the human beings. This recognizes the immanence principle by which human beings worship God with the participation of utmost sincere spiritual dynamism.

In Christianity, the so-called immanence principle is based upon the fact that all men are created Imago Dei, whereas in the case of Buddhism, it is the affirmation that all human and even sentient beings have Buddha nature. We can say that, for Christians, there is certain divine nature in human beings, by which we should be as perfect as our Father in Heaven. Jesus affirms this divinity of human being when He says, "Is it not written in your Law: "I said, you are gods?" So the Law uses the word "gods" of those to whom the word of God was addressed, and scripture cannot be rejected."[12] In Judeo-Christian tradition, human beings are created Imago Dei; they are also children of God. In this sense human beings could be seen as gods. This divinity of human beings is therefore related ontologically to God, to be seen as the inner light, the locus of enlightenment, of human existence; just as in the case of Buddhism, the Buddha nature of each human and sentient being is the source of his own enlightenment.

Nevertheless, in Christianity, this immanence principle also claims a transcendence principle by which human being will not be limited and thereby enclosed in his own subjectivity. There will always be God, and the truth and spirit are openness to God. Human spiritual illumination is never limited to itself and by itself, because in the human enlightenment there is relation with and participation of divine illumina-

tion. It is in this sense that I understood what St. Augustine said, "God hath created man's mind rational and intellectual, whereby he may take in His light...and He so enlighteneth it of Himself, that not only those things which are displayed by the truth, but even truth itself may be perceived by the mind's eye."[13] By this openness to God and enlightenment from God, human beings will never be enclosed in *"Man, all too human*" type of humanism. In this sense, "worships" means to enhance one's self to the spirit of God and to the truth as enlightened by God himself to us. This is to say that in Christianity the immanence principle is always related to and enhanced by the transcendence principle and never to be separated from it.

When we come to Buddhism, the principle of immanence is overwhelming: human beings are in search of enlightenment, and through enlightenment liberation from all suffering and human finitude. But, in Mahayana Buddhism this liberation could be acheived only through the self-awakening of one's own Buddha nature within oneself. Although this self-awakening should transcend any empirical experience and the egoist self for the altruistic and universal reason, the resources of this self transcendence is within one's own self and its fulfillment is of one's own Buddha nature. There seems to be no need to recognize any transcendent God and the intervention of His grace in human enlightenment. In this sense, there seems no need to set up any principle of transcendence.

But, under the overwhelming weight of the immanence principle, there are still tendencies in Buddhism to worship Buddha, or a certain figure of Buddha, as divine, and the necessity to appeal to His Grace. We could find this contrasting tension in the history of Buddhism. For example, Pure Land Buddhism, in which there is Amida Buddha, a figure somewhat similar to a personal God to whom one may sing and pray, even by simply appealing to his name in incessant repetition. In everyday life and in times of urgency, this prayer and appeal to Amida Buddha might be accorded His grace and help. The end of this prayer for the grace of Amida is to attain the Pure Land or the Paradise. Beyon this, it is also an everyday practice among both Buddhist monks and laymen to pray for the blessing and protection of Bodhisattva.

But even here, the prayer to a quasi-personal God and the repetitive evocation of his name could be interpreted as a technique of spirituality, the effect of which is to reduce one's distracting thoughts into the pious petition of one holy name or the name of the perfect One. And the evocation of Amida Buddha's name might also be seen as the simplest way to awaken one's Buddha nature inside oneself. Therefore, "Pure Land" could be interpreted as "Pure Heart," in which it is extremely easy to attain Enlightenment, rather than be compared with the Heaven of Christianity. Even the focus of Pure Land Buddhism prayer is enlightenment rather than grace. In the seemingly theistic tendency of Pure Land Buddhism, there is always the possibility of understanding it with the principle of immanence.

In fact, the deification of Buddha existed from the first stage of development of Buddhism and continues to exist until these days. Recently there is critique of the phenomenon of deification of Buddha within today's Buddhist movement. Buddhist

scholars, such as Rev. Yin Shun and Prof. Yang Huinan, have criticized this tendency in Buddhism to worship Buddha God as a strategy to extend Buddhism into the secular world. They have traced this tendency of deification of Buddha back to the origin of the Second Council, which resulted in the division of the Mahasamghikas (Section of the Great Mass) and Sthaviras (Section of the Elders). As Rev. Yin Shun has pointed out, the first reason of this great schism is differences in interpreting the status of Buddhahood. For the Sthaviras, which is more humanistic and realistic according to Rev. Yin Shun, who takes a humanistic position, the human body of Buddha, just like everybody, needs clothing, eating, sleeping and medical care when ill, whereas Buddha's Dharmakaya (Spiritual Body) is perfect. However, the Mahasamghikas asserted the position that Buddha is Omnipresent, Omnipotent and Omniscient and living endlessly and eternally. And that Buddha himself is in the Tusita Heaven, and never teaches in the world. He who teaches is merely a Nirmannakaya, a form of Buddha's appearance body.[14]

Following Rev. Yin Shun, Prof. Yang Huinan has also traced the actual phenomenon of deification of Buddha to Indian Buddhism, in which the Mahasamghikas proclaimed that Buddha is All Mighty and Omnipresent (in all places and instants of time) in order to adapt Buddhism to a greater number of believers. Prof. Yang worries about this tendency and characterizes it as a "return to Brahmanism" in Buddhism and claims it is the reason for the latter's decline.[15]

This tendency in Buddhism to conceive of Buddha as All Mighty, Omnipresent and Omniscient forms a contrast situation within Buddhism. On one hand, the Immanence principle: on the other hand, a transcendent Buddha. Nevertheless, in its essence, Buddhism in general understands enlightenment and liberation more by the immanence principle. It was for this reason that Chinese Mahayana Buddhism has quickly transformed the divinity of Buddha into the Buddha nature of each individual human and sentient being. This overemphasis on the immanence principle, once introduced into Chinese philosophy, has transformed progressively Chinese philosophy into different kinds of Philosophy of immanence. This is the case with all different sects of Chinese Buddhism. This is also the case with Neo-Confucianism.

IV. Fulfillment of Being versus Emptying of Emptiness

For Christians, God is the most perfect Spiritual Being. He is the creator of the whole universe, including human beings, other sentient beings and all other things, a God unexplainable and unfathomable by all human discourses such as science, philosophy and theology. To say that God is the creator and fulfillment of all beings is not to identify Him with Being, as some scholastic philosophers would say. But I will follow St. Thomas when he distinguished Being, which is the act of existence of all beings but not to be seen as self-subsistent, and God, who is *Ipsum esse subsistens*.[16] Besides, we should add that in God there are unfathomable possibilities, which could be but are not yet. Here God could be conceived only in a negative way,

as taught by negative theology. Without a better term, we could term these unfathomable possibilities as "nothingness," without which there will be no possibility for further fulfillment of Being. God's unfathomability forbids us to identify Him with Being. God is Being and God transcends Being. He transcends therefore the distinction between Being and nothingness, and out of nothingness, He created all beings.

We could say that God is personal, in the sense that He is conscious and spiritual, that He knows and loves. But we can also say that He is not personal, in the sense that He is not "consciousness" and "spiritual" in the way that we are. He knows, but not in the sense that we know. He loves, but not in the sense that we love. God is personal and God transcends personality.

In the tradition of Buddhism even if there is a tendency to deify Buddha as Omnipotent and Omniscient more profoundly it declares itself free from any idea of God. This freedom from the need to worship one personal God constitutes an essential part of the experience of Buddhist enlightenment and liberation. Even if in the Pure Land Buddhism there is petition to Amida Buddha for his grace and for the happening of the Pure Land as spiritual paradise, still Amida is not understood as a creator of the world as in the case of Christianity. Although Amida actualizes the Pure Land, He does not intervene in the course of world history. Also the idea of Pure Land does not entail any idea similar to the Christian New Heaven and Earth. Rather the petition of Amida's name represents an action of reducing all thoughts to one. It signifies the attainment of perfect sincerity in faith analogous to the attainment of perfect emptiness through meditation. Therefore emptiness is most profound experience in Buddhism, so much so as to go beyond even the experience of worshipping a personal God. Different from the Christian emphasis on the God as *Summum Bonum* and the fulfillment of their being in God as the destiny of all beings, Buddhism emphasizes more upon the experience of emptying that is the essence of all enlightenment and liberation[17].

For Buddhism, emptiness is to be identified neither with being nor with nothingness. In order to keep the liberation process radical so as to bring out the freedom implied in the experience of enlightenment, emptiness is experienced always as emptying of emptiness. It is something similar to Heidegger's *Ab-grund,*[18] the always departing from all foundation. In Heidegger's eyes, the Christian conceptual framework is more like what he called "onto-theo-logy,"[19] which, on the one hand affirms Being as the ontological foundation of all things; and on the other, affirms God as the theological foundation of Being. By contrast, Buddhism is more like an anti-foundationalism. Emptying of emptiness is without any foundation and continues to depart from all foundation, in order to keep human spirit as free as possible.

But, even if the Buddhist experience of emptiness is most profound in its spiritual freedom, still this does not mean there is no God as Fulfillment of Being. Even if our freedom is so radical that not a single human discourse or philosophical, scientific or theological doctrine could serve as foundation to our existence, this does not mean we are foundationless. There must be a certain foundation of Being, although the

foundation itself is unfathomable and all our founding discourse should be deconstructed in order to keep human spirit and its foundation free.

Because of its emphasis on enlightenment and liberation, Buddhism tends not to identify the realization of Buddha nature with Being. It is reluctant to recognize Buddha as a personal God. It seems that for Buddhism the personalization of God is a sign of inferiority, when compared with the rich experience of impersonal emptiness. Still I think it is more human to posit a personal God who knows and loves and to whom we could pray. Although there is also a profound meaning in God as impersonal, an inflexible maintaining of this thesis might also fall into an insensible cult in which there is no personal interaction and dialogue. It would become a state of mind into which an impersonalist interpretation of God and Buddha has the danger to fall. This state of mind is something similar to what Jesus has described:

> What description can I find for this generation? It is like Children shouting to each other as they sit in the market place: "We played the pipes for you, and you wouldn't dance; we sang dirges, and you wouldn't be mourners."[20]

For us humans, to say God is personal is to say that God does know and love and there is God to whom we could pray in our heart. But this does not mean that He knows, loves and listens to our prayers in our *human, too human* way. Especially in the Christian tradition of mysticism, God is Mystery of all mysteries. In the mystical experience of God, there is a certain moment in which we enter in the darkness of the soul, as St. John of the Cross would characterize it. A moment where contemplative prayer enters into a mysterious, passive phase of experience in which the mystic looses himself in an overwhelming rhythm not to be qualified as an interpersonal experience at all. In the contrast of personal / transpersonal there emerges a tension of experience in which our relation with God becomes more and more profound.

V. Ethics of Virtue to Overcome Nihilism and Domination

Last but not least, in facing this world that is marching through the dark valley of nihilism, and especially the social and political world under power domination and struggle, both Christianity and Buddhism should develop and extend together the influence of their ethics of virtue, instead of putting forth all kinds of utilitarian and deontologist ethics. Facing the world of nihilism, utilitarianism, with its emphasis on the pursuing and the calculation of utility, will not serve to help the human spirit. On the contrary, it could only, by its emphasis on calculative rationality, add to the nihilistic crisis in which human beings search merely for more immediate interest and pleasure.

As to the ethics of obligation, it brings no help to this world of power conflict and domination. It is time for us to rethink of the priority of areteology over any form of deontology, because today our world is suffering from its over-emphasis on obliga-

tion, either as moral or as legal constraint of human behavior. This emphasis could be traced back to the rise of modernity, when Kant defined morality as acting autonomously according to categorical imperatives. For Kant, morality consists merely in the autonomous observance of moral obligation, whereas virtue was the denial of one's desire in following the demand of moral obligation.[21] On the level of morality, Kant sustained the position of deontology. On the level of state, he proposed the concept of *Rechtstaat*, a state ruled by law. With the advancement of modernization, the situation is nowadays getting worse, to the extent that nobody really loves legal and moral obligations, and even tries on the contrary to evade from their constraints. Instead, people prefer love, creativity and excellence.

I think it is the common spiritual resources of Christianity and Buddhism to emphasize the priority of virtue over utility and obligation. Virtue is seen in these grand traditions as both the development and fulfillment of the goodness originally existing in human nature, both as the excellence of human ability and as realization of good relationship. Obligation is considered necessary only when it helps to form and achieve a virtuous life. Obligations are never taken at their face value; they exist for the formation of virtues. Human excellence and good relationship are always presupposed in the observance of obligations.

For example, in the case of Christianity, the rule set in the Garden by God to Adam and Eve is a rule by covenant, that is, a rule for the maintenance of relationship between God and Human beings. And the moral obligations concretized in the Ten Commandments resulted from the Mosaic covenant between God and Israel. Respect for the justice of God constitutes the reason for Israel's obedience of the obligations expressed in the Ten Commandments. These are not to be considered as heteronomy, as some scholars maintain in criticizing Christianity. The distinction between autonomy and heteronomy still belongs to the ethics of obligation, in which there is priority of norm over virtue. But in Christianity, the truth is quite to the contrary. And this is most evident in what Jesus said, "If you love me then obey my order." Here the relation of love has priority over the obedience of order. Obey in order to love. Love is the essence of Jesus' commandment. Faith, hope, love, justice, wisdom, temperance...etc. are virtues in Christian ethics. In short, Christian ethics is an ethics of virtue that emphasizes the perfection of human good and the fulfillment of good relationship.

Buddhism also teaches an ethics of virtue and sustains the priority of virtue over obligation. The eightfold paths proclaimed repeatedly by Buddha as the way to enlightenment and liberation[22] from all suffering and from the determination of dependent causation consist in the accomplishment of a virtuous life rather than the formalistic observance of obligations. In the eightfold paths, right speech, right action and right livelihood primarily concern the performance of sila or moral obligations. The so-called five precepts (not to kill, not to steal, not to be indecent, not to use abusive words, not to be alcoholic) are not merely negative obligations. They are set up for the positive unfolding of wisdom and compassion of all things, which is the perfec-

tion of our altruistic capacity. That is to say, the observance of obligation is for the excellence of our capacity and relation with all things.

As to other constituents of the eightfold paths, for example, the right effort, right mindfulness and right meditation are for the practice of the meditative life; and the right vision, right thought are for the attainment of wisdom. Sila, meditation and wisdom constitute the threefold training for a Buddhist virtuous life. The excellence of our altruistic capacity and the fulfillment of relationship with ourselves and all sentient beings are essential to Buddhist ethics, only the relationship with God seems not to have been emphasized in Buddhism.

In Buddhism, the life of enlightenment is a life of virtue. In Christianity, the life leading to spiritual salvation is also a life of virtue. Both agree in seeing virtue as excellence or perfection of our natural abilities and the fulfillment of our relations. Buddhist enlightenment concerns the relation with one's own Buddha nature and all things, not including God. In Christianity, apart from our relationship with ourselves, with nature and other human beings, we should fulfill a good relationship with God, which serves as the foundation for all other relationships.

VI. Conclusion

The Buddhist emphasis on enlightenment is important for today's world to bring out what is best in human nature (characterized by Buddhism as Buddha nature) in a self-conscious way.This is also essential for Christians, because, without the experience of enlightenment, there will be no active experience of God. It is upon the self-awareness of our own human nature that we have a basis in us to collaborate with God in our experience of luminous truth and goodness. Buddhist notions of enlightenment and Buddha nature lay the anthropological foundation of all religiosity. On the other hand, this experience of enlightenment needs also to be promoted and accomplished by Christian salvation, understood as the enhancement and transformation of our finite being by God, a God who transcends both Being and nothingness, personality and impersonality. Without this mysteriously mysterious God, there will be no ontological foundation[23] for the experience of enlightenment and liberation. If deprived of its ontological foundation, the saying that "*Every sentient being could become Buddha*" would become only an encouraging motto.[24]

Nevertheless, in facing the common human condition in which impersonal technology is now creating a miserable situation of alienation, both Christianity and Buddhism should come to the rescue of human beings in spreading the influence of their integral and open humanism. Especially in this dark valley of nihilism, both Christianity and Buddhism could revitalize their dynamism of value creativity. This dynamism is rooted in their respective understanding of the goodness of human nature, the one as Imago Dei and the other as Buddha nature. And, facing commonly this world of domination of all kind, both Christianity and Buddhism should not serve as corroborating ideology for the commercial and political control. Instead, they should

collaborate for the liberation and enhancement of human beings by the practice of their ethics of virtue, in overcoming the insufficiencies of both utilitarian ethics and obligation ethics. In the starting years of the Third Millennium, Buddhism and Christianity have much to cooperate for the enlightenment and salvation of humankind.

NOTES

[1] See Wallner, Fritz, *Acht Vorlesungen ьber den Konstruktiven Realismus,* Vienna: Vienna University Press. 1992; Shen, Vincent, *Confucianism, Taoism and Constructive Realism*, Vienna: Vienna University Press. 1994; Shen, Vincent, *Contrast, Strangification and Dialogue*, Taipei: Wunan Publishing Company 2002.

[2] On this point I am different from F. Wallner who understand ontological strangification by the fact that we can travel from one microworld to another micro-world, which for me is merely ontic and can become ontological only when in the access to other micro/cultural/religious worlds there is a detour through Reality Itself. I have modified Wallner's two realms of reality, "Reality Itself" and "Constructed Reality", into three, by adding the "Life-World" which mediates the Reality Itself and Constructed Reality. Also I have modified somehow his pragmatist vision of science. (Shen 1994).

[3] About the concept of nihilism and contemporary cultural situation, see Goudsblom, Johan, *Nihilism and Culture*: New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980. Pp. 3–18.

[4] Shen, Vincent, *Method, History and Being — A Philosophy of Contrast*", in *Universitas, A Monthly Review of Philosophy and Culture*, Vol.8, number 3, Taipei, 1981. Pp. 190–200.

[5] *Genesis*, 1:27, in *The Jerusalem Bible*, *The Old Testament*, p. 16.

[6] This is similar to Chinese philosophy where Confucianism asserts that human nature is transcendentally good, but the Daoist critique by Laozi shows its empirical degeneration process because of the negligence and forgetfulness of Dao and *de*. "Therefore, when Dao is lost, there comes de(creative power). When de is lost, there comes ren (humaneness). When ren is lost, there comes yi(righteousness). When yi is lost, there comes li (the ritual)." Laozi, *Daodejing*, Ch. 38.

[7] St. Augustine, *Confessions*, translated by R. S. Pine-Coffin, London: Penguin Classics, 1961. P. 4.

[8] Here I disqualify myself, as a philosopher, from any theological interpretation of the Christian dogma concerning hell.

[9] In this sense, dependent causation could have some cosmological status. But it does not offer any explanation of the origin of the world, as the doctrine of creation of the world by God in Christianity. Buddha seemed to see those metaphysical questions and doctrines as playing with words, but this ways of saying does not resolve the cosmological question of the origin of the world. For me, philosophically speaking, cosmology and ontology seem to be a weak point in Buddhism.

[10] St. Augustine, *Confessions*, translated by R. S. Pine-Coffin, London: Penguin Classics, 1961. P. 1.

[11] *John*, 4, 21–24 in *The Jerusalem Bible*, *The New Testament*, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966. P. 153.

[12] *John*, 10, 34–35 in *Jerusalem Bible*, *New Testament*, p.170, In *Psalms*, 82,6, it reads, "... you too are gods, son of the Most High, all of you." *Jerusalem Bible*, *Old Testament*, p. 867.

[13] In *Ps*. 118, *Serm*., 18, 4, quoted from F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy, Vol. II*, Westminster: The Newman Press, 1960. P. 63.

[14] Shun, Yin, *A History of Indian Buddhist Thought*, Taipei: Cheng-wen Press: 1988. Pp. 61–63.

[15] Huinan, Yang, *Treatise on the History of the Development of Buddhist Thought*, Taipei: Dongda Book Store, 1993. Pp. 6–9.

[16] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, I, 29, 2; *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, 25.

[17] But we have to notice here the fact of being enlightened cannot cancel by that mere fact the existence of dependent causation. It merely frees itself from the determination of the dependent causation.

[18] Heidegger, M., *Wozu Dichter*, in *Holzweg*, Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1938. P. 248.

[19] Heidegger, M., *Identitдt und Differenz*, Pfünlingen: Gunther Neske, 1957. Pp. 60–63.

[20] *Matthew*, 11, 16–17, in *Jerusalem Bible, New Testament*, p. 32.

[21] As MacIntyre points out, "To act virtuously is not, as Kant was later to think, to act against inclinations; it is to act from inclinations formed by the cultivation of the virtues." McIntyre, A., *After Virtue*, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1984. P. 149.

[22] The fact of being enlightened, and therefore of becoming a Buddha, does not cancel by that fact the existence of dependent causation, but merely gets rid off its determination.

[23] By "ontological foundation" I mean the ultimate ground for all existents, not limited to merely human understanding of Being. We should not anthropologize the meaning of the ontological. It is the ultimate and free ground of all groundless, even more profound than Heideggerian Ab-grund.

[24] Even if I use the conditional "if", there must be such a foundation in Buddhism, even if there is no doctrine of creation in it. Cosmological and ontological explanations could be developed out of the theory of dependent causation. Since understanding, when compared with faith, practice and proof, is of key importance in Buddhism,, the lack of ontological foundation still constitutes a part of human ignorance. These explanations are not to be treated as merely playing with words, but in need of development in Buddhism through creative hermeneutics. The characterization of all metaphysical explanations of the origin of cosmos by Buddha himself as "playing with words" could be seen as a sign of his recognition of finitude of human reason, which awaits, in some way or another, other resources of wisdom (such as the divine revelation).

ИСТИНА И ОСТРАНЕНИЕ: РЕЛИГИОЗНЫЙ ДИАЛОГ БУДДИЗМА И ХРИСТИАНСТВА

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Под актом Остранения (*waitui*) в лингвистическом, прагматическом и онтологическом смыслах я понимаю момент сопричастности истине, не только в сфере науки, но и в области религии и культуры. Понятие акта Остранения представляется более глубинным, реальным и плодотворным, чем концепция истины как консенсуса в коммуникативном акте, выдвинутая Ю. Хабермасом. Аргументация Хабермаса рушится, когда в процессе *Обоснования* (*Begründ-*

ung) и в акте поиска консенсуса нет попытки Остранения, без которого невозможными становятся действительное взаимопонимание и авторефлексия в процессе спора. Остранение понимается здесь как предпосылка любого успешного коммуникативного акта и согласования действий, включая межрелигиозный диалог. Способность к Остранению оказывается своеобразным критерием истины.

Христианство и буддизм — две мировые религии со своими традициями системы веры, философии и духовности, существующими в течение длительного времени. Они обе прошли процесс успешного развития и распространения по всему миру, преодолев становление через Остранение. В настоящей работе я предпринимаю попытку сопоставления двух религий в понятиях «Контраста» и «Остранения».

С точки зрения контраста христианство и буддизм представляются разными, но взаимодополняющими, далекими друг от друга, но сопричастными. Далее я останавливаюсь на сопоставлении религиозных доктрин, уделяю особое внимание сравнению буддистской идеи Нирваны и христианского догмата о Сспасении. Обе религии ведут человечество сквозь мрак нашего всеотрицающего мира модерна/постмодерна. (1). Общий интерес христианства и буддизма к человеческим страданиям, физическим и к духовным, и к их укорененности в природе человека. (2). Христианское спасение в противоположность буддистской Нирване: принцип трансцендентности в противоположность принципу имманентности. (3). Христианское восполнение бытия и буддистское опустошение пустоты. (4). Этика добродетели, общая для христианства и буддизма, и практика преодоления сомнения.

MULTICULTURALISM AND SCIENCE: TEACHING DIVERSITY IN "VALUE-NEUTRAL" SCIENCE

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Introduction: The challenge of multiculturalism

In the past decade on college campuses across the U.S. we have seen an increasing awareness of a number of issues which collectively are frequently called diversity issues. Numerous authors have pointed out that the U.S. is no longer — if indeed it ever was — a great "melting pot," amalgamating the diverse ethnic identities of its immigrants into one great American identity and culture. Instead the U.S. has been called a "salad bowl" in which diverse ingredients are mixed but retain their unique identity and contribution to the salad. On the personal scale, where not long ago workplaces, schools, and daily life were highly segregated by race, class, and even gender, barriers are slowly eroding and we find ourselves increasingly likely to encounter people quite different from ourselves — different in appearance, in language, in beliefs and values, priorities and goals. On the global scale, where once it was fashionable, even liberal, to imagine a world at peace thanks to universal adoption of "American values" of individual freedom, democracy, free enterprise, the rule of law, and literacy — in English, of course — nowadays a less imperialistic ideal is that we might all get along even if we retain our cultural differences. In fact, those differences are seen as enriching for humanity and need not be sources of perpetual wars and conflict. The ideal of preserving cultural diversity can also be seen as an attempt to check the overwhelming homogenizing effects of globalization of communication and commerce.

As educators ask themselves what students need to know to get along successfully in the decades ahead, it becomes increasingly apparent that a deep understanding of "multicultural issues" is imperative. Such an understanding involves many things:

- the simple awareness that each of us comes from a culture, with cultural assumptions, predispositions, and biases
- some appreciation for how profoundly our cultural backgrounds affect us
- awareness of and respect for similarities and differences with other cultures (and genders)
- an ability to listen and communicate across these differences
- some feeling for the importance of cultural identity, particularly to small minorities at risk of total cultural assimilation; and, ideally
- an ability to empathize with others different from oneself

As part of seeing through the eyes of another culture, many professors have sought to help students from the dominant white culture to recognize their "white privilege" — the numerous, often subtle, advantages conferred upon them by being a part of the dominant culture.

I teach at a small liberal-arts college within a large state university. Especially in the past decade both my college and the university have begun to put new emphasis on diversity issues, with stronger commitment to diversity in their mission statements, in hiring practices, in student recruitment, and in the curriculum. Professors are urged to include diversity issues and multicultural awareness in all appropriate classes — some would say all classes. The goal is not simply to add a little new content, in the pattern of the old recipe "add women and stir." The goal is to encourage professors to rethink what they teach and how they teach, so that courses are more inclusive and diversity-conscious in style, approach, and assumptions, as well as content.

1. Multiculturalism in the humanities and social sciences

In the humanities and social sciences, specific changes in response to the movement for diversity and multicultural awareness are easy to imagine if not always easy to implement. Over time, changes are gradually occurring. Such as: greater gender equity and more racial and ethnic diversity in the composition of the faculty, at every rank; the inclusion of more women and ethnic authors in the curriculum of basic literature classes; more non-Western art and history classes; more history from the underside, as historian Elise Boulding calls it, seen from perspectives other than those of the rich and the powerful; a more global perspective on what's going on in the world today, again seen more often from the underside; and more explicit consideration of how racism, classism, and sexism have distorted and still distort perception, interaction, and discourse, in academia and in all aspects of daily life. These changes are happening too swiftly for some and too slowly and belatedly for others, but they are happening.

2. Multiculturalism in the "objective" sciences

In the sciences, however, we have a different story — literally. The story we tell ourselves, and that we most commonly tell our students, is that science is different from other fields because science is objective and universal; science is empirical, based on evidence which, in principle anyway, everyone can perceive. So science is science, no matter what your language, your sex, your skin color, your religion, your political persuasion, or your sexual orientation. As physicist Steven Weinberg succinctly puts it: "The discoveries of science are as free from human values as the rules of arithmetic."[1] Two plus two is still four, even in a multicultural world.

This is not to say that scientists don't argue, but they argue about which theory best fits the available data, or whether or not the experiment has been carefully per-

formed, or whether all relevant factors have been taken into account. Their personal or political biases cannot change science, cannot change what nature does, and cannot alter the outcome of a properly designed experiment. If science becomes clouded with personal or political biases, it ceases to be science and becomes subjective opinion; we call this "bad science" or "junk science" or not science at all.

This is the story we tell ourselves, and tell our students. For many scientists the objectivity and universality of science is almost a religion — a refuge of rationality and order in a world of subjectivity and relativism, a world of insane conflict and chaotic diversity.

Assume for a moment that this story is true. Then science is elevated above the fray of politics, for science, in this view, is objective, rational, and comfortingly singular. There is one right answer, and "good science" carefully pursued can find it. We should not be surprised, therefore, that many scientists have resisted calls for increased attention to issues of diversity and multiculturalism in the teaching of science. Science is, after all, what science has to be — dictated by the natural world and rational analysis, not by politics. Moreover, science is already "multicultural" in that it is a universal language; the same science is taught worldwide because the same laws of nature prevail worldwide. In this view, it makes no difference which nation's scientists, which color people, which sex or sexual orientation makes the discovery, performs the experiment, or develops the theory, as long as it is done with scientific objectivity and honesty.

Scientists take pride in being the original color-blind, gender-blind profession — by the very definition of the scientific method. The fact that fewer than twenty percent of physicists, for example, are women carries no burden of self-examination in a field that is, or at least aspires to be, objective, apolitical, and value-free. To suggest that science has a rich-white-heterosexual male bias — not only in its history but also in its current practice, teaching, theories, language, and philosophy — is to commit heresy in the science community. Indeed, we see a bitter backlash against feminist critics of science. We also see ridicule of the emerging field of science studies, which views scientists, like other academics and professionals, more as constructors of reality — one reality among many — than as discoverers of increasingly better approximations of the one true reality. The critics of science commit further heresy by not considering scientists to be uniquely positioned objective arbiters of conflict between political antagonists, since, to the critics, science itself is "just another standpoint."

Unfortunately the polarization has continued to increase between the science critics (whom many see as "attackers of science") and a portion of scientists who feel the need to defend the noble institution of science against those who would undermine it by relativizing and politicizing it. *In this paper I hope to illuminate an alternative response among science educators to the challenge of multiculturalism. In the process I may alienate fundamentalists on both sides of the "science wars." My intention, however, is to offer suggestions to science educators on*

how to respond positively to the challenges raised by multiculturalism while preserving the spirit of sound scientific inquiry. At the same time I hope to challenge multiculturalists to think more broadly and deeply about what they really want students to know and feel and practice as they become successful, respectful participants in a multicultural world.

POSITIVE RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE OF MULTICULTURALISM: SOME LESSONS FROM THE SCIENCES

1. Greater inclusiveness

The easiest change that science educators in the U. S. can make is to uncover and include the stories of women and people of color in the history of science, and, when showing photographs or giving examples of working scientists, to be sure to include women and people of color. The assumption is that women and minority students will feel more included and welcome if they see others like themselves contributing to science. While this may be the case — especially if these "others" are the professors themselves — there is a danger of propagating an illusion that everything is okay in science, that science is an inclusive field, when unfortunately it is not.

Instead of pretending that science is inclusive, science educators can address the exclusivity straight on, and raise some very interesting questions, such as: Why are there such ethnic and gender imbalances in the sciences? Are these minorities somehow excluded or do they exclude themselves by choosing other fields — or both? What are the dynamics underlying these processes? What is the nature of the power relationships in the scientific community?

These questions bring us to the really meaty and controversial issues. What systematic biases might be present in the practice and teaching of science which cause or result from the imbalance of genders and ethnicities in science? If women and people of color are grossly under-represented, especially in the so-called hard sciences, can science really be as universal and objective as we like to believe?

These questions have led a generation of writers, especially women, to challenge the hallmark objectivity and universality of science, and not only to question its teaching but also its practice, theories, language, and even its foundational principles. The title of a book by feminist science critic Sandra Harding, for example, asks the revealing question, *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?* Challenges like these have created a backlash in response, but they have also led to some wonderful insights about the nature of nature, the nature of knowledge, and the nature of the scientific community; these insights contribute significantly to the discussions around diversity and multiculturalism.

Diversity as an ecological value

Despite its shortcomings of exclusivity, science can still teach a great deal about diversity and multiculturalism. The most obvious insights come from the fields of ecology and evolutionary biology, where students learn and see for themselves that the vitality and resiliency of an ecosystem relies heavily upon the diversity of species which comprise the system and even upon the richness of variation within species. *Diversity is a resource for adaptation to change*. If, for example, a species is perfectly adapted and maximally efficient in a particular ecological niche, its very homogeneity will be its downfall when the niche changes. With a diverse population, some of the members who were marginally adapted to the old circumstances may thrive in the new circumstances, while those who thrived in the old circumstances may become marginal in the new ones. The vulnerability of homogeneity is exactly why bio-diversity advocates urge the preservation and planting of many varieties of food crops and the conservation of heirloom species. If farmers all plant the same variety of corn, for example, a single blight can destroy a significant portion of a nation's crop. Ecologists have given scientific support to the old adage, "don't put all your eggs in one basket." The study of ecology also highlights the human folly of extinguishing species after species as we destroy whole ecosystems in our rage for global homogenization and growth. What vitality and resiliency will the human species lose when everyone speaks English?

In my experience, students who value diversity in natural ecosystems are usually quick to appreciate the value of diversity in human realms as well. Indeed, many students of ecology find themselves drawn to studies of sociology, cultural anthropology, and human ecology. They begin to question the nature of the human systems on the planet which give rise to the ruthless extermination of species and the annihilation of whole cultures and whole ecosystems. Thereby challenging global capitalism, consumerism, the politics and economics which work against preservation of bio-diversity, the inequities of wealth and power, and the attitudes of ignorance and indifference which allow the destruction to continue. They may begin to consider what role they themselves play in the systems of destruction and homogenization, and possibly even dedicate their lives to working for change.

Many students are able to find a motivation for multicultural awareness and sensitivity better through the back door of the study of ecological diversity than through being directly confronted with their own racism or white privilege with enforced studies of race, class, and gender. For some students, direct confrontation evokes — and, in the their minds, legitimates — latent prejudices, defensiveness, and resistance. To learn to value diversity should not require guilt, repentance, and conversion. A few simple lessons in basic ecology can open students' minds.

Survival of the cooperators

Another value evident in the fields of ecology and evolutionary biology is the benefit of cooperation. "Survival of the fittest" is too often thought of in social Darwinist

terms as survival of the strongest, toughest, meanest, shrewdest, most competitive. But in the natural world, fittest may equally involve a capacity for symbiotic cooperation — mutually supportive alliances, even individual sacrifice for the sake of offspring or the greater community — every bit as much as ruthless competitiveness.

The human species is marvelously skilled at employing our brains to develop technologies that confer a "competitive edge" over fellow humans and other species. However, unless we learn to give equal attention to developing our capacity for *cooperation* to address urgent global problems of war and violence, poverty and oppression, resource depletion, and the annihilation of our plant and animal relatives that evolved with us for millions of years, we are not fit to survive.

Communicating across differences of paradigm / culture

Another major lesson that we want our students to learn, in addition to the value of diversity and cooperation, is how to communicate across difference. Scientists regularly encounter this challenge and have given it a lot of thought. In 1962, science historian Thomas Kuhn, in his widely cited classic *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, elevated the word *paradigm* from its prior narrow meaning ("an illustrative example or pattern") to a much larger and widely used concept suggesting an entire worldview. The book presents a model for the process of paradigm conflict and change in the sciences that many others have generalized and adapted.

Over many years of discussing Kuhn's model of paradigm conflict in the sciences, I have evolved my own eclectic definition of the term:

> A paradigm is a worldview or perception of reality that provides a perspective for understanding, interpreting, and responding to everything we know and experience. As such, it may include beliefs, values, assumptions, prejudices, priorities, goals, desires, and visions of the future; language, jargon, literature, stories, and mythology; theories, mental models, methodologies, and techniques; in short, anything that organizes and lends meaning to the perceptions, thoughts, communications, and actions of its adherents.

I realized to my surprise not long ago that this definition is very close to what anthropologists mean when they use the word *culture*:

> ...a learned configuration of images and other symbolic elements widely shared among members of a given society which, for individuals, functions as an orientational framework for behavior, and for the group serves as the communicational matrix which tends to coordinate behavior.[2]

> ...all the customs — the different ways of behaving and believing — that each society teaches its members.[3]

Thus when students look at the process and nature of paradigm conflict and cross-paradigm communication in the sciences, they are also learning about the challenges of communication between differing cultures. They are learning a model that applies to many different circumstances of communicating across differences, from arguing with a roommate to international diplomacy. Kuhn's insights and those of subsequent authors regarding the incommensurability of paradigms and the unprovability of paradigms outside of their own domain are very helpful tools for helping students recognize the implicit assumptions and biases of their own paradigms, and to listen to others with patience and an open mind.

Perhaps the most revolutionary insight coming from the discussion of paradigms is the recognition that even in science one cannot escape from thinking and communicating with *some* kind of paradigm. There is no neutral, value-free, bias-free ultimate standpoint that is above all paradigms. Any such claimed standpoint is itself a paradigm. (Of course, even the statements I am presently making also come from within a particular paradigm of science.)

It's all models, metaphors, and uncertainty — and that's a good thing

Science offers us many more opportunities to examine values. Quantum physics, for example, offers the opportunity to teach about the essentially multiplistic and probabilistic nature of nature. Is the electron a highly localized point particle or a non-localized wave spread throughout space? The answer, of course, is that it *is* neither, but that aspects of its behavior are *well modeled* by the mathematics which physicists have associated with waves *and* particles. But what is the electron *really*? — students may ask — and the only answer is that *it is what it is*, and we call it an electron. To talk about an electron, to compare it with waves or particles that are common in human experience, is to use metaphors for the sake of communication and visualization. The metaphors and models we choose also suggest further experimentation and applications. We make predictions of electron behavior based on how the associated metaphors behave. Good metaphors lead to successful predictions. But they do not tell us what something *is*. To ask what *is* the electron *really* is already a leap of reification that makes a "thing" out of a *collection of observed phenomena*.

Anthropologist Michael Kearney, in his book *World Views*, recounts the joke of an Englishman, Frenchman, and German sharing a loaf of bread. "I call it *Brot*," says the German. "I call it *pain*," says the Frenchman. The Englishman says, "I call it bread, and it *is* bread."[4] Most monolingual, monocultured American students, like the Englishman, feel in their guts that the reality they know and describe in English *is Reality*, not just one particular representation or model of reality.

To realize that even hard core physicists are always talking about maps and models and never about reality itself comes as a major revelation for many students. With a bit of additional introspection they may realize that they too live in a world of socially-constructed myths, models, and metaphors which take on the feeling of

real reality because most students have never experienced radically alternative paradigms. Students who are bicultural or who have lived in other cultures for a significant length of time seem to find these ideas much easier to accept.

The dual wave-particle nature of electrons turns out to be characteristic of all elementary "particles," from protons and neutrons to light. This paradoxical behavior derives from a basic principle of quantum physics commonly called Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, or sometimes Heisenberg's Principle of Indeterminacy. This principle is a mathematical representation of the intuitive idea that to know where something is (or even *if* something is) requires "looking" at it — which means *interacting* with it using light or some other means. But every interaction involves an exchange of energy and velocity, with the consequence that the more precisely one determines the location of something, the less precisely one can know its velocity — i. e., which direction or how fast it's going. So its location a few moments later is impossible to know or predict with any certainty. The better physicists understood this principle the more humble they became regarding prediction and determinacy. Any aspirations for certainty have been abandoned, and physicists content themselves with calculating probabilities of various possible outcomes. Moreover, all observation involves *inter*action, which necessarily changes both the observer and the thing being observed. We live in a participatory universe.

So with this one story of the wave/particle duality, we have the opportunity to encourage students to consider all the following notions:

- that the world is essentially pluralistic;
- that multiple perspectives are required for what remains an incomplete explanation;
- that paradigm conflicts, as between wave and particle models of elementary phenomena, are not always "resolvable" but may persist in a tension which physicists call complementarity; and to comprehend nature seems to require complementary, seemingly contradictory perspectives;
- that when scientists try for perfect precision they find it to be impossible — not just in practice but in principle; all knowledge is probabilistic;
- that the language of communication in science (and dare we say in all realms) is one of models and metaphors, maps of reality, and not reality itself.

Altogether, these ideas form a sort of scientists' version of post-modernism — an awakening from the illusion of absolutes and from the delusion of dogmatic certainty. These ideas are all valuable lessons in cross-cultural (i.e., cross-paradigm) communication.

Can seemingly conflicting realities both be "true"?

Many years ago I was generously offered the opportunity to participate in a Native American healing ceremony led by a revered elder of the Lakota tribe. I came

with an open, receptive mind mediated with a lifetime of trained scientific skepticism. Among numerous memorable aspects of the ceremony, one was the most provocative. In a totally darkened room, small, sparks of light appeared above and around the floor-seated group. We were told that these were manifestations of powerful spirits who had come to hear our petitions for healing. I found it hard to accept the likelihood of little spirits flying around the room making sparks. As a skeptical scientist, I found it easier to assume that the wise and clever healer knew some tricks of pyrotechnic "magic" which he could use to wow trusting people into believing that spirits had come to heal them. The sparks were impressive theatre, but to claim that they were manifestations of spirits seemed manipulative and deceptive.

However, despite my skepticism, I had come to like and respect this elder, so I let myself try to imagine how he could feel that he was being honest, not just creating illusions. My insight in this moment was that the entire ceremony was based in a whole different paradigm, a whole different *set of metaphors* than I was assuming. A spirit is, like every other word we use, a metaphor, a socially constructed concept that associates certain phenomena together and assigns "it" a name — just like the electron, just like the bread / *Brot* / *pain*. Was "healing energy" present in that room? Evidently. More than a few people said later that they experienced some degree of "healing" — some change in themselves for the better. The healer did indeed invoke healing energy and, even in my skeptical view, facilitated its manifestation. He called it spirit. A physiologist might have called it psychosomatic healing or healing with the mind. But what is it *really*? Like the electron, it is what it is. There are different metaphors for talking about it; some come from languages of spirit and some come from languages of science. Some metaphors are useful for some things and some are useful for others. This Native healer had developed language and ritual appropriate to his experience that helped others to heal; I could no longer think of him as dishonest.

Conclusion: Why does it matter?

In a world unenlightened by diversity values, differences between people quickly become causes for bitter conflict. If Truth is singular and absolute, and if someone thinks they possess it, then any opinion or belief different from theirs must be false, wrong, bad, evil. No wonder diversity is threatening to the self-righteous, for to them, diversity breeds chaos and perpetual conflict. But if truth is plural, if multiple perspectives are essential to understanding, then diversity is welcomed.

Some students, not to mention academicians, fear this seeming intellectual relativism as post-modern or new-age solipsism, a move toward moral chaos. How is anyone supposed to make moral judgments and commitments in a world where every person's opinion is as valid as every other? Although diversity values suggest a world in which multiple, seemingly contradictory partial truths can coexist, critical analysis is still possible, along with moral commitments. But the criteria for evalu-

ating metaphors and paradigms are not generally the same as those for evaluating claims of truth, and even these criteria are open for discussion. Ideally students are left with a great deal more awareness and humility about their own opinions and biases, and a greater willingness to listen to and respect those of others.

Ideally, in a multicultural, multi-paradigmed community, truth and reality are collectively created, through constant communication and sharing of diverse experiences and insights ("storysharing"), with no voices excluded. Though universal consensus may not be achieved, mutual understanding and appreciation may at least facilitate peaceful coexistence. People are killing and dying in dogmatic, self-righteous adherence to their Truth. Perhaps the world would be less violent if we recognized that we are always arguing over paradigms — myths, models, and metaphors of reality and truth — not over truth itself. Especially for students who resist the self-examination and self-recrimination that often comes with considering issues of race, class, and gender head-on, learning diversity values in a science class enables them to let-go of some of their dogmatism, defensiveness, and fear, and to join in the process of negotiating and sharing realities, rather than fighting over them.

NOTES

1. Quoted in Keller, Evelyn Fox, *Reflections on Gender and Science*, New York: Yale University Press, 1985. P. 6.
2. Charles C. Hughes, quoted in Banks, James A., *Teaching the Black Experience*, Belmont, CA: Fearon, 1970. P. 37.
3. Gene Lisitzky, quoted in Banks, *Teaching the Black Experience*, 37.
4. Kearney, Michael, *World View*,New York: Chandler & Sharp, 1984. P. 158.

МУЛЬТИКУЛЬТУРНОСТЬ И НАУКА: ФАКТОР МНОГООБРАЗИЯ В «ЦЕННОСТНО-НЕЙТРАЛЬНОЙ» НАУКЕ

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Считается, что наука принципиально отличается от других видов познания, практикуемых человеком. Говорят, что для науки характерно нейтральное отношение к ценностям — это объективное, универсальное познание физического мира, свободное от человеческих пристрастий и интересов. Многие ученые скрывают за своей верой в ценность нейтральное отношение и преподают своим ученикам «исключительно факты», полагая, что им удалось остаться в стороне

от запутанных баталий в сфере политики, религии и культуры. В последнее время, однако, большое число авторов обращает внимание на то, что культурные и гендерные аспекты оказывают значительное влияние на определения, приоритеты и практику преподавания науки. Подобное признание не свидетельствует о кризисе в науке, а наоборот, расширяет масштаб научного подхода и позволяет студентам открыть для себя «многообразие ценностей», доступное современной науке. Эти ценности включают: преимущество различных взглядов и понимание несовершенства ограниченной перспективы; преимущества умения общаться и сотрудничать, преодолевая парадигмальные отличия; преимущества понимания многообразия, не просто как ответ на актуальный социальный запрос, но как базовое условие жизнеспособности, устойчивости и адаптивности любой системы; преимущества сотрудничества для экологического и эволюционного аспектов; ограниченность достоверности, определенности и контроля; способность и желание видеть мир скорее как совокупность возможностей, нежели набор непреложных фактов и неопровержимых истин; способность к выстраиванию целостной и сущностно сложной картины природы; и осознание того, что знание, даже научное знание, не является реальностью, а лишь одной из ее моделей.

ANONYMITY IN ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS: DIVERSITY RELINQUISHED, DIVERSITY REGAINED

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The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.
Karl Marx

It is not about changing the world, but living in it.
Robert Rauschenberg

The difference between the two quotes above demarcates a profound difference of opinion with regard to how humans might pursue the problem of becoming at home in the world. Marx's attempt to change the world suffered the same fate as all such rationalized systems — be they conscious constructions or products of more or less unconscious socio/cultural evolution. Rationalized systems are, sooner or later, transformed in the crucible of power dynamics to meet the ends of power — not those of positive social transformation. The writings of cultural studies practitioners, critical theorists, and philosophers of science in the last three-quarters of a century or so are replete with examples of the failure of systematic thought to escape the encroachments of reification. There is little reason to believe that this phenomenon will not continue replicating itself with varying degrees of ferocity.

Robert Raushenberg is best known as a "pop" artist. His idea about not "changing the world, but living in it," means for me the rejection of purely formal or rational constructs in favor of a much more individual, lived, solution. One does not seek happiness, one is happy in the pursuit of a rich life; one does not seek world change, one lives in the world, and in so doing, contributes to the making of a life-space that is congenial to oneself and one's loved ones.

But we live in a world of differentiation that is ever the more radically articulated even as that difference is reduced to the finest splitting of hairs. We live in a consumer culture that ever more intensely pounds us with an endless stream of messages about how definitively to set ourselves apart — if we only use this shampoo, drive this car, see this film, have this job... At the same time, any semblance of distinction drains away in an inescapable cycle of cynical self-recognition followed by blind re-immersion into that which swallows both our misgivings and our selves. As Frank Lentricchia once said, "Early capitalism produces alienation — late capitalism appropriates it."

How to find oneself? How to engage others in a space that forbids the intrusion of any of the common social barriers of status, money, religion, class, caste, sexual preference, etc.?

The concept of Anonymity is called the "spiritual foundation" of Alcoholics Anonymous. In the nearly seventy years since AA first came into being, an appreciation of the richness of this concept has steadily evolved. This evolution has enabled a form of identification with other human beings that is as significant as it is profound. I argue that identification of this kind may enable people who are not members of AA or any of the programs that AA has encouraged, to explore its potential in their own lives. I will not be able here to detail the specifics of an adaptation of AA to general use. I will, however, lay out the argument that I believe makes such an adaptation possible.

The term *anonymity* is commonly thought to refer to the anonymity of alcoholics with regard to their membership in AA — that is, the fact that one is an alcoholic in AA should remain private, not public, knowledge. This aspect of anonymity was especially important in the earliest years of AA, when there was far less confidence that AA would achieve lasting success. In that tentative, early period, members of AA who were also public figures would occasionally, often out of a fervent but misplaced desire to help others, announce that they were members of Alcoholics Anonymous. Unfortunately, some of these people began to co-opt the hard-fought reputation for scrupulous honesty achieved by the *program* of AA. They used AA as a validation for all kinds of personal, political and even financial gain. Equally as bad, some fell away into active (and well-publicized) alcoholism. These incidents caused unwanted and undeserved criticism of AA at a time when its success and attractive power were especially vulnerable. This aspect of anonymity is still a significant part of its meaning.

So, many have rightly assumed that a critical factor in recovery is the fact that people in AA identify themselves as alcoholics. However, of crucial importance in this process is also the willingness, not just to identify oneself as an alcoholic, but to give up all *other* definitions of one's self. One becomes anonymous in the hopes of identifying with others. Over the years, then, the concept of anonymity has evolved to include this deeper meaning: the process of gradual elimination of all definitions of oneself commonly held to be indicators of status or prestige. In most cases alcoholism and/or the problems resulting from it are the motivating factors in *getting* to AA. But the willingness to relinquish all socio/cultural and self-definitions of status or prestige is crucial in motivating people to *stay*.

AA meetings, then, consist largely of people who have relinquished common socio/cultural criteria many use as self-validation. They see this as an essential step in their personal sobriety. This is a necessary factor in identification with others during meetings. Socio/cultural categories that would ordinarily limit one alcoholic's ability to identify with another are eliminated or, at least, reduced to the point of insignificance. Anonymity, therefore, functions even more importantly *within* AA meetings than it does on the outside.

A bit of history can elucidate these points further.

In the early years of AA, most alcoholics who came into the program had lost everything. They had experienced an ever-accelerating elimination of the people and responsibilities that interfered with their drinking. In fact, active alcoholics often

used these relationships and responsibilities with increasing frequency as an *excuse* to drink. They lost jobs, titles, friends, wives, families — everything. When, finally, there was nothing between them and the bottle, they discovered that they *still* couldn't drink successfully! They discovered they were nothing *but* alcoholics.

This still happens to some. In cases like these, progressive personal disintegration as the result of alcoholism functions to reduce the alcoholic's self esteem to virtually nothing. So, *before* they get to AA, they have lost virtually all socio/cultural distinctions that might enhance self-esteem. Though many people coming to AA still have this experience, an ever-increasing number have quite a different story.

Due to a growing awareness of the success of AA in our society, many alcoholics are coming to the program much earlier in the progress of their disease. Such people often sustain almost no serious financial, physical, or family losses. Therefore, many aspects of their lives that serve as markers of personal and social validation survive. Most have suffered considerable damage to their self-respect, but not the serious personal and financial losses that plagued virtually every newcomer to the program in the early years.

Some who are in this category seem to recover their self-esteem very quickly. But this is often a smokescreen. What they recover is the ability to quickly paper over the fact of their alcoholism. But this façade eventually cracks under insistent pressures driven by the superficially effaced reality of their alcoholism. The genie pops its own cork and enslaves its hapless possessors once again. Enslavement lasts as long as such people choose to hold any self-definition or self-concept prior to that of "alcoholic." Today, the trick for many newcomers is to recognize the fact that the newly acquired self-definition is not simply an addendum to the various roles and self-definitions they still maintain in life. Newcomers must, at the deepest level, recognize that the self-diagnosis of alcoholic is *the* defining characteristic of their existence. Successfully recovering alcoholics become anonymous creatures whose sole defining term is one not, initially, easily or comfortably taken on.

But it is the other side of this phenomenon that is important in this discussion. In many cases, it is not just the difficulty of accepting one's alcoholism that is the problem — although that can be an agonizingly slow and painful process in itself. It is, rather, becoming willing to relinquish all traditional indicators of personal and social status — to become just another human being in the room, just another alcoholic. For a person in the early days of sobriety, the willingness to relinquish whatever shreds of personal esteem he or she has left is almost an impossible task. Until this begins to happen, identification with others in meetings is not fully realized.

By now, some of you are probably feeling increasing exasperation. "Clearly," you say, "it is not possible for such a level of anonymity to exist — the anonymity you talk of must be porous as a sieve. One could simply observe the parking lot after the meeting. It is obvious whose getting into the BMW, Lexus, Chevy Cavalier or rust bucket. Life just isn't that private. Clothing can be a clue. To speak in a meeting is to reveal, by speech pattern and vocabulary, something of oneself. The anonymity you talk of can't work because it is not possible."

Of course, "pure" or "total" anonymity is impossible to achieve, much less maintain. *But it doesn't matter. Willingness* to give up markers of social status is the key. Alcoholics value and practice anonymity because, however imperfect, it enables them to cut through to what is important and valuable in their lives. That is, the attainment of a form of identification with others that sadly, many human beings rarely experience. Anonymity enables alcoholics to identify with others because they are not encumbered or distracted by the mundane details of others' status, income, possessions, or political views. But, again, this is only one side of it. On the other side (the *inside*), to chose anonymity is to refuse to *oneself* the easy distractions of one's own personal status (be it good, bad or indifferent). It means striving toward a form of identification that not only promises, but delivers rewards not achieved by many "normal" people, much less those who have, for centuries, been reviled as being physically, morally and spiritually corrupt.

There are certain characteristics of meetings today that help to understand the function of anonymity.

First, the focus in meetings is on usually on living, not, as often was the case in the early years, on extended "drunkalogues." Secondly, a speaker's reference to personal details, other than brief self-qualification as an alcoholic, is minimal. Specific, personal details serve to inhibit others in the meeting from identifying with the experiences the speaker is describing. If, say, a person walks into a meeting for the first time and his or her attention is directed again and again to the socio-economic status, political orientations, religious beliefs, and detailed personal lives of the people speaking, rather than to basic human experiences and feelings, that person may leave having not identified and likely never to return.

The character of AA meetings, then, has been molded out of a history marked by a resolute and voluntary maintenance of the condition of anonymity. The premise of anonymity requires no embellishment beyond concerns of the *quality* of daily life. Many alcoholics feel that the lives they have today are infinitely superior to any of their previous experience, even those who did not develop full-blown alcoholism until later in life. These individuals constantly extol the quality of life they now have even though some had years of normalcy previous to active alcoholism. Discussions focus on the quality of one's mental and spiritual condition. The protective cloak of anonymity enables identification on a basic, human level. People speak to the human spirit, not the ego or bank account. Identification is therefore, paradoxically, a function of anonymity — the willing relinquishment of identity.

It is the paradox of anonymity enabling identification that is crucial to this discussion. The import of this form of identification can be best indicated through its negation. Identification can be thought of as a technical term that has a number of meanings, many of them either negative or at best ambivalent.

Two brief points must suffice to elucidate. First, some students of culture and society have noticed that the history of Western culture is based largely in the reduction of nature to rational formulae and/or discursive treatment. The "identification of

phenomena," that is, the reduction of phenomena to rational categories, is an almost universal human undertaking. But those who examine these activities also noticed that identification of this kind resulted in the same basic outcome — the reduction of everything (and everyone) to instrumental functionality. That is, labor, products, people, and nature became means to an end rather than ends in themselves.

Secondly, it became clear that, despite this negative side, the process of identification was essential to the entire project of science and knowledge. There cannot be knowledge without the construction of hierarchical categories that provide us the means of coping with the complexities of life. The reduction of everything to the rational has its price, but it also has enormous payoffs. However, there seem to be few situations in which there is not a reduction to instrumentalist terms. The highest price in all of this in my view, is the reduction of humans to categories — from those we label as prejudicial as in racism or homophobia, to those we presume reflect the epitome of import and status. Further, virtually all of these categories are, in one form or another, associated with a dollar sign.

Identification through anonymity in AA, however, produces a situation in which all are both means *and* ends. With the sacrifice of personal identity, people of all kinds can communicate in a most profound manner. They are immersed in a unique atmosphere that encourages the unveiling of their most intimate thoughts without fear of judgment or condemnation. Most of us have had the experience of a serious chat with our image in the mirror. Expressing oneself in AA has virtually all of the confidentiality of those chats, except that the mirror — the anonymous fellow member — speaks to us in words other than we might have chosen, without judgment or condemnation, without comment on our statements, but profoundly, out of their own experience.

The result is a sense of community and intimacy that many *families* fail to achieve even in their most trusting and open moments. This sense of identification — of community — in the shared, willing sacrifice of personal identity motivates AA members to continue regularly attending meetings throughout their lives. Fear of insanity or loss of family or job or even death never served as long-term deterrents for alcoholics. While the hopelessness of alcoholism sometime gets people to AA, anonymity enables a level of identification profound enough to keep them there. But alcoholics have no corner on living problems. Such problems are facts of human existence. Non-alcoholics, conversing and communicating under the empty category of, as someone has said, just a "bare-assed human being," may themselves be able to reach a level of serenity and self-respect many sober alcoholics experience.

As their sobriety deepens, members of AA gain the ability to leave a meeting and go home or back to work fully re-engaged with the world and all of its difficulties and all of its joys. They wear the mantel of complexly interwoven and often conflicting everyday identities as a loose garment. Sober alcoholics engage in continual and critical self-reflection. Their own experiences, actions and thoughts are rarely conveniently opaque to them. In this reflective re-engagement with the world and with themselves, sober members of AA know exactly what criteria qualify as worthy indicators of their progress toward a richer, more humane existence.

АНОНИМНОСТЬ В ОБЩЕСТВАХ АНОНИМНЫХ АЛКОГОЛИКОВ: РАЗНООБРАЗИЕ УТРАЧЕННОЕ И ВНОВЬ ОБРЕТЕННОЕ

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Понятие анонимности принимается за «духовное основание» обществ анонимных алкоголиков. За почти 70 лет существования подобных обществ смысл этого понятия существенно расширился. В результате этого развития возникла форма отождествления собственного «Я» с другими людьми, что представляет собой явление неоспоримой важности и глубокого характера. Я глубоко убежден в том, что такого рода идентификация способна дать возможность людям, не являющимся членами обществ анонимных алкоголиков или других подобных программ, оценить ее потенциал на примере своей жизни. Здесь мы не приводим описание способов адаптации этой формы к ее широкому использованию. Однако представим доводы, убеждающие, что такая адаптация принципиально возможна. Под анонимностью в обществах анонимных алкоголиков обычно понимается анонимность факта членства в подобном обществе. Что означает, что признание человека алкоголиком, посещающим анонимное общество алкоголиков, остается частной закрытой информацией. Однако, другой важной составляющей этого процесса является желание человека не просто идентифицировать себя как алкоголика, но отказаться от прочих своих идентификаций. Человек прибегает к анонимности в надежде идентифицировать себя с другими. Со временем понятие анонимности приобрело более глубокое значение: речь идет о процессе постепенного отказа от всех определений себя, которые выполняют функцию показателей социального статуса и престижа. В обществах анонимных алкоголиков вариативность приносится в жертву ради разделяемого всеми стремления идентифицировать себя с другими. В рамках данной работы мы изучаем природу анонимности, анализируем, как она функционирует в обществах анонимных алкоголиков и как можно расширить область применения данного механизма как способа идентификации себя с другими. Мы полагаем, что исследование подобного рода идентификации поможет лучше понять характер функционирования элементов общности, преодолевающих этические, расовые, религиозные, культурные и политические различия.

UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING PHILOSOPHICAL HARMONY: (A MUSICAL OFFERING OF THE OTHERNESS)

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The hidden harmony is more perfect than the apparent[1]
Heraclitus

Humanity is not an aggregate of individuals, a community of thinkers, each of whom is guaranteed from the outset to be able to reach agreement with the others, because all participates in the same thinking essence. Nor, of course, is it a single Being in which the multiplicity of individuals are dissolved and into which these individuals are destined to be reabsorbed.[2]
Maurice Merleau — Ponty, 1948

Musical Understanding is an expression of the life of mankind[3]
Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1948

Ethos of the Problematic

The primordial aim in this lecture could be accurately described as a *musico-philosophical* investigation. Such a *philosophical* perspective seems to assume, after Nietzsche, Adorno, and Wittgenstein, that the blurring of the original unity between philosophy and music has to be rethought and overcome. This assumption, equally relevant for the Indo-Iranian, Japanese and Chinese cosmologies, is grounded, in western culture, on the constructive acknowledgment of the internal relation between the general theory of *Lógos,* and the theory of αρμονια for which the concept of *musiké* is one of the major dimensions.[4]

The 20th century provided, since the Nietzsche's investigations concerning the essence of music, fundamental rediscoveries of the original link between *mélos, rutmos* and *lógos*, and generally between *the essence of music and the essence of Saying*. Their impact can be felt in the field of Greek philology or musicology[5] and, obviously, in the field of the philosophy of music represented by thinkers or composers such as Ernst Bloch, Arnold Schoenberg, T. W. Adorno and, most particularly, in all periods of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical itinerary. It is, in effect, worth underscoring that Wittgenstein, beginning with his early *Tagebьcher*, continuing in the *Tractatus*, the *Philosophical Grammar* and his last remarks concerning the concept of *understanding*, provided the conditions of possibilities for a consistent *Musical Thinking*. These works give rise to a double construction of logical and *musical* thinking in the elucidation of *proposition:*

> Musical themes are, in a sense, propositions. Knowledge of the essence of logic will, for this reason, lead us to knowledge of the essence of music.[6]

Such a prelude for a musico-philosophical approach to culture (holistic and differential) leads us to assume the range of musical thinking may transcend the limits of a grammatical elucidation. Obviously, thinking about *Unity and Diversity* through the philosophical *lekton* of structural *Harmony* will start by describing our language games with these concepts, by describing their *grammar*s. However, the true *ethos* of the problematic of *harmony* does not lie in a mere ethical and methodological gesture. On the contrary, the possible sense of *ethics*, *aesthetics*, and *otherness* can only be defined by the *Kairos* of the Other, the ante predicative apparition of the other's *Face*. Unity of aesthetic and ethical experience through an inter-subjective encounter with the world is granted following the poetic terms of Renй Char, in the evidence of a *Common Presence*.

The controversial idea of *Harmony,* from its exaltation in Leibniz's *Monadology* to its disqualification in Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory*, passing through Rousseau or Victor Hugo, requires, *a fortiori,* a philosophical construction. Such a construction should take into account the multiplicity of its conceptual use in theology, ethics and aesthetics. In order to overcome the analogical misconceptions of *closeness* and *regularity* inherited from the prejudices of anthropology and aesthetic theory, we need a semantic clarification capable of leading us, through a conceptual genealogy, to possible new constructions. Understanding *Harmony* refers primordially, under these conditions, to the experience of listening αρμονια.

From this perspective, *éthos* will be also linked to codetermination between the generic concept of music — *mélos* — and the primordial meaning of *éthos,* that is, for the body to be *tuned* in a certain way. Arguing a difference between cultivated and popular music (or culture), as R. Shusterman suggested, would not change at all the formal conditions of the hermeneutical problem. Such, one might say, was also the case — apart from all the contextual differences arising from mass culture — in Terpandro's days, in Plato's time or in Aristotle and Aristoxene's. The secularization of musical traditions and their *eventual* perception as a degraded culture, *Unkultur* and *music industry* must itself be subject to definition by the hermeneutic approach.

A close link can be traced between philologist and musicologist Johannes Lohmann's interpretation of the Greeks' *system* of music as a *primary grammar*, and Heidegger's conception of it as a kind of "existential logic." This affinity can point us the possible interconnections between philology, phenomenology, hermeneutics, ontology and Wittgenstein's style of grammatical thinking.

Our theoretical and dialogical perspective, with its stress on the relevance of *cultural hermeneutics*, *aesthetics* and *musical thinking* for the problematics of *Unity and diversity,* will entail several methodological demands. These tasks can be equally formulated from a *phenomenological, hermeneutical,* or *grammatical* point of view. In any case, the crucial point is to provide a conceptual clarification of our way of using such categories as *hermeneutics, aesthetics, and musical thinking*.

A precise *construction* of their respective theoretical use will ensure the consistency of our main goal of *understanding* and *interpreting culture*.

As a first Coda, we assume that, as the phenomenologist would say — and as Wittgenstein pointed in his *Conference on Ethics* — a discourse *in the first person* will be effectively tuned with the *tónos* of the problem.

Delimitation of the hermeneutic situation (Perspectives of Cultural Hermeneutics)

After the relatively short intermezzo of the so-called post-modern post-philosophy, *philosophically* thinking about Unity and Diversity in the field of any morphology of culture and religion cannot consist in constructing or deconstructing discursive topics already constrained by the limits of preconceived theoretical models. This poses the problem of the possible concurrence of *mythology* and demythologizing. As Wittgenstein observes in his *Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough,* "We can only describe here and say: so is human life."

Wittgenstein's innovative remark is certainly consistent with a philosophical tradition of anti-causal *morphology* concerned with stressing differences in anthropologic phenomena. A tradition involving such different thinkers as Aristotle, Goethe, Montesquieu, Condillac or Kant, and leading to C. S. Peirce, W. James, E. Spranger and R. Musil. However, in order to respect the independence of Wittgenstein's description of the multiplicity of *Lebensformen* which articulate *scientific or philosophical explanations*, we must avoid any *transcendental use* of the categories of *Sprachspiel, Lebensform* or *Grammar*. In other words, the exercise of human investigation does not call the *pragmatic transcendental* foundation.

Even for Wittgenstein, *description* is a *moment*, never a philosophical *Telos*. These assumptions lead us to defining the grammar of the concept of *hermeneutics* and its distinctive relevance for what is to be thought.

Considering the current styles of philosophical discussion, we must first remark that the semantic domain of *hermeneutics* has branched out in such different methodological directions that we can only use the term in a *relative* sense, and, indeed, in consciously open manner.[7] Hermeneutics refers for us to a multiplicity of perspectives on understanding, a *deep* or *speculative* hermeneutics and finally a *philosophical hermeneutics* following the thread of *language*. After the era of Schleiermacher's[8] and Dilthey's emphasis on *understanding* the function of *strangeness* following the model of the sciences of spirit, *hermeneutics* has not only included the full *historical* dimension, but also the *language* character of human experience of the world. In this line, completely developed by Gadamer in *Truth and Method*, the hermeneutic strategy has also integrated the *philological study of conceptuality itself*[9], and, above all, the Wittgensteinian concept of *Sprachspiel*. Analytic philosophy, pragmatics, Wittgensteinian anthropology conducted through *language games* and *forms of life*, are consistently articulated in contemporary *Hermeneutics of Cul-*

ture.[10] It is however reasonable to think that this process of fusion is, in a sense, a logical development of the "traditional concept of Hermeneutics" exposed by Heidegger during his Fryeburg lectures (1923) concerning *Hermeneutics of Facticity*.[11] Two years earlier, in the context of his *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, Heidegger had engaged a meditation concerning the *aesthetic* motive in *Augustine and Neo-Platonism*. There we find the young Heidegger stating that "Augustine produces the first *Hermeneutics* of high style." This emphatic early thesis is in effect intimately related to the growing role of *aesthetical experience* in the phenomenological and hermeneutical tradition leading to Gadamer and Hans Robert Jauss. In this sense, the complete structure of the six books of Augustine's *De Musica* is conceived not in light of any specific psychological or aesthetic purpose, but as a kind of neo-platonic formal aesthetic, where numeric theory and the doctrine of relations are engaged as a function of an *axiological ordination*: the *Summum Bonum*.[12] Augustine uttered this in a rather oracular style, echoing the ethical sense of this primordial *Cantare* for our lives. It will be precisely this point that, in his own *cammin della nostra vita*, Dante's poetic *fictio* will constantly recall, in reference to the *Confession*'s author.

At this point, it is well to recognize that our subject is not to draw a history of the hermeneutic spirit, a semantic genealogy of culture as such, of its structural morphology, or of the general problem of cultural relativity. Were all these methodological problems cleared, true philosophical themes would still inhabit our minds in a metamorphic way, resounding in all our complicated forms of life, as the tension or the counterpoint between *éthos* and *otherness*, bodied forth as an irreducible affirmation of duty. The definite use of musical *lexis* is far from *metaphorical*. Its function corresponds internally to the outlines of an alternative ontology of the *otherness*. The appearance and entreaty of the *Other* has been effectively defined, at its deepest level, in the Heideggerian meditation of the *Dasein*'s resoluteness towards itself: *"Only by authentically Being- their- selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another*"[13] However, if *Resoluteness* is a distinctive modality of the *Dasein*'s *Disclosedness,* it is so in the ontological horizon of *Being-in-the-World*. The experience of a *musical* understanding of otherness, as opposed to simply an acoustic one, is connected with the *ontological* presence of the Other. Strangely, perhaps the most discerning intuition of this specific *tension* can be founded in Robert Musil's description of Ulrich's utopia of *Other Condition* in *The Man without Qualities*.[14] In effect, the binomial opposition between *Soul and Precision* exposed by Musil's view of *Kultur* in *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* and his *Essays* seems singularly adequate for an initial consideration of the *grammar* of Unity and Diversity. The philosophical and anthropological polarity already introduced by the young Musil springs from an obviously Nietszchian source. This *motive* is, however, one of the most *durchkomponiert* from a philosophical and narrative point of view. It expresses the Musil's claim to a *real* fusion of this cultural polarity, while the same time flaunting a complete defiance (even an aversion) towards any scientific, philosophical, psychoanalytic or sociologic *dogma*.

The self-articulation of ideas is possible through the monadic perspective of each fictional character. Thus the will for a perfect fusion in Clarisse's mystic Love or Ulrich's and Agate's utopia of the Millenary Reign are connected with the sphere of reality in a new register. Harmony between Unity and Diversity is set forth in a kind of baroque intercession of concepts, illuminating the three ethical utopias that still make our world in 2004: the utopia of Inductive Thinking, the utopia of life in love and the utopia of the Other Condition. As Musil wrote in a late manuscript: "Overall problem: war. Pseudo realities lead to war. The *Parallel Campaign* leads to war!"

In the literary writing, *Possibilities* open up reality but "in a more subtle tessitura." Such a skeptical emphasis of Culture's myths echoes amazingly the distinction established by Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* between what can be *expressed* and what has to be silent, the *mystical*. For Musil, the grammar of anthropological and ethical unity can be heard most accurately through the voices of his literary characters. Likewise, the language games we play with these concepts and with our own concepts of understanding and interpreting arise from *aesthetic investigation*. In Wittgenstein's case, the true *Opus Metaphysicum* was *music*. Thus, for him it is in the practice of *musical thinking*, music interpretation, and appreciation that the deepest signification of understanding, interpreting and translating a *Sprache* can be found. At the same time, the ethical and aesthetic possibilities of humankind can be exhibited in a sphere other than *theoretical*, scientific or philosophical *discourse*. This line of thought, focused on *Dichtung* or *Musikalische Gedanken* as opposed to celebrating an anti metaphysical or anti aesthetic position, conveys a *cultural hermeneutics,* understood in the most polyphonic and open sense. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty addressed the relationship between art and ontological experience through their diverse manners of thinking the painting gesture. Yet both stress that creation, always ever new, brings out Being's self revelation and its fission. In this sense Merleau-Ponty observed that painters such as Cйzanne or Klee offer "a carnal essence or icon" giving visual existence to that which profane vision believes invisible.

In its widest sense, the *musical gesture*, projecting *musical thinking* in all its multiplicity and framed by its interpretation, realizes an ontological *contrapunctus* of such categories as expressible-inexpressible, visible-invisible, sense-non sense, finite infinite, order-chaos, universal-singular.

Cultural hermeneutics, including in some ways the philosophical spirit of a definite Aristotelian and Musilian *precision*, establishes the effective counter play of Unity, Diversity and Otherness. Philosophical description is not conducted in the spirit of a skeptical rhapsody, nor is it necessarily aimed towards a "pre established disharmony." Cultural hermeneutics, as the philosophy of mathematics and aesthetics, is not a mere description of an ontological absolute. Unity and plurality are categories diversely orchestrated by specific constructions in the following internally connected fields:

α) Mathematics and Logic
β) Quantum Physics and the Theory of Physics in general

γ) Biology
δ) Epistemology
ε) Philosophy
ζ) Aesthetics, particularly musical aesthetics and formal analysis
η) Dialectical Theology
θ) Mystical experience
ι) Political sciences
κ) Law and the Theory of Justice
λ) Anthropology in the broad sense

There is no consistent reason for the claim of a *theory* of unity among these cognitive fields. However, what is required is that we recognize the cross relations between our uses of the concept of unity. The primary use involves the link, recognized by Husserl, among the idealization of the diverse, the attribution of meaning and *temporality*. "Consciousness of time is the original location for the constitution of Unity in general."[15] Such a perspective is more complex than the mere assumption of a vague *intuition*. Rather, it leads to a *pure generality* whose derivations are *pure possibilities,* not facts or empirical experiences.

After Boethius's *Consolation* of musical cosmic order, specified in his *De Institutione Musica*, only Leibniz offered a framework of the *ontology of music* as an invisible harmonization of Creation. In this sense, his presentation of music as a kind of unconscious experience[16] is not only a metaphor. The ramification of the hermeneutics of music as an ontological experience of *Harmony* is understood as a process of *structural stability* in all the above mentioned cognitive fields, the ontological dynamics of the play of the world, the singular explosion of Being and its infinite resolutions. This reiteration of the ontological and cosmological relevance of *harmony*, obliterated during the secularization of culture, is key for interpreting the unity of ethics and aesthetics. An open hermeneutic problematizes both holism and cultural relativism, showing and constructing the multiple voices of the Invention of cultural harmony.

Methodology and possible human worlds

We could summarize this emphasis by indicating the importance of the following question: "What does it mean, what are the implications of *understanding* and *interpreting* an aesthetic or ethical *gesture,* an artistic or religious experience (eventually unified in musical thinking) — in their silences or in their many languages — as integrated culture*,* and as sign of *humanity*?" This interrogation, in its modulation, functions as an outline for hermeneutic methodology itself. Just as in the case of *mathematics*, the problem does not consist in *penetrating the essence of unity* or in describing its systematics, but in *inventing* it or *constructing* it. Remarking on how Augustine calls to mind in his *Confessions* (XI, 20) the variety of statements

about duration, past, present or future, Wittgenstein points out the importance of directing our investigation towards the *possibilities* of phenomena:

> Es ist uns, als muβten, wir die Erscheinungen durchschauen: unsere untersuchungung aber richter sicht nicht auf die Erscheinung, sondern, wie man sagen kцnnte, auf die "mцglichkeiten" der Erscheinunge[17]

Understanding is not achieved through a special kind of *insight*, but in the course of a synoptic view of the *language* forms in which we talk about them. The scope of the investigation of the possible transcends the status of *possibility and probability*. It opens the concept up for the philosophical consideration of ways to see and think about impredictable aspects of the world, in a sense stressed by Wittgenstein and Musil as well as by Merleau-Ponty or Emmanuel Levinas. It has been both a motive for enthusiasm and despair to ascertain that Wittgenstein's grammatical approach to understanding through the virtually infinite language of music *registres,* in a constructive process, the many descriptive methods of *Gestalt* psychology and theories of perception.

Despite significant theorical differences, it appears that the *logos of the aesthetic world,* in the many senses of this expression, constitutes a medium where logico-grammatical, transcendental and existential "*phenomenology*" may share a basic and fruitful concern. It is true that while Merleau-Ponty didn't thematise the ontological significance of music in his published works, he did strongly stress these in manuscripts like *The Visible and the Invisible,* the *reversibility of sonority and listening*, as a powerfull crossover between visible and invisible dimensions of thought. Similarly, Wittgenstein worked extensively on his own kind of phenomenology, one concerning our concept of vision and perception, and our view *meaning* in visual perception and painting.[18] From a methodological point of view, a hermeneutics of culture is largely conceived as an unforseeable morphological counterpoint between different approaches: the phenomenological, the grammatical and the analytical approach of semiosis through the play of *lógos* and thought. As such, the hermeneutical process can overcome the dogmatic secularization of the *theorein,* as well as the reduction of *language* (that is *lógos*) to the *linguistic* sphere. This integrative game reveals a tense *harmony*. In this spirit, Nelson Goodman's description of *cognitive* and artistic *ways of worldmaking* appears to be logically connected with *a priori* construction of possibility. The holistic determination of a *world* is not incompatible with its multiplicity. Understanding aspects, profiles and versions of a world lead to the comprehensive construction of other worlds and other's worlds. Discerning a human world will start with a discovery of the other's Face and with the unpredictable receptive and constructive experience of strangeness. As pointed by mathematicians like L. E. J Brouwer or Hermann Weyl and philosophers like Wittgenstein, the key is not to describe an absolute reality but to understand the sovereign possibility of *constructive actions*. As suggested early on by Emmanuel Lévinas we can oppose the significance of the *face* to the conception of meaning and understanding determined by the notion

of *horizon*. Nonetheless we must complete this transformation by the acknowledgment of *face* in its non-visual dimension, as a *kerugmatik* experience through *musical thinking, gesture, and action*. In this light, harmony must be rethought in its original key, outside of aesthetic and ethical discourses, in order to properly reinvent the play of *Lógos* and *Harmonia*. This *proto harmony* results from the tension and contrasts of opposites, as evoked by Heracliters subtle definition.

It is now time to consider some forms of this "palintropic" harmony in the thesaurus of *musical thinking*. The musico-philosophical *unterweg* to harmony differs fundamentally from an aesthetics *of* music. As suggested by Wittgenstein and by Adorno in his *Beethoven*, this line of thinking could be characterized as a *musical hermeneutics of culture*.

Interpreting the essential contribution of music[19] to the problem of *hermeneutical universality* in this manner focuses on certain specific *topoi*. In the process we will refer mostly to examples of the 20th century innovation articulating both understanding and performance interpretation and characterizing music as an ontological harmony and an ethical experience of infinite trascendence.

Autrui: *An Infinite Ricercar The principle of Art is infinite variation Robert Musil*[20]

The melodic articulation of cognition, cosmography, theology, ethics, arts and especially music has been conceived through models of cosmic order: in the Egyptian *Ma' at,* the Vedic conceptions of the *Châdogya,* the Greek notions of *Themis, Lógos and Harmonia,* the platonic Idea of a wisdom of the world (*Timaeus*) and its later cosmological counter subjects in Hellenistic Greece, the Biblical order of Creation, the anthropological and cosmographic determination of the Gospels, the final goal of creation by Allah, and the Gnostic vision of an illusory world. We know that as Wittgenstein, Musil and, topically, Heidegger insisted these philosophical models are more complex that any *Weltanschauung*. This points toward two theses:

α) Between the Egyptian, Greek, Old Testament, Rabbinic, Christian, Islamic, Hindu and East Asian's axial conceptions, cultural hermeneutics can no longer be limited to any kind of Spenglerian *relativism, contextualism* or speculative *universalism*. What we have is a dialogue, a *counterpoint* of sources, a cross-cultural translation and understanding.

β) This dialogue overcomes hermeneutic aporias through a creative *musical language game*, in which ontology is conceptually invented and experienced through the song (*Mélos*, *Saman, Ming...)*.

A musical hermeneutics of culture is, therefore, a *creative* hermeneutics, in which philosophy is understood as a *comparative* and conceptual *act* of *interpretation* in both the theoretical and the musical sense. In any culture, this gesture of interpretation requires thinking the *central* world experience, as well as wisdom of

the world, understood as a mystical and aesthetic experience. Music is a privileged instance of this if we follow the philosophical tradition[21] culminating in Nietzsche, Bloch, Wittgenstein, Adorno and Jankélévitch, in saying that the pure concept of art is applicable primordially to music. This tradition has led us towards a meta-empirical privilege of music as *mystery*. The project of thinking the *non-categorical* from Philon and Plotinus to Mallarmé generates the Meta-empirical paradox. Moreover, the significance and ambiguities of mysticism are always exposed to the risk of being associated with what Musil could call the "*Meingast*'s shadow," that is to the theosophical and rhetorical versions of intuition and mysticism. Both Adorno and Wittgenstein escaped such an ironic risk by making the individual moment in music mystical, constructing *formal* constellations of semantic musical contents, and describing the primordially musical *aura* and *enigma* of authentic art.

Indeed, while for Hegel the true was the whole, for Adorno, Benjamin and Wittgenstein, the whole comes to be seen the false. Beethoven, a mainly Hegelian figure, intensely defends the musical *idea* as the whole, as fortress, as interpretation of the World's spirit, an imageless image of dialectical totality. Yet, within the celebration of mystical experience understood as a unitary paradigm found in such works as the *Missa Solemnis* and late Sonatas and Quartets, we discover an equilibrium of the individual, a musical *homeostasis*.

After Wagnerrs *Love duet and Liebestodt* in *Tristan und Isolda*, the musical transfiguration of Nietzsche's *Midnight Song* from *Also Sprach Zarathustra* in Mahlerrs third Symphony (IV) provides a precise example of transcendence.[22] This symphony, which Mahler had for a time planned to name *My Happy Science*, exemplifies a double transfiguration:

a) The intersemiotical transfiguration of the poem "*What Mankind Tells Me*" which closes both "The other Dance Song" and "The Drunken Song" chapters in *Zarathustra*
b) The musical (and critical) transfiguration of Nietzsche's implicit hermeneutics of *dialectical unity* between Night and Day, Dream and Awakening, Nature and Man, Time and Eternity through a *musical* enactment of eternal return.

Understanding the evocative power of the poem through Mahler's writing does not consist in the mere musical *analysis* (classical or Shenkerian), but in the *act* of *reception* and *interpretation*. It calls not only for the *reading* of music but eminently for the individual *gesture of interpretation*: conducting, singing, playing or teaching.

The double transfiguration of the *Midnight Song* in the form of *an original musical thought* is accomplished through the play of language between *Lógos* and *Mélos*, Saying and Singing. Beyond any linguistic model, this play of language is due to the internal grammar and logicity of the writing. It manifests itself through *Harmony* (starting from mystical touches), through spiral musical reiterations of the

apostrophe *O Mensch,* through an exceptional range of Dynamics and Timbre, and through Mahler's own innovative style of instrumentation. This Panic way of thinking about the mystical presence of Nature corresponds to another "musicalisation" of Nietzsche's hermeneutics of cultural otherness: the Mahlerian reading of Chinese Poetry in the *Song of the Earth*.

Our second musical example follows the development of the ontological radiance of aesthetic experience through a translation of Arthur Rimbaud's primordial *Thaumazein* facing Beauty, written by the contemporary composer Hans Werner Henze in his Cantata *Being Beauteous*.[23] The hermeneutical gesture arises from a semiotic experience guided by the Wagnerian-Nietzschian claim of resonance among the arts. Nevertheless, Henze shows both elective affinities and strong differences regarding French traditions of Poetry sublimation. Through the formal process, the composer unveiled the floating connotations of the poem, unfolding a vision, la *Face Cendrůe*. As a farewell (*meno mosso)*, a melodic slow *Walzer* elevates the last verse into the light air towards an instant of grace, a transparent movement revealing the *ineffable*, *aphtegton, arreton*. I interpret this as, at the same time, *Anabasis* and *Anakoresi*s. The vertiginous decrescendo from the high B pianissimo to C sharp, after having strangely made it dance, submerge the Vision into the same amorphic silence which preceded its apparition. The chiasma between music and the sense fugitively captures the radiance of *invisible harmony* in the same way as Rimbaud's writing evokes the *Flesh* in the radiance of poetry. We have here a musical resonance of Illumination. For Henze as for Mahler, music and musical aesthetics are ontologically *impure*. Music is *impure* in the sense that, for Neruda poetry is impure. In its very essence, *Musikŭ* irradiates the colors of the *Musica di Piazza,* and echoes the rhythms of ethical and political conflicts. *Boulevard Solitude* and *El Cimarryn* exemplify the tense exposition of ethical despair in music. Following our methodological observations in section 2, a phenomenology of *Rhythmizing Consciousness* and *Intentionality*[24] is as relevant as a *grammatical* approach in the consideration of rhythm-objects, harmony and musical thinking in general.

Thus our third musical *topos* is dedicated to the musical idiosyncrasies of a composer, Leo Brouwer. Considering his *Sonata* for solo Guitar (1990) in three movements in my own version recorded in 1997, *understanding* and *interpreting* form and style in their specific unity, appears to be a task coextensive with the double gesture of thinking and performing styles and cultures. In this work, Beethoven and Padre Soler are both invited to a baroque but extemporal and numerological encounter (*Fandangos y Boleros*). On the other hand, the *Sarabanda de Scriabin* has to be performed (that is understood) as an integration of mystic experience as proposed by the pure harmonic schema and by polyphony.[25] The Sonata is written in the classical notation used by Messiaen or Boulez. The central *enigma* of this strongly unified work cannot be dissociated from the fact that the composer's musical thinking, far from the *false cultural reconciliation* of the *Musical Industry*, answers to *Musiké,* to the primordial *Mélos*, *at the foot of his genealogical tree*.

The rhythmizing consciousness active in the structures of afro-Antillean music (and poetry), here constructs an infinite and always invertible counterpoint with European musical traditions.

The *aura*, in Benjamin's sense, touches as much the individual as the universal, as is exemplarily the in the case of the *mythical* compositions of Villa-Lobos, Revueltas or Ginastera.

Our last musical *topos* leads us to the final questions concerning the inter-subjective experience of thinking about harmony across diverse cultural boundaries and through the primordial ontological offering of music. We can certainly consider the musical language offered, after Parsifal, by 20th composers like Bartok, Schoenberg, Stravinsky, Darius Milhaud, Messiaen and Henze as the best examples of the "archaic" imperative of *Mélos* and *Harmony*. In their works, the ineffable manifests itself without rhetorical usurpation, in the density of the construction and the richness of its *possible* significance. The idea of unity and diversity becomes in them not only a metaphysical, ethical or hermeneutical horizon but a sensuous musical reality.

Nevertheless, what I would like to consider here as last locus for dialogue is the interpretation (and performance) of a chamber work by Japanese composer Toru Takemitsu. It is a work of transparent *complexity* offering within its dense technical and semiotic synthesis the clearest possible *simplicity*. *Toward the Sea*, in its first version for Flute Alto and Guitar, is a mystical triptych dedicated both to celebrate Hermann Melville's thinking and *Moby Dick*'s cultural and metaphysical connotations. The perceptive and dynamic state of *sawari,* the fusion of performance and meditation, will define the sonority of both instruments, beyond tradition and technology.

However, the most relevant significance of Takemitsu's thinking has to be clarified within our hermeneutical approach. Just as for Debussy, recognized by the Japanese composer as his primordial "master," the fundamental elements for Takemitsu were colors, light and shadow. But this sound aspect only makes sense through an explicit *philosophical* approach of music. The composer is operating a conscious double fusion: unifying Japanese conceptual traditions of composition, the spirit of interpretation (*ashirai)* and instrumental playing *(sakuhachi),* with Satie's and Debussy's harmonic freedom, Schoenberg's constructions, Messiaen's synesthesia theory and seven mode's combination, Cage investigations and meditations. *Toward the Sea* has specific *Debussy-like* intentional objects, dominated by the element of the *sea* or the *water*. They define the form of the work: *the Night, Moby Dick, Cape Cod*. The harmonic arpeggios, chords, and the *perpetuum mobile* suggestions of the guitar part define the complex background for the *pathos* of the flute figures where Nature and Man are singing. The writing suggests "erotic" coincidence between the two players, recalling not so much Bergsonian duration as the effulgescence of Husserl's protensions and retentions.

Towards the Sea has to be understood, through the Interpretation and Reception of its hermeneutical gesture, as a philosophical expectation of the Other, and, accordingly to the composer, like all music, as a Prayer.

East Asian and European versions of the human gesture toward otherness and nothingness spring from the common sources of Saying and Singing. This vision is apophantically expressed in the East-West metaphysical dialogue, by Nietzsche, Watsuji, Heidegger, Tanabe or Nishida.

Perhaps this same philosophical intersubjective motive can be heard in another poetical tone, the *Peitho* of Claudel's *Partage de Midi,*[26] so intensely beloved by the French composer Darius Milhaud: facing the *Risk of the Sea*[27], the Face of *Isé* and the sculptural presence of Man in the *Transfiguration of Noon*.

NOTES

[1] Heraclitus, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Diels, Hermann,, Berlin, 1951.

[2] Merleau-Ponty, Maurice., *Causeries* (I. N. A., 1948), Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 2002; *The World of Perception*, translated by O. Davis, Routledge, London & New-York, 2004.

[3] Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Vermischte Bemerkungen*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1977.

[4] As a matter of fact, the history of ideas, and sometimes academic Aesthetics, show a permanent tendency to reproducing the misconceptions that have affected the transmission of the basic Greek concepts of *philosophia, mathematica, lógos, armonia, stoikheion, rythmos, musiké and mélos*. The origin of the term philosophy is connected with a geometrical thinking, developed by a culture (*paideia eleúteros*), where the theory of cosmic forms, the theory of *lógos didonai* (conceived later as acousmatic or mathematic) and the theory of *musiké* as a *general philosophical theoretic* are conceived as a *theory of harmony*. The very supposition of any "theoretic vision of music" attributed to the early Greek philosophers and music thinkers, is one of the most evident symptoms of a complete *misunderstanding* of the internal relation between *Theorein* and *Musiké*.

[5] We are mainly referring here to the seminal contributions of Hermann Köller (in *Glotta*), Oskar Becker, the musicologists Johannes Gombosi, W. Broecker and specially Johannes Lohmann (in his articles of *Lexis*, 1948–1954 and *Acta Linguistica III*).

[6] Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Notebooks 1914–1916*, Edited by C. H. von Wright & G. E. M Anscombe, 2nd edition, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, University of Chicago Press, 1961, 1979. P. 40 (modified translation). See also *Prototractatus*, p. 62.

[7] As stressed very early on by Jacques Bouveresse in *Hermeneutics and Linguistics (in Truth and Meaning,* Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976; Éditions de l'Éclat, 1990),

[8] See *Philosophische Hermeneutik*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 1976.

[9] See also Lohmann, Johannes, *Philosophy and Linguistic Science*, in *Erfahrung und Denken*, 1965.

[10] As an example of this rigorous fusion following the *pragmatic turn*, see Karl Otto Apel, *Transformation der Philosophie*, 2 vol, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973 and *Die Logosauszeichnung der Menschlichen Sprache*.

[11] Heidegger, Martin., *Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität)*, Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, Frankfurt am M., 1982. Pp. 9–20 f.

[12] Agustine, *De Musica*, VI, 1: "Illos igitur libros qui leget, inveniet nos cum grammaticis et poeticis animis, non habitandi electione, sed itinerandi necessitate versatos".

[13] Heidegger, Martin., *Sein und Zeit, Neomarius Verlag, Tubingen*, p. 298.

[14] Musil, Robert., *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften,* Rowohlt Verlag GmbH, 1978; *The Man Without Qualities*, First Vintage International Edition, Vol. I, NY, 1996.

[15] Husserl, Edmund, Erfahrung und Urteil, Hamburg, 1954. Pp. 75–76 / see also § 90, Pure Generality and Necessity a priori. Pp. 426–427.

[16] Leibniz, G.W., Principles of Nature and Grace, in Philosophical Essays, Indianapolis, 1989. P. 212.

[17] Wittgenstein, Ludwig., *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, I, § 90, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1953 / 1958 / 2001. p. 36.

[18] Wittgenstein, L., Remarks on Philosophy of Psychology, Basil Blackwell, § 869.

[19] Jean-Bernard, Marc., Text Zum Spielen, Critique, Editions de Minuit, 1979.

[20] Musil, Robert, Prosa, Dramen, spate Briefe, Hamburg, 1957, p. 715.

[21] From the Pythagoricians, Plato, Aristotle-Aristoxenes , Boethius, Wackenroder, Schopenhauer and Nietzscherepresented by culminated by Adorno.

[22] Gustav Mahler, Symphonie III, IV, *Was mir der Mensch erzhält,* (*What Mankind tells me*).

[23] Henze, Hans Werner., Being Beauteous, Schott, 1963.

[24] We refer to the fundamental essay by French phenomenologist Nicolas Abraham: *Rythmes* (...) Flammarion, Paris, 1985; *Rhythmizing Consciousness: an Essay on the Temporality of Rhythm*, in *Rhythms*, Stanford, 1995. Pp. 67–103.

[25] Jean-Bernard, Marc. *Leo Brouwer Guitar Works*, Pierre Vérany, 1997.

[26] Claudel, Paul, *Partage de Midi*, drame, Gallimard, Paris, 1949. Pp. 232–234.

[27] Claudel, Paul, Connaissance de l'Est, (*Knowing the East*), *La marée de Midi, Le risque de la Mer*, Léon Pichon, Paris 1928. Pp. 197–203.

ПОСТИЖЕНИЕ И ИНТЕРПРЕТАЦИЯ ФИЛОСОФСКОЙ ГАРМОНИИ: (МУЗЫКАЛЬНОЕ ПРИНОШЕНИЕ РАЗЛИЧИЯ)

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1) *Проблематика*: В данной работе представлены теоретический и диалогический аспекты важности *герменевтики культуры* и эстетики в русле общей проблематики единства и многообразия. 2) *Определение герменевтической ситуации:* Основные задачи исследования состоят, во-первых, в терминологическом *прояснении единства и многообразия* современных языковых игр. Опорой для всестороннего анализа станет *художественное мышление* и *эстетика как исходная функция герменевтики*. В целом, настоящее исследование должно способствовать *утверждению* новой открытой теории *гармонии* в культуре, во всей метафизической, музыкальной и политической полноте смысла этого слова. 3) *Методология и виртуальные миры человека*: Проблема метода неразрывно связана с проблемой всего исследования, *способом* рассуждения и *стилем мышления*. Верность выводов *герменевтики культуры* сегодня напрямую зависит от способности к достижению *сравнительного* и открытого симбиоза разных способов рассуждения, творчества и говорения в западном и незападном философских сообществах. Помимо собственно анализа герменев-

тическая мысль преследует цель *сотворения* представлений о *человечестве*. Эта проблема имеет неметафорическую связь с нечеткой логикой и философией *виртуальных миров*. 4) *Выводы:* Феноменологическое влияние «слияния горизонтов» (*Horizontverschmelzung*) способствует развитию новой *полифонии* и философского *контрапункта*, позволяя нам переосмысливать функции *мысли, чувственного переживания, музыки, поэзии и эстетического опыта*. В настоящей работе обсуждается значение *мистицизма*, *онтологического опыта* и *сравнительно-эстетических теорий*, а также того, как языки искусства и формы жизни (эстетическая сторона метафизики и религии) способствуют постижению единства и многообразия опыта.

DUELING TRUTH CLAIMS: COMPARING THE MORAL WORLDVIEWS OF AMERICAN EVANGELICAL AND LIBERAL PROTESTANT CHRISTIANS

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Introduction

The recent presidential election has focused our attention on American religion, particularly American evangelical religion. This paper will not address those events directly but analyze the dueling truth claims that lie below the surface of American Protestant Christianity. Evangelical and liberal Protestant Christians may appear to share a common core but, when looked at in depth, the differences are striking. This paper will dissect these differences using an analysis of two volumes that are exemplars in the liberal and evangelical Protestant traditions. One is Marcus Borg's *The Heart of Christianity: Rediscovering a Life of Faith*.[1] Borg is a New Testament scholar, author and speaker to what is called the progressive or liberal side of the American Protestant church. Borg summarizes his book as a compendium of his efforts to make sense of Christianity in light of his work with liberal churches. The other volume is Rick Warren's best-selling book, *The Purpose Driven Life: What on Earth am I Here For?*[2] This book has sold 2-million copies since its publication in 2002. It exemplifies the contemporary American evangelical tradition. Warren pastors a 15,000-member church in California and is a widely sought-after speaker.[3] Borg's relative national obscurity compared with Warren's celebrity reflects the growth of the American evangelical movement.[4]

I suggest that liberal and evangelical Protestantism are distinctive types of Christian religion. Evangelicals claim the Bible is a religious revelation without error; they demand a personal conversion to Jesus Christ and interpret Christ's death on the cross as atonement for human sin. They are congregationally centered, active in national and global missions, and expect the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. Liberal Protestants, on the other hand, interpret the Christian scriptures as classic literature and of "sacred" importance. They often say, "We take the Bible seriously but not literally." They discount the need for personal conversion, de-emphasize the necessity of congregational fellowship, and view Jesus as a moral and spiritual exemplar. They do not expect or believe in supernatural intervention and emphasize missions of social justice rather than evangelical faith sharing. For many liberal Protestants salvation is a this-worldly affair with no expectation of a world to come.[5]

This paper will focus on the volumes of Borg and Warren. It will analyze the moral worldviews that they construct and the truth claims they make about the self and its

relation to God. It will examine how each tradition approaches Christian theological assertions concerning Jesus, sin, evil, and salvation and the social claims that each author makes relative to church, mission, and the world. Finally, the paper will examine the core epistemological claims that mold each author's moral worldviews.

Theoretically, I argue that religious communities create moral worlds in which they nest their truth claims. Humans are "moral, believing animals" that need guidance for their personal and communal actions, which are validated by super-empirical metaphysical claims.[6] Within these worlds humans also seek rewards — emotional, social and eschatological-based payoffs. I argue that the evangelical worldview is more successful numerically because it offers a worldview that is communally focused, emotionally charged and morally certain. Moreover, rewards are paramount for evangelicals; they include the expectation of supernatural intervention in this life and the promise of eternal life with God in heaven.

Liberal Protestantism provides a moral worldview as well. I argue it is as morally demanding as its evangelical counterpart, yet with little expectation of communal solidarity and no prospect for metaphysical or eschatological payoffs. Thus, my thesis: liberal Christianity is less successful because it makes tough moral demands while offering little in return, while evangelicalism succeeds by offering a definitive moral worldview with a communal vision and a system of robust rewards.[7]

Truth Claims and Personhood

Claims about the self are central to Warren and Borg's texts. Warren is writing against a self-help type, claiming that the book is not a "self-help" manual but is about how Christians sacrifice the self in order to find God's purpose. This purpose is proclaimed in the opening dedication, telling readers that the very act of picking up the book was "intended by God." Reading the text is "no accident." For Warren, the self-help genre so popular to many both in and outside the American Christian community is the problem and not the solution. To turn inward to find one's destiny is a cul-de-sac rather than a thoroughfare. In the classic Christian tradition, the "true" self is found by giving up the self for the sake of serving God's purpose. But for Warren, this action of sacrifice has real consequences and promises. The validation of personhood is not established by a worldly legacy but only as one is acknowledged in God's eyes: "Yet, what ultimately matters most will not be what others say about your life but what God says... .You weren't put on earth to be remembered. You were put here to prepare for eternity" (pp. 34-5). The touchstone of personhood is not about one's achievements but about how one lives in the light of the world to come. This claim focuses the attention of the self on how it can best fulfill the wishes and desires of God. Of course, as Warren assaults the self-help genre with the hammer of self-sacrifice, it turns out that this sacrifice is for the sake of an ultimate reward for the self, eternal life in heaven with God. The cost of not following one's own desires is more than worth the reward of eternal happiness with God in heaven.

Throughout Warren's text the reader is reminded that dissatisfaction here on earth is normal and that this world was never meant to fulfill one's fundamental needs. In a sense, without referencing the remark, we are reminded of St. Augustine, the 5th century Christian Father, who said to God, "Our heart is restless until it rests in you."[8] One's home is with God and, as Warren says, we are living on "enemy territory." Indeed, the true Christian is surrounded by temptation and tested by Satan; conflict is normal in this world.

The trajectory of the self in Borg's writing is remarkably different. Whereas Warren never mentions that there are other forms of Christianity, Borg distinguishes his form of liberal Christianity from what he calls an "earlier paradigm" of traditional Christianity. Borg calls this earlier paradigm a type of "supernatural theism" (p. 65) that focuses on a literal reading of scripture, endorses an other-worldly reward-based faith and offers a fact-based epistemology. Borg's rhetoric of "earlier," versus what he calls the liberal Protestant "emerging paradigm," portrays his own bias that liberal religion is somehow an evolutionary step up the religious ladder. Borg claims that in time a more differentiated religious view will replace this old-fashioned notion of the Christian faith.

The trajectory of personhood within Borg's perspective posits that the self is not sacrificed for the sake of a life to come, but is "transformed" for the life in the present world. In Borg's worldview, when St. Paul writes about Christ's "way," or Jesus says, "Take up the cross and follow me," that does not mean a literal crucifixion but connotes a process of dying and rising within the self — a transformative enterprise. One dies to the destructive tendencies in the self and rises to the parts of the self that are merciful and compassionate. As Borg says, "When Paul resolved to 'preach nothing but Christ and Christ crucified,' this is most centrally what he meant: the cross as symbol of the process of personal transformation at the heart of the Christian life" (p. 111).

A crucial aspect for Borg is the movement away from believing in specific dogmatic propositions of the faith that he describes as "reward-bound" and based on the promise of an after-life, to a position of trust: "To be a Christian does not mean believing in Christianity, but a relationship with God lived within the Christian tradition as a metaphor and sacrament of the sacred" (p. 14). Borg asserts that the self lives by means of the Christian narrative as it relates to what he calls the "sacred." Borg never defines the term sacred. A vagueness permeates his explanation of the self's relation to the object of its devotion. This is intentional since he wants to allow for a broader interpretation of the divine. Nonetheless, the sacred becomes a type of placeholder for something or someone who may or may not exist beyond one's imaginative grasp, or more broadly, humankind's construction of this ultimate point of reference. Borg himself says that he does not believe in divine intervention, so one might ponder what lies below, above or beyond these metaphors. Moreover, Borg intentionally avoids talk of external rewards for the self and its transformation. He later defines salvation as a form of "enlightenment, liberation for captives, being

born again, healing and being made right with God" (p. 175). But in essence, he assumes that these terms are metaphors and it is not clear how and whether they point to an empirical referent. Thus, the promise of salvation remains ambiguous at worst and subjective at best. One is left with the idea that Christianity is one way to personal transformation with no promise of a life to come, or supernatural intervention in life on earth. The reward for the self, as the clichй goes, is the journey itself — a promise less practical and robust than the evangelical goal of eternal life in God's presence.

Theological Claims

In part, what makes Warren's book powerful and persuasive is the clarity that it offers. For Warren, life is preparation for a final exam given by God. The exam could not be more consequential for Warren. Each of us will come to this time and experience what Warren calls an "audit" of our lives. There will be two core questions to answer: "What did you do with my Son, Jesus Christ?" and "What did you do with what I gave you?" (p. 34). All people are obligated to use their gifts for the purposes of serving God's interests in the world. This is all that matters. Moreover, and this claim is made implicitly, if you have not accepted Jesus Christ then you will not pass the test. Warren quotes scripture as Jesus asserts, "*I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me*" (p. 34). This could not be clearer: one's eternal destiny is on the line and the choice must be made. There is no room to equivocate. Warren addresses none of the natural questions that follow from this theological claim. What about people who do not know Jesus? What about people in other religions who faithfully follow their faith? What about people of great moral character who do not ascent to the Christian claims about Jesus? Warren simply ignores these questions. He bluntly tells the reader that, "By the end of this book you will be ready to answer both questions" (p. 34). Warren offers a theological diagnosis of the human situation, gives the prescription and offers the promise of a reward to come.

The diagnosis is, of course, sin. Sin is a matter of giving allegiance to things and people in the world who will fail to give what one needs, and are not the source of one's creation. Life is a "test." The test is a question: to whom and to what one will "surrender" one's love and loyalty. As Warren says, "You were designed to worship God — and if you fail to worship him, you will create other things (idols) to give your life to" (p. 82). This is each person's choice; one will be as close to God as one chooses. Warren, following the Arminian theological tradition, puts the power to choose or reject God into the hands of the individual.[9] Individuals have the ability to choose God and make God their friend. This friendship, however, comes at a price. "One thing worship costs us is our self-centeredness. You cannot exalt God and yourself at the same time. You don't worship to be seen by others or to please yourself. You deliberately shift the focus off yourself" (p. 105).

Warren again and again claims that following Jesus involves sacrifice, a sacrifice that de-centers the self. At the very same time, this cost comes as a down-payment for the reward of eternal life. Thus, the theological claim of a cost is covered by the hope of a reward. This contradiction is never explicitly addressed. At the same time, Warren refuses to support the kind of popular "prosperity gospel" that is sometimes a part of evangelical Christian circles. He asserts that Jesus' promise of "abundant life" is not for this world but for the world to come. As Warren asks rhetorically, "Why should God provide *heaven on earth* when he's planned the real thing for you in eternity? God gives us our time on earth to build and strengthen our character for heaven" (p. 173).

For Warren, the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ create a specific formula for salvation: humans, trapped in sin, now have a savior who has redeemed them from their sin and saved them for eternity. Life on earth is preparation for this ultimate good. Borg's vision of Jesus, salvation and the rewards of faith differ dramatically. Borg argues that the "literalism and exclusivity" of Warren's traditional vision of Christianity is "not only unpersuasive, but a barrier to being Christian" for "millions" of people (p. 82). Borg, in line with many liberal interpreters of Christianity, wants to make the faith more palatable to people living with what he calls a "modern" epistemological perspective. Borg paints a picture of Jesus and his character that accommodates a liberal vision in which eschatology, supernatural acts and metaphysical claims are all downplayed. It is precisely this type of modern accommodation that evangelicals find problematic. Evangelicals accuse liberals of taking away the offensive and radical nature of God's supernatural intervention in the person and work of Jesus Christ. For evangelicals, this accommodation "guts" the core of what they claim is the gospel. When liberals say that evangelicals are accommodating to the consumerist and market-centered trends of contemporary culture, evangelicals respond that it is liberals who have "sold out" to contemporary culture.[10]

For Borg the traditions of the historical and metaphorical approach to the New Testament relativizes the text and thus enables the interpreter to understand it as it applies to a modern context. This method undercuts the tendency to take the text literally and expands the possible meanings of the text for the reader. For example, Jesus' miracle at the Cana wedding, where it is said that he turned the water into wine, should not be taken literally. For Borg, this is a "mystical imagery" connoting the marriage of heaven and earth and the celebration of Jesus as he feasts with all people in a banquet setting, reminiscent of God's kingdom where all are accepted and loved (p. 85). Borg ignores the question of whether the story has historical validity. For him, the imagery is powerful; it doesn't matter whether or not Jesus actually performed the miracle. But the logical question is — If Jesus didn't do it, where did the story come from? Moreover, if he didn't do it, why should anyone take the imagery as powerful and lasting?

For Borg the evangelical obsession with literalistic theological claims is problematic and distorts the authentic message of the gospels, "Jesus is, for us as Chris-

tians, the decisive revelation of what a life full of God looks like." Again, this vague statement is followed by the assertion that Jesus' purpose was to make present the "fullness" of God on earth and to paint him as one who, by his teaching, pointed to this God (p. 88). Jesus was a prophetic leader who called the rich to serve the poor and to upend the social structures of inequality and oppression. And finally, Jesus created a social movement for a more egalitarian and communal way of life. Borg argues that the historical-metaphorical approach shows us that Jesus was a this-worldly teacher who did not interpret his own death as a redemptive act, "We do not think that Jesus thought that the purpose of his life, his vocation, was his death. His purpose was what he was doing as a healer, wisdom teacher, social prophet, and movement initiator. His death was the consequence of what he was doing, but not his purpose" (p. 92).

Borg and Warren's dueling set of purposes is in plain view. For Borg, Jesus' ministry of justice and compassion serves as a model of a human life "full of God" and a way of life that leads to justice for all. For Warren, Jesus' life does not stand alone but must be seen in light of his death and resurrection. Jesus' purpose was his redemptive action that redeems all who believe in him. Jesus vouchsafes the sinner's salvation for the world to come. For Borg, the Christian mission is to let go of a reward-based theology and give of oneself in service to those who are the least among us. The point is to serve this world in ministries of justice that lead to social transformation and the "dream" of the kingdom of God on earth (p. 135). Borg's dream is the hard-fought battle to create a political world of justice and equality with no promise of success or a final reward. For Warren, the sacrifice of the self is to focus on glorifying God for giving Jesus to redeem sinners. This sacrifice is for the sake of a less immediate, though ultimately more powerful, reward of eternal life with God in heaven.

Social Truth Claims

While claims about the self and its theological purposes differ dramatically in these two visions, claims about the church, the community and mission are distinct as well. For Warren, the church is pivotal to the Christian life; in Borg's book there is no mention of the word church. For Warren, communalism is about accountability to a small group; for Borg, spiritual practice is more abstract and individualistic. For Warren, mission to the world is the task of global evangelism; for Borg, personal transformation leads one to make demands for the transformation of unjust systems and social structures. Warren could not be more practical, concrete and personal; Borg could not be more abstract, utopian and intellectual. Warren demands personal commitments with global impact; Borg demands global thinking, social critique and political transformation.

Warren details a full-blown ecclesiology. The Christian participation in the church is necessary. Jesus Christ came to institute the church for his world mission. The church is not simply a practical embodiment of this mission, but a metaphysical ele-

ment in God's mission in the world, "*I will build my church, and all the powers of hell will not conquer it*" (p. 132). Church membership is not a superficial engagement but a metaphysical commitment to the body of Christ and a personal call into small groups of moral and religious accountability. Jesus' group of twelve disciples is the model of Christian fellowship, whereby individual believers are disciplined and trained as missionaries of the Christian movement. The pedagogy of these small groups is practical and concrete. Warren describes nine characteristics of biblical fellowship: "We will share our true feelings (authenticity), encourage each other (mutuality), support each other (sympathy), forgive each other (mercy), speak the truth in love (honesty), admit our weaknesses (humility), respect our differences (courtesy), not gossip (confidentiality), and make group a priority (frequency)" (p. 153). This commitment to the church is not a casual element of one's life but a deep commitment to intimacy, moral accountability and the nurture of Christian life.

While Warren says that the Christian life is not about the self, there are several moments in the book that I describe as a "how to" manual, in which he appeals to the self and its development. Of course, Warren would counter his plea for the self is for sake of others and for God's glory. That is, personal gifts are given for the sake of sharing them with the community of the faithful, the church. Nonetheless, Warren's section on "Unwrapping Your Spiritual Gifts" could be a part of any Christian self-help manual. The reader is counseled to "listen to your heart" and to know that you are activating your personal gifts when you feel "enthusiasm" and are personally enlivened by these activities. Even as Warren asserts that personal gifts are not given to make money, some activities produce enormous monetary rewards. Certain individuals have the gift of wealth creation. These "wealth builders" in the church should be encouraged to make money, but in doing so they must recognize that this ability is a gift from God. This gift is to be used to share the faith with others, and "10 percent" of their wealth must be given to the church as a part of their worship to God (p. 243). In fact, Warren develops a ministry of wealth builders who form an important part of his church's expansion and growth. Once again, Warren does not approach the ethical questions of how the wealth is created, its sources and its effects on others. He simply wants this capital to be used for building the church and its mission.

Warren ends his book by counseling Christians to become "*world-class* Christians" and not "*worldly* Christians" (p. 297). The difference is that the former live their lives and exercise their gifts for the sake of others, to convince the world that the Lord of life is Jesus Christ. Worldly Christians, on the other hand, exercise their faith for their own sake, thinking only about their own comfort and security. Nonetheless, an outsider might ask, "With your fundamental focus on eternal life, isn't the Christian life the most selfish of all acts?" Warren would hypothetically respond, "No, precisely because the Christian is doing what he is made to do, worship God, and for that the Christian is simply obedient to his highest good; and yes, this obedience leads each Christian into heaven to enjoy and worship God eternally."

Borg's perspectives on the social claims of the Christian life are much more abstract and opaque. He sums up the two social claims for the Christian by delineating Jesus' ministry as "social prophet" and "movement initiator." At no point does this mean for Borg that Jesus initiated a church or a community of believers per se. The church is conspicuous by its absence. Regardless, Borg claims that Jesus is in a long line of social prophets that stand against "domination systems" (p. 137). These systems undercut social justice and exploit vulnerable groups, insuring wealth for a few and poverty for everyone else. Jesus came to uproot these systems of inequality. Jesus mobilized a "deeply Jewish movement" that was, at the same time, "remarkably inclusive" (p. 91). Borg asserts that Jesus' inclusive meal practice — sitting with tax collectors, women and other "sinners" — symbolizes the heart of the kingdom of God that Jesus came to inaugurate. Borg simply ignores the inherent tension in Jesus' core Jewish ethnocentrism, claiming that all the while Jesus was radically inclusive. Does this mean that Jesus intended to create a globally inclusive community, regardless of gender or ethnicity? Borg assumes so, but his position is never defended or explained.

What is most remarkable about Borg's social claims is that he never addresses a community of followers, the group that Jesus supposedly initiates. Where and what is this movement in practical terms? Should the church exist? Was it initiated by Jesus? Without an answer, Borg argues that the kingdom of God is fundamentally a "religious-political" or "theo-political" metaphor (132). But the social group behind this movement is opaque at best, even as Borg claims that the kingdom of God is for the "*earth*." Considering Borg's this-worldly focus, one cannot help but ask, "Where is the kingdom of God?" Borg says, "Thus the Kingdom of God is what life would be like on earth if God were king. It is God's dream as dreamed by the great figures of the Jewish tradition: Moses, the prophets, and for those of us who are Christians, Jesus. It is a dream for the earth" (p. 135). Nonetheless, this sort of abstraction about God as king, and a place on earth where the poor are fed and the stranger is welcomed, sounds rather hollow if there is no social group to help implement this aptly labeled "dream."

Later in Borg's volume he does mention the importance of Christian fellowship, where spiritual practices are upheld in acts of "hospitality, learning, singing, testimony, simple economics and Sabbath-keeping" (p. 200). He follows by suggesting that Christian friendship is not just about having friends who are Christians, but also about sharing the faith with one another. Borg then alludes to a story about Frederick Buechner, a well-known Christian author who while visiting an evangelical college overheard someone describe, "What God had been doing in his life lately" (p. 200). Borg seems to imply that this is what Christian fellowship might involve, but we get no explanation.

Borg does say that Christians are to be "political activists." This can come in several forms including philanthropy, social reform and social transformation. Specifically, he notes the importance of health care for the uninsured; environmental

practices that advocate ecological sustainability; economic justice that provides the essentials for all; and the recognition of the "imperial power" of the United States and the temptations to misuse this power (pp. 143-4). At minimum it means voting on issues in a way that are sensitive to matters of justice for the poor and the downtrodden. Borg's agenda is not revolutionary by any means; he suggests no fundamental structural changes in the economy or politics. Once again, these suggestions without a political base become abstract and hollow. The thinness of the liberal Christian community undercuts its economic or political vision.

Dueling Truth Claims

Each of these authors makes fundamental truth claims about their Christian visions. This is not unusual. All religious discourse, no matter the social or cultural position, makes explicit or implicit claims about what is true. Humans need and want to know that their beliefs are true. This is the heart of any moral worldview — a set of truth claims that guide the community. Within each of these moral worldviews are individual and social rewards. Warren has a clearer set of rewards, while Borg explicitly rejects rewards as beneath the morals of Christians. Borg hearkens back to the Kantian moral imperative that one should do one's duty not for the sake of a payoff but because it is right and just. While some might see this as a noble cause, Borg's moral vision and the vitality of the liberal Christian church has declined.

The fundamental source of these authors's epistemological truth claims centers on their interpretations of scripture. For Warren, the Bible is his absolute: "The Bible must always have the first and last word in my life" (p. 187). Believers must assimilate its authority by consenting to its power even when, like Billy Graham, one doesn't fully understand its passages. The believer must assimilate the truth of the Bible. This means studying it, listening to it, meditating and memorizing it. Finally, believers are to apply the Bible to everyday life, holding one another accountable to its demands by participating in small group Bible studies. For Warren, the scriptures are "flawless" (p. 187). In this way, the moral world of scripture becomes or should become the moral world of the believer. The integration between the two is every believer's ideal. Warren seems to imply that any recognition of contradictions within scripture or historical critical analysis of scripture forms resistance to its authority and an unacknowledged denial of its truth. The Bible is "alive" because it is God's word and from God's word the answers will come if one submits to its ultimate authority and truth.

For Borg, "Christianity is not absolute, but points to and mediates the absolute" (p. 215). In this way, the Bible is not absolute but is an instrument that guides the believer toward what is ultimate. How does it do this? Christian scriptures are metaphorical, to be approached in a "nonliteral" fashion, whereby the Christian assimilates the "more than literal meaning of language" (p. 49). Regardless of whether the stories in scripture are factually true, they can become "revelatory" and create oppor-

tunities for "epiphanies" (p. 51). Borg wants to loosen the believer's grip on the need to prove a one-to-one correspondence between biblical stories and empirical events. This serves the purpose of allowing believers to "trust" in the truth of the gospel revealed in Jesus' teachings and actions. More importantly, Borg wants to overcome the "exclusivist" claims made by Christian traditionalists. Borg employs a sacramental understanding of all religions. Religions operate as instruments that point to the sacred. In this way, the sacred is a transcultural and transhistorical "more" mediated by each of the traditions (p. 61). Each religion is a human creation that responds to the sacred as that tradition experiences it. Each of the "enduring religions" communicates wisdom that inspires forms of compassion and justice. Finally, religions are communities of practice and instruments of personal transformation (pp. 213-215).

On one level, Borg is trying to overcome the inherent conflicts that arise from traditions that make mutually exclusive truth claims. However, most of the world's major religious traditions do make these claims. Thus, Borg's project glosses over the differences between world religions and, in a sense, ignores their real differences. To take the most obvious example, Judaism and Islam in particular have developed traditions that explicitly deny the truth claims within Christianity. Internally, of course, Roman Catholicism and forms of Protestantism often have denied the truth of the other.[11]

It appears that Borg is appealing to Western liberal elites who desire tolerance and inclusiveness and want to avoid conflict as much as possible. Certainly, as history shows, those who have power, particularly economic and political power, seek to avoid social and cultural unrest at whatever cost.[12] The recent history of Islamic conflict in the world exemplifies this process. Many Westerners want to know who are the "good" Muslims. They want to know how the West can either kill the "bad" Muslims, or somehow mitigate their hatred of the West by "marketing" ourselves more appropriately. I am not suggesting that Borg makes these errors in judgment, nonetheless, his perspective portrays a vague homogeneity between the great world religions, doing none of them justice, including Christianity. He makes the rather weak claim that, at their core, all religions point to a similar reality and express the same truth, thus there need be no conflict. This kind of intellectual colonialism undercuts the very moral worldview that Borg affirms, the need to recognize and affirm the other for its own sake.

Conclusion

Each of these authors offers moral worldviews that present truth claims for their visions of the Christian faith. For Warren, the authentic Christian worldview is centered on the truth and authority of scripture practiced within a disciplined and communal organization that supports and disciplines each participant as they live out the message of the gospel. This gospel claims that all have sinned and are subject to the temptations of Satan, thus by Christ's death on the cross and his resurrection from the grave grace is offered to each individual. Life is a test and an examination that each must pass. The goal of life is to recognize one's sinful nature, give oneself

to Christ and to worship God. In the end, if the test is passed, one receives eternal life with God, which is far better than life on earth. It is a worldview with clear moral demands and rewards. Warren says that life is not about us but about God. Of course, as one submits to God one receives the ultimate reward. Warren is offering a form of self-interested self-transcendence.

Borg's moral world has clear truth claims as well, but the truth in Borg's worldview is more complex. It is not simply a matter of turning to scripture to find one's way. The sacred, as the transcultural and transhistorical more, discloses itself through all of the religious traditions, not literally but figuratively. Every individual's task is to spiritually discern these signs and symbols and use them for self-transformation. Borg never suggests that a community is necessary for this transformation. It is a personal journey that is more intellectual than affective, more abstract than practical. The transformation leads to compassion and an egalitarian perspective culturally and politically, as well as a greater sense of tolerance and appreciation for other religious and cultural traditions. Borg offers nothing by way of a payoff; one should not expect the divine to intervene or give one eternal life following death. One should seek transformation neither for the sake of the life to come nor for a community here on earth, but simply because it is good and just to do so. In this sense the moral stakes for Borg's liberal Christianity are at once more demanding than the evangelical worldview and less rewarding.

These are two dramatically different moral universes and distinctly different sets of truth claims. Despite Borg's claim to the contrary, the evangelical moral world finds more resonance in the American marketplace of religion. It is not difficult to see why. People want clear moral worlds in communities where they can raise their families; they want to know what is expected of them and do what they think is right. They also want rewards. Evangelicals offer a Bible with answers, a community that nurtures them in faith and a final promise of life with God. Liberals offer a complex journey that can lead to personal transformation and a more compassionate sense for others. But it offers a thin community life and no metaphysical or eschatological rewards. In a sense, the truth of liberal religion may turn out to be more demanding precisely because it offers so little. Evangelicals are morally demanding and epistemologically clear, and offer a payoff that many find appealing. Truth claims count in the moral worlds that religions create, but not all are equally appealing. Evangelicals have created a system that produces results. It remains to be seen whether liberals are interested in adjusting, or if they will continue to demand so much and offer so little.

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NOTES

[1] Borg, Marcus J., *The Heart of Christianity: Rediscovering a Life of Faith,* New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 2003.

[2] Warren, Rick, *The Purpose Driven Life: What on Earth am I Here for?* Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 2002.

[3] Warren is a Southern Baptist and, like many evangelicals, downplays his denominational affiliation. He is not a fundamentalist in that he has no interest in separating from culture; indeed, like many evangelicals, he uses popular culture through worship and teaching to evangelize and engage the wider culture. Borg is a professor of religion and culture at Oregon State University and a noted scholar of the New Testament.

[4] See Mark A. Noll's book, *American Evangelical Christianity: An Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001) on the growth and size of American evangelicalism.

[5] See Mark A. Noll's examination of early American evangelicalism and his comparisons with early liberal Protestantism, *America's God* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[6] See Christian Smith's *Moral, Believing Animals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), which examines the origins of religion as the human need for moral guidance and belief.

[7] See Rodney Stark and Roger Finke's *Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2000), which uses rational choice theory to examine religious capital and reward maximization.

[8] See *Saint Augustine's Confessions*, translated by Henry Chadwick, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 3.

[9] This tradition is named after the Dutch Calvinist, Jacob Arminius (1560–1609), who opposed the hyper-Calvinism of the sixteenth century and emphasized the human role in the nature of salvation.

[10] This point is based on my research on 25 of the fastest growing evangelical congregations in the Pacific Northwest. Again and again we found evangelicals claiming that it was liberals who accommodated contemporary culture.

[11] See Paul F. Knitter's summary of the various models between religions in *Theologies of Religions* (New York: Orbis Books, 2002). These include the replacement model (only one true religion), fulfillment model (one fulfills the many), mutuality model (many true religions called to dialogue) and the acceptance model (many true religions: so be it).

[12] See Rodney Stark's *One True God: Historical Consequences of Monotheism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Stark reflects on the history of conflict in the monotheistic traditions, explicating the inherent tensions within and around these religious traditions.

СТОЛКНОВЕНИЕ ИСТИН: СРАВНЕНИЕ ЭТИЧЕСКИХ ПОЗИЦИЙ АМЕРИКАНСКИХ ЕВАНГЕЛИСТОВ И ЛИБЕРАЛЬНЫХ ПРОТЕСТАНТОВ

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В настоящей работе проводится анализ различий моральных позиций американских евангелистов и либеральных протестантов на примере двух книг, принадлежащих этим традициям: Маркуса Борга «Сердце христианства: возвращение к вере» и Рика Уорена «Целеустремленная жизнь: зачем я живу на Земле?»

Анализ затрагивает моральные воззрения, сформулированные авторами, и их видение собственной личности и ее отношений с Богом. Исследуются отношения двух традиций к христианским теологическим постулатам, касающимся Иисуса, греха, зла и спасения, а также социальные и метафизические утверждения, которые делают авторы относительно церкви, и ее предназначения и мире.

Мое предположение заключается в том, что религиозные сообщества создают этические миры, где они пропагандируют собственные убеждения, подтвержденные сверхэмпирическими метафизическими основаниями. В подобных мирах люди также могут рассчитывать на вознаграждения: эмоциональные, социальные и эсхатологические. Можно говорить о том, что евангелическое мировидение предлагает больше преимуществ, среди которых внимание к интересам всего сообщества, четко сформулированная мораль и ясное представление о жизни после смерти. Этический мир либерального протестантизма, напротив, ставит перед своими обитателями более сложные понятийные и моральные задачи, и к тому же, не поддерживает чувства солидарности в сообществе, не гарантирует метафизических или эсхатологических поощрений. Таким образом, в данной работе выдвигается следующий тезис: либеральное христианство представляет собой менее успешную позицию, так как формулирует жесткие моральные требования, мало что предлагая взамен, в то время как евангелизм преуспел за счет своих четких моральных представлений, ориентированных на общие интересы и систему ясных вознаграждений.

ISLAM AND THE WESTERN WORLD

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We approach the topic, which is receiving increasing attention, of the comparison between Islâm and Europe, Islâm and the West, and Islâm and the Western world. We approach this topic without the slightest embarrassment, since Islâm is a divine Revelation based on Abrahamic monotheism. Whereas Europe is just one of the five continents, West is one of the four cardinal points, and the Western world is merely a geographical concept, usually opposed to an ill-defined Eastern world. Islâm is typically compared to the European, American, African and Asiatic continents, as if it were itself a continent or maybe a world on its own. Separated by the artificial conception of globalization, and far from the universal and symbolic reality expressed, for instance, by the well-known Christian image of He who is worshipped in the Islamic tradition too, sayyidinâ 'Isa ('alayhi-s-salâm), our Lord Jesus, the Christ, who holds the Globe in His right hand.

In the context of globalization, for instance, we cannot consider any longer the Mediterranean Sea as *Mare nostrum*, since it washes the coasts of three continents, not just two, as is usually thought. There is indeed a third continent washed by the waters of the Mediterranean, and it is Asia, even though branded as "Minor." Nowadays, Islam exists not only in Asia and Africa, but also in the Western world, be it Europe, America or Australia, and definitely not merely as a consequence of a migratory or demographic phenomenon. Therefore, rather than thinking of Islam geographically we like to think that Islam can still be considered the third and last Revelation of Abrahamic monotheism.

There is no fear of inconsistency in being Western and Muslim, since the East cannot be identified with Islam: nor the West with Christianity. And if in history Islam has been present in the Western world as well, nowadays those very countries that once witnessed the culture of Islam are not Muslim anymore. In fact they cannot possibly be considered really Christian either.

On the other hand, it is not even possible to compare the Islamic civilization to an alleged Western civilization. As a matter of fact, true traditional civilizations — from the Mayas or Aztecs to the Assyrian-Babylonians, from the Indhus or Buddhists to the Taoist, Confucian or Shinto civilizations, from the Egyptians, Greeks or Romans to the Orthodox Hebraism or to Medieval Christianity (of the Middle Ages) — were founded all on theocentric principles. While the modern Western civilization, which in fact lacks a real unity based on higher principles, according to us cannot be even considered a true civilization at all.

Since the times of the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum*, Europe, together with the whole Western world, has embarked towards a form of creative psychology which,

once past the tunnel of the Enlightenment (that has once and for all closed the gates to Heaven) has led to the dark recesses of the lower, if not infernal psychic dimension. Thus reversing the principle of man created by God in His own image. Indeed man, who is nothing but a reflex of God who only Is, has been considered not only a being who thinks and is thought of, the cogitor, as in the theories of the new philosophers, but he has been made a thought itself. Claiming himself able to create Being, as stated in the formula "I think, therefore I am." Of course, this formula is intended in the sense of being able to prove if not Being at least one's own existence, a term which means something that stays "outside" what only Is, something other than God, the essence of everything.

It is this Europe which till then had managed to preserve — in the original Christian and Orthodox faith — the openness to spirituality contained in the previous divine messages and in the message following the coming of Christ. And consequently the mutual respect and the peaceful co-existence with the peoples who had been their special receivers that has given rise to our modern Western world, which is closed to any transcendent or immanent reality and to the theocentric order necessary for the creation of every real traditional civilization. In opposition to all traditional civilizations, the "westernization" which has now spread far beyond the West, represents the only exception or deviation from what should be the rule, the "norm" and, therefore, normality.

Only now, possibly after having witnessed the setbacks of secular ideologies and colonial "missionarism" and the failure of the hegemonic pretences justified by religious exclusivity or advanced technologies, the illusions of the material progress, and the consumer and affluent society, some Europeans, including real or just nominal members of religious communities as well as some who do not belong to any religion at all — unfortunately the overwhelming majority — are beginning to recognize the superficiality of their assumed affiliations as well as the utopian nature of the systems created outside the religions.

If we really live in what is supposed to be a "state of right," even if it does not correspond any longer to the ancient civilizations' concept of being ruled by a temporal power that is subject to spiritual authority — defined by "divine right," we have to ask ourselves in the light of "human rights" whether the duties of a believer can be included among the basic human rights. Lâ ikrâha fî-d-dîn — so the Holy Koran states "there is no compulsion in religion"(1), not just in the Islamic tradition but in the religious faith in general. Faith is after all the consequence of a free choice inspired by a true and deep conviction. Is it therefore sensible to wonder whether this choice can still be made today, or in other words: Is also the right of being religious granted to man?

After all there can be no pretence of transmitting a doctrine which in fourteen centuries of history has spread providentially to a geographical area which includes now about one billion believers. It is a universal doctrine as God intended it for the entire mankind, even though it has not actually extended to everyone around the

world. The relatively poor adherence to Islâm by Europeans, compared to that of the other continents, results not only from the scarce knowledge of its principles and opposition from other religious institutions. It results mainly from the aridity and hostility of modern Western man towards Eastern spirituality and the sacral dimension of the divine Revelation, originally found also in the previous Revelations — likewise from the East and oriented towards the metaphysical fulfillment, the reunion with God — in which they were born.

We cannot expect Europeans to pronounce the shahâdah, the declaration of Islamic faith, if they have not regained their faith in God. The imân, (the) faith first of all, then in shâ Allâh, if God wants, the islâm, the submission to God, and finally the ihsân, the spiritual calling. Men may not convert to Islâm if they have not previously reconverted to God, as much as we couldn't say la ilâha illâ al-Islâm, "there is no divinity but Islâm," before saying: lâ ilâha illâ Allâh. As some exceptional Europeans have also been able to speak about the oneness of God next to the transcendent unity of the Revelations, we have to make sure that those who nowadays decide to embrace the teaching of Islâm still have the sense of God's immanence, of His spiritual presence in this world and in themselves.

This applies not only to people who belong or do not belong to other religions, for whom the example of every true observant Muslim can help them regain their faith and ritual practice in their original religious community. This also applies to those European Muslims who have been "westernized" and who, perhaps unconsciously, have absorbed the mentality, the customs and the ideologies typical of the modern world in the secularization and desecration of their own faith. A secularization and desecration which has been reduced faith to the level of what today's champions of psychological analyses call "the search for identity."

The most serious dangers in the contact between Islam and the Western world do not solely come from the conceptions of hegemonic Christian exclusivity towards other religions or from the leveling-out of Catholic theology to a mere social doctrine of the Church. Danger also arises from the secularization and desecration of the Western world, be it formally "religious" or lay, agnostic or more generally atheist. Christians themselves do not even try any longer to convert Muslims to Christianity — which most of them do not practice at all — but only to convert them to their way of interpreting religion on exclusively ethical-social bases. Hence, the resistance among Christians to the efforts of those followers of Islam who commit themselves to showing them the truths written in the Holy Koran, which, of course, the Christians do not consider the word of God. Since the Christians do not even believe in the truths proclaimed in the Holy Scriptures of their own tradition, and maybe not even in God himself. Believing in God would require a radical change in lifestyle and to avoid this change they try in every way possible to oppose the spirituality that can still be found in Islâm — the last Revelation, which comes as all the others from the East. They speak of Him through obsolete or superstitious conceptions or associate Him with the manifestations of a rampant fundamental-

ism, the real obstacle to the propagation of Islâm in the West. The dialogue and debate between true Islâm and the Western world implies not just the risk for the latter to be absorbed by a world that is considered "stranger." It implies the risk for the last Revelation to be flattened in the claiming of what are commonly called "human rights," instead of preserving its original eastern sacredness. And it is this sacredness which reminds us all — as already mentioned — of our "divine duties," the duties which Islâm seems nowadays the only and last traditional civilization capable of transmitting.

We do not intend, however, to return to a theocentric or theocratic civilization, such as the traditional ones of the past, in the whole Universe — again in the etymological sense of the term "tend" or "to be intended towards the One." We only hope that minorities of people devoted to the Knowledge of the Truth can also be preserved till the end of times. This in our view is not only the fundament of the different religions, but of man's existence in this world.

Now that Islâm is more and more present in the Western world, it is relevant to make a comparison between the last two revealed religions, not only because they are universal, based on Abraham's doctrine and both are monotheistic. But also because both have given rise to civilizations that include at least one billion believers in all countries of the world, and they are the only religions which underscore, though in different ways, the figure of Jesus Christ, Sayyiddunâ 'Isâ, 'alayhi-s-salâm (Our Lord Jesus peace on Him).

However, this is not a comparison that aims to determine some form of superiority of one religion over the other, which would be unconceivable as both revelations are derived from the same and only God. Rather, this comparison aims at the preservation by both sides of a correct spiritual orientation that can be achieved thanks to the metaphysical tension necessarily implied by the disparity between the forms, which "forces" believers to grasp the Truth beyond these forms. And this is expecially useful during a time when the process of secularization has had an impact on all religious communities.

This comparison should herald the mutual acknowledgment of the salvific truth of any religion and particularly that of the last two Revelations, in the acceptance of the necessary diversity of their theological expressions and ritual forms. The closeness between the last two Revelations is quite clear in the expression of their holy texts, which confirms the previous divine messages and anticipates the following with the prophecies they contain. Above all in the acknowledgement of Go's Almightiness, which reveals itself in ever-new forms to different peoples in "providentially" different places, times and ways.

1 Koran II, 256

ИСЛАМ И ЗАПАДНЫЙ МИР

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В статье рассматриваются проблемы развития ислама на Западе.

Ислам, как полагает автор, является третьим и последним Откровением Бога (после Откровений Ветхого и Нового Заветов). Некорректной представляется ему прямое соотнесение религиозной традиции ислама с культурой Востока.

Статья раскрывает необходимость и правомерность распространения ислама в Европе.

Слабая распространенность ислама среди европейцев объясняется дефицитом информации и противодействием других религиозных организаций. Но еще более весомой причиной этому является неприятие западным человеком восточной духовности и священной стороны божественного Откровения, обретаемых в исламе так же, как и в предшествующих Откровениях, пришедших с Востока через единение человека с Богом.

THE VOCATION OF DIALOGUE

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Life, the life of our life, is ineffable — it is the good, the Dao, God, qi. Everything we experience manifests life, yet life is obscured by humans, because of our fear, refusal of gift, ignorance, desire, and urge to control. We see and live "through a glass dimly," and struggle to respond more fully, based on the discovery and guidance that is available to us.

For humans this is a choice. We can move toward the light or away. Humans are a species capable of *refusing* the gift quality of life (and the incredible claim of the great traditions that all will be well if we are faithful to gift, that which we could never do for ourselves). We are capable of *choosing* life, either unconsciously through the mediation of culture, or consciously. The latter is necessary for most of us post-traditional humans, living in the midst of both critical awareness of traditional culture and the radical limitations of secular modernization. Now we must do for ourselves and each other what culture once did — for better and for worse — for us. We must choose life, or not.

William James said "[a] philosophy is the expression of a man's [sic] intimate character, and all definitions of the universe are but the deliberately adopted reactions of human characters upon it."[1] In the post-traditional, post-modern period we learned that previous philosophies were radically limited. We have learned that Western culture has been logo-centric, patriarchal, imperialistic, materialistic, ecologically disastrous... etc. Unfortunately, many have responded to this learning, this reflexive awareness, by withdrawing from life, into cynicism, narcissism, pessimism, denial, fundamentalism — and sometimes into terror.

The challenge before us today is well articulated in the Hebrew Torah: "I call on heaven and earth to witness against you this day, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse; therefore choose life, that you and your descendants may live..." (*Deuteronomy* 30:19). After a period of critique and discovery (again, not only about constraints associated with the traditions, but also about limitations of the secular, scientistic, post-traditional situation), we need positive and constructive resources in order to help people choose life. In Huston Smith's terms, we need to move "beyond the post-modern mind"[2] to develop what David Ray Griffin calls "constructive postmodern thought."[3]

The thesis of this paper is that there is a new philosophy, a vision which is already present in our time, one that is common to our humanity itself, oriented to development, pluralistic, and emerging through the intercultural dialogue movement. In fact, I would stand with the American philosopher John Dewey when he speaks of

"a common faith" of humankind that has been implicitly available for a long time, and when he describes a shared vocation inspired by that faith:

> The things in civilization we most prize are not of ourselves. They exist by the grace of the doings and sufferings of the continuous human community in which we are a link. Ours is the responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage of values we have received that those who come after us may receive it more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared than we have received it. Here are all the elements for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class, or race. Such a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of mankind.[4]

My aim in this paper to contribute to the common faith becoming "more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared" through articulation of its emergence in our time as what we have come to call *dialogue*.

More specifically, I will suggest that the vision we need is available through the qualities of relationship associated with the intercultural dialogue movement, and that dialogue constitutes a new paradigm of communication and growth, one that affirms diversity and unity simultaneously. In the next section of the paper I seek to describe six qualities of dialogue, under the commitment to make it "more solid and secure." After description, I will then offer a few comments in a last section about dialogue as a new paradigm for the human future.

II

There are many descriptions of dialogue,[5] many connections between dialogue and the world's traditions, many ways in which we can understand dialogue as vital to the future of the human race. My purpose in venturing the description of this essay is to make it possible for people to see and connect with a certain stream of possibility at work in the world, a developmental process that is already well under way in both ourselves and the world. Hence the guiding purpose and organizing principle of this essay is invocation.

After description in this part of the essay, I will then step back in a third part, to think about implications and prospects.

Affirmation of Gift

Dialogue opens up as a life possibility through awareness of the gift quality of life, through appreciation — and wonder — that there is "something rather than nothing." This fundamental experience is symbolized by the photograph of the Earth from outer space, which may be taken as one of the chief religious symbols of our time. The Earth and everything upon it is experienced as miraculous, against the back-

drop of the abyss of outer space. Seeing the Earth and our lives in this way is what several of the great post-traditional philosophers are pointing to when they speak of it being essential that we encounter Nothingness. For example, Karl Jaspers when he says that "if man [sic] is not to be allowed to founder in the mere persistence of life, it may be essential that in his consciousness he shall be confronted with Nothingness; he must recall his origin."[6] The theme of the survivor is reflective of the same deep awareness, the theme of "survivor as creator,"[7] the one who has faced death and/or radical limitation and returned with a new vision of the preciousness of life. And William James, when he identifies — out of "the varieties of religious experience" — one experience in particular that is necessary in order that "a new era of religion as well as of philosophy [and personhood and culture] will be ready to begin: ... experiences of an unexpected life succeeding upon death. By this I don't mean immortality, or death of the body. I mean the deathlike termination of certain mental processes within the individual's experience, processes that run to failure, and in some individuals, at least, eventuate in despair. ...[e]xperiences of a life that supervenes upon despair."[8] For James, everything depends on our response to these moments, to our "posit[ing] life" with and through them, affirming gift.

The same life stance can be indicated made in broad historical terms: One of the most important discoveries of the post-traditional Twentieth Century is that religion and culture had been Earth and life-denying in the traditional or historic period.[9] This discovery was accompanied by another: that of the Axial movement of humankind all across the Earth around 600 BCE in which the oneness of existence was experienced — later to be articulated in the form of the great traditions.[10] In the post-traditional Twentieth Century we found that one attribute of those great traditions of the Axial Period was that they had been essentially oriented to *getting out,* to life in this world as a problematic place we must pass through or escape in order to arrive at another, better world. And, in that same fateful awareness, we began to encounter the legacy of this orientation in the shape of a very limited and largely ruined Earth.

Explicating our circumstance, some have referred to Deuteronomy 30:19 in the Hebrew Torah: "I call heaven and earth to witness against you this day, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse; therefore choose life...." Likewise, many of the great philosophers and cultural figures of our era have underlined the enormity and urgency of the choice before us today, and chosen life and even been identified as "philosophers of life."[11]

My suggestion is that the intercultural dialogue movement is directly responsive to the discoveries and the choice that are fundamental to our time. In my own experience it dates back to a 1982 Danforth Fellows conference presentation by John B. Cobb, Jr., and to reading his book which was published in the same year: *Beyond Dialogue: Toward a Mutual Transformation of Christianity and Buddhism*.[12] Cobb spoke most persuasively of the need to "review the past with eyes that are open to the greatness and goodness of other Ways," and about dialogue as transformative practice, one that cultivates an ever-expanding global memory.[13]

In 1986 I attended the Third North American Buddhist-Christian Encounter.[14] Here Masao Abe, the great Zen professor and spokesperson of the Japanese Kyoto School, was powerfully present. He offered the Kyoto School synthesis of Eastern and Western thought, grounded in the "perspectiveless perspective" and the great affirmation that arises from "the negation of negation" in Zen, as the foundation for a peaceful uniting of the world in the post-traditional period, a world in which we regard both other and self as gift.[15] But a problem became evident also: at the conference there was intense interest in Zen as Abe presented it, and in the Kyoto School claim to have the world synthesis that is needed for the human future. However, the discussion became more and more general, abstract, distant from any particularity or practice. Abe attracted much attention with his distinction between Eastern/mother/ontological and Western/father/axiological.[16] But, again, the dialogue definitely moved away from practice, the immediacy of experience, and the particularity of Zen — into the realm of the abstract and the intellectual, as though admiring a possible future view of the Earth from outer space. The sense of gift remained, but it had drifted away from embodied Earth.

The point is that in early stages of dialogue there is a tendency to drift into a universalism that can be limited or even dangerous.[17] Disconnection from what is actually happening in the immediacy of life can lead to neglect of practice and of consequences. Worst yet, focus on the ideal of what might come to be (or even *is* at some level) can lead to an impatience with the present, and a willingness to do violence in the name of what is taken as movement toward that ideal future.[18] Much trouble in our post-traditional time arises out of misplaced or displaced perceptions of gift, recalling Whitehead's remark about how usual it is for great ideas to enter history with disgusting alliances.[19]

Reappropriation of Tradition

We come to discover that secularism and the claims of the scientific worldview (including its expressions as social science) are not sufficient to the human spirit. We also discover the larger body of who we are, the sense in which body, the life we em-body, includes tradition. I cannot be everything, and my capacity to respond to the gift quality of life depends on clarity about the nature of the gift: life is given, inseparably one with the particularity of my circumstance — including my being the expression of one tradition or another.

Reappropriation of tradition has been most dramatically evident to me in China and with Chinese Third Epoch Confucians. When I first started going to China in the mid-1990's after *Rediscovering the West* had been translated and published there, the philosophy departments to which I was invited were mostly engaged in Western philosophy, mostly Modern and Analytical. But some were interested in the central suggestion of my book (among others) that encounter with the other makes it possible to see and gain access to the genius of one's own tradition, as well as in reports

about the value of classical Chinese philosophy for Western people. In a few years, by the late 1990's, the situation had changed dramatically, to the point where classical Chinese philosophy was no longer seen as a part of the pre-May Forth Movement past that must be left behind. As impossibly vague and/or naпve, or as merely a matter of antiquarian value — good for decoration only. Dialogue with Chinese philosophers has centered on the movement beyond the limits of modernization,[20] including attention to such dynamics as those of "re-appropriation." In fact, dialogue has developed to the point where there is growing expectation among Chinese colleagues that, in the words of Peimin Ni, "... Confucian philosophy is what we should count on for recovery from the materialized and alienated world and for the revitalization of humanity."[21]

There has been a reciprocal process in my own life. The effect of contact with other cultures has led me to reappropriation of my own tradition that is deeper and more solid than what I had before, more fully practical and alive in my life, more secure from the distractions of consumer society. Getting to this has involved a journey — across the broad and barren plains of post-traditional secularism in which I was raised (as though there *were no* human spirit), and past temptations to deflect either into fundamentalist involvement in a particular tradition (or a cult), or into universalist meandering in the great museum of the world's traditions. But I have been fortunate to have reminders from members of my tradition who have gone before, such as Alfred North Whitehead when he said, "definiteness is the soul of actuality."[22] More to the point, I have received this crucial learning through the discipline of dialogue itself. One way to put it is in terms of a basic paradox of our post-traditional journey: the nectar of universality is only available through the particular, including the humble (and humbling) practice of a definite tradition.

Yet in our time the very existence of traditions is threatened by the tight and tenuous interdependence of peoples and ecosystems, and by the associated claims of the scientific worldview about the irrelevance of tradition. In this context, Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, gives a practical argument for the importance of dialogue as it inherently involves reappropriation of traditions: "... it helps us draw on the deeper, ancient roots cultures and civilizations to find what unites us across all boundaries, and shows us that the past can provide signposts to unity just as easily as to enmity."[23] Dialogue and comparative study are of immediate and practical value in giving us access to the wisdom of the great traditions in the present.

Along with availability we discover through genuine dialogue that definiteness and openness are not opposed. In fact, the expansiveness that is so desirable as a human experience — that nectar of universality — is only available when we are definite in/as "the soul of actuality," while our own authentic definiteness becomes vividly available to us when we are open to the other. This is why Tu Weiming, one of the great masters of dialogue in our era, says: "Many kinds of 'thick descriptions' from a variety of spiritual traditions will have to be presented. We depend on the concrete manifestations of general principles to live a meaningful life in the world. The

need for dialogue between civilizations is obvious."[24] Re-appropriation of tradition on the post-traditional landscape is necessary in order for those "concrete manifestations" to be present.

Reflexivity:

The choosing of healthy re-appropriation is not fundamentalism; it does not retreat from life in the present, in the attempt to deny and get back to the Traditional Period; it is not rigid with assertion of unquestionable and absolute judgment. Healthy re-appropriation is encouraged by dialogue that contains within it an essential hermeneutical awareness.

Reflexivity is the developed capacity for self-transcendence, becoming aware that I *have* a self and a tradition of life-interpretation — rather than simply playing these things out as the unconscious given, the unreflective "way things are." Once a little distance has occurred (distance, yes, that *can* put us on the "slippery slope" toward relativism, but by no means necessarily), we begin to move into a whole new order of choice and responsibility. Distance on "self" means we are liberated from defensiveness and the ego's absurd pretense to perfection, free to be honest about our vulnerability and limitations, free to enter the movement from ego consciousness to reality consciousness that John Hick and others see as central to all of the great traditions.[25] Distance on tradition means we are able to exercise what Robert Bellah calls "responsibility for choice of symbol system,"[26] to appreciate that all traditions are limited by culture and society — such that each points to the Ultimate while none is ultimate in itself.

I have seen the emergence of this hermeneutical awareness most purely in the dialogue with my students, for whom it is a fundamental aspect of a liberal education. They seem to learn this awareness most effectively through feminist critique, which is possible, in the words of Elizabeth Minnich, because of "the human gift of reflexive thought" and "the liberatory quality of reflexive thinking."[27] Reflexivity makes it possible to "particularize what was [falsely] universal" and hence "open ourselves to greater diversity." Which in turn allows us to "live and work with more complexity and fineness of feeling and comprehension, taste and judgment," and "to create ways of thinking that support democracy rather than undermining it."[28] Similarly, Elizabeth Johnson, in an approach she identifies as "somewhat analogous to inter-religious dialogue," engages "a feminist hermeneutic."[29] Based on the understanding that "there has been no timeless speech about God" and that "words about God are cultural creatures,"[30] she criticizes and reforms the classical tradition in light of the experience and the practice of "the emancipation of women toward human flourishing."[31] Again, hermeneutical awareness opens he door for us to be more fully faithful to our finest experiences.

In more formal dialogue settings, the 2000 Jewish Christian Dialogue program entitled "Old Boundaries, New Boundaries — Taking the Next Step" was espe-

cially clear on the significance of reflexivity. Rabbi Irving Greenberg emphasized the necessity of knowing one's limits, and, in fact, this reflexive knowing as a precondition for the maintenance of one's own position in a plural world. He was eloquent:

> ... the deepest truth is that we hold on to our absolutes in pluralism only if we know the limits of our position. My truth cannot and does not cover all people, all possibilities, all times, because God wants others to contribute. We need the checks and balances to prevent the spinning out of control of our individual positions. This is why our dialogue is so vital and so necessary. We are embarked on one of the great moral adventures of all time: to give up triumphalism, to accept that it is God's will that will be done, to accept that we are only servants and agents, to know that we have not been the sole vehicles of God's love or the redemption that is coming. It is this generation's calling to undertake this task for the sake of redeeming suffering humanity.[32]

Reflexivity — as the ground of any genuine pluralism — indicates a capacity to reflect on or *see* one's self / tradition, as though from another location, a post-traditional place from which we can respond to both the limitations and the greatness / gift of our tradition / self, along with our most complete experiences of being alive.

Commitment to Growth / Maturity

Reflexivity and growth / maturity go hand in hand: as implied in discussion of the previous quality, dialogue entails the kind of distance from both self and tradition associated with healthy growth. However, there is much distance in our time — even homelessness as a major theme, so that the distance of healthy growth needs to be distinguished carefully from the other forms. Healthy growth makes it possible for us to affirm life as a gift. It makes it possible to appropriate resources of tradition effectively, without denial of life in the present (by escape into either an idealized traditional past or an ideology for the future), to exercise reflexivity, maintain healthy growth, contribute to thriving of others and self, and be at home in relationality. Again, it is the interdependence of these six qualities.

To say we must grow is first of all to say — maybe especially to Westerners — that we must move beyond fixed systems and static understandings of the absolute and transcendent, which have themselves been absolutized in the form of dogma, intellectualism, and patriarchy. This means we must learn to affirm process and immanence, "ongoing creation," both in ourselves and in the larger world, maybe even theologically in terms of "God's" ways of relating to the world.

Growth means pattern of movement, and a way of distinguishing the healthy motion from those that are cancerous or otherwise dangerous — either by kind, or direction, or by failure of a part to move in an otherwise dynamic system. I think

that since Gail Sheehy's groundbreaking 1976 book, *Passages: Predictable Crises of Adult Life,*[33] the conversation that has evolved about "life-span development" and the fullness of human growth (beyond age 21!) is one of the most distinctive intellectual breakthroughs of our period. Here I can only briefly point to two voices that show the intimate connection between dialogue and the healthy pattern of growth — into an expanded vision of human maturity:

First, William Fowler, in his very influential *Stages of Faith,*[34] describes his fifth stage, beyond the dichotomizing logic of the fourth, as conjunctive and *dialogical:* "In dialogical knowing the multiplex structure of the world is invited to disclose itself. In a mutual 'speaking' and 'hearing,' knower and known converse in an I-Thou relationship," on the understanding that "truth is more multidimensional and organically interdependent than most theories or accounts of truth can grasp."[35] Development and maturity through this stage "implies no lack of commitment to one's own truth," but rather "radical openness to the truth of the other [which] stems precisely from its confidence in the reality mediated by its own tradition and in the awareness that that reality overspills its mediation."[36] My understanding at any point in life is limited, and yet my understanding grows, becomes deeper, clearer, and more effective over time. This is quite the reverse of the previous paradigm which favored understanding that is absolute and unchanging.

The second voice is that, again, of Elizabeth Johnson. She too speaks of growth beyond dichotomizing logic, and its association with the limited male ideal and definition of maturity as nonrelational autonomy: "What is slowly coming to light is a new construal of the notion of the person, neither as a [male] self-encapsulated ego nor a [female] diffuse self denied, but selfhood on the model of relational autonomy."[37] Hence "Oppositional, either-or thinking, which is endemic to the androcentric construction of reality, dissolves into a new paradigm of both-and," and the vision of "the coinherence of autonomy and mutuality as constitutive of the mature person."[38]

Whether in the language of social science, feminism, or that which is more specific to intercultural dialogue, the point seems common — and twofold. First, humans mature past a way of thinking and relating that is oppositional, generative of dichotomy and forced choice that denies and does violence to the complexity of real life. This older way or stage may be described as that of male-domination, or of the Western atomistic individualism, or of intellectualism. Second, we begin to develop into a new stage in which we become capable of what we cannot quite articulate. As Johnson says, "The model is rather inclusive, celebratory of difference, circular, feminist — we reach for words."[39] It involves living beyond the dichotomizing mentality, *living* the paradox of autonomy and mutuality, male and female, definiteness and openness, West and the rest, universal and particular, global and local. In dialogue we experience moment in which we are fully present in our genuineness, our maturity. It is as though our deep or authentic self is able to shine through the clouds of ego that otherwise subdue and obstruct. This self-evidently good experience occurs at the very same moment when we are attentive and open to the other — in dialogue.

Urge to Flourishing

The word "flourishing" enters the vocabulary of intercultural dialogue (often with "thriving" as a synonym). For example, Tu Weiming, evaluating the Western Enlightenment, says it was "detrimental to human flourishing" because of its anthropocentric self-assertion[40] Clearly this usage of the word "flourishing" is broader than the practices and definitions of any particular society, such as to open the possibility of this sort of cross-cultural criticism. J. Ronald Engel, one of the framers of the Earth Charter speaks of "the flourishing of all life:" "If there is one overarching moral and practical priority for the Earth Charter it is the radical democratic imperative of forming a global compact among all citizens to engage in individual and collective moral deliberation for the sake of the flourishing of all life."[41] Here the reference is not only broader than any particular society; it is planetary in scope.

"Flourishing" reveals the ways in which the intercultural dialogue movement overlaps the environmental movement (as we have already seen its overlap with some forms of feminism and social science). It connotes awareness and support of vital ecosystems in which humans cohabitate in a natural order of harmonious interdependence — or not. This vision of well-being goes beyond the materialistic and atomistic modern notions of both capitalism and communism; it echoes the traditional visions of Greek *Eudemonia* and Chinese *Xing Fu,* the ideal community envisioned by *Datong* and *Polis*.

Arising out of the post-traditional period in which humans are no longer embraced and supervised by metaphysical authority, we can distinguish the orientation to thriving from Nietzsche's "will to power." The Nietzschian response in the West to the absence of metaphysical context, and the resulting nihilism, arises from the individual will and its social constructivist assertion. It is tinged with a dangerous kind of regret and resignation in relation to what is lost, the tone and consequence of which is well stated by Nietzsche himself: "Mankind would rather will the void than be void of will."[42]

The flourishing orientation is also post-traditional, but moves through and past the negativity of nihilism ("negating negation," in the language of the Kyoto School) to conscious affirmation of post-traditional life as liberation and gift, and develops toward greater awareness of the conditions under which gift is given. Sometimes associated with "survivors' wisdom,"[43] the flourishing response opens onto an ethic of care[44] and a reappropriation of democracy (rather than resignation to the war of all against all). Reporting on the dialogue process that resulted in the Earth Charter, J. Ronald Engel speaks of participants *experiencing* democracy as a way of relating that is beyond the thinking of democratic theorists, and involves appreciation of "gifts that outrun what we can see or understand," leading the Earth Charter to take "the radical democratic posture that underneath all these different interpretations there is a natural religious piety we all can share and a common covenant we can all make with the ultimately reliable powers of life."[45]

Clearly this vision of flourishing as democracy is deeper than the broadly accepted "procedural democracy" associated with the globalization of free markets, representative government, and constitutional rights. Not to deny the preferability of this type of political system over many others, Engel points out that merely procedural definitions of democracy fail to provide space for genuine citizenship and a vision of the common good — they do not result in or lead toward flourishing. The Earth-affirming vision of democracy is decidedly religious: it locates and specifies our human wellbeing within the harmonious interdependence of the many peoples, species, and geographies of this planet. To flourish is to live on and celebrate the whole planet at the same time we rest and work in our local niche, simultaneously global and local.

Relationality as Locus

Flourishing identifies interdependence within the ecology of Earth as our home, and leads to awareness that "world civilization will become a universal moral democracy, or perish,"[46] and the religious significance of our faithfulness to the Earth as what William James calls "the common mother."[47] Relationality as Locus, as a separate sixth quality, goes a crucial step further to specify the meaning of interdependence for humans. "Flourishing," like affirmation of gift, can be vague and romantic without specification as to how and where. For humans, full experience of flourishing arises not from detached appreciation of interdependence, but rather from the midst of rigorous engagement with the other who becomes mysteriously both more other and more same in that moment of meeting. At the same time both self and other come into bright distinctiveness, the space between opens up as a space of possibility, creativity, and freedom — as locus of the ultimate, even as temple or holy place, the space in or out of which the divine appears, the new, and the "unexpected life" to which James refers. Here is both the place and the activity in (or through) which we are most faithful to the gift of life that is given to us. Hence this sixth quality, with its crucial specification, identifies dialogue as a religious *practice*.

The distinctively human interdependence is neither the isolation of atomistic individualism nor is it co-dependence, but rather the simultaneity of independence and intimacy — in what Peter Hershock calls "truly liberating intimacy."[48] It is not exchange or social contract or construction, but rather that way of being to which Jesus points when he says that he is present when two or more are gathered in his name,[49] or Confucius when he asks: "Am I not one among the people of this world? If not them, with whom should I associate?"[50] Dialogue, for humans, *is* democracy — and pluralism — in that it entails openness to truth appearing through and with the other, and in that truth is understood as manifest in a kind of relationship rather than as correspondence with a reality that is external to encounter. The distinctively human form of interdependence is beyond competition and the assumption that all association must be ordered by the law of dominance and submission.

In traditional religious language, this sixth quality can be spoken of in terms of the fullness of return. The broadly shared sense that the truly enlightened being is not the one who leaves, or who retreats from the world into his/her own mystical purity, but rather is the one who returns from the enlightenment experience out of love/compassion/service/stewardship. And this not as a "sacrifice," but as the fullness (or maturity) of enlightenment itself. In more contemporary terms: in coming out of the nihilism and the relativism that swirls around it — which many take to be inherent to modern and "post-modern" life[51] — and understanding this as a sort of leaving, the awareness of relatedness as locus of the ultimate for humans can be seen as return ("beyond the post-modern"). One very clear example of this sentiment and awareness is Karl Jaspers — in radical distinction from the leaving of Nietzsche — when he says (in what we could call the returning spirit[52]) that personal ties are the only source of hope for a "new and trustworthy objectivity."[53] We see this same spirit in Richard J. Bernstein, speaking from Continental and American pragmatic philosophy, when he speaks of "engaged encounter with the Other, the otherness of the Other" as the fundamental *Aufgabe* [task or obligation], and the primacy of the ethical response of "cultivat[ing] the type of imagination where we are at once sensitive to the sameness of 'the Other' with ourselves *and* the radical alterity that defies and resists reduction of 'the Other' to 'the Same.'"[54] Relatedness with the other is both our salvation and our service; it is locus of our thriving.

III

There seem to be three possibilities for the human future. One is "globalization" in the of sense the whole world being shaped by the multinational corporation, the life of producing and consuming, "modernization" in the Western style as celebrated by Hollywood and advertising, the life of more and better and endlessly expanding luxury.[55]

But this is unlikely as a world prospect, especially given the realities of increasingly limited resources, and an ever widening gap between the rich and the poor. A second and more likely possibility is "the clash of civilizations," as envisioned by Samuel Huntington and others.[56] As the world becomes smaller and the interdependence tighter, as world resources and the possibilities for successful modernization diminish, and as leaders and societies become aware of the insufficiency of modern values to the human spirit, reaction sets in. And reaction takes the form of not simply withdrawing into benign traditionalism or alternative visions of social and individual goodness, but of fundamentalism — drawing back in judgment, absolutism, self-righteousness, and terror.

Some of us are working on a third alternative: dialogue. "Dialogue" is a vision of unity and diversity grounded on a deeper appreciation of human and ecological thriving, a vision of human maturity that is witnessed in all of the great traditions, and a commitment to continuous learning and growth, within a new awareness of a limited Earth as our commonly shared home. This, of course, is improbable, "un-

realistic" alongside the massive physical facts of life on the planet at this time. And yet it has always been such — that the ideals worth living for appear weak and frail, almost foolish, against the massive facts on the surface of our circumstance.

We return to the vocation that is described by John Dewey, the vocation of "a common faith," and making it "more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared." We engage his vocation most profoundly by *practicing dialogue,* supporting occasions, programs, candidates, associations that work toward a world of dialogue as what Tu Weiming calls "a new paradigm" for the human future.

One element of this work is articulation, recalling Dewey's remark about our problem with the public being "primarily and essentially an intellectual problem."[57] Here is the work of finding ways of speaking about dialogue so that it might be shared as a vision of the human future — in the Biblical sense of "Where there is no vision the people perish" (Proverbs 29:18). Its persuasiveness and efficacy, the experience of it as responsive to both our deepest and most urgent need and our highest wish.

And I am suggesting in this essay that one essential component of articulation is reappropriation of the relational vision of dialogue as it is represented in the world's great traditions. Through the intercultural dialogue of the later Twentieth Century, it was discovered that the traditions contain resources of mysticism and spiritual development, resources that are magnificently similar and different in a way that releases great potential for us in the post-traditional present. In like fashion, my suggestion is that these same traditions also contain rich and effective resources for dialogue, as the vision of radiant relationality of harmony and justice, as well as both the spiritual *and political* practices through which we can develop toward embodiment of this ideal — the actual *living* of it in our own lives and beyond. The great traditions contain resources for what I have earlier spoken of as "return," resources for democratic living.

I can best conclude this essay with an example of what I mean by reappropriation through and in dialogue as it occurs in my own practice:

As is clear from my description of the six qualities of dialogue in this essay, I have been in dialogue with China. Specifically, I have had the great privilege of being involved with the reappropriation of traditional Chinese culture and philosophy, especially that of Confucianism. China, after "one hundred years of humiliation," after a long period of attempting to modernize in the Western way and a Cultural Revolution that attempted to erase tradition, is rediscovering the richness and dignity of its cultural roots. In the midst of reappropriation many amazing discoveries occur: for example, the discovery that tradition Chinese philosophy is quite "postmodernist" in character[58] and presents great resources for Westerners and others who struggle to move beyond our paralysis and nihilistic deconstruction.

Traditional Chinese philosophy contains powerful resources for practicing and articulating dialogue. I have already indicated some of these in relation to the work of Peimin Ni and Tu Weiming. Here I will also mention Sor-Hoon Tan, and her effort to reappropriate Confucian resources for Chinese democracy, out of her dialogue with John Dewey: "Introducing Dewey into a discussion of Confucian democracy illumi-

nates Confucianism in new ways that contribute significantly to the reconstruction of Confucianism that we need to undertake to make Confucian democracy possible."[59] Her reconstruction provides significant resources from the Confucian tradition for moving the discussion about the possibilities of democracy in China — and the world — beyond focus on thin procedural democracy to the cultivation of the truly democratic personality and community.

In the fecundity of the dialogical relationship, the Chinese reappropriation helps me to engage a parallel process, to see and gain access to resources in my own tradition that have been overlooked in the past. Here I will mention Socrates in particular and the fully relational / dialogical quality of his philosophy — before it was eclipsed by Platonic doctrine (or later doctrinal interpretations of Plato) and the Western intellectualism or logocentrism which William James and so many others in our time have criticized.

Look at the *Apology:* Socrates says "...I tell you that to let no day pass without discussing goodness and all the other subjects about which you hear me talking and examining both myself and others is really the very best thing a man [sic] can do, and that life without this sort of examination is not worth living."[60]

Or look at the *Phaedo*: "No greater misfortune could happen to anyone than that of developing a dislike for argument."[61]

Or the *Gorgias*: "And what kind of man am I? One of those who would gladly be refuted if anything I say is not true, and would gladly refute another who says what is not true, but would be no less happy to be refuted myself than to refute, for I consider that a greater benefit, inasmuch as it is a greater boon to be delivered from the worst of evils oneself than to deliver another. And I believe there is no worse evil for man than a false opinion about the subject of our present discussion"[62] [i. e. the relative values of rhetoric and dialogue.

My final suggestion, then, is that we who read and write and teach can contribute to the much larger vocation of making dialogue more solid, secure, accessible, and shared through reexamining our traditions and bringing their riches to the needs of life in the present, developing articulations of dialogue that are simultaneously effective in the fully practical sense, and inspiring in that they breathe energizing spirit into our being together.

NOTES

[1] James, William, *Essays on Radical Empiricism and A Pluralistic Universe,* New York: Dutton, 1971. P. 131.

[2] Smith, Huston, *Beyond the Post-Modern Mind,* New York: Crossroad, 1982.

[3] David Ray Griffin is editor of the SUNY Press series by this name. See his series introduction, "Introduction to SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought," in, for example, Griffin, ed., *God and Religion in the Postmodern World,* Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1989.

[4] Dewey, John, *A Common Faith,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934. P. 97.

[5] I am working on an anthology of such descriptions, and would welcome suggestions from readers of this essay as to statements or essays on dialogue which might be included.

[6] Jaspers, Karl, *Man in the Modern Age*, trans. Eden and Paul Cedar, Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1957. P. 193.

[7] See, for example, Lifton, Robert Jay, *The Life of the Self,* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1976.

[8] James, pp. 265–266.

[9] Robert N. Bellah, "Religious Evolution," in *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World,* New York: Harper & Row, 1970. P. 22.

[10] See Jaspers, Karl, *The Origin and Goal of History,* New Haven: Yale University press, 1953; Arendt, Hannah, "Karl Japers: Citizen of the World?" in *Men in Dark Times,* New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955, pp. 81-94; and Smith, Huston, *Beyond the Post-Modern Mind*.

[11] Philosophers of life — I am not sure about the origin of this term. In conversation with Elizabeth Minnich, we thought it might be John Dewey, Arendt, Hans Jonas, Julian Marias. For an attempt to engage dialogue with contemporary philosophers of life, see my *Living Philosophy: Remaining Awake and Moving Toward Maturity in Complicated Times,* St. Paul: Paragon House, 2002. See also below on "philosophers of return."

[12] Cobb, John, *Beyond Dialogue: Toward a Mutual Transformation of Christianity and Buddhism,* Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982. Pp. 1, 52.

[13] *Ibid.,* p. 52.

[14] See my account of this event in *Rediscovering the West,* Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994. Pp. 35–39.

[15] Abe, Masao, *Zen and Western Thought,* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985. See also Mitchell, Donald W., ed., *Masao Abe: A Zen Life of Dialogue,* Boston: Charles E. Tuttle, 1998.

[16] See conclusion to Abe, *Zen and Western Thought,* "The End of World Religion," pp. 261–275.

[17] See *Living Philosophy,* pp. 138–140.

[18] Arendt, Hannah, "Ideology and Terror: A Novel form of Government," in *The Origins of Totalitarianism,* Cleveland: Meridian, 1958. Pp. 460–479.

[19] Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas,* p. 18.

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ПРИЗВАНИЕ К ДИАЛОГУ

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В данной работе межкультурный диалог рассматривается как хрупкая надежда, располагающаяся между двумя неприемлемыми перспективами будущего: «столкновения цивилизаций» С. Хантингтона и усредненной глобализации и модернизации западного образца. В первую очередь, понятие диалога сформулировано относительно основополагающего опыта, и далее — в попытке быть верным этому опыту, поддерживать и культивировать его относительно семи качеств, присущих как человеку, так и культуре, которые связаны с такими составляющими диалога, как этика, духовность, зрелость. Эти качества: признание дара, обретение традиции, стремление к росту/зрелости, способность к рефлексии, желание успеха и отношение как локус. Заключительная часть работы посвящена рассмотрению настоящего положения вещей в Соединенных Штатах касательно данных качеств, а также рассуждениям о существующей надежде, практике и той работе, которая должна быть проведена.

THE SPREAD AND DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAM IN BEIJING

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Where there are Muslims, there are Mosques. Mosques not only witness the development of Islam but also reflect Islamic culture. According to the author's research on more than sixty mosques in Beijing, every one of them has a rich cultural connotation. As is said by some scholars, mosques are "embedded deeply in the cultural framework of time, involving a religious art concerning the history and religious, philosophical mood of Muslims" (*China Muslim*, 2002.2: 7). The culture of Beijing mosques is the product of the communication and integration of Chinese and Arabic cultures, and the crystallization of hard work and wisdom of Muslims.

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, especially since the policies to reform and to open the door to the outside world were carried out, Beijing Muslims have gained political equality; their material and cultural life has been greatly improved; and their religious belief has been held in great respect. By the end of the 20th century, the population of Beijing Muslims has reached more than 240,000 people according to the statistical data of 2000, the fifth national census, which ranks the first in all large cities in China. The components of minority nationalities are quite full and complete in Beijing region in comparison with other large cities of the country. It may be said that for each of the minorities believing in Islam, such as Hui, Uigur, Kazakh, Dongxiang, Khalkhas, Sala, Trajik, Uzbek, Paoan, Tartar, there are always some of them living, working or studying in Beijing region. On the whole, Muslims in Beijing are mainly of Hui nationality. Beijing Mosques and Muslims of all nationalities constitute the main body of the culture of Beijing Mosques. This culture has become a way of life and plays an important role in the formation of Hui nationality and is closely related to the religious beliefs, ethical norms, habits and customs, and food culture of the above-mentioned minorities. The reason why for thousands of years Chinese Muslims have always believed in Islam lies in the establishment of Mosques. Muslims and Mosques are just as inseparable as fish and water.

History of Culture of Beijing Mosques

The mosque, also called the place for Muslims to do religious services, is derived from Masjid, an Arabic word meaning "Muslim's place of worship", namely, "the place where Muslims worship Allah." The word mosque began to appear in the Yuan Dynasty.

> In the second year of Yanyou of Yuan Dynasty (1315 AD), Sai Dianchi, the King of Xianyan, rebuilt the temple of western Chang'an under the imperial edict and he presented a memorial to the emperor asking for the name of Mosque to extol the pure and spotless Allah. Since then existed the name of Mosque and it is used habitually as a general name for all Islamic temples (Ma&Ma, 1997: 368).

In China, Muslims of all nationalities refer to the mosque as "Allah's house" to show their respect. Islam penetrates its spirit to the minds of Muslims through the medium of mosques. Mosques are holy places for Muslims of the world to do their religious services and to worship Allah. Mosques concentratively reflect Islamic culture, occupying a lofty and holy position in Muslims' minds.

As is verified by Islamic scholars, the earliest mosque in China was built in the Tang dynasty. As is recorded by the historical data, during the period of Zhenguan under the regime of Taizong of Tang Dynasty, there were already messengers from the country of *Dashi* (the later Arab) to build friendly relations. The disciples of Mohammed, Wakkas, also went to Guangzhou to spread Islam. According to *Biography of Dashi in Book of Tang Dynasty*, (651 AD), the third calif of Arabian Empire, Osman, sent messengers to Chang'an in the second year of Yonghui, ruled by Gaozong of Tang Dynasty. From then on, there were frequent contacts between the Arabian Empire and the Tang government and there were more and more Muslims merchants from the western and middle Asia doing business in China. In the early periods of Tang Dynasty, the rulers held a policy of tolerance and acceptance towards Muslims immigrating to China, showing respect for Islam which they believed in, providing a good living condition and building places for the Muslims to do religious services in. According to what Soleyman, an Arabic tourist coming to China in the 9th century, recorded in his *Soleyman's Journey to the East*:

> The place provided by the Chinese commercial port for Arabic merchants to assemble is called Khanfu, the present Guangzhou, where there is an Islamic priest and a church. ... The Islamic merchants from different places are mostly gathered in Khanfu. The Chinese emperor appointed an Islamic judge to govern the Muslims according to Islamic customs, the Holy Koran and the memorandum of Mohammed. This is highly praised by every Irak merchant coming here (cited in Zhang, 1977: 201).

Some historical documents record that most of the Dashi soldiers who had helped the Tang government pacify the riot led by An Lushan and Shi Siming later settled down in Chang'an and the Tang emperor built a mosque to satisfy their need for their religious life. Consequently, some scholars maintain that during the Tang period there were already mosques in the capital of Chang'an, and along the southeastern coast. The period of the Tang dynasty is the developing period of mosque culture in China.

Up to the Song Dynasty, the contacts between China and Arabia continued. Muslims kept coming to China, among whom those accompanied by their families increased. The main reason for the increase of Muslims coming to China from Arabia was that wars broke out in various places of Arabia resulting in turbulent societies and intense conflicts at home, so that many Muslims were forced to come to China to take refuge. On the other hand, the Song authorities attached much importance to overseas trade and they adopted policies beneficial to Chinese-foreign trade with regard to Arabian and Persian Muslims. The governments during the Northern and Southern Song dynasties not only built hotels and post houses to receive merchants from outside, but they set up special agencies in trading ports along the southeastern coast to take charge of foreign trade and trading affairs. In addition, they allowed Muslim merchants to build mosques and public cemeteries in China. All these policies caused the foreign trade in southern region to increase time and again. At that time, Guangzhou, Quanzhou and Hangzhou had become famous commercial ports at home and abroad. Incoming Arabian Muslim merchants and those who are rich and powerful mostly inhabited in these cities. "During the Song Dynasties, there were more foreigners who chose to stay in China forever compared with the Tang Dynasty and their social status was noticeably higher"(Jin, 1987: 338). Thus, many Arabian Muslim rich merchants inhabiting places of China such as Guangzhou and Quanzhou built luxurious and delicate houses and mosques. It was a common phenomenon to find mosques in Muslim communities during Tang and Song Dynasties. There might have been one temple in a lane or several temples in a lane. With the building of mosques in southeastern coastal cities, the Chinese culture of mosques began to develop.

The culture of mosques developed rapidly in China during the periods of Yuan and Ming Dynasties, when the population of Muslims coming from the middle and western Asia soared and mosques spread all over the country. In the Yuan Dynasty, there was a saying that Muslims existed throughout the world. Among them, some were merchants, some craftsmen, but more of them were soldiers, whose social status had changed radically compared with Tang and Song periods. They were no longer foreigners immigrating into China; instead, they had become important members in the Chinese nation family. Islam not only developed abreast of Taoism, Buddhism and Christianity, but also was paid equal attention to by the Yuan and Ming governments. The building of mosques was no longer confined to the capital and havens and ports along southeastern coast, which was the case during the Tang Dynasty, Five Dynasties and two Song Dynasties. Mosques were built in every place of the country and became a common phenomenon. "The practice of referring to Islamic churches as "mosques" began in the middle of 13th century and by the middle of 15th century, the word "mosque" was widely adopted by Islamic churches. ... 'Mosque' had become a name of Chinese characteristic"(Feng, 1991: 27). Most of the famous mosques existing in China at present were built in the Yuan and Ming Dynasties. During this period, "Muslims had formed a national community, and offices in charge of imperial music centered around mosques and spontaneously organized

by Muslims were being perfected" (Wu, 1995: 7). In addition, there were Muslim teaching staff in those mosques. The Yuan and Ming Dynasties saw a milestone in the formation and development of Islam and the culture of mosques in China.

At the end of Ming Dynasty and the beginning of Qing Dynasty, many mosques were built on both banks of the Canal and in the northern part of China, owing to the expansion of Muslims from the south along the Canal to the north. Especially during the last years of Qing dynasty, there was an increasing tendency for Muslims to locate in the north. Although Muslims enjoyed a far lower status during the last years of Ming Dynasty and early years of Qing Dynasty, Islam was still developed to some degree with the progress of the time. Muslims acquired a new look either in terms of philosophy, religious education, architecture, or with regard to their culture and customs. In this way, the culture of mosques in China was further developed.

Formation and Development of Culture of Beijing Mosques

The oldest mosque in Beijing is the Nuijie Mosque. Mengyang Pan (1993: 41) wrote in his *Islam and Muslim*:

> Nuijie Mosque is a mosque of largest scale and longest history in Beijing. It was built in the 14th year of Tonghe period during Liao Dynasty (the second year of Zhidao in the Northern Song Dynasty, 996 AD) and was rebuilt in the 7th year of Zhengtong of Ming Dynasty.

Nuijie Mosque is a well-known ancient temple of a large scale and with splendid architecture. It has a history of over one thousand years. However, this statement has aroused controversy among scholars. Some scholars hold that Nuijie Mosque was built in the Yuan Dynasty with a history of less than one thousand year. Others tend to think that Nuijie Mosque was built in the Ming Dynasty. Although there is disagreement in the academic field on the year when Nuijie Mosque was built, they all agree this mosque is the oldest one in Beijing. Nuijie Mosque witnesses the formation and development of Beijing Islam and reflects the forming of the culture of Beijing mosques.

As to the question: when did Islam come to Beijing? There is no reliable written record up to now. As is mentioned above, Nuijie Mosque is the oldest one in Beijing. Besides the record in *A General introduction to epigraphs of Stone Tablets showing the historical events in the order of the years calculated by Muslim Calendar*, which says the mosque was built in the Song Dynasty, Professor Dunzhen Liu in Nanjing Industrial College have noted that:

> ...the color paintings and designs of the back Cave Hall in the Prayer Hall of Nuijie Mosque were painted by architectural artists of the Song Dynasty, which can be used as evidence that Nuijie Mosque began to be built in the Song Dynasty, and Islam was also introduced during that period (Peng, 1996: 252).

Thus, some scholars hold that Islam was introduced into Beijing in the Song and Liao period when mosques were also built. According to some historical data, it is in the Yuan Dynasty that Islam was developed in the Beijing region when there was a large population of Muslims in Beijing and indeed quite a few mosques. According to *Complete works of Sir Qiujian* vol. 88, "in registering residence for all the Muslims in the capital (the capital of Yuan Dynasty), there were 2953 households, counted since the year of Renzi and continued in the fourth year of Zhongtong (1259 AD)" (Peng, 1996: 253). Some statistics show that "if counted by five people per household, there were 15,000 people, accounting for more than one tenth of the whole population, and there were 35 mosques at that time" (Liu, 1985: 4). These statistics reflect, to some degree, the condition and status of the development of Islam in the capital of Yuan dynasty. It is a pity that with the conquering of the capital by Ming soldiers and the construction of the city of Beijing by the emperor of Yongle of the Ming Dynasty most of the mosques built in the Yuan Dynasty were destroyed. Owing to the facts that Muslims, who had contributed to the protection of the country, were treated with high respect by the Ming government, were considered to be officials who had rendered meritorious service, and that Islam was in a special position and enjoyed special advantages in Beijing, many mosques were rebuilt and some were built under the edict of the emperor. Most of the old mosques in Beijing were built in the Ming Dynasty, when the culture of Beijing mosques was developed.

After the downfall of the Ming Dynasty, the Qing government founded by the dignitaries of Manchuria adopted a policy of "resorting to both benevolence and severity" toward Islam, which put Islam in a difficult position in the capital of Qing Dynasty. At the early period of Qing Dynasty, under the high pressure of Qing government, Islam developed from the inner city of Beijing towards the outer city and outskirts. With the expansion of dwelling places of Beijing Muslims, mosques increased time and again in Beijing so that the Qing Dynasty became the developing period of Islam and culture of Beijing mosques.

The Republic of China underwent an eventful period of time, when Muslims of all nationalities together with all the people in the country were plunged into the movement of democratic revolution. During that period, Islam in Beijing developed very slowly. In nearly forty years of time, there were few mosques built in Beijing, with the exception of Gulou, Tianqian and Mishi Mosques. Despite the slow development, history was progressing and the first mosque for female Muslims appeared in Beijing during the period of the Republic of China, namely, the mosque built in Shouliu Lane in Nuijie. However, most of the mosques for female Muslims in Beijing were built on a small scale and didn't exist long. Nevertheless, the number ranked first in the country.

It was after the founding of the PRC that Islam was truly developed in China, followed by the rapid development of Islam in Beijing. The population of Muslims living in Beijing ranked first among all the large cities in China. In addition, with regard to the components of nationalities, Beijing Muslims were incomparable. It can be said that for all the minorities believing in Islam, there were some of them living in Beijing, the ma-

jority of whom were of Hui nationality. Historically, although there were always many Hui people in Beijing, their development began after the founding of the PRC. As "native Beijing people," the population of Hui increased rapidly. "In the 30s, there were over 17,000 Muslims in Beijing, accounting for more than one tenth of the whole population of the city" (Guan, 1999: 163). By the end of the 20th century, the number of Muslims in Beijing had increased to over 20,000 (according to the statistical data of 1990 — the fourth national census). There are relatively more celebrities among Beijing Muslims, who occupy important positions in Islam around the country. After the founding of the PRC, the Chinese Islamic Association, which was initiated and prepared by well-known Muslims such as Erhan Bao, Pusheng Da, Jie Zhang, Yuhuai Ma, and Jian Ma, came into being in Beijing in 1953. Encouraged by the Chinese Islamic Association, the Islamic Association of the city of Beijing was also established. So far, there are already 68 mosques in Beijing, which indicates the development of the culture of Beijing mosque. Each mosque stands for a period of the history, showing not only its unique architectural style but the historical development of Islam and culture of Beijing mosques.

Characteristics of the Culture of Beijing Mosques

Mosques reflect Islamic culture and each mosque has a rich cultural connotation. The architectural style and structure of the mosque is developed along with the diversification of its religious functions. As is said by some scholars, mosques are "embedded deeply in the cultural framework of time, involving a religious art concerning the history and religious philosophical mood of Muslims" (*China Muslim*, 2002.2: 7). The culture of Beijing mosques is the product of the communication and integration of Chinese and Arabic cultures, the crystallization of the hard work and wisdom of Muslims of all nationalities. It reflects in a concentrated way the historical culture with regard to religion, nationality, education, architecture, calligraphy, and art, and has formed an architectural system and artistic style of its own.

Beijing mosques are mostly buildings with Chinese and Arabic styles combined. The entire layout is symmetric and well knitted with a remarkable central axis. The roofs are covered with glazed tiles, giving the mosque a solemn and imperial style. In terms of the shape and structure of the building, a mosque usually consists of spacious and bright yards that are separated from each other. The gates, prayer halls, main matched halls, Mi'd hanah and pavilions were all built with strong wood ridges and beams, with a system of tiers of brackets inserted between the top of a pillar and a crossbeam, and upturned eaves, which belong to traditional Chinese palace-style architecture. Outside the gates of some of the mosques, there are screen walls of Chinese style.

By a careful observation, the layouts of Beijing mosques are usually flexible and varied. In general, Prayer halls and Cave halls face east, which is quite different from the traditional Chinese buildings facing south. The decorations on the screen walls are different from traditional Chinese patterns. Instead, the style peculiar to Islam is maintained. With regard to the decorations of Prayer Halls of Beijing mosques, a rich

and colorful decorative art with Chinese and Arabic styles combined is adopted. It digests traditional Chinese architecture techniques and fine Arabic artistic style, while giving prominence to Islamic religious connotations. This results in a culture of Beijing mosques of Chinese characteristics. Within the prayer halls of the mosques there are no decorations of images and animals. Instead, they are decorated with Arabic scriptures, geometric designs, or flowers and grass designs, thus displaying Arabic culture. Nuijie Mosque is a good example of this. Take the "architecture component of anopia-animal" for example. It looks like dragon in shape, but it has no eyes or other organs, and the eyes are replaced by water waves, for Islam avoids the designs of images and animals. Therefore, early Beijing architecture components of mosques are mostly anopia-animal components. Since the policy of freedom of religious belief was implemented as well as the policies to reform and to open the door to the outside world were carried out, many mosques in Beijing have been rebuilt or repaired. In 1979, Nuijie Mosque was regilded and redecorated with fresh paintings and ornamentals. Now this old mosque has taken on an entirely bright and new look.

In the rebuilding and repairing some mosques have adopted or used for reference Arabic architectural structure and style. The green domes and the crescents are the main signs of the newly built mosques of Arabic fashion in Beijing. They have added luster to the culture of Beijing mosques. Since most of the mosques in Beijing were built after the Yuan Dynasty, especially during the Ming and Qing Dynasties, architecture with Chinese and Arabic styles combined is a major feature of the culture of Beijing mosques. With the development of the society, libraries and computer rooms have been built within some mosques, realizing the modernization of these mosques. Viewed from the organizational system of Beijing mosques, every mosque is the result of the fusion of Chinese and Arabic cultures.

IV Beijing Mosques are the Carriers of Chinese and Arabic Cultures.

Mosques in themselves are palaces of art and museums exhibiting both Chinese and Arabic cultures. As is said above, Beijing mosques are examples of the fusion of the Chinese and Arabic architectural arts. In the world, Arabic calligraphy has a long history with various styles of chirography, enjoying a high reputation in the field of calligraphy. After it is spread into China together with Islam, Arabic calligraphy has evolving gradually into an Arabic calligraphy with Chinese characteristics. Arabic calligraphy of brush style, of big character, and various inscribed boards with Arabic words appear everywhere in Beijing mosques. Besides, there are also quite a few "horizontal scroll in both Chinese and Arabic" in them. Hand-written copies of Koran and Saibugai with a history of over a hundred years, engraved Koran, and ancient books on Chinese Islam in Chinese are kept in Beijing mosques. For example, a hand-written copy of Koran in the fifth year of the ruler of Yanyou Emperor in the Yuan dynasty (1318 CE, or 718 according to the Islamic calendar) kept in Dongsi Mosque in Beijing has a history of more than 700 years and is known as "the rare treasure in the world." The porcelain tablet with white background and blue Arabic written words of al-kalimah al-Tayyibah, which was made in Ming-Qing Dynasties, can be said to be an excellent relic in the world. In

Beijing mosques, there are also tablets of Ming-Qing Dynasties inscribed boards with Chinese words, "Koran" in different languages, as well as arts and handcrafts.

When I was researching Beijing mosques, I was surprised to find that there were Islamic relics of "copper teapot" and "Tabut al-Mayyit" that were kept in good condition in Yanzhen Mosque and Nuilanshan Mosque in Shunyi district of Beijing. The structure of "Tabut al-Mayyit" is similar to that of traditional Chinese big sedan chair carried by eight men and maybe was inspired by that. The "Tabut al-Mayyit" kept in Beijing Mosque also has stout carrying poles with it and has to be carried by eight men. The discovery of the "Tabut al-Mayyit" in Nuilanshan Mosque in Shunyi renders forceful evidence for the study of the indigenization of the Beijing Islamic culture. Meanwhile, it is shown that every mosque in Beijing is a portrait of the fusion of Chinese and Arabic cultures and the objectification of Beijing Islamic culture.

Beijing has a long and rich historical culture of distinct features, of which the culture of mosques is one important part. Just like the historical culture of Beijing, the culture of mosques shows different features in different period of time. With the development of time the culture of Beijing mosques, like a beautiful flower, will attract more attention in the world.

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РАСПРОСТРАНЕНИЕ И РАЗВИТИЕ ИСЛАМА В ПЕКИНЕ

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В сегодняшнем мире ислам является не только космополитической религией, насчитывающей 1 миллиард приверженцев, но и представляет собой своего рода систему идей. С приходом ислама в Китай здесь также можно было наблю-

дать распространение исламской архитектуры, медицины, литературы, искусства и других элементов культуры, которые впоследствии сформировали некий китайский стиль ислама. Неотъемлемой частью исламской традиции являются мечети, не только представляющие собой архитектурные памятники, но и играющие роль посланников исламской культуры. Из более шестидесяти мечетей, расположенных в Пекине, каждая отображает богатство культурного наследия. Некоторые ученые рассматривают мечети как «своего рода произведения религиозного искусства, запечатленные в определенном времени и культурной среде, и служащие художественным воплощением истории и религиозной философии мусульманского народа». Мечети Пекина являются результатом взаимодействия китайской и арабской культуры, раскрывают мастерство и талант мусульманского народа, совмещают в себе функции религиозных и образовательных заведений, а также традиционных культурных центров, объединяющих людей. Они представляют собой образец архитектуры, искусства, каллиграфии. Данная работа посвящена описанию мечетей, как отображения истории развития исламской культуры в Пекине, характера и закономерностей этого развития, своеобразия и отличительных черт культурного наследия мечетей Пекина, взаимодействия китайской и арабской культур.

COPING WITH INCOMMENSURABLE PURSUITS: BERLIN, RORTY, AND THE CONFUCIAN-DAOIST COMPLEMENTARITY

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Living a human life is about choosing alternatives, from alternative actions, to alternative values, to alternative ways of life. These alternatives are often incommensurable. They also are, or can be, incompatible; choosing one necessitates rejecting others. How to cope with incommensurable and incompatible alternatives is an important question for philosophers. This question becomes even more acute in today's multicultural world. In this paper I will explore three models that provide insights to this question. I will first examine Richard Rorty's view on two human pursuits, i. e., "private perfection" and "human solidarity," and his attempt to separate the public and the private spheres as a solution to accommodate these two pursuits. Then I will examine the work of Isaiah Berlin, whose interpretation of Niccolo Machiavelli provides a second model. My examination of Rorty and Berlin will lead to critiques of both philosophers. Finally, I will present the Confucian-Daoist complementarity model. I believe that a useful way to tackle this question is to examine and see how value systems — which represent and crystallize different ways of life — accommodate various human pursuits. I will make the case that the Confucian-Daoist complementarity model can help us understand and handle different value patterns within and across societies.

I

In his influential book *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, Richard Rorty describes two kinds of human ideals. They are represented by such authors as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Baudelaire, Proust, Heidegger, and Nabokov on the one hand, and Marx, Mill, Dewey, Habermas, and Rawls on the other. The first group of writers exemplifies the ideal of self-perfection — a self-created, autonomous, human life. The second is that of "fellow citizens" who advocate the ideal of social justice and human solidarity. The first kind of pursuit may be idiosyncratic in character, e.g., one's love for a particular kind of poetry or music, one's obsession with wild orchids (like the young Rorty himself), and one's religious passion to become a recluse in the Himalaya Mountains.[1] As Rorty puts it, "what matters to you may well be something that may never matter much to most people" (1999, 13). The second kind of pursuit is universal in character, e. g., one's shared sense of solidarity with other human beings, one's devotion to fight capitalism or communism, and one's sacrifice to organize a political party in order to improve society.

Even though Rorty's exemplary authors seem to point in opposite directions, self-creation and human solidarity are not necessarily opposed. Rorty writes,

> The two will, for some people, coincide — as they do in those lucky Christians for whom the love of God and of other human beings are inseparable, or revolutionaries who are moved by nothing save the thought of social justice. (1999, 13).

For those "lucky" people, it is indeed possible to integrate the pursuit of self-creation and the pursuit of human solidarity into one consistent whole. Mohandas Gandhi may be an apt example. Gandhi spent his life fighting for social justice. It is precisely through the pursuit of human solidarity that Gandhi excelled, or should we say, created himself as a national hero. Mother Teresa may be another good example. From a "very small, quiet and shy" and "ordinary" nun, as described by members of her early congregation, Mother Teresa created in herself sainthood through her life-long pursuit of social justice and human solidarity.

Rorty's point, however, is that self-creation and human solidarity do not have to coincide and that it is alright when they do not. He writes, these two ideals of life "need not coincide, and one should not try too hard to make them do so" (1999, 13). It may be safe to say that, for most people at most times, these two ideals do not coincide; what one does in the pursuit of one ideal does not simultaneously advance one's pursuit of the other. In Rorty's view, demands of these pursuits can be "equally valid, yet forever incommensurable" (Rorty, 1989, XV). He writes,

> We should only think of these two kinds of writers as *opposed* if we think that a more comprehensive philosophical outlook would let us hold self-creation and justice, private perfection and human solidarity, in a single vision (Rorty, 1989, XIV).

To hold them in a single vision, for Rorty, is to "weave" or "tie in" them together (1999, 13). If I understand Rorty correctly, I would say that he does not mean by "a single vision" merely "weave" or "tie in" the two together; for loosely speaking, "balancing" the two into a single life may also be described as "weaving" or "tying in" them together. By "a single vision" Rorty means to "weave" and "tie in" them together in such a way that whatever advances one automatically advances the other. The desire to weave all good things into "a single vision" can be traced all way back to Plato, who attempts to hold reality and justice in a single vision. For Plato, the real is the good and the good is the real; whatever is good for the soul is always good for humanity. Plato's system of Forms is supposed to ensure that everything falls neatly into a single vision of the Good. Rorty wants to finally declare the futility of this attempt and to put the last nail in its coffin.

While I strongly agree with Rorty in his resistance to the "single vision" philosophy, he appears to have underestimated the tension, even conflict, between different pursuits. It seems to me, even if we do not attempt to mould private perfection and hu-

man solidarity in one philosophical outlook, the two groups of authors cited by Rorty are opposed in an important sense. They are opposed because they are exemplars of *opposing* pursuits. I would say that two pursuits are opposed to each other if they compete for "space" in a person's life in such a way that, at some point of the process, the increase of one necessitates the decrease of the other. As in sports, two individuals or two teams are opposed when they compete; gaining for one necessitates losing for the other. Of course, opposing pursuits are not limited to self-creation and human solidarity. As Charles Taylor puts it, "the act with the best consequences may conflict in some situation with the demands of my integrity. Or the demands of benevolence to others may conflict with those of my own fulfillment. Or the demands of justice may conflict with those of mercy and compassion" (Taylor, 1997, 170). For the sake of argument, however, we will not involve other pursuits until later. Between Rorty's two pursuits, he does not deny that there can be mutual effect. He recognizes that "your private process of self-creation may result in your deciding that you have more, or fewer, responsibilities to others than you had previously thought" (Festenstein and Thompson, 2001, 202). But from here Rorty does not go further, at least not explicitly, to recognize their mutual effect to the extent that they can conflict with each other.

I believe that, for the "unlucky" people, there is tension between the pursuit of self-creation and the pursuit of human solidarity. Unmanaged, the tension can become conflict, when the pursuit of one ideal demote or impedes the one's pursuit of the other ideal. In some way, this is like requesting state budget for education and for law enforcement. The two do not necessarily conflict, but tension exists between the two allocations. The two come into conflict when the increase for one area necessitates decrease for the other. The examples that Rorty uses show this kind of tension; when the two pursuits do not coincide, being more like Rorty's exemplars of self-creation is to be less like his exemplars of human solidarity. I would suggest that one plausible account of the lack of success in the pursuit of human solidarity by authors in Rorty's first group is that their way of pursuing self-creation, and the extent to which they pursue self-creation, leave little room for the pursuit of human solidarity.

We can talk about conflict between these two pursuits in the sense of the word as is used in "conflict of interest," where two interests point to incompatible directions. The two pursuits may come into conflict in many ways. Different demands may logically contradict one another. Obviously, if the need for human solidarity and justice called one to join the Free French Forces to fight the Nazis, while one's pursuit in self-creation demanded one to be a Jain pacifist, the two demands could not be met at the same time. Or different demands may compete for resources. Devoting one's time to writing a lifetime book for self-fulfillment necessitates taking quality time away from one's effort to strengthen the family and community. Joining the Peace Corp will put off, if not put an end to, the realization of one's dream of becoming a spiritual recluse. Using time and energy to learn and memorize the names of all wild orchids in New England prevents one from using the same time and energy to participate in the Boy Scots or to help the Salvation Army.

Rorty is optimistic in dealing with the pursuit of self-creation and the pursuit of human solidarity. He suggests that we should "not to try to choose between them but, rather, give them equal weight and then use them for different purposes" (1989, XIV). "To choose between them" means to pick one and reject the other, as people sometimes do. "To use them for different purposes" is to pursue each at different times and to alternate these pursuits.

For Rorty, self-creation is a private matter, while human solidarity or social justice is public in nature. The two occupy different realms; we should separate the private and the public; sometimes one concentrates on private self-creation, and at other times one concentrates on public justice. The two need not interfere with each other and one can engage in them alternately.

Rorty's approach leaves ample room for individual freedom and provides a much-needed strong voice for individuality in our contemporary society. But his view seems to rely too much on an easy separation between the private and the public spheres. If the private and the public spheres are as separate as Rorty makes them to appear, then tension and conflict between his two pursuits might have been non-existent as Rorty makes it sound. However, the reality is that the so-called "private" almost always has some kind of effect on the "public," and vice versa. Consequently, the pursuit of self-creation and the pursuit of social justice almost always affect one another. For those who do not put these pursuits into "a single vision," there is almost always tension in between. Overlooking this tension will inevitably lead to the pursuit of one at a great cost to the other. For those people who pursue both ideals (that is, virtually all of us), it is important not to overlook this tension.

For Rorty, we need to have both self-creation and human solidarity,[2] as David Hall writes, Rorty insists that we remain sensitive to the manner in which private self-creation can lead to cruelty. Such can occur if we seek to employ others for purposes of private gratification, or if we use more than our fair share of resources, or if the amount of time spent in self-creation excludes any exercise in the support of justice and fairness in public, or if the self we create is a dumb clod or an arrogant aesthete, insensitive to the pain and humiliation suffered by others. Alternatively, of course, it is likely that too much yielding to public need will result in a narrow, hollow, and dull personality (Hall, 1994, 111).

If David Hall's interpretation of Rorty is correct — I believe that Hall has presented at least a plausible interpretation — Rorty holds that a sensible person should maintain a balance between self-creation and human solidarity.

It can be argued that, with a very small number of exceptions, the vast majority of people do attempt to integrate self-creation and human solidarity into a balance vis-a-vis "a single vision," even though there is no consensus as to what the ideal balance would be. Conceivably, one person may want to give self-creation a larger role than human solidarity in her balancing whereas another may want to give human solidarity a larger role.[3] Heidegger definitely encouraged self-creation. He, however, did not entirely reject human solidarity. For instance, he writes,

Rather, the sole implication [in *Being and Time*] is that the highest determinations of the essence of man in humanism still do not realize the proper dignity of man. To that extent the thinking in *Being and Time* is against humanism. But this opposition does not mean that such thinking aligns itself against the humane and advocates the inhuman, that it promotes the inhumane and deprecates the dignity of man (Heidegger, 1993, 233).

For Heidegger, self-creation definitely has a primary significance because, as he writes,

> Only from the truth of Being can the essence of the holy be thought. Only from the essence of the holy is the essence of divinity to be thought. Only in the light of the essence of divinity can it be thought or said what the word "God" is to signify (1993, 253).

The "truth of Being" is realized in the authentic existence of Dasein;[4] "God" is commonly used as a covering word for social justice.

Marx fought for human solidarity. He, however, did not rule out self-creation or private perfection as evidenced in his works such as *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. For Marx, overcoming alienation is a means of self-fulfillment. Only in the ideal society can individuals be complete in self-creation. Many would regard Marx's accomplishments in philosophical writings as an example of his own self-creation or self-fulfillment.

Therefore, an accurate characterization of accommodating these two pursuits is to say that one way is to put self-creation ahead of human solidarity, as found in the exemplars of Rorty's first group, and another is to put human solidarity ahead of self-creation, as found in the exemplars of Rorty's second group. There are various balancing choices.[5] Some give self-creation the leading role whereas others give human solidarity the leading role. This is another way to show that the two groups of Rorty's exemplar authors are opposed. On this understanding, whereas some "lucky" people can bring the two pursuits into a single vision and some cannot, no one can bring these *two kinds of balancing* — one with self-creation as the leading value and the other with human solidarity as the leading value — into a single vision. Such a characterization requires us to look into not self-creation and human solidarity as individual values, but into different patterns or systems of values, as I will discuss later.

If my above discussion is right, Rorty has underestimated the tension and conflict between different pursuits, and he has overlooked the close connection between the "private" and the "public" spheres. In addition, I believe that Rorty has also failed to give adequate consideration to the influence of culture patterns on individuals' choice of pursuits. For the vast majority of people, their ways of balancing competitive values are heavily influenced and, sometimes even largely determined, by the culture and society in which they live. To be sure, there are always individuals in any

society who deviate more from cultural norms than others, and, overall, modern societies tolerate these individuals more than traditional societies. However, the vast majority in society also makes their balancing of various pursuits, and their ways of balance reflect the large cultural patterns in society. Whether we like it or not, the vast majority of people are, more or less, "a copy or a replica," being so without experiencing anything like "the strong poet's anxiety of influence" (Rorty, 1989, 24). They live in a world "one never made, an inherited world," and live without the fear of the "strong poet," the fear of leaving no mark behind (ibid., 28). Even if they each make some kind of mark in the world, but it is too trivial to be taken seriously. In an era of individuality, this may seem sad, but it is a fact. The vast majority of people embody humanity as much, if not more, as those of the "strong poet" type and that philosophy needs to address their ways of life. I think Rorty recognizes this (e. g., ibid., 43). But in my view, he has over-emphasized individuals' idiosyncratic aspects and overlooked larger cultural patterns impressed in them. One may hold that the cultural pattern is nothing more than the summary of the individuals' behaviors. This conception, however, does not do justice to the fact that cultural patterns continue over generations and shape the behavior of individuals that are born into it one at a time. While I accept contingency in the formation of selfhood, I maintain that, for the vast majority of people, the kind of contingency that leads them to idiosyncrasies is not as great as Rorty appears to want us to believe. For this reason, we cannot adequately understand individuals' pursuits independent of the cultural patterns in the society. To cultural patterns in society our discussion will turn now.

II

In his article "The Originality of Machiavelli" Isaiah Berlin discusses different patterns of values by presenting a new interpretation of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527). Berlin's interpretation provides us with another interesting way to understand human pursuits in the world.

The sixteenth century writer Machiavelli's *The Prince* and *The Discourses* have been a source of controversy for scholars. There have been numerous interpretations of his works. The commonest view, that of the "murderous Machiavelli," is predominant in the Elizabethan literature. According to this view, Machiavelli is the teacher of evil, a great subverter, and a dishonorable writer. Therefore, he is an example of the worst type of humanity, and any moral person must fight what Machiavelli stands for. It is for this purpose alone one should read Machiavelli. Another view, however, is that Machiavelli cannot have literally meant what he said in these works and that he was being satirical. He tells us what some politicians are capable of in achieving their goals, and thereby issues us a cautionary warning of what tyrants could be and do. That is the way we should read him; other readings are missing Machiavelli's point. Accordingly, Machiavelli is at most a messenger who is subject to being misunderstood, but we should not shoot this satiric messenger. The third

view is that Machiavelli is an anguished humanist, who "laments the vices of men which makes such wicked courses politically unavoidable" and who divorces politics from ethics. According to this view, ethics requires good virtues such as humility, love, and kindness, whereas politics demands the art of success and the skill of getting what one wants. Therefore, politics belong to a domain independent of ethics. Hence, we should not use ethics to evaluate one's political maneuver[6] (Berlin, 1979, 28–9). The varieties of Machiavelli interpretations continue.

According to Berlin, however, in *The Prince* and *The Discourses* Machiavelli holds that there are two incompatible systems of moral values, that a person has to choose between them, and that choosing one system necessitates rejecting the other. While it may be disputable whether the originality of this idea belongs to Machiavelli or to Berlin himself, this idea itself is extremely important and is worth further exploration of its implications for us today.

On Berlin's reading, Machiavelli sees two incompatible moralities represented by two sets of moral virtues. One set is Christian morality: love of God, charity, mercy, sacrifice, forgiveness of enemies, faith in the life hereafter, contempt for the goods of this world, belief in the salvation of the individual soul as an incomparable value — a value that is higher than any social or political or other terrestrial goal and any economic or military or aesthetic consideration (Berlin, 1979, 45). These virtues or values are the principles according to which Christians organize affairs in their lives. The other set is the morality of the pagan world. The pagan morality is centered around such virtues as courage, vigor, discipline, happiness, strength, justice, pride, pursuit of glory and magnificence, above all assertion of one's proper claims and the knowledge and power needed to secure their satisfaction (Berlin, 1979, 44-45). These two sets of morals represent two entirely different ideals of society. They are not only different but also fundamentally incompatible. If one sets one's life toward the ideal of the virtuous Christian life, one cannot at the same time effectively pursue the pagan ideal of life.

Berlin maintains that Machiavelli does not deny that these Christian virtues are indeed good moral virtues; Machiavelli does not say or imply that virtues such as humility, kindness, unworldliness, faith in God, love, unwavering truthfulness, compassion are bad or unworthy virtues. A person of these virtues is indeed a good person, as indicated in Chapter XV of *The Prince*.[7] However, these virtues are not compatible with those needed for building a great state, which is Machiavelli's primary goal. Machiavelli argues that, regardless of their intrinsic value, the central Christian virtues are "insuperable obstacles to the building of the kind of society" that he wishes to see, the kind of society he believes better satisfies the permanent human desires and interests (Berlin, 1979, 46). Meekness or the search for spiritual salvation by no means leads toward a satisfactory, stable, vigorous, strong society on earth. On the other hand, the pursuit of justice and power contradicts the moral value of forgiveness and mercy. Therefore, between these two incompatible pursuits of moral values in life, *one must choose*. "To choose to lead a Christian life is to con-

demn oneself to political impotence," and to choose to lead a life of the pagan virtues is to abandon the Christian ideal. (Berlin, 1979, 47)

However, what usually happens, in the view of (Berlin's) Machiavelli, is that most people cannot bring themselves resolutely to follow either of these paths, and they end up taking the middle way (e. g., *The Discourse,* I: 26). They compromise between these two ideals and attempt to incorporate virtues into their lives from both moralities. But this way is worse than resolutely choosing one and rejecting the other. Machiavelli sees such a compromise as "injurious" that makes people neither altogether good nor altogether bad (e.g., *The Discourse,* I: 26). As Berlin puts it, "they try to effect compromises, vacillate, fall between two stools, and end in weakness and failure" (1979, 47). These people do not understand that whoever has chosen an omelet cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs; they end up mixing whole eggs in their omelet. As Berlin puts it, to be a good physician is to be ready to burn, to cauterize, to amputate, when the treatment requires. To stop halfway because of personal qualms or requirements for some other professions can only give you the worst of the two worlds.

A better way, in (Berlin's) Machiavelli's view, is to choose one of these incompatible paths. And according Berlin, Machiavelli realizes the inevitability of the choice and opts for the pagan ideal of life. In doing so, Berlin maintains, Machiavelli is not abandoning morality per se and his values are indeed moral values. The conflict between these two life paths is not between autonomous realms of morals and politics, nor between the moral and the immoral; rather it is one between two incompatible moralities.

We should note that Berlin's interpretation is grounded in his value-pluralism. Berlin believes, I think rightly so, that values, as ends that we pursue in life, can conflict. He writes, "The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realization of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others" (Berlin, 1969, 168). He would agree with Machiavelli that humility and pride are contrary values and so are justice and forgiveness. If justice demands adequate punishment, to forgive and to forgo deserved punishment undermines justice. Like Rorty, Berlin rejects one of the deepest assumptions of western political and philosophical thought — "the idea of the world and of human society as a single intelligible structure," a single principle "which not only regulates the course of sun and the stars, but prescribes their proper behavior to all animate creatures" (Berlin, 1979, 67). According to this assumption, there exists a single universal principle that regulates all moral values. This principle, like Plato's Good, is all-encompassing and never self-contradictory. It has the power to organize all human values in a logical and consistent pattern into a coherent system. For Berlin, this long-held belief is fallacious. He maintains that, first, there are ends that are equally ultimate. Second, it is in terms of these ends that everything else is justified. Third, these ends are fundamentally incompatible with one another. And fourth, therefore there is "no single universal overarching standard" that would enable us to choose rationally between different ultimate ends. (Berlin, 1979, 69) Based on these ideas, Berlin's Machiavelli has to reject the hope

to look for a perfect system of values and the hope to look for a single morality that prescribes a perfect society. For Berlin, because of the inherent nature of (conflicting) values, the very idea of such a perfect value system is simply incoherent.

Thus, the originality of Berlin's Machiavelli lies in uncovering that there may be more than one valid system of values, and there is no criterion common to the systems whereby a rational choice can be made between them (Berlin, 1979, 71). For Berlin, the realization of this impossibility is of extreme importance to moral philosophers. If we accept this thesis, we will have to think of and evaluate various value systems in an entirely different light.

I find myself in agreement with Berlin that there is more than one valid value system. But here let me discuss where I do not agree with him. In my opinion, Berlin's Machiavelli (or perhaps Berlin himself) overstates his case. Berlin's Machiavelli not only construes the two value systems, the Christian and the pagan, as opposed, but also as two with mutually exclusive values. According to Berlin, Machiavelli sees the Christian morality as incorporating one set of virtues whereas the pagan morality as incorporating a set of entirely different virtues. Because these two sets of virtues are contrary to each another, they do not mix into the same value system. In my opinion, Berlin's Machiavelli has confused two propositions. The first proposition is that some virtues or moral values are contrary to and conflict with one another. The other proposition is that it is impossible for these opposing virtues to be incorporated into one value system. I think the first proposition is true whereas the second is false.

Contrary and conflicting values *can* be incorporated into one value system. In fact, we can hardly find any value system in history that does not incorporate conflicting values. There is abundant evidence to show that Christian morality also values discipline and strength, while pagan morality values sacrifice. The real difference is not, as Berlin's Machavelli holds to be, that one group of virtues is found exclusively in Christian morality while the other exclusively in pagan morality. In my view, the real difference is that, while both moralities contain these varieties of values, they do not give the same priorities to these values. Christian morality gives higher priorities to such values as charity, mercy, forgiveness and faith in the life after, and gives lower priorities to such values as courage and strength.[8] Pagan morality gives higher priorities to such values or virtues as courage, vigor, strength, and justice, and gives lower priorities to such values as charity, mercy, forgiveness and faith in the life after.[9]

I maintain that, not only is it correct to say that there is no singular universal principle to logically organize all moral values into one coherent value system as Berlin correctly maintains, but also that there is no principle to organize into one value system only mutually compatible moral values. Every value system in human history incorporates moral values that may point in opposite directions. For example, the same moral system may value both justice and mercy, even though they clearly conflict, as Berlin correctly maintains.[10] But the fact that they conflict only implies that assigning more importance to one entails less importance for the other; it does not imply both cannot be incorporated into the same system.

I believe that different value systems contain similar moral values;[11] what makes them different is that they assign different priorities to these values. For example, Christian morality presumably values mercy more than pagan morality does, and pagan morality values discipline more than Christian morality does, while all these values can be found, more or less, in each of these moral systems. If I am correct, the primary difference between moral systems is the difference of assigned priorities to values in these systems rather than the presence or absence of certain moral values.

III

In this section, I will present my interpretation of what is known as the complementariness of Confucianism and Daoism in Chinese culture. I will use it as an example to show that different value systems can share common values while prioritizing them in different ways, that each of these value systems has its own strengths as well as weaknesses, and that different value systems not only compete with, conflict with, but also can complement one another.

Confucianism and Daoism have often been seen as opposed to each other. For example, in his popular book *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, Wing-tsit Chan writes:

> It is true that, while Confucianism emphasizes social order and an active life, Taoism [Daoism] concentrates on individual life and tranquility, thus suggesting that Taoism plays a secondary role. But, in reality, by opposing Confucian conformity with non-conformity and Confucian worldliness with a transcendental spirit, Taoism is a severe critic of Confucianism. In its doctrines on government, on cultivation and preserving life, and on handling things, Taoism is fully the equal of Confucianism (1963, 136).

The opposition between Confucianism and Daoism is real. As Chan correctly points out, Confucianism emphasizes social order, conformity, active social life, and this-worldliness, whereas Daoism emphasizes spontaneity, non-conformity, tranquility, individual life, and transcendental inspiration. However, it would be wrong if we think that the moral values of these two systems are entirely exclusive of each other.

First, Confucianism and Daoism share many commonalities. As Joseph Adler maintains that,

> Confucianism and Daoism have much in common. They both emphasize the goal of establishing a harmony of heaven, earth, and humanity. They both display a kind of thinking known as organicism, which defines things by their functional relationships to large wholes (like organs in organisms). And they

> both arose in the Warring States period as proposed solutions to the social and political chaos then gripping China. (2002, 43).

Much can be said of the commonalities between them. The values embraced by both Confucianism and Daoism range from harmony of the universe to thriftiness in everyday living. In social philosophy, both Confucianism and Daoism oppose harsh government; they both hold that individuals should engage in self-cultivation; and they both value prudence as a virtue. If we compare Confucianism and Daoism, on the one hand, with some other world traditions like Christianity on the other, the commonalities between Confucianism and Daoism are even more salient. For example, they both embrace the idea of organist evolution of the universe rather than appeal to a transcendental creator, and they both believe in the immanent Dao rather than a natural law bestowed by an external creator.

Second, while Confucianism and Daoism seem to have contrasting values, they are not mutually exclusive. It is not the case that Confucianism simply does not leave any room for such values as spontaneity, non-conformity, tranquility, individual life, and transcendental inspiration, nor is the case that Daoism leaves no room for such values as social order, conformity, an active social life, and this-worldliness. Even though Confucianism emphasizes the following of *li* (rules of propriety), it does recognize the need for spontaneity. For instance, Confucius says that "In dealing with things in the world the *jun zi* (gentleman) does not have to conform to anything, nor does one have to be debarred from doing anything. One only needs to do what is right (*yi*)." (*Analects,* 4: 10) It can be argued that here Confucius recognizes that at least some kind of spontaneity is appropriate. Even though Confucius advocates the conformity of filial piety, he also indicates that sometimes non-conformity is desirable as evidenced, for example, in Chapter 15 of the *Classic of the Filial Piety*: "when one's father is not right, one must contend with him." Even though Confucius is this-worldly in orientation, he never rules out the "*tian*" or "heaven" in his philosophical deliberation. Daoism, on the other hand, does not oppose social order and social life in this world; it just does not give them as much weight as Confucianism does.

Therefore, it makes sense to say that the difference between Confucianism and Daoism is not that one possesses values excluded by the other, but that they prioritize values differently within their systems. It is precisely because Confucianism and Daoism prioritize values differently that they realize alternative ways of life, and it is because they realize alternative ways of life that they complement each other. We may say that two value systems complement one another if they both contribute to harmony in society by providing people with desirable alternative ways of life. A harmonious society is different from the society of the Platonic "single vision philosophy" in that the former allows the pursuit of diverse ways of life.[12]

Prioritizing a value may give a value system strength in one situation, but its correlative de-prioritization of a competing or opposing value may well be its weakness

in another situation. The Confucian's prioritization of conscientiousness and persistence (*zhong*) may be a strength in comparison with the flexible Daoist. But it is also a weakness in comparison with Daoism in circumstances where flexibility is needed. Unfortunately, human finitude dictates that we do not have absolute certainty as to what is ultimately superior. This is the ground for having both to play different roles and to complement each other in society.[13]

In the history of China, we can find numerous examples of the Confucian-Daoist complementariness. One such example is Tao Yuanming (365–427). Tao was a conscientious Confucian scholar-official in the government for years before he retreated to a small village to pursue a Daoist life close to nature. Either way he led a fulfilled life. At either time he exemplifies certain values common to Confucianism and Daoism, yet different prioritizations led to different ways of life. The same person who is practically a Confucian may have her Daoist phase in life, and vice versa, similar to Rorty's promoter of social justice who may have his self-creative phase or even moment in life, and vice versa.

IV

Now we have seen three models of alternative pursuits. Rorty's model presents two alternative pursuits of ideals, self-creation and human solidarity. Berlin's model presents two alternative ways of life as two mutually exclusive sets of moral values. The Confucian-Daoist complementarity model as I elaborated above presents two alternative ways of life as two overlapping systems with different prioritizations of values. I am not suggesting that Rorty's self-creation matches Berlin's pagan morality and the Daoist way of life, or that Rorty's human solidarity matches Berlin's Christian morality and Confucian way of life. I am suggesting, instead, that it is more accurate and informative to understand alternative ways or ideals of life as different configurations of values.

By "configuration of values" I mean the process to prioritize and assign importance to various values that an individual or a culture embraces. For example, Rorty's authors of the first group are those people who typically place self-creation and individual autonomy above human solidarity, whereas those in his second group typically place human solidarity and social justice above self-creation and autonomy.[14] Confucianism assigns more weight to social conformity than Daoism does. We can see why value configuration is necessary via Berlin. Berlin is right that there is tension between values that we cherish and that good values can oppose one another. His insight raises the question of how we can pursue desirable yet competing values. He also extends our horizon to set our sight on systems of values rather than discrete individual values. Life is never the pursuit of a single value. As we pursue values that compete or conflict with one another, we need to prioritize or rank them. Furthermore, choosing a particular way of life is to prioritize values in a particular way. Because some values are opposed, giving one value a high priority implies giving its

opposing value a relatively low priority. A value configuration that ranks conformity high entails its ranking flexibility (non-conformity) low. Berlin's model is problematic, however, because it denies that conflicting values can be configured into one value system, and because it does not recognize different configurations of the same values. Rorty is right in suggesting that different alternative ways of life have their own merits and risks, that they do not have to be woven into a single vision, and that we should use them for different purposes (I would say that they have complementary functions). Rorty's insight helps us lay to rest the perennial desire for a universal value system. But I think Rorty's characterization of the matter only shows us part of the picture; it does not present enough in helping us understand the nature of alternative ways of life. Borrowing the insights of Berlin and Rorty to interpret the Confucian-Daoist complementarity model, we can understand that alternative ways of life do not necessarily exclude one another's values, even though they configure values differently. That we cannot produce a better or superior value system simply by weaving alternative value systems, and that we can, and probably should, use alternative ways of life for different purposes as Rorty has insightfully suggested.[15]

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NOTES

[1] Another good example may be Helen Vendler, the A. Kingsley Porter university professor at Harvard University. The prominent poetry critic is quoted in the January 26, 2005, *Chronicle of Higher Education* as saying "I have never joined a political party. I have never voted. I have never registered to vote. I have never gone to a church. I have never belonged to a club. I've never belonged to anything."

[2] Rorty did not say that his first group rejects human solidarity and his second group rejects self-creation.

[3] These two, however, do not have to be on a single scale. As in our state budget allocation example, in addition to education and law enforcement, there are health care and other sectors.

[4] For a discussion of the truth of Being in Heidegger, see Li (1999), Chapter 2.

[5] If we can read Rorty literally, his kind of balancing would be to give both "equal weight." (1989, XIV).

[6] On this interpretation, Machiavelli bears (limited) resemblance to Reinhold Niebuhr in his *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics* (1932). I have resisted this tendency to separate ethical values and political values. See Li (1999, Chapter 7).

[7] "A man who wishes to make a profession of goodness in everything must necessarily come to grief among so many who are not good." (*The Prince*, XV) Here "goodness" evidently refers to Christian virtues.

[8] One may argue that, in Christian morality, all depends on whether if one practices these values for God; if done for the wrong reason, these values would have no merit at all. I maintain that this claim only shows that the love of God always has higher priority than all other values; it does not undermine my claim that, within Christian morality, forgiveness and mercy are still valued higher than are in the pagan morality.

[9] "Giving higher priorities" should be distinguished from what Charles Taylor calls "systematic priority," namely, "Answer all the demands that belong to domain A (say justice or benevolence) before you move to satisfy any demand of domain B (say, personal fulfillment)." (1997, 176) In my view, if one gives something a priority, either high or low, one has to more or less do it; otherwise, one gives it "no priority," rather than "low priority."

[10] One example of this conflict may present itself in the parents of the victim of a convicted murderer on death roll. Suppose the murderer is asking to be spared of his life. Should the parents forgive him or seek justice by pressing on the death penalty?

[11] If we compare different cultural and value systems in terms "thin" enough, to borrow Michael Walzer's terminology, we will find that the values in these systems are by and large the same. See Walzer (1994). I go further than Walzer to look into different prioritizations within various value systems.

[12] For a discussion of harmony, see "Toward a Harmonious Cosmos: Confucian Ideal of *He* for a Peaceful World," *Philosophy East & West,* forthcoming in October 2006.

[13] For more elaboration of the Confucian-Daoist complementarity, readers can see Li (1999), Chapter 6 "Religion: Multiple Participation versus Exclusionism."

[14] Membership in each of Rorty's groupings may be disputable. Here I am not concerned with the accuracy of his groupings.

[15] The paper was presented at Soochow University and the National Chengchi University, Taipei, March 2005. I would like to thank the audience for their helpful comments. Thanks to my colleague Matthew Altman, who read a previous version of the paper and provided valuable comments.

ПРОБЛЕМА ПРОТИВОПОЛОЖНЫХ УСТРЕМЛЕНИЙ: БЕРЛИН, РОРТИ И КОНФУЦИАНСКО-ДАОССКИЙ ПРИНЦИП ДОПОЛНИТЕЛЬНОСТИ

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На протяжении всей своей жизни человек совершает тот или иной выбор, — мы выбираем между противоположными действиями или разными ценностями и образами жизни. Зачастую на чаше весов оказываются несопоставимые, взаимоисключающие ситуации, когда выбор в пользу одной возможности требует отказа от другой. Разрешение дилеммы выбора между противоположностями является актуальным вопросом философии. Проблема приобретает особенно острый характер в сегодняшнем мультикультурном мире. В настоящей работе исследуются три подхода к пониманию данной проблемы. Сначала мы рассмотрим взгляды Ричарда Рорти на такие устремления, свойственные человеку, как «собственное усовершенствование» и «человеческая солидарность», а также, его попытку найти примирение этим устремлениям в разделении частной и общественной сфер. Далее мы исследуем труды Исайи Берлина и его интерпретацию философии Никколо Макиавелли, которую можно расценить как вторую модель разрешения конфликта. На основе проведенного анализа в настоящей статье высказывается критическая оценка позиций Рорти и Берлина. Также, рассматривается конфуцианско-даосская модель комплиментарности. В подобных случаях — столкновения противоположных интересов представляется целесообразным сравнить ценностные системы, представляющие разные образы жизни, для заимствования опыта гармонизации разнонаправленных устремлений. Мы демонстрируем актуальность конфуцианско-даосской модели комплиментарности для понимания различных ценностных принципов, присутствующих в рамках единого сообщества и проявляющихся при взаимодействии разных культур.

FUNDAMENTALISM VERSUS GLOBALIZATION, A CASE STUDY: MEDIEVAL SPAIN

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> *The recognition of the intricacy of human life and society is essential to anyone who wishes to study either art or history — or their inevitable intersections* (Krow-Lucal 1).

Whether from distant lands or our own neighborhoods, it is often easier to dismiss the customs and belief systems of those who live differently than we do as mystical or exotic. Strengthening these misconceptions are our own ethnocentric views propagated by ethnohistoric data often filled with misrepresentations which in turn foster typecasting rather than attempts to understand and learn from these differences. Erroneous understanding grows each day, as an encounter with another immediately becomes reflexive labeling of that person as the "other."

The stereotyping and racism this spawns creates an even more complex notion when characteristics of the "other" are integral parts of us and our own culture. When this occurs we often choose to ignore that "other" side among us and our nation, thus, erasing their contributions and presence within our society. This erasing creates a false sense of homogenous culture and breeds prejudice that can lead to confrontational consequences ranging from ignorance and intolerance (discrimination) to tragedy (the Spanish Inquisition / the Holocaust).

Spain is widely considered a homogeneous Catholic nation, rich in the art, architecture, literature, language and imperialistic endeavors. This perception fails to acknowledge the Spain before the Spanish Inquisition and those Medieval Spaniards who made the nation as it is today. Little attention has been paid to the period before the Christian Crusades, during which intercultural interaction occurred among the Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Spain was never, as it can appear in our day, a uniform Christian nation built solely on the efforts of one people. Since Medieval times Spain's very complex and rich history — the result of many cultures' contributions, especially the three fundamentalist monotheistic based cultures and their globalizational ideologies — has been washed to the side and replaced with one based on misconceptions.

Fundamentalism and globalization are considered modern words originating in the early decades of the 20th century. Fundamentalism is a "movement advocating return to traditional principles: a religious or political movement based on a literal interpretation of and strict adherence to doctrine, especially as a return to former principles" (Encarta 1). On the one hand, fundamentalism is a concept often associated with religious beliefs and defended by those who feel the need to maintain their original ide-

ologies, thereby preserving their religious and social identities. However, extreme forms of fundamentalism become reactionary and exclusive, cutting off members from the real world and hindering intercultural progress.

Globalization, in contrast, is considered a vehicle for unification, prosperity, and peace. "Globalization is a comprehensive term for the emergence of a global society in which economic, political, environmental, and cultural events in one part of the world, quickly come to have significance for people in other parts of the world. Globalization is the result of advances in communication, transportation, and information technologies. It describes the growing economic, political, technological, and cultural linkages that connect individuals, communities, businesses, and governments" (Encarta 1). Although both terms are considered to be relatively new ideas, their origins trace back many centuries. While the two ideologies seem to be in opposition, during Islamic Rule of Medieval Spain, fundamentalism and globalization worked together as each of the three monotheistic cultures interchanged knowledge creating the most dynamic nation of the time.

Much scholarly interest has emerged since Franco's death in 1975 and his politics negating the roles Muslims and Jews played in Spanish history have dissipated. However, the majority of concern has focused on the discussion anti-Semitic origins in Spain, specifically post Crusades during Christian rule. Contrary to popular belief, Jews formed the first monotheistic religious communities in Spain. Remnants of grave markings have been dated as far back as 200 BC.

From their very beginning, Jewish people were forced into a nomadic life, settling in various regions only to be expelled by the Christians who came to dominate each settled land. In Elvira in 305, the first known laws against Jews appeared. In 598, the Third Council of Toledo ordered conversion by force. Thousands converted and thousands fled. Property was confiscated; many were enslaved and forbidden to practice their faith. The arrival of the Bubonic Plague and Leprosy throughout Europe offered English, French and German Christians the rationalization to force Jews out of their countries. This landed them in various locales. Many Jews fled to Spain where they encountered a place within the Muslim society.

In 711, the Umayyad conquest began and Muslim conquerors released Jews from previous law and invited them to contribute to society. Here, the Jewish people coexisted peacefully until the eleventh century, flourishing "as traders, merchants, doctors, poets, and philosophers within the Muslim society" (PBS 1). Such tolerance allowed for the exchange of ideas and growth of intellect leading to the "highest achieving" culture of Medieval times (Thorton 3).

Although Islam "conquered" Spain and occupied the Iberian Peninsula, they offered their Christian and Jewish countrymen protection and religious tolerance considering them "People of the Book" in accordance to the Koran. Spanish intellectual, religious, and cultural life prospered. Muslims and Jews interchanged philosophical, scientific, and literary culture. Jews took part in activities at each level. During the period known as Umayyad Spain, caliphs (heads of community) Abd al-Rahman and

the caliphate (kingdom) of al-Hakam ruled over their capital of Cordoba, which had become the "most cultured city of Europe." Cordoba soared above even Paris and Constantinople economically and socially, housing numerous elaborately shelved libraries, mosques, public baths, and shops (Thorton 1). This is the period during which Cordoba and Granada became the grand centers of art and architecture — remnants of such time are still visible today. The Mughira pyxis, carved in Cordoba in 968 can be found in the Lourve today (*Saudi Aramco World* 3).

Because Islamic religion believes that "the glorification of God's word" should come in the form of art instead of idol worship, art and poetry flourished. Art often took the form of arabesques — a unique combination of geometric shapes and nature or beautiful language in calligraphy and Arabic script. Literature and its translation from Latin to Arabic and vice versa also thrived as many Jewish and Christian followers began to use the Arabic language in addition to or instead of Hebrew or Latin (PBS 6).

At the same time that the arts flourished, there was a surge of economical and technological advances in the region. Engineering focusing on irrigation methods acquired from Western Asia was put to the test. Irrigational ditches were dug to water the various new plants Muslims introduced including rice, sugar cane, cotton, and fruits such as peaches and pomegranates. These products played key roles in international trade. Concurrently, the Muslim people shared their knowledge of paper, which they brought from China, and together Cordobans developed new ways of manufacturing it more efficiently, which became especially significant in algebraic and trigonometric proofs, in addition to filling their enormous libraries.

The fields of mathematics and science broadened to include innovative theories and areas of study. Several revolutionary mathematical developments took place including the introduction of the concept of zero and the employment of Arabic numerals to replace Roman numerals. Also important was the use of letters to represent unknowns in algebra. These advances became central components of the astronomy, astrology, mineralogy and medicine (Colish 135).

During the Umayyad period, many Jewish men took part in intellectual and scientific arena. Many like Oisdai b. Issac shared their specialized knowledge, in his case medicine and law. He worked closely with caliph, al- Hakam II allowing him to teach others. Not only did he teach Spanish Jews of what they were ignorant, but he also allowed them to break free from reactionary Jewish authorities (Stillman 1). This moved them further from their exclusive fundamentalist positions, which restricted growth potential to that available solely within the basis and confines of the particular culture and disallowed development based on the sharing and incorporation of ideas and knowledge offered by "others," which generated a sharp contradiction to the goals of globalization. Now, they were closer to true knowledge and integration into the global society, of which they held central roles. Fundamentalism and globalization co-existed. Neither ideology took over. Spain was run neither by intolerant fundamentalists nor by imperialists. Instead, both sides were tolerant of the other. There was rich intercultural exchange at work.

However, with the arrival of the exclusive fundamentalist al-Moravids and al-Mohads, who held fast to their reactionary beliefs. "After 1031, the Caliphite of Cordoba split up into many small kingdoms. In 1094, Cordoba came under control of the al-Moravids; in 1149, the al-Mohads took control allowing for and resulting in the Christian kings' rise to power over the Muslims and Jews (Thorton 5). Globalization began to break down as the unified Spanish society, divided and retreated to its three fundamental monotheistic religions, never to return.

During this time, many Muslims emigrated to the Near East or fell back into Sufism, a mystic/fundamentalist form of Islam, to reinforce social and religious identity. This not only created an anti-Christian sentiment among the Muslims; it also broke much of the tolerance for Jews, excluding them from their previously important positions within the scientific and philosophical communities. Jews were no longer welcome among the Muslims and were persecuted, ghettoized and expulsed from Spanish Christian lands. Rejected, Jewish people no longer wrote in Arabic, they returned to Hebrew and began to practice fundamentalist Jewish, such as Talmudism, Pietism, and Cabbalism in order to preserve (recollect) their religious identity.

The Medieval period was a tumultuous time filled with religious and cultural tension across all of Europe; one exception was among the intricately connected, yet diverse, population of Spain. Until the eleventh century, Christian, Jewish, and Muslim cultures inevitably intersected and co-existed relatively peacefully developing an integrated form of globalization throughout the nation. During this period, cultures exchanged knowledge and technology progressing intellectual, economic, social, and philosophical dimensions.

However, when struggles for power arose, initiated by exclusive fundamentalist reactionaries, this ideal form of globalization was shattered. Christians, Jews, and Muslims retreated back to their fundamentalist beliefs in order to conserve their communities' identities. A natural reaction to the risks involved in globalization is fundamentalism. Yet if cultures respect and embrace the intentions other cultures offer, globalization and fundamentalism may interact in powerful ways furthering cultural, economic, and political aspects of society peacefully today and tomorrow as they did for so many centuries throughout Medieval Spain.

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ФУНДАМЕНТАЛИЗМ ПРОТИВ ГЛОБАЛИЗМА: ПРИМЕР СРЕДНЕВЕКОВОЙ ИСПАНИИ

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Фундаментализм и глобализм считаются современными понятиями, появившимися в первые десятилетия XX века. Фундаментализм часто ассоциируется с религиозными верованиями, сторонниками фундаментализма являются те, кто чувствует необходимость защитить собственную идеологию, и делают это посредством сохранения религиозной и социальной идентичности. Глобализм, напротив, представляет собой механизм унификации, открывая возможности для мира и процветания. Данные определения отражают две противостоящие позиции, имеющие вековую историю. Ярким примером активного взаимодействия этих идей является средневековая Испания с ее мультикультурным обществом, состоящим из иудеев, мусульман и христиан. Могут ли фундаментализм и глобализм сосуществовать, и если это возможно, то какие результаты подобного взаимодействия можно ожидать в будущем? Период средневековья характеризовался неустойчивостью, вызванной напряженностью в отношении к религиозным и культурным вопросам во всех европейских обществах. Исключение составляла Испания, население которой, хотя и сохранявшее свое разнообразие, отличалось нетипичной для того времени сплоченностью. До XI века христиане, иудеи и мусульмане сосуществовали относительно мирно, создавая общество, представлявшее собой законченную форму глобализма. В течение этого периода между культурами шел обмен знаниями и технологиями, что стимулировало прогрессивное развитие интеллектуальной, экономической, социальной и философской сфер. Однако с усилением притязаний на власть эта идеальная форма глобализма была разрушена. Христиане, иудеи

и мусульмане вернулись к своим фундаменталистским убеждениям с целью сохранения традиций своих сообществ. Фундаментализм является естественной реакцией на риск, связанный с глобализмом, однако, если представители разных культур способны уважать и воспринимать культурные богатства друг друга, взаимодействие фундаментализма и глобализма будет иметь исключительно плодотворный характер, способствуя мирному развитию культурных, экономических и политических аспектов жизни общества в сегодняшней и будущей перспективе, как это происходило в средневековой Испании на протяжении многих веков.

Part 3. Identity //
Часть 3. Идентичность

IS THERE ROOM FOR PLURALISM IN THE MOBILITY OF TODAY?

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I would like to explore the implications of identity in a world that is exploding with movement. Too often the movement is not by choice. How do people secure and establish selfhood? Does the increasingly ethnic complexity in which people are thrown increase or decrease acceptance? Does the increase in ethnic complexity indicate a pluralistic identity is too confusing for humans to tolerate? Has war become a method to develop identity? To fight "another" may be even to die, is this a cause by which identity can be secured? For 99% of human existence anthropologists tell us we have lived in small hunting and gathering communities where we knew all of our relatives, both biological and affinal. We were intimately knowledgeable about the ecology and resources of the area in which we lived. The human creature has been materialized, consummerized and globalized, yet the importance of human dignity alludes us at the most basic level. To give another the basic respect for their being — for which we all wish — appears beyond comprehension. Does it mean we give up ourselves to accept another?

I would like to start with a poem by Naomi Shihab Nye that captures the movement so many experience.

The World In Translation

It was a long climb out of the soil. She counted off
whole continents as she lifted each foot, imagined
her dark years falling away like husks. Soon she could
feel objects come to life in her hand, the peel of banana,
a lightly waxed pepper, she accepted these into her home,
placed them in bowls where they could be watched.
There was nothing obscure about melons,
nothing involved about yams.
If she were to have anything to do with the work,
these would be her translators, through these she

would learn secrets of dying, how to do it gracefully
as the peach, softening in silence, or the mango,
finely tuned to its own skin. (Nye, I 995; p: 17)

As I read this poem I think of how one moves from all they have known, leaving roots that go back generations and learning to feel comfortable. Although anthropology tells us that 99% of the human experience has been in small groups, it also tells us that there have been some people who have wandered, explored, and left their known areas of comfort. They may have done this for adventure, or curiosity or safety.

How one leaves is an important consideration. Even the most willing immigrants will most surely succumb to some short episodes of grief. Does one arrive at a new place in exile, a refugee, an immigrant or expatriate? Will the circumstances of choice matter to the person and/or to the country they enter? Edward Said, Peace Be Upon Him (PBUH), reminds us that exiles originated in the age-old practice of banishment. The exile is to live an anomalous and miserable life, always an outsider. The twentieth century has created the refugee. Said states, "The word 'refugee' has become a political one, suggesting large herds of innocent and bewildered people requiring urgent international assistance, whereas "exile" carries with it ...a touch of solitude and spirituality" (Edward Said, 2001; p: 181). For the expatriate, who may encounter solitude and estrangement, the issue is more ambiguous than the exile who has no choice and cannot return.

Can the immigrant return? How many people who finally settled in the United States went back and forth numerous times to the "old country" as my grandfather did? Often it was and still is the family member who knows English who will be chosen to pursue economic opportunity in the United States, to support the family at home. My grandfather came at the age of 15 years. He worked and returned to the village, always to return to the United States when the economic circumstances made it a necessity. Finally, with three children of his own to support it became impossible to continue in that same manner, so he immigrated.

When leaving, whether fully by choice or not, how is one allowed to grieve for all that is familiar. This may be especially true when the immigrants are supposed to be happy; their lives are safe, maybe. Happy especially if it appears there is opportunity to raise and educate one's family. I will always remember my father (PBUH), who lived in the "old country" in his youth, reflecting on fruit — the size, taste and abundance. Was this reflection his way of grieving which I did not understand, but somehow I knew was important.

In the United States it has always seemed to me that grieving is to be short and sweet. We are to move along, accept the reality, know how lucky we are and above all be thankful for the opportunity to have a good, productive life. Kublar-Ross spent a life-time of research understanding and explaining the importance of grieving a loss that is important to us. What we know from her research is that if one is not allowed to grieve one may become stuck in one's own growth and development.

Edward Said (PBUH) talks about exiles often compensating for the loss by becoming, "...novelists, chess players, political activists, and intellectuals" (ibid). Occupations, he notes, that do not require investment in objects and where mobility and skill are important. Said finds that Georg Lukacs compellingly argues in his *Theory of the Novel* that novels are a literary form of "transcendental homelessness"(ibid). Where one sees classical epics coming out of ... settled cultures... (where) values are clear, identities stable, life unchanging" (ibid), the novel is exactly opposite. A new world is constructed by a disinherited hero.

When I think about the world created in fiction, and think about our modern media and the world that is being created around consumerism and consumption, I loose my sense of balance. How does the material world make one centered and whole? Who decided this was a good substitute for dignity and respect

I wonder if nationalism was thought to be a good substitute for dignity and respect. As an anthropologist, I think about what I need to feel support, in terms of respect and dignity, is acceptance from a fellow human being. This does not mean they must do as I do. Nor does it mean that I may do something that is of harm to them or their surroundings. It does mean that I am allowed to be, just as I allow them to be. Such must be a value shared by the community.

Our ethnicity, according to Anthony Smith (Tibi, 1990) resides in our mythology, memories, values and symbols. When these indicators are just "tolerated" yet clearly not accepted in the new environment, how does one approach creating a place to call home? Is one to feel shame, on top of grief?

Diverse societies, which have existed in the past, have been allowed to thrive and enhance the civil society. Janet Abu Lugod gives us an example in *Before European Hegemony*, (p: 186) stating, "Neither the violence of the Crusades nor the repeated Papal injunction enjoining Europeans from trading with Muslims could interfere with the prosperous trade in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. ...A deeply symbiotic relationship had developed over the years between Christian merchants of the Crusader kingdoms and the Muslim merchants."

In another passage Abu Lugod states, "Whereas European merchants trading in the Middle East seem to have had very little influence on the culture. ...Muslim traders established colonies throughout the Asian world, carrying not only their goods of trade but their culture and religion". Islam...was transmitted to India, Ceylon, Malaysia and Indonesia. ...There, it coexisted with the Hindu and Buddhist cultures that were being diffused from India and China along the same routes. This intermingling and coexistence gave a continuity and coherence to the Indian Ocean area" (Abu Lugod, 1995: p. 242).

People moved, came into contact with strangers, were displaced and explored in the past. Scholars who have studied Islamic civilization relate that Muslims "....did not regard their own community as unique (a) hereditary body selected out from a world left otherwise without direct divine guidance" (Hodgson, 1974, p. 317). The Muslim community saw themselves as one among many divinely guided commu-

nities (ibid). In the Islamic empire, Muslims were obligated to pay zakah, a legal tax obligation and were under laws that governed Muslims. Non-Muslims paid a pole tax and in civil matters were under the jurisdiction of their own ecclesiastical magistrates. Goldschmidt (1996) tells us that civil administrations of newly acquired provinces were left almost untouched. There is a respect that allowed one to maintain one's identity, language and customs, which were not just tolerated but accepted.

Eqbal Ahmed once stated that Nationalism is an addiction we need to get over. The example above was from a time long before "nation states" prevailed. Is it my imagination or are wars which nation states engage becoming a way to authenticate one's identity? When this most recent Gulf War was beginning, I heard the U. S. government military recruiters were in Northern Canada to enlist Native Americans. Citizenship through military service is not a new fad.

When people move, for whatever the reason, their ethnicity — that is their mythology, values, memories and symbols — covers them just as securely as their skin and makes their heart beats. If asked to discard our skin or stop our hearts we can no longer be whole. As one arrives at a new place how does one integrate one's past life with their present except through one's past life experience. Maybe it is the question of fear I should be addressing. What makes us fearful of difference? When will curiosity, excitement, and joy be how we respond to the fullness of humanity?

I would like to end with another poem by Naomi Shihab Nye, which is where I believe we need to move toward.

For Lost and Found Brothers

Where were you in winters of snow, what ceiling
did you stare at before the dark came home to hold your hand?
What did your mama tell you about the world?
Facts interest me less than the trailing smoke of stories.
Where were you when no one else was there?
You lived in France at the foot of mountains with paper,
with creamy white days.
You hiked railroad tracks dreaming of mirrors, How
one life reflects another, goes back and back and back.
You stood in rooms, your black eyes birds barely landed,
and learned the long river that was your voice. Thank you,
a stone thrown in, a stone quietly sinking. Thank you, a ripple returned.
So today when you bend to sign the first page of your book.
There are other thinks to thank too, the days folded behind you,
in your wake, this day connected, more mirrors more birds.
For you, Brothers. For the blood rivers invisibly harbored.
For the grandfathers who murmured the same songs.

And for the ways we know each other years before meeting,
how strangely and suddenly, on the lonely porches,
in the sleepless mouth of the night, the sadness drops away,
we move forward,
Confident we were born into a large family, our brothers cover the earth.
(p. 51)

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ЕСТЬ ЛИ МЕСТО ПЛЮРАЛИЗМУ В СОВРЕМЕННОМ МЕНЯЮЩЕМСЯ МИРЕ?

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В настоящей работе мы исследуем процесс развития идентичности в сегодняшних условиях активного перемещения. Как правило, подобное движение является вынужденным. Как люди сохраняют и защищают свою индивидуальность? Готовы ли они к восприятию сложной ситуации, связанной с этническим многообразием, присущим современному обществу? Не сигнализируют ли трудности, возникающие в многонациональной среде, о том, что плюралистические взгляды не могут служить конструктивной основой для формирования идентичности? Неужели война стала способом становления идентичности? Борьба с «другими» может означать даже смерть: можно ли видеть в этом возможность для сохранения идентичности? Антропологи утверждают, что период, когда люди жили в тесных сообществах, вместе выходя на охоту и собирая урожай, и знали всех своих родственников, как биологических, так и приобре-

тенных в результате брака, составляет 99% всей истории развития человека. Люди имели точное представление, основанное на непосредственном опыте, о состоянии окружающей среды и полезных ископаемых на той территории, где они жили. Человек оказался подвержен влиянию общества, экономических отношений, глобализации, однако, по-прежнему, важность понятия «человечность» заставляет нас возвращаться к базовым ценностям. Умение уважать личность другого человека, к чему мы все стремимся, оказывается сегодня недостижимой целью. Должны ли мы пренебречь собственной индивидуальностью, чтобы принять другого человека?

MOBY, MAKAH, AND MORAL EDUCATION

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Creating an ethical consensus about complex issues and among diverse peoples can be a daunting endeavor. We come to this conference as philosophers, psychologists, and teachers. We consider a major responsibility that we have as teachers to be moral education. This means preparing individuals to recognize and resolve ethical issues in their own lives, professional practices, and in completing the responsibilities as citizens for social and political democracy.

This paper: (1) presents a case study of an ethical dilemma, present arguments for and against the Makah whaling, (2) frames the dilemma as it might be used for moral education — through three different approaches to moral education: caring, character, and development, and (3) concludes with some conjectures about reaching consensus and with some recommendations for seekers of ethical truth and unity.

Case Study — Makah Whaling

To illustrate and provide a focus, consider the following case study that poses a conflict between a native culture and a whale. The Makah are an indigenous people whose home is what is now the northwestern-most point in the "lower forty-eight" States of the U.S. (e.g., Erikson, Ward, & Wachendorf, 2002; Tweedie, 2002) The Makah have a maritime culture. Part of their tradition is whaling. In 1994, the gray whale was removed from the list of endangered species. The Makah, citing both tradition and an 1855 treaty between the tribe and the United States, resumed whale hunting, killing one whale in May 1999 (e. g., Sullivan, 2000). For the Makah, a spiritual dimension to the whale hunt exists:

The Creator gave the Makah people the responsibility of caring for the whales, birds, medicine plants, ancestors and future generations of that corner, through ceremony and sacred ritual. The Makah people brought the whale spirit home." (Means, 2002)

Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment that allowed the Makah legally to continue whaling. While the Makah are not whaling at the time this paper is prepared the issues — legally and ethically — lack resolution or consensus and are likely to be raised again.

Exploring the Issues and Possibility for Consensus

In an attempt to both explore the issues and to investigate the possibilities for consensus, we engaged some of our colleagues in dialogue. A discussion with Professor Ted Fortier from Seattle University provided us with several arguments supporting the Makah. We also looked to some published works of other scholars and found Gaard (2001) and Light (2004) have responses to the points raised by Fortier. Below, we will use a point-counter-point to highlight the issues. The arguments advanced by Fortier are paraphrased, not direct quotations; Gaard and Light are quoted verbatim.

> [Fortier:] Historically and legally: based on treaties, The Makah are a sovereign nation, with rights for self-determination. They have their own polices and laws. They are not subjected to state laws, though they did negotiate away certain rights and are subjected to federal laws.

> [Gaard (2001):]
> The environmentalists who challenge the Makah's right to hunt whales claim that these treaty rights are superceded by the International Whaling Commission [IWC] moratorium on commercial whaling, and point out that the Makah do not qualify for aboriginal whaling rights because they do not meet the IWC requirements of having an unbroken whaling tradition and a genuine subsistence need. In return, the Makah point out that their tribe was not party to the formation of the IWC, and that the United States entered into these agreements without considering former treaty obligations with the Makah; consequently, the Makah do not believe they are bound to obey the IWC rulings, and have petitioned for IWC approval simply "in the spirit of cooperation," as a courtesy to the United States. (p. 13).

> [Fortier:] Environmentalists, by imposing their values beyond their boundaries and into the M's nation, act like missionaries who impose their subjective values on others.

> [Gaard (2001):]
> Anti-whaling environmentalists maintain that challenging the Makah whale hunt as a cultural practice is not a form of colonialism but rather a defense of the whale. They argue that not all cultural practices are worthy of being continued, citing such examples as human sacrifice, cannibalism, bride burning, slavery, and female genital mutilation. Instead, cultural practices should be reexamined anew by each generation in light of contemporary environmental, economic, and ethical concerns. (p. 14).

> [Fortier:] The Makah elders hold secrets of the tribe in whale hunting. This contributes to a respect for hierarchy and wisdom. The hunters are rigorously trained and purified. This is in contrast with situation in which men are unemployed and idle, leading to bad habits. Wives of hunters participate in the whole process, from helping husbands prepare, to praying incessantly during the hunt. Even children are inspired to learn to paddle. Paddling in the ocean requires much skills and discipline, and can't mix with alcohol. It's dangerous to be out in the ocean with simple equipment, and it's not easy to get one whale. The whole whale hunting gives the Makah a positive meaning in life: we are a good people, with a mission.
>
> [Gaard (2001):]
> Anti-whaling environmentalists counter that renewed cultural practices will not address the root problems, since this strategy has been tried in the past through such initiatives as the "Paddle to Seattle." (p. 13).
>
> [Fortier;] Finally the hunt itself is a spiritual quest. Spiritually, the Makah consider that all life participates in the Spirit. In this cosmology, animals are highly regarded as "first people." Each nation has unique rights and responsibilities in this unified world. For the Makah, it's to take care of the whale. The Makah are "the people of the whale." If the whales go away, the Makah will also. It's not that the Makah caught the whale, but the whale allows itself to be caught to provide nourishment for the Makah, resembling the Eucharist for Christians. Thus the Whale is the crux of the Makah's spirituality. There has been a long interruption from 1880 to 1979, when Native Americans are allowed to practice their religions again. It's crucial that they go back to their practice to reconnect to their spirituality.
>
> [Light, 2004:] Try as I might I can't be persuaded that the gray whale killed by the Makah in 1999 accepted its fate. While this is a view steeped in a long tradition, it does not make it correct (P.31).

As did the Makah, many environmentalists also saw spiritual issues involved, but the obligation being not to engage in or permit whaling:

> Environmental spirituality embraces the notion that all living things are connected. The feeling can be particularly dramatic when it involves a 40-foot whale. "You kind of have this mutual understanding that you want to check each other out," said Cheryl Rorabeck-Siler, an Oregon biology teacher who kayaked past the whales while preparing to block the hunt last fall. "He's purposely coming over to say, 'Hey.' That instant, where you can reach out and touch them, is pretty neat. An animal of that size and magnitude and intelligence is something special. (Sorenson, 1999)

Some environmentalists protested in Neah Bay (home of the Makah and site of the hunt), in Seattle, and elsewhere. Members of one environmental organization, Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, took to boats and attempted to put themselves between the Makah whalers and their target. The issue did not, however, create unity among environmentalists; The Cousteau Society, Greenpeace, and The Sierra Club, for example, did not join in the strong condemnation of the Makah:

> Greenpeace and the Cousteau Society, while endorsing the community's right to self-determination and its effort to affirm its cultural ties with whales, have proposed whalewatching as an alternative to the hunt: it would strengthen the Makah's maritime traditions as well as provide employment opportunities. (Sachs, 1997)

Another of our colleagues, Professor Loretta Jancoski from The Center for Water and Ethics at Seattle University's Institute of Public Service, advocates an approach to environmental justice that draws upon a Christian foundation (e.g., Martin-Schramm & Stivers, 2003). This approach incorporates four ethical norms in making social policy and resolving conflicts: (1) sustainability, (2) sufficiency, (3) participation, and (4) solidarity. Below, we will examine the definition of each and the implications for the Makah/whaling dilemma.

Sustainability:

> ...emphasizes that an adequate and acceptable quality of life for present generations must not jeopardize the prospect for future generations ... [and] precludes short-sighted emphases on economic growth and also excludes long-term conservation efforts that ignore human needs and costs (Jancoski, 2003, p. 2).

Applying this ethical norm to the issue of the Makah whaling requires some non-moral predictions about the future of the gray whale. According to Light (2004), sustainability was not an issue in this case:

> From a biological standpoint, the permission to allow whaling by the Makah cannot be questioned. The Makah were allowed only to take five whales a year and the number of allocated kills was not made over and above the subsistence amount already allotted to indigenous peoples in the arctic north, but instead transferred to the Makah from that allotment. (p. 28).

Sustainability would dictate no whaling if the whale is an endangered species, but a wider range of potential outcomes if the whale does not have endangered status.

Sufficiency:

> ...emphasizes that the interests of all forms of life are entitled to those things that satisfy their basic needs and contribute to their fulfillment ... [and] repudiates wasteful and harmful consumption, requires fairness, and encourages the virtues of humility, frugality, and generosity (Jancoski, 2003, p. 2).

In the case of the Makah, if one concludes that their cultural and spiritual practices and beliefs are (from their own perspective) inherently connected to their basic needs, this ethical norm can support Makah whaling.

Participation:

> ...emphasizes that the interests of all forms of life are important and must be heard and respected in decisions that affect their lives ... [and] is concerned with empowerment and seeks to remove all obstacles to participation by various social, economic, and political forces and institutions. (Jancoski, 2003, p. 2).

This ethical norm of participation and that of solidarity, explicated below, are strikingly similar in their attempt to promote procedural justice to the prescriptions for creating principles in an "original position" made by Rawls, (1999, 2001) and in resolving real-life moral dilemma through "moral musical chairs" as advocated by Kohlberg (1981). In the original position, Rawls would have humans agree governing principles in a situation where they are blind to the personal consequences of their decision. In "moral musical chairs," Kohlberg recommended that individuals sequentially take the perspective of every person in and affected by a moral dilemma. Both Rawls and Kohlberg concluded that equity — advancing the well-being of the least advantaged — would be the principle to be used. This in consistent with the ethical norm of

Solidarity:

> ...emphasizes the kinship and interdependence of all forms of like and encourages support and assistance for those who suffer ... [and] highlights the fundamental communal nature of life in contrast to individualism and encourages individuals and groups to join together in common cause and stand with those who are the victims of discrimination, abuse, and oppression. (Jancoski, 2003, p. 2).

We will return to these issues below, in a discussion of moral education.

In framing this issue, we have ignored arguments advanced by others, notably animal rights and ethical vegetarians. One of the issues in dispute in the Makah/whaling dilemma is whether, or if under some conditions, non-human animals are considered as being in the moral domain. If so, the question "to what extent?" naturally follows. The argument for including animals in the moral realm is forcefully advanced by Peter Singer (e.g., 2001a, 2001b). The arguments deserve a more detailed account and analysis than the scope of this paper permits. However, in the moral education section below we briefly describe how the question of animal rights can affect moral dialogue and discourse.

Diversity and Unity?

Before continuing a discussion of the case of the Makah, let us consider the how this case relates to the themes of this conference — diversity and unity. In the Makah and the environmentalists we definitely have diverse views of the proper course of action. If we can claim any sense of unity, it is perhaps that both environmentalists and the Makah seem convinced of the rightness of their respective positions.

How, as educators, philosophers, psychologists, should we respond? Are diversity and unity desirable under all conditions (i.e., are unity and/or diversity inherently good)? How should we respond when the two are in tension? If, in our classrooms, communities, faith communities, etc. we ask "Who is not at the table?" and we discover an absence of members of the Ku Klux Klan or the Aryan Nation, should we despair or rejoice? Should we seek out members of these groups in order to add to our diversity?

Turning to unity, what types of unity or consensus are praiseworthy? Should the entire world agree with either the Makah or the environmentalists, would that settle the ethics of the case or might it be that the world would be in unanimous agreement for an immoral position?

The questions are philosophical and theoretical, but simultaneously the questions have real implications in classrooms — K-12 and higher education — as we engage in moral education. Should conflict be embraced or seen as a dis-ease to be remedied? Is all conflict to be treated the same or does it differ? Is the "math wars" conflict among mathematics educators the equivalent of conflict in the Middle East and the current tactics of suicide bombers and assassination as tactics? As the last examples illustrate, when diversity leads to conflict and the conflict to violence, we have entered yet another realm of questions and consequences.

That we cannot offer answers to all of these questions will not come as a surprise. We do, however, consider grappling with ethical issues part of the human condition and a responsibility. We also believe that, as educators this responsibility to engage in moral education is what we must do in our classrooms. Below, we present an overview of moral education, how each of the major approaches would frame the Makah whaling dilemma for use in the classroom.

Moral Education

Three major approaches to moral education dominate the field, each with its own history, philosophy, and assumptions about human nature. The approaches are *character*, *cognitive developmental* (abbreviated as *developmental* hereafter), and *caring*. The philosophical traditions are Aristotelian, Socratic, and influenced by David Hume, respectively (e.g., Howard, forthcoming). As might be expected theories about how to prepare individuals to deal with frequently controversial ethical issues, many and major differences exist among the three approaches (e.g., Howard, Berkowitz, & Schaeffer, 2004). Rather than emphasizing the disagreements — especially given the nature of this conference — let us examine the point of agreement among the approaches and the potential for creating consensus. All of the approaches agree that schooling should include moral education and that moral discourse is a necessary — but not necessarily sufficient — condition for resolving many ethical disputes. Below, we present the ways in which the three approaches frame the issues and the processes they advocate in resolving disputes.

Caring approach to the dilemma.

Of the three approaches, caring is most explicit in published materials regarding the ethical issues in the treatment of animals. In, *The Challenge to Care in Schools* (1992) Noddings includes a section that is directly relevant and applicable to the Makah's whaling.

In the caring classroom's examination of the Makah issue, students learn about animal behavior and, in doing so, identify attributes and capacity. Some of the attributes and capacities are valued and some deplored. Noddings (1992) illustrates this point with her household pet, "I admire my cat's speed and grace ... but I deplore her inclination to kill birds and play with her prey" (p.128). Some would object to Noddings's use of the word "play," seeing it as anthropomorphic. While an interesting question in its own right, it is not central for this discussion: "my cat's behavior with its prey" could be substituted with the same result. Human obligations to animals arise, Noddings (1992) claims, based on judgments about those attributes.

> This is difficult critical work, and it is central not only to our relations with animals but also to the development of a coherent ethical position on our obligation to human beings exhibiting some but not all of the usual human attributes (p. 128).

Noddings also notes the connection between the life of animals and the spiritual, citing the range from an Augustinian indifference to Jainism's concern about not hurting animals (some going so far as to wear a mask so as not to inadvertently inhale a flying insect). Noddings (1992) also acknowledges the importance of cultures and raises the concept of "cultural evil," as opposed to "natural" and "moral" evils.

> Cultural evil is the most complex and difficult. In this category we find all the harmful practices that are variously accepted or rejected in different times and places. (p. 57).
>
> Female circumcision/genital mutilation in Kenya (e.g., Lacey, 2002). A Nigerian court's verdict to stone to death an unwed mother (e.g., Onishi, 2002). The decision of a jury in the Pakistani village of Meerwala Jatoi that a young woman be gang raped as a punishment for her brother's crime (Sarwar, 2002). All of these are examples that fall, in our view, within this category of cultural evil.

Using the Makah whaling case study as a focus for moral education in classrooms, the caring approach would through investigation and dialogue, have students study whales, understand the animal's attributes, and determine what obligations arise from judgments about the nature of those attributes. Students would also investigate the history and culture of the Makah, with a particular focus on their cosmology. To understand the culture is a necessary condition to being able to assess whether any aspect of it might constitute a "cultural evil." These tasks and the type of dialogue that might result are easy to comprehend. What would be the resolution from the caring perspective is more difficult to determine. That might be expected with such a difficult case. This is particularly true from the caring perspective because it does not require "universality" or prescribing a course of action for both one individual and all others in the same situation. The ethic of care places great importance on the individual context of moral decisions and actions. Perhaps no single conclusion would apply to more than one Makah, environmentalist, or concerned observer.

Developmental Approach to the Dilemma

In contrast to the caring approach, from a developmental perspective, this is a case of a true ethical dilemma — where one is forced to choose between two goods (or two evils). The process of investigation of facts used by the caring approach would be repeated in a developmentalist's classroom. The best case for whaling would be presented and summarized, such as, (arguably) respect for an indigenous people's tradition and culture. The same would be done for the environmentalist's position: (perhaps) intelligent and threatened animals (even if no longer endangered) should be respected and protected for the good of the animal, for humans, and for the environment. Using Kohlberg's (1981) "moral musical chairs," we should sequentially take every perceptive of those involved and, by giving extra weight to the moral agent most "at-risk" (or to use Rawls's term, "least-advantaged") making a decision based on equity. Note here how important it is to try to determine who is most at-risk and how the question of whether the

whale is to be considered a moral being takes on incredible importance (e.g., Regan, 1985, 2001; Singer, 2001a. 2001b; Wise, 2001, 2002). If the Makah are the least advantaged, we conclude that they should be able to whale. If the whale is part of the moral domain and is judged to be the least advantaged, we come to the opposite conclusion.

The Character Approach to the Dilemma.

Unlike the caring approach, there is no single section of a publication that parallels Noddings in direct application to this case. Asked to respond to this issue, Jacques Benninga, a character educator (e. g., Benninga, 1991), prefaced his comments by citing Kenya where successful programs to protect elephants created problems for people. "They came in and swept through, they felled all the productive trees we had," recalls Abdalla Mwakanzere, who grew up in Mwaluganje. "When they invaded the farms, they even started killing people" (Crawley, 2001). A *New York Times* columnist reached made the same conclusion about the gray whales in August 2002 and wrote.

> The number of gray whales (which came off the endangered species list in 1994) surged so much in the late 1990's that hundreds of dead ones began washing up on West Coast beaches, so emaciated that their ribs showed. The best guess is that the numbers of grays grew, the food supply shrank and Malthus had his way. (Kristoff, 2002)

In this context, Benninga wrote:

> As a character educator, I would say that one-sided sensitivity is a counter-productive emotional basis for decision-making. In this scenario, the gray whale is no longer on the endangered species list. It is legal for the Makah to hunt them and they should be allowed to do so unfettered. It's possible that left unchecked, the whales' population growth could result in negative consequences similar to that caused by the elephants in parts of Kenya.
>
> Character education focuses on the judicious, reasonable application of traits — honesty, courage, loyalty, kindness, etc. In [this] case, sensitivity to the plight of the gray whale (described above as "an animal of that size and magnitude and intelligence is something special") is oppositional to the right of the Makah to make a living in a traditional way.
>
> As I see it, if the law doesn't prohibit the hunting of the gray whale, and if those same regulations control the number that can legally be killed, no independent group has the right to interfere with the Makah. Though this is not a character education issue per se, it's a pretty clear case to me. (J. Benninga, personal communication, August 15, 2002)

The Makah whaling example highlights some of the differences in how the three approaches might address an ethical issue in a classroom setting, but not reaching a consensus about the right answer.

Summary and Conclusion

At this point, we have yet to answer the question whether the Makah are ethically justified in whaling. From our perspectives, we are inclined to support the Makah, but we do so as carnivores and with concerns that the analyses might be found wanting by others and, upon reflection and education, by ourselves. Faced with this existential reality, we rely on our faith in reason, discourse, and development. One of our ethical exemplars, Mohandas K. Gandhi, would argue against whaling based on his vows, philosophy of nonviolence and his ethical vegetarianism. Rather than focus on his position, we prefer to focus on his practices and his development. In his political campaigns in South African and India, Gandhi never failed to keep in communication with his opponents and to reexamine his own views. While anything but shy about expressing his conclusions, Gandhi admitted to confusion and lack of certainty stating at one point "A votary of truth is often obliged to grope in the dark" (Gandhi, 1957, p. 349).

Both as humans struggling to determine what is ethically right for ourselves and others and as moral educators, we conclude that, (1) as humans we need to take ethical issues seriously; (2) our goal should be to reach an ethical consensus after considering diverse cultures, perspectives, metaphysics, etc.; (3) at any given time, we may be unable to reach consensus; and (4) we need to be humble, continue the conversation, and continue to try to reach clarity & consensus. We also invite our colleagues and students to join us in this quest.

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НАРОДЫ МОБИ, МАКА И ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ В ОБЛАСТИ МОРАЛИ

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Программа образования в области морали в государственных школах включает ознакомление с этическими вопросами и методами разрешения этических конфликтов. Достижение консенсуса в этических спорах может требовать серьезных усилий, особенно если речь идет о столкновении разных культур. Данная работа представляет собой анализ примера конфликтной ситуации, затрагивающей народ мака, коренных жителей Северной Америки, и защитников окружающей среды. Вопрос состоит в том, можно ли оправдать традицию охоты на китов, распространенную у народа мака. В настоящей работе: (1) приводятся аргументы в пользу позиции мака и описываются этические нормы, на которых строится политика и механизмы принятия индивидуальных решений по защите окружающей среды, (2) анализируется данный пример и его потенциал для морального образования в средней школе и высших учебных заведениях, выделяется три основных подхода — с точки зрения характера явления, социальных отношений и их перспективы, (3) обсуждается возможность разрешения данной сложной дилеммы.

THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF MEANING: IDENTITY, TRAUMA AND POSTMODERNITY

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Both postmodernity and trauma bring the unwelcome news that one has been dwelling in one's meanings rather than inhabiting the world. It is shocking to discover that one has been living conceptually rather than existentially. Sketches and schemata, representations and concepts have been acting as stand-ins for the electric flux of reality.

In the first half of this paper I will attempt to substantiate the above opinion with supporting arguments from psychology, neurobiology and philosophy. These arguments will have an individualistic point of view. In the second half I will situate this individualist perspective within a cultural context of postmodernity. I hope that by so doing I will be able to demonstrate that the culture of postmodernity is reconfiguring its members' psychology.

The meanings by which we live are Janus-like in that they face different directions but have a common source. They *refer* both out towards the world and in towards the self. An explicit reference toward the world contains within it an implicit reference to the self...and vice versa. A simple example: when a teen remarks, "These are stupid questions!" it is quite probable that the teen is also saying, "I'm afraid that I'm stupid." *Anything that challenges our conceptions of the world also challenges our conceptions of self*. Another example: I have a client who is afraid that the world (or people in it) will abandon her and so she refuses to abandon her adult son...to the point of not letting him grow up. Her treatment of her son is a mirror image of her desire for herself. When I ask her to let go of her son she resists. She resists because at some level she knows that his continuing need for her, a need that her behavior cultivates, insures that *she* will never be abandoned. While writing the above I remember that when she initially came for therapy, she saw her function as warding off other people's crisis or, failing that, picking up the pieces afterwards. Of course this is what she expected of her husband, her lover and her therapist. We all were expected to head off her crisis or pick up her pieces later. In her cosmology nobody stood on his or her own two feet. She expected from the world what it seemed to expect from her.

Postmodernity and trauma, however, operate on a far more general level than the particular beliefs these preceding examples illustrate. Both trauma and postmodernity operate as meta-challenges, in that they destroy not a particular belief but rather the more general illusion that the map is the territory — that dealing with one's concepts is equivalent to dealing with the Real. One who has been

"broken open" by trauma is ejected from the familiarities of one's assumptive world and thrown into the strangeness of the Real.

* * *

I would like to attempt to ground these global terms such as the "Real" and the "assumptive world" in neurobiology. Later in this paper I point out that the right hemisphere is responsible for proprioception and perception — those forms of direct knowledge that enable living in the world. The left hemisphere, on the other hand, generalizes from the right's multiple interactions with the environment. By so doing it builds schemata and concepts that are abstractions of the lived experience. It produces routines and protocols that make "life easier." These routines and protocols, schemata and concepts are the contents of the assumptive world.

Language, of course, greatly expands the inventory of abstractions, generalizations and even ideologies. These are second hand meanings, in that they weren't derived from lived experience but from communication with others. These "received" meanings allow the person access to and participation in consensual reality, and are privileged partially for that reason.

To summarize, I am suggesting that engagement with the Real[1] correlates with right hemisphere activity, whereas "living" conceptually correlates with the left. In the latter case, subjectivity relates to a conceptual system as its field of operation. I suspect that there is a developmental dimension to all this. It seems reasonable to suppose that at the early stages of development, the left hemisphere *mediates* between consciousness and the Real. At this stage the conceptual map enables us to navigate the actual territory more efficiently. It seems, however; that once this step — the use of concepts to mediate — is taken it becomes easier to employ concepts as a *substitute* for the Real. If and when this occurs one is totally "flying by instrument."

This is especially true when there has been some previous narcissistic injury resulting from contact with the Real. The person's self esteem was bruised or damaged in the encounter. Often when this type of injury occurs one responds by dissociating, by distancing oneself from one's experience. Instead of engaging with the Real, one watches a "movie" or "video" of the event. In fact, some therapies (EMDR) train clients to observe traumatic incidents in just this way. As a result the individual learns to denude reality of its "realness."

Of course the best way to denude reality of its realness is through the coding that is language. Many theories claim that trauma is overcome when it is "languaged." That is, when trauma is transformed from an eternal, horrific "now" in the right hemisphere to a coded representation in the left, its sting is muted. Once having experienced the resultant relief, many individuals are tempted to privilege language and symbol over the Real. Such coded symbols are much easier to control and manipulate than the Real thing. I am currently working with a young man

who is quite facile with such verbal productions but who has little awareness of who he is actually. I suppose that, ideally, the left hemisphere would read the map while the right would navigate the territory. However, with this young man, and many others like him, I suspect that the car never leaves the garage and all the "traveling" occurs only on the map.

These ideas get some support from the Ian Hacking in his review of *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain*. "One part of the human organism, the brain, monitors the whole body, and helps keep it in equilibrium. Another part, *the mind,* monitors the brain and the way it monitors the body" (Italics mine). A part of me is affronted by the materialism that would locate the mind in the body; however another part recognizes the parallels with my own thinking: Hacking's "brain" equates nicely with what I mean by right hemispheric functioning. Likewise, "the mind" seems comparable to left hemisphere activity.

Hacking's model of organism, brain and mind implies an ideal condition where both right and left hemispheres work cooperatively. In health I think this is the case. However, as any psychotherapist can attest, many clients override their awareness of their body and the world of perception, and focus instead on conceptual categories. The body remains mute and dumb, while the mind works its algorithms.

Consciousness, therefore, can choose either the world or its derivative, the cognitive map, for its environment. My guess is that many of us shuttle back and forth between the two environments...sometimes "in" our concepts, sometimes in perception. I also suspect that, as we age, many people make a transition to a condition where concepts can become not just "stand-ins," but rather, substitutions for the Real. Such people have become "set in their ways."

* * *

The foregoing analysis was primarily psychological in tone with some philosophical speculation. I would like to now shift my attention to cultural analysis. In particular I am interested in the interaction of the psychological with the cultural. Let me begin with the bold suggestion that in the mass culture of the West, *modernity* has elided the substitution of concepts and ideology for the Real.[2] That is, the modern culture or zeitgeist reinforces (may even prescribe) the dominance of left over right hemispheric functioning. Modern culture provided virtually no challenge to its members' assumption that the map was the territory. The postmodern *correction* of this elision separates "the thing" from its representation — the concept and the Real belong to separate domains.

Before this correction takes place, both an individual's worldview and his or her self-definition are shot through and through with reification. If the former, one hears statements like: "This isn't just my point of view; this is the way things are." A more sophisticated version might be: "I don't have a world view; I have a world." Literalism and reification. One's complicity in one's worldview is hidden. Like-

wise, the *process* of constructing one's self is telescoped into the final product, one's identity, which is experienced as a given — the ground of one's being. Both trauma and postmodernity deconstruct identity with the result that a self that once was so defined, stable and opaque becomes fluid and transparent. Frequently, this is experienced as a loss of the sense of self; "I'm no longer my self; this is not me; I don't know what is gotten into me; I want to get my old self back."

This is not a mere intellectual experience but strikes at the existential or even ontological core of one's identity. *Because being and meaning have been conflated, their eventual separation is traumatic*. One can get closer to an experiential understanding of this loss through phenomenology. In our everyday functioning there is an overall *felt sense* that accompanies our thought processes. This felt sense is the somatic correlate of our self-concept. At home in our body; comfortable in our own skin; a kind of familiar background hum that is always with us. With trauma — suddenly there is a silence. Our bodies clench, our blood vessels constrict, and our gut tightens as we attempt to cling to our meanings — as we attempt to keep meaning and being from uncoupling and moving apart. When being and meaning are fused one's identity is experienced as something Real. When being and meaning uncouple, the individual often begins to experience derealization and depersonalization. Both the world and one's self are experienced as unreal. In fact, what has been revealed as unreal are one's conceptions.

As one's assumptive world is undone, the familiar background hum is replaced by silence. Quickly followed by an unfamiliar background noise — dread. One experiences discontinuity. One's story is broken. In extreme cases there is a sense of annihilation of the self.

Discontinuity, fragmentation, and incoherence: these are also descriptors of an age we call postmodern — our age.

This paper was prepared for a conference that highlighted identity as one of the key constructs involved in reconciling unity and diversity. Identity based on difference is postmodern; replacing the modern assumption of unity based on commonality. If we think of identity as primarily an intellectual construct, it might seem puzzling that it resists reconfiguration; that people cling so tenaciously to their ethnic, gender, and class identities. So when we speak of identity crisis — as in "the whole world might be experiencing an identity crisis" — it is important to acknowledge this tenacity. I think that we can go some way to understanding its insistence if we acknowledge its somatic dimension. It is because our very being inhabits the shelter of our meanings that we cling to them so ferociously. To lose our meanings, therefore, is to be in danger of losing our being. "For what should it profit a man to gain the whole world and lose his own soul." This quote from the bible names an ancient terror — the loss of orientation that we call self.

I'm suggesting that postmodernity is a kind of slow acting, diffuse trauma that generates identity and epistemological crisis in everyone that it touches. No one can escape.

Cover Art from the Pink Floyd Album — "Wish You Were Here"

Why is this image inserted at this particular site in the text? I chose this image because I think that it was created at the dawn of postmodernism. Like David Bowie, I locate the birth of postmodernism around 1970. I'm aware that Jameson and others have argued that the beginnings of postmodernism could be pushed back to an earlier time. However, I'm sticking with my marker because I'm interested in how and when *postmodernism entered the popular imagination*, not when it first occurred to one or several thinkers. I see this album art as one of the first incursions of postmodernism into mass culture. At what point can we say that it is not just a few members of the intelligentsia, but rather a whole culture that is becoming postmodern? I've selected this image as a sign of such a foundational moment.

How, precisely, does this image perform postmodernism? It displays fire as content *and as context*. Fire as an event happening within the frame and fire as consuming the frame. That is, this image problematizes the conventions of representation. As long as the frame isn't on fire we see the burning man as a real event rather than as a representation, image or symbol of a burning man. We conflate image and event. As soon as we realize that the image itself has been singed we become alert and curious, we drop a conventional way of looking and begin to see.

That is, this art permitted us to see "representation." *Representation* suddenly came into view. Previously it had been soaked or absorbed into reality.

Something similar had occurred a few years earlier when Jimi Hendrix sang "Are you Experienced?" He wasn't asking the more familiar question, "What are you experienced *at*?" His question was making "experience" itself an object of contemplation. The way we "experience" the process of "experiencing" was becoming noticeable.

A few years later Supertramp produced their *Even in the Quietest Moment* album. The front cover of this album had a snow-covered grand piano perched on a

mountaintop. The back cover was the same scene, only broken into fragments of shattered glass. The back cover revealed that the image on the front was only image, only representation. It was the representation that was being shattered. It was *representation* that was being hollowed out or separated from being. To conclude this section, these are three examples drawn from the same time span that I register as the onset of postmodernism.

* * *

Trauma is the experience that meanings/concepts/assumptions failed to protect one from the invasion of the Real: a car accident; an earthquake; a date rape; a mugging on the way to the theatre; a divorce; a bankruptcy. Before the trauma, however, the person assumed that his or her meanings were more than adequate. The individual was supported in a hammock or net of meanings. After the trauma, though, the story is different. "I didn't notice that there was more hole than netting. Why would I? Those holes were unimportant. The only thing that mattered was the netting and it sustained my weight." In fact, the person is not aware of the holes until *after* the trauma, when every antecedent condition is being inspected for its fatal flaw.

The artwork that I have cited above is the aesthetic rendering of our postmodern condition. It demonstrates the nascent realization that meaning and being have been conflated. This conflation had made possible the illusion that living conceptually and/or ideologically was the same as living existentially, but with far less risk, supposedly. This artwork could be read as a cause, or as a symptom, or both. When read as a symptom this artwork asks us to look elsewhere for causes. One candidate cause is multiculturalism. Postmodernity relativizes our values when it displays alternative values from other cultures. When we look for a transcendent yardstick by which to measure their values against ours, we find that there is none, and therefore no way to order or arrange competing cultural values. The solid ground of the absolute which legitimized and guaranteed our values was revealed to be the originary and relative ground of one's particular culture. And if not grounded in the absolute then falsely grounded through reification. We could no longer naively trump other cultures values. But now we could see that what we were standing on was fluid or dynamic. As Merleau-Ponty pointed out, anxiety is the fluidization of everything that once was solid.

Even before our beliefs are undermined by multiculturalism we face a threat closer to home: contradiction. Being caught in self-contradiction often produces a frenzy of defensiveness that frequently borders on offensiveness. One believes in both contradicting positions but these convictions can only be upheld if the competing claims are kept apart — kept in ignorance of each other. When juxtaposed, however, their mutual exclusiveness guarantees that the truth-value of each term is suspect. That is, contradiction leads inevitably to the realization that our "truths" are incomplete,

that we are in fact "suspended over the void." Intellectuals have known this for some time, but now postmodernity is visiting this difficult realization on us all.

Both multiculturalism and contradiction, as features of postmodernity, reveal that concepts stand between oneself and the Real as its intermediaries or representatives. Harmless signs pointing to a reality that has not been seen for so long that one forgets that it is there. All that is left is a landscape of signs. In summary, postmodernity reveals that "reality" was actually only billboards and false fronts. That what lies behind these signs is actually some untamed beast — whose ways we know nothing about.

Suddenly we feel naked or exposed, having found out that we have been living in a house with no walls. One soon learns that panic is not a viable reaction. It compromises functioning, draws unwanted attention, and leads to labeling and devaluing. Instead of understanding, one gets intrusiveness and confinement: a reduction in autonomy. That is, one's experience is defined as a personal problem rather than cultural condition.

So one learns to avoid panic reactions. Instead, one learns to shut down. Dampen everything. Regulate one's arousal directly. With healthy living, contentment and ease are the byproduct resulting from successfully dealing with a life challenge. An expedient alternative, that short-circuits this process, operates directly on our nervous system. We shut down. Then this "solution" becomes the new problem. That is, the person begins to experience symptoms of depression and, if those symptoms are severe enough, medication and/or counseling is sought. I suggest that the widespread usage of anti-depressant medication is a symptom not of a biochemical deficit in the brain, but of cultural change.

Turbulence on an aircraft is alarming — but just how alarmed should one be? One looks to the flight crew to see what their reactions are and their reactions become the gauge of danger.

This is, of course, a metaphor for our culture. As Geoffrey Hartman, a culture critic, observed: we look to Jay Leno, Dave Letterman and Jon Stewart for clues as to what the appropriate attitude towards current events might be. I think that we try to vouchsafe the safety of our being by referring to other people's meanings? We try to stay "in the loop" because we sense that, *when reality is created consensually*, to be outside the loop is equivalent to ostracization. Our meanings are also our inclusion.

But our vulnerability is more fundamental than inclusion/exclusion. It is epistemological or even ontological. We are creatures who live in two different environments simultaneously: the natural or physical and the symbolic or cultural. A bullet can wound us and so can a word.

We are born into a sea of language — our most comprehensive and intricate symbol system. Most of us know about this language environment, as a fish knows about water. We might know how to use it; but most of us do not know how it uses us. I submit that the meanings language carries forms a more pervasive environment

then does our natural world. We operate in symbolic "space" as much as we move through physical space. Living symbolically means that we live one step removed from reality. Our minds can escape the immediacy of the physically present. Our range expands to include the past and the future. Such freedom.

This freedom has a cost however: Existential Insecurity. To the degree that we live in language and meaning, to that same degree we have been distanced from being. On a good day we suspect that we are not quite in touch with reality. On a bad day we "know" that there is something wrong and hope that we can "fake it until we make it."

We are experiencing the unbearable lightness of meaning. No ballast. No wonder we look to reification to provide the gravity that only the real can bring. No wonder we look to others as our gauge of what is going on. No wonder that we look to others to tell us who we are. No wonder we are so vulnerable to the meanings that they project onto us.

Our identities were already more symbolic than Real. Hence our vulnerability to the expectations of others. If this "other" seems sure of himself or herself, the certainty of my experience and my sense of self evaporates. I can become the person's expectation. "You want an action movie; I want an action movie." "You want a glass of Chardonnay with your meal; so do I."

I remember hearing of Milton Erickson, the famous hypnotherapist, and his work in cancer wards. Someone had noted that many of the staff developed symptoms very similar to the patients'. But not Milton. When asked why this was so, Milton responded, "Because, I know who I am." His groundedness protected his identity from symbolic osmosis. On a purely speculative level, I find myself wondering if Japan didn't "become" the United States after the Second World War. There was an identity vacuum after the Emperor surrendered and, as a result, it was but a short step to fill in their hollowed out selves with the identity of their conquerors.

Conclusion

This line of thinking leads to other speculations. I will mention only two. First, postmodernism may be the first right hemisphere ideology. Previous ideologies were much more of a piece with left hemispheric functioning. Secondly, if meaning and being have become conflated in identity, then it is understandable that people will defend their meanings with their life. However, as we come to understand that being is the true source of ground, we may learn to attend to it, rather than clinging ferociously to our self-concepts. Meditation is a practice that encourages this outcome. Sometimes I skip my meditation sitting. I do so because I know what is awaiting me — my existence: the residual mood from a bad dream, some distress from an incident the previous day. But I've learned that if I let myself be...Let myself be, without concepts to interpret, blame, explain, rationalize, or predict then, by noon, I will be quietly streaming with clean energy.

NOTES

[1] I capitalize the word "Real", in the manner of Jacque Lacan, in order to distinguish it from "reality" which I believe is actually conceptual rather than existential.

[2] When I use terms like modern and postmodern I am applying them to the Western culture and neither to the avant-garde nor the intelligentsia.

НЕВЫНОСИМАЯ ЛЕГКОСТЬ ЗНАЧЕНИЯ: ИДЕНТИЧНОСТЬ, ТРАВМА И ПОСТМОДЕРНИЗМ

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Согласно одному из определений травма представляет собой «разрушенные ожидания». Речь идет не о событии, послужившим причиной, а о том эффекте, который оно оказывает на психику, эффекте непосредственно называемым «травмой». Когда ожидания рушатся, сознание оказывается оголенным и часто содрогается от столкновения с жестокой реальностью. В результате «субъект остается опустошенным». Преследующее его отчаяние в большей степени связано не с самой раной, а с последствиями «воздействия утраты». Без действующего субъекта невозможно формирование новых психических структур, способных преодолеть разрыв, вызванный раной. Субъект остается «привязанным» к старой идентичности, которая не может меняться. В данной работе проводятся параллели между явлением травмы и постмодернистской культурой. Травма возникает в результате определенного события, в то время как культура постмодернизма отбрасывает традиции, устои, конвенциональную реальность и даже само понятие объективности. Таким образом, и явление травмы и постмодернизм подразумевают потерю системы убеждений и угрозу идентичности. Подобная утрата вызывает такие реакции как: беспокойство, депрессия, устойчивая привязанность к прежним представлениям о себе и реальности. Представляется трудным проследить параллели между двумя запускающими условиями из-за тенденции «видеть» простые или отдельные, а не системные, причины явлений. Травму легко распознать, так как она является результатом определенного события, оказавшего сильнейшее воздействие. Но что если беспокойство, отчаяние и ригидность, которые мы наблюдаем у пациента, вызваны ситуацией постмодернизма? Мое предположение заключается в том, что подобную связь трудно распознать. Вместо этого мы предпочитаем «видеть» те условия, которые легко поддаются лечению. Если отдельной «причиной» являются, например, биохимические нарушения мозговой активности, то решение проблемы с помощью новых медикаментов будет отчасти прямолинейным. К тому

же, биохимическое «объяснение» депрессии скорее является готовым решением для тех, кто ищет ответы на все вопросы в «научности». Однако, предостерегающие выводы, недавно опубликованные FDA (Управлением по контролю за продуктами и лекарствами Правительства США), относительно потенциальной опасности употребления антидепрессантов стимулируют более широкое исследование проблемы. Возможно, пришло время вернуться к вопросу о том, что инициирует широкое распространение таких симптомов, как беспокойство и депрессия? В настоящей работе выдвигается предположение о том, что имплицитно мы живем в эпоху постмодернизма, и эксплицитно — в современную или традиционную эпоху, и большая часть наших психических трудностей возникает из-за несовместимости этих эпох.

THE MONG-AMERICAN ORAL TRADITIONS: MAINTAINING CULTURAL IDENTITY THROUGH THE SACRED QEEJ INSTRUMENT

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Introduction

The *Qeej* is the sacred, ritual funerary instrument of the Mong.[1] This sacred instrument is made of six bamboo pipes and a wooden chamber similar to a wind chest. It is an instrument made of bamboo, through which the voice intones a highly stylized and ritualistic language. This sacred instrument makes a special sound, which only a Master *Qeej* player can produce. The *Qeej* makes beautiful sounds. The Mong believe it is these ethereal sounds that communicate with the souls of the dead. Only *Qeej* players, who spend years studying with their masters, know the meaning of these sounds.

The *Qeej* is different from the Laotian, Mongolian, and Chinese *khane*. The *khane* instrument plays many roles in weddings, New Years celebrations, big fairs and other fun events. But the *Qeej* is not built to make music to entertain people during courtship. Playing the *Qeej* is an important cultural tradition to the Mong, and the Mong have had this instrument for thousands of years. In this article, I will investigate the role that this instrument plays in the Mong's funeral rites and why it is important. In addition, I will describe the *Qeej* origin, how the Mong people maintain the skills, knowledge and value of the instrument from one generation to the next in a non-verbal fashion at a Mong cultural learning center.

Statement of the Problem

Today, the Mong have begun to use the *Qeej* in a secular way. They no longer view it exclusively as an important instrument for communicating with the souls of the dead during funeral rituals to help the soul journey to the realm of the ancestors. Mong elders are extremely concerned that their boys are losing the skill of playing the instrument that is so central to the Mong funeral service. Mong parents worry that they may not be able to maintain the beauty of their tradition. Some Mong are beginning to use the *Qeej* to perform in non-ritual settings. Traditionally, this instrument was used only for *Lub Nteeg Tuag* (funeral services), *Rov Plig* (rebirth rites), and *Ua Nyooj Dlaab* (a son pays respect to the souls of his dead parents by sacrificing a bull). It has been rumored that some Mong have used this sacred instrument to entertain people at weddings, New Year's celebrations and other fun events. According to some observers, the Mong have used the *Qeej* to entertain people during

the Mong New Year, weddings, and other festive occasions (Morrison, 1990; Catlin, 1997; Lor, 1997; Cooper et al., 1996; Cooper, 1998; Falk, 1998; Xiong, 1999).

The process by which the *Qeej* has been converted from a traditional to a contemporary instrument has caused considerable damage to the Mong's traditional funeral rite. All lessons on this instrument are transmitted exclusively through oral education. Today, Mong children no longer have an oral culture. In everyday life, Mong children of today have ever less and less exposure to their oral culture. In a modern, literate society, Mong children are surrounded with books and technology. The knowledge they receive in school and in the larger community is all transmitted in printed form. As a result, Mong children no longer have any connection to their traditional, oral education. The access they have to printed information has little to do with oral education. Likewise, by and large, they are no longer maintaining the *Qeej* tradition. They have replaced their parents' oral culture with written culture. They view the *Qeej* as an instrument for entertaining, and expect to learn how to play it from musical notation. The *Qeej* no longer has the same significance for the Mong as it did before it was taken out of the oral tradition. The richness of the *Qeej* as used in Mong funeral celebrations is in danger of being lost forever. When Mong play the *Qeej* in non-funeral settings or take *Qeej* lessons from written notation, this conflicts with sacred traditions. The soul of the deceased will not be able to travel safely back to the realm of the ancestors.

Purpose of the Study

I am interested in the oral tradition of the *Qeej* and its use at Mong-American funeral services because this is the traditional celebration and practice, which represents the real culture of the Mong. The dilemma modern Mong have of not being able to maintain their traditional values and appreciate their traditional funeral celebration is a new phenomenon. Mong children have begun to lose the richness of their funeral celebration. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to explore the sacred oral tradition of the Mong and the value of the *Qeej*, and the importance of its preservation, thus assisting the Mong in continuing to celebrate their traditional funeral rites in the United States.

Methodology

This study used participant observation at the Mong Cultural Program in Long Beach, California. The program has many activities, but this study focuses exclusively on its *Qeej* class. I observed how the *Qeej* tradition is passed down to children for preservation and the role the *Qeej* plays in the Mong's funeral rites as they continue to be practiced in the United States. In addition, I interviewed five Mong elders informally, using open-ended questions, to uncover the origins of the *Qeej*. These interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. I then pieced together my annotated observations and transcriptions in order to evaluate the findings.

As a Mong educator, I based my information on Mong legends with which I am familiar, and my knowledge of Mong culture, and deepened my research on the *Qeej* tradition in particular through interviews with Mong elders and observations of the *Qeej* in use in traditional settings.

Background

The Mong are an ethnic subgroup living in Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, and Vietnam, who have a unique culture of their own. They have a long history that dates back to 2500 BC (Quincy, 1988). Researchers state that, based on archeologists' evidence, the Mong were one of the Siberian groups that lived in China before other groups migrated there (Quincy, 1988; Thao, 1999a; Mottin, 1980; Geddes, 1976). The Chinese call the Mong, "Miao." This term means savages (Quincy, 1988). Today, in China, all Mong are still referred to as "Miao" (Quincy, 1988 and Thao, 1999a).

The Mong migrated to Laos from China in the early 19th century. The Mong lived in Laos until 1975, and then they began to resettle in the United States, as well as other Western countries, due to their involvement with the United States' Secret Armies in Laos during the Vietnam War (Quincy, 1988; Thao, 1999a; Thao, 1999b; Thao, 2003). Thao (1999a) estimates that, between 1975 and 1988, about 85,000 Mong immigrated to the United States.

The Mong belong to an oral tradition in which their values are transmitted through oral teachings, story telling and legends. In Laos, Mong social life and welfare depended on hunting, farming and gathering as a means of survival. Information and skills were passed down through oral education. These values were handed down from one generation to the next in an oral form until the Mong language obtained a written form in the early 1950s. The printing era ushered in a major deterioration of the beauty of the Mong culture and the general welfare and social customs of the Mong, who once lived peacefully, harmoniously, and happily in the Mong Mountains in Laos.

The **Qeej** *in the Mong Oral Tradition*

The special use of the *Qeej* in traditional funeral rites is a perfect example of Mong oral traditions, and changes in this custom are an equally perfect example of the effects of cultural dilution. Before the 1950's, the Mong lived surrounded by nature and had close contact with the beauty of their oral cultural education. Since literacy in the 1950's, this educational tradition and its values have suffered massive assaults. This has created a huge disruption in the funeral celebration in that they have been unable to maintain the significance of the *Qeej*. In short, the Mong's beautiful *Qeej* tradition was passed down from generation to generation and belonged to the ancestors. Traditionally, the Mong are not allowed to take *Qeej* lessons in the house. All lessons must take place outside the home, so they do not harm the house spirits that protect the living. Since the *Qeej* is only to accompany the souls of the

dead, it is taboo for the Mong to play the *Qeej* in a house without a dead person (Cooper et al., 1996; Cooper, 1998). All the special sounds the *Qeej* makes are exclusively about death. The special sounds of the *Qeej* communicate to the souls of the dead for guidance and accommodation. The *Qeej* leads the souls of the dead to the ancestors' world.

The Mong believe that this is the only way to help the souls of the dead negotiate the unfamiliar journey to the realm of the sacred and ensure that they do not return to harm the living. If the ritual is changed, their spirits will not be able to reach the ancestors' world, and the living will be cursed, because the souls of the dead will be unable to rest in peace ("*Ua Dlaab Ua Qhua Phiv*"). Falk (1998) confirms that in the Mong worldview the soul of the deceased cannot return to its ancestors without the ceremony.

My interviews and observations overwhelmingly confirmed that the instrument is to be used only on those occasions that involve the souls of the dead. When the Mong use it in a secular place, it demonstrates that they no longer view the *Qeej* as an important ritual instrument. They use the *Qeej* in secular places because of the influence of non-Mong. It is my assumption that the Mong were influenced in this regard by the Chinese, Laotian and Western cultures that they subsequently encountered. They began to use the *Qeej* in ways similar to the way the Chinese, Mongolian, Thai and Laotian musical instruments are used, which is to entertain government officials during celebrations, as is done even today for the Lao and Thai royal families. I have observed that the Mong continue to use the *Qeej* in this fashion in the United States, for governors, mayors, city councils, senators, etc.

Literature Review

The Mong culture has a very complex oral structure, especially with regard to the *Qeej*, because playing it requires highly developed oral skills and intense concentration in order to memorize the special language words that the Mong use to communicate with the souls of their dead. Xiong (1999) explains that learning to play the *Qeej* is not like learning to play the guitar or other musical instrument. With most musical instruments, similar chords can be played on all the instruments, so that any given instrument can play the same song, whereas the *Qeej* has its own chords, its own sounds, and even its own special language. When non-Mong try to understand the special language codes of the *Qeej,* it makes no sense to them, because the meanings are embedded in the Mong's chants, in the rituals and their cosmological knowledge. Anthropologists Cooper et al. (1996) observed the Mong playing the *Qeej* in Thailand:

> Part of the hypnotic power of the weaving *Qeej* player is caused by the continuity of sounds. Notes and chords of the *Qeej* flow into one another like the music from bagpipes, and the player seems, to the non-Hmong observer, to

> have no need to pause for breath. Unlike bagpipes, the *Qeej* has no reservoir of air. The continuity of sound results from the fact that the player breathes through the *Qeej*, which resounds not only when air is blown through it but also when air is sucked in. The windchest is held with the balls of both thumbs and the small fingers of each hand are free to close and open the holes in the six pipes. (p. 42)

Mong men play this instrument in funeral rites for hours,non-stop throughout the day and the night. Falk (1998) noted, "The most important function of the khaen [*Qeej*] for the Hmong is during the funeral ceremony when it is played continuously for many days" (1998, p. 1). The *Qeej* player plays exclusively in the Mong funeral as a way of making a connection to the otherworld and communicating with the souls of the dead (Cooper et al., 1996; Cooper, 1998).

Qeej sounds are very difficult to understand. It is impossible for someone who is not familiar with the sound of the instrument to understand fully everything that is played on the instrument. There are thousands of special words and phrases in the *Qeej* repertoire. Consequently, it becomes very difficult for non-Mong to understand without direct translation from a master player. The player himself may be the only one who can explain what the *Qeej* said. Hall explained, "One cannot interpret any aspect of culture apart from, and without the cooperation of, the members of a given culture" (1981, p. 220).

Nonetheless, at least one anthropologist who researches the Mong has tried to transcribe the special sounds into musical notes. There have been several translations by Falk, but these are very confusing, both to master players and the Mong people. In fact, these translations have created greater conflicts with the values and beliefs of the traditional funeral celebration, because they do not accurately reflect all the special sounds made by the *Qeej* in the chants that the Mong use in their funeral rites. Hall stated:

> A given culture cannot be understood simply in terms of content or parts. One has to know how the whole system is put together, how the major systems and dynamisms function, and how they are interrelated. (1981, p. 222).

Furthermore, in another context, Hall (1981) commented that "white men" devoted their lives to "helping" the American Indians discover their own culture through literacy. He argues that "white men" revealed the Indian's culture, and this actually threatened the Indian people. The Mong face a similar threat as that suffered for hundreds of years by the American Indians and their sacred rituals in the United States. The special sounds of the *Qeej* no longer possess the same significance as they did in oral form once they became written down. If their sacred traditions are documented, the Mong will face a similar culture crisis as that of the Native Americans.

Morrison (1990) confirms that the Mong's *Qeej* was not designed to make music *per se*. In a sense, it would be difficult for anyone to try to translate *Qeej* sounds into musical notation, or any other kind of written form, to represent the Mong sacred *Qeej*.

Origins of the Qeej

In reviewing the literature, I found that there is more than one version of the story of the *Qeej*'s origins. However, my research did reveal that the *Qeej* was intended for the Mong to use only to honor the souls of their dead. There were at least five different origin stories for the *Qeej*, each with variations:

1) Morrison (1990) states that the *Qeej* derived from a god-man by the name of Sinsay, *Xem Xais*. His seven wives constructed this instrument for him. However, this version is a Lao story.
2) Falk (1998) states that seven sons made the *Qeej* to celebrate their father's funeral ceremony. It accompanied the father's transformation into spirit. In this way, their father would not simply turn into a "Maggot" and crawl out of the house.
3) Cooper (1998) states that the *Qeej* was made by a god-man, *Siv Yig,* because of a lost book that he gave to the seven brothers. *Siv Yig* taught the Mong how to make and play the *Qeej*.
4) Xiong (1999) states that the *Qeej* instrument was given to the Mong people by a god-man, *Saub,* and that the Mong went to the dragon, *Zaaj* to learn how to play the instrument.
5) Lor (1997) maintains that the *Qeej* was given to the Mong by a pair of ancestral grandparents after the great flood destroyed all life on earth.

I am not sure which story is an accurate reflection of the instrument. Research by Morrison (1990) indicated that one of her interviewees reported that no-one really knows the facts of the history of the *Qeej* and the Mong.

In interviews with five Mong elders who are master *Qeej* players and by observing performances at the Mong Cultural Center in Long Beach, California, I learned that the impulse for the creation of this instrument began with the Mong's concept that people do not die, but live forever. The Mong die and are reincarnated. They merely exchange their old "skin" for a younger one, *Plhis*. This transformation is very painful:

> Once upon a time, some Mong found a dead tiger. They called out to the tiger. They said they would rather die and be reincarnated than go through the process of changing their skin. They brought the dead tiger into the house for a funeral. They called all the people in the village to come see the tiger. They made a *Qeej* from hemp straw called *Qeej Plhaub Maag*, and a drum from a bitter squash called *Nruag Plhaub Taub*. There was a great celebration. The people cried out to the tiger and it disturbed *Yawm Saub*, the Creator. The Creator wanted to

> know what was going on down on earth. First, the Creator sent the bumblebee, *Nkawj*, to find out what was wrong. The bumblebee went, but could not get through the crowd. So the bumblebee returned to tell the Creator that there were too many people and his trip had not been successful. So, the Creator sent the fly, *Mog Ntsuab*. The fly was much smaller and was able to get through the crowd. The fly saw a dead tiger and the Mong who were calling to the tiger. The fly returned to tell the Creator that the people were crying and saying to the tiger that they wanted to die like the tiger, rather than getting a new skin. After the tiger was buried, death became a curse to the Mong. From this point on, the *Qeej Plhaub Maag* and *Nruag Plhaub Taub* have been used in Mong funeral rites to send the souls of the dead to the realm of the ancestors to be reincarnated.

Since the villagers' *Qeej* was only made from hemp straw and the drum was made from bitter squash, the instruments did not last very long and quickly broke. There was a wise man who went to ask the Creator to find a way to make the *Qeej* last longer. The Creator told him to use bamboo pipes, copper, and wood to make the *Qeej*, and tree trunk and cow hide to make the drum. This way, they would last longer. In all my interviews with the five Mong elders regarding the origins of the *Qeej* it was stated that, according to the Mong legends, *Qeej Plhaub Maag* was the origin of the *Qeej*, which is now made from bamboo pipes, copper, and wood.

There are many more stories about the origins of the *Qeej* from different versions of Mong legends. I feel that none of these origin stories can be considered conclusive. Further research needs to be conducted, because each story has several different versions.

Mong Cultural Program in Long Beach, California

The Mong Cultural Program in Long Beach, California was established in 1998 to help the younger generation maintain Mong cultural values. The Cultural Program provides Mong culture classes for children and parents. The program has many activities, from *Qeej* lessons, chant, dance, and poetry singing classes, to song and needlework lessons. This program takes place every Sunday from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. This Mong Cultural Program in Long Beach makes a special effort to have a *Qeej* class for children so that they learn how to play the Mong's sacred instrument.

Formal Instruction Time

The teachers began the lesson by having the students do a quick warm-up. The students picked up their instruments and played until they were told to stop. After that, the instructors asked the students to place their instruments on the table and sit down. The teachers called on each student at a time, starting from the left to play everything they had learned in the previous lessons. While the students went

around the tables taking turns, the two teachers alternated listening carefully to what the students were playing. If a student made a mistake, the teacher would stop the student right away. The teacher then asked the student to listen carefully to him playing the part that the student had missed. Then, the student repeated that part. If a student played all the parts right and showed that he knew it all, then the teacher would add a new part for the student to learn. The teacher would play the new part and the student would listen to it. After that, the teacher would encourage the student to try to play it. Then, the teacher commanded the student to play along with him. In this manner, they repeated the part several times. It was very helpful that the instruction was one-to-one but done in a class setting, because each student benefited from the teacher's correction of the others. All lessons were given orally. This was how the class proceeded.

When learning how to play the *Qeej,* one must know by heart all the basic fingerings, called *ntiv*, for each part, from one level to the next. The *ntiv* are the most complicated level of *Qeej* technique. The *ntiv* are the foundation to the *zaaj*. If a student knows all the *ntiv,* then he will learn the *zaaj* more quickly, but then there are thousands of *zaaj* to learn. After a student masters all the *ntiv,* then he is ready to move on to the next level, which is the special *Qeej*-language chants, which are called *zaaj*. Most of the students during my visit were at various degrees of the *ntiv* level. There were only a few students studying at the *zaaj* level. They must learn each *zaaj* completely by heart before they can advance to the next *zaaj*.

Performance Time

The students were asked to form a big circle. Then, they sat down on the floor. One of the teachers walked into the center of the circle with an instrument to model the *Qeej* performance lesson, *dla Qeej*. He asked the students to watch him carefully. Before the teacher performed, he stood up straight. He held his instrument at his side with his right hand, switched position by bending down a few inches, and then brought the instrument up into position in front of him. His left hand joined his right so that both hands were holding the instrument.

He quickly placed his fingers into position over the holes on the *Ntiv*, or bamboo pipes. There were two holes on the two top pipes, and four holes on the side of the bottom pipes. Each bamboo pipe has its own name. The teacher's right thumb was placed on the single hole of the shortest and biggest pipe, called *Ntiv Luav*. His left thumb covered the small pipe that sits on top on the left and is called *Ntiv Tw*. His forefingers were placed on the single holes of the second two bottom pipes called *Ntiv Raus* right and *Ntiv Npug* left. The right middle finger covered the single hole on the pipe called *Ntiv Liag,* and the left middle finger covered the single hole of the pipe called *Ntiv Puj*. The teacher's ring and pinky fingers were used to support the instrument.

Next, the teacher put his mouth on the mouthpiece of the wooden chamber, and inhaled and exhaled air through the wind chest, *Tau Qeej*. There are eight free reeds,

Nplaim, inside the wind chest. Each free reed is mounted on a pipe and vibrates when air passes through the wind chest into the pipe. There are three free reeds mounted on the shortest and biggest pipe, the *Ntiv Luav*, and one free reed mounted on each of the remaining five pipes. If a single hole of the pipe is covered, it makes a tone. The tones of the *Qeej* are made by closing a single hole on the pipes with the fingers as air is blown or exhaled through the wooden chamber.

As soon as the teacher placed his fingers in the appropriate positions, he moved his left foot a short step forward and bent his knees. He spun his body around and, at the same time, played the instrument. First, he began to spin to the left. Then, he spun in the opposite direction, after which he alternated five rounds in each direction. He made five spins to the left, and then switched to the right. The left foot balanced his spin.

After the instructor finished his demonstration, all the students were asked to stand. They formed four rows with an open space between them and the instructor stood in front. One of the teachers, along with the teachers' assistants, scattered around the room ready to help the students. The teacher repeated his demonstrations and the students imitated him. The teachers and assistants circulated throughout the room, helping any student that was having difficulty making the turns.

The method of learning this manner of performance is very complicated. It involves great concentration, with the feet moving the fingers in their proper positions continue playing the instrument, and care is taken with the instrument so as not to let it hit someone. Dizziness also made it very difficult for the players to concentrate on the performance. The teachers assured us that these turning and spinning performances are always used at a funeral rite and a *Qeej* player must know how to do them. The instructor's performance made it look deceptively easy.

At the end of practice, the students were asked to sit in a circle. The instructor called on one student at a time to come up to the middle of the circle to perform. After a student finished his performance, the instructor explained to the student what he needed to practice at home. While explaining, he also showed the student the turning and spinning the student needed to know. This way the student can do it right.

Conclusion

The *Qeej* is not a musical instrument to the Mong. It is a sacred instrument for guiding and communicating with the souls of the dead. The students learn to play the instrument using their ears, fingers and body, in a method that is both physically and mentally demanding. It involves tremendous concentration. Student must have good listening skills to understand the sounds produced by the instrument. There are very few people who know how to play the *Qeej,* because most of the learners quit during their struggle at the beginning level of basic fingerings, *Ntiv*. The *Ntiv* are very difficult to learn, and yet, the *Qeej* is a central part of the Mong's sacred oral tradition. The Long Beach Cultural Program is an excellent way to help Mong children preserve the *Qeej* and continue the knowledge of the Mong oral tradition

and maintain the Mong cultural identity. Similar programs need to be established in all Mong communities across the United States in order to educate Mong children about their valuable cultural traditions.

The use of the *Qeej* in non-ritual settings, I believe, is an adaptation. This is strong evidence that the role of the *Qeej* has changed from a funerary to a non-funerary instrument because young Mong are acculturating to the dominant culture and slowly abandoning their own culture. They are no longer interested in learning how to play the *Qeej* and studying the special *Qeej* chants, a sacred tradition the Mong have practiced for thousands of years.

Research on the true — Mong — origins of the *Qeej* must continue. It is important to compile data from the various similar Mong legends, story telling, and, most importantly, the traditional funeral service itself. These are vital resources in the further investigation of the origin of the *Qeej*. Through extensive study of Mong culture, researchers will need to combine empirical data from various sources to form an accurate theory for the origin of the *Qeej*. This will increase the number of resources made available by both Mong and non-Mong researchers. It is important to view the problem through research from both the *emic* and *etic* perspectives and become conscious of their differences (Agar, 1996).

Despite modern influences, the *Qeej* must remain an oral tradition of performance during funeral rites for assisting the soul in departing to the other world.

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NOTES

[1] The author uses the term *Mong* exclusively throughout this article for representation of both the Mong Leng and Hmong Der.

УСТНЫЕ ТРАДИЦИИ АМЕРИКАНСКИХ МОН: ПОДДЕРЖАНИЕ КУЛЬТУРНОЙ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ ПУТЕМ СОХРАНЕНИЯ САКРАЛЬНОГО ИНСТРУМЕНТА «КИДЖ»

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В настоящей работе исследуется артикуляционный метод, который практикуют американцы азиатского происхождения для обучения игры на своем сакральном инструменте К*ена (Qeej)*, и для сохранения своих песенных традиций, являющихся частью погребальных ритуалов, поддерживающих их национальную идентичность. В традиционных погребальных ритуалах, практикуемых в азиатских сообществах, инструменту *Кена* отводится центральная роль, связанная с сопровождением усопшего в мир предков. Данное исследование позволяет понять важность голосовой традиции, соотносимой с инструментом К*ена,* а также описывает методы преподавания этой артикуляционной техники, которые использует старшее поколение азиатской коммуны для обучения молодых игре на инструменте, сохраняя тем самым их связь с национальной культурной традицией. К*ена* является сакральным ритуальным инструментом. Это не музыкальный инструмент, он не может быть использован в светской обстановке. Основная роль инструмента заключается в общении с духом умершего и сопровождении его на небеса. Техника игры на этом инструменте очень сложна для освоения. И старшее поколение азиатской коммуны возлагает большие надежды на молодежь, веря, что они смогут перенять и поддерживать эту традицию, позволяя азиатскому сообществу в Америке сохранить свою идентичность. В последнее время представители молодого поколения начали использовать К*ена* в светском развлекательном контексте, что разрушает обычаи и мешает молодым людям отождествить себя с национальной культурой. Заслуживает внимания Программа Азиатской Культуры, осуществляемая в Лонг Бич, штат Калифорния. Это достойная попытка сохранить традицию, практику и технику игры на инструменте К*ена,* являющимся важным элементом азиатской культуры.

RESISTANCE AND CULTURAL AUTONOMY IN THE TSELTAL INDIAN COMMUNITY

Ted FORTIER
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(First, we would like to acknowledge the funding provided for research on this project from the following organizations: The Lilly Theological Scholars Grant, from the Association of Theological Schools, The Louisville Institute for the Study of American Religion, The Theological Grant from the Association of Theological Schools, Faculty Research Grant)

This presentation is part of a project that utilizes extensive ethnographic fieldwork and collaboration of the disciplines of anthropology and theology. We focus on the Indigenous community of the Tseltal Indians of the State of Chiapas, Mexico, and the manner in which they are maintaining and creating their identity in the midst of an increasingly globalized world. We focus on issues of resistance, spirituality, worldview, and alliance with the Jesuits of the region.

This presentation is a dialog between an anthropologist and a theologian; it is between a cultural anthropologist who has spent many years working with various Indigenous groups and with a theologian who is well known in the fields of Latin American and liberation theologies. In order to facilitate our conversation, we proceed through a series of slides that illustrate our points, and that introduce the Tseltal speaking Mayan Indians of Chiapas. This presentation is not a typical academic paper for a couple of reasons. First, in order to delve into the cosmological order of the Indian worldview we would insist on the presence of numerous Indians whose life we are discussing. In contemporary ethnographical practice, it is just not ethical to present in depth materials without our Indigenous allies. And, secondly, we want to be able to introduce you to the complexities and nuances of the project before we go to the deeper levels of the personal stories that animate the Chiapian reality today.

We want to begin with the notion of ethnicity and its integral role in the global world system today. Ethnicity is a category of human beings that is created by nation-state systems. In essence, an "ethnic identity" results from categorizing cultural differences that are highlighted by a dominant cultural system. Often, the enclave of diverse cultures are assumed, and assimilated, by the nation-state, and language, religion, life-ways, customs, and world-views are lost forever. In some ways a nation state can be viewed as a virus that gobbles up resources, people and anything else it needs before it, itself, dies out. The fact that ethnic enclaves continue to resist nation-states today in an important signal that for the survival of all

people, diverse enclaves of resistance must be made secure and safe. If not, virulent forms of life that kill humans, decimate resources, and marginalize the essence of being human will surely destroy all life on our planet. But, these enclaves cannot exist in isolation, either. Rather, creative partnerships with organizations that can bridge the two-world views are essential for long term organization and survival.

Our work with the Tseltal speaking Mayan communities of Chiapas provides an important example of the autonomy, strength, an importance of cultural resistance. Located in the most southern state of Mexico, bordering Guatemala it is a historically marginalized area that, prior to conquest, was an important center of Mayan rituals and ceremonies. Usually considered "backwater," a far off outpost, or a pristine example of colonialism, the State of Chiapas has been a venue of active para-military resistance for the past 10 years. It is also the venue of a peaceful, spiritual transformation that seeks to deepen ethnic identity. Why this sudden uprising, and how is it maintained, understood, and what is the significance of the resistance to the Tseltal people, are some of the research questions that we bring to this work.

While the State of Chiapas had for centuries been under the colonial-style rule of Mexico, conditions in the latter part of the 20th century led to a growing discord among the Indians. Most notable in this growing unease was the steady erosion of village autonomy, the extension of globalization, and the continued attempts by the Mexican school system to re-educate the Indian children away from their culture. Of course, the uprising of 1994 led, eventually, to the signing of the document extending civil rights to Indigenous People (by the Mexican government). This document*, however, could remain a hollow promise of ideals if not for the very active participation of Indigenous leaders, and their allies to ensure that their struggle for their land, customs, and children remain in the forefront of the communities plans.

The now famous 1994 Zapatista uprising (named after the famed Mexican Revolutionary, Emilio Zapata) was a significant moment in indigenous rights for this past century. Because of the steady erosion of medical availability, the re-education of Indian children, and the steady inroads global-capital concerns were making, peasant-soldiers united to take several regional towns in order to get their concerns voiced on a larger venue. This, of course, caught the attention of the world, and catapulted their struggle onto the global screen.

Behind this action, however, lies another structural element that has been working to maintain cultural autonomy and survival. This is the Jesuit Mission located in Bachajon. In a manner that we have seen played out time and again among indigenous people, the hierarchical Catholic Church initially imposes a regime of drastic cultural change among the Indians. The levels of syncretism that occur, however, are often surprising for the Missionaries, and for later ethnographers and other cultural workers. Thus, in the Chiapas region, the Jesuits did find a highly spiritual people, and imposed a system of Western spirituality on top of that. The resulting oppression became a source of resistance and of re-interpreta-

tion of ancient ways alongside Catholic theological constructs. A large reason for this was the relative scarcity of Catholic priests, the wide flung villages, and the relatively large indigenous populations. The winds of change which revolutions brought to Mexico, the expulsion of the church, the re-interpretation of Vatican II and the rise of Liberation Theology, set an important stage for alliances when 1994 occurred.

The following three slides (the slides are not included in this print version) illustrate the power of two essential elements to the indigenous struggle for self-rule and for survival. The first is the strength of the people to unite, and to see themselves as an extended community. This is an essential part of the Tseltal worldview, as opposed to Western constructs; the community is prior to the individual. The second essential component here is the focus of the community on the Church as an icon, and a center, for their communal action. The photos here depict an important *intercambio* that took place a few years ago in a remote jungle village, and the important role of non-native Jesuit priests and lay leaders in that dynamic.

So, what exactly is the role of the Jesuit Mission here in Chiapas? Certainly, it can be jarring to many to reconcile the colonial-history of the Church with the struggle for autonomy that exits today among the Indian people. The significant element here, however, is the active participation by Indian leaders in the formation and direction of each Indian community. Rather than being the passive receptors of Church doctrine, they are the animators of their respective communities. In fact, the term "animadores de corazon" refers to the role of deacons. And deacon is not a term of an individual, but of the traditional partnership of a married man and woman who function as "a deacon."

The context for this dynamic is based on the reality of the people in Chiapas today. The oppression of poverty, allied to the natural richness of their land, and the historical trauma caused by colonialism and globalization, sets the stage for a response based on human rights. This need for a concerted effort at unification and appreciation of the native ways of knowing, learning, caring for one another, and practicing their cultural ways has resulted in a growth of the understanding of how education was done, and incorporated into the internal organization of the parochial groups.

This partnership, of Indigenous communities with the Jesuit Mission, is a prime example of the sort of solidarities that can produce greater indigenous consciousness and autonomy. Let us look at some of these images that illustrate the growing strength and resiliency of the Tseltal self identity.

Here we see the pride of the women in their native dress, worn as a way of identifying themselves as the People. Working closely with non-Indian people, they are able to convene in large numbers to discuss their spirituality, their past, present and future, and to educate their children in the Native Ways. The strength of the Tseltal community lies in this dialogue of generations, communities, and in the traditional roles of men, women, and children.

Perhaps no where else that we have worked have we seen the ideal of *ecclesia* so well articulated as it is here, in its ideal state. The concept of an Indigenous Church is an idea that hinges on the involvement of all people to run the community, and to base their lives in the spiritual values that orchestrate all facets of existence. Ritual action is integral to this identity and results in the recognition of leaders within the community. Furthermore, the self-direction of these groups results in regular meetings and education, which gather people to pray, discuss and learn, and to forge alliances.

As noted earlier, the lack of good health care, and the historical trauma of colonialism, brought the Indian communities close to destruction. An important development of the process of a native Church is the twinning of health and spirituality. Making use of outside professionals and Indigenous healers a re-awakening and re-appreciation of the depths of Indian knowledge, healing, and place in the natural world are taking place. This, ultimately, is leading to a new interpretation, a new philosophy of being, that is seen on Native Theology.

This New Native theology is a creation of the Indian people, based on their understanding of Judeo-Christian Scriptures, their own traditions, and their active reflection and practice within their own communities. In theological terms, this is termed "inculturation," and is nicely captured in the following exchange:

At a meeting a few years ago, the Jesuits asked some Tsteltal leaders what would happen to them (the Indians) if all the Jesuits were killed in a plane crash. One of the elders responded, "If you all died, and you feared that we could not survive without you, I would say you had not done your work well. Jesus' ministry lasted three years, but he left the Holy Spirit. If you all die, you won't leave us with anything. Give us the Holy Spirit. Open the Church to our full participation." In other words, inculturation is the process where a new cultural creation blooms out of the seeds of the indigenous ways mixed with the ways of the outside religion. As an anthropological concept, this is what is termed culture change; adaptation and reinterpretation for cultural continuity.

This new understanding of place and being continues to use the ancient ways of political-social-religious organization, and to re-interpret those roles in contemporary areas. So, rather than demeaning, and eradicating the ancient ways of sustainability, these partnerships re-interpret and dynamize the rites, myths and traditions of the ancestors. This active participation, along with the service of the Jesuits, and the Catholic Church in Chiapas, sets out not its own goals, but, rather, articulates the goals and processes of the Indians themselves. The partnership with the Jesuits of Chiapas helps to unite the ideals of human rights, the organization of the internal strengths of the communities, and underscores the goodness of the people to be non-globalized, and ethnically separate from the dominant culture. Ultimately, this is a gift to future generations, and to the hope of all of us: the children, who learn from one another, and from their elders.

AGREEMENT

Regarding the documents:

"JOINT DECLARATION THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE EZLN SHALL SUBMIT TO NATIONAL DEBATING AND DECISION-MAKING BODIES"

"JOINT PROPOSALS THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE EZLN AGREE TO SUBMIT TO NATIONAL DEBATING AND DECISION-MAKING BODIES, IN RESPECT OF POINT 1.4 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE"

"COMMITMENTS FOR CHIAPAS MADE BY THE STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS AND THE EZLN, IN RESPECT OF POINT 1.3 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE,"

Stemming from the first part of the Resolutive Plenary Meeting on the topic of Indigenous Rights and Culture:

A. The Federal Government, through its delegation, expresses its acceptance of said documents.

B. The EZLN, through its delegation, expresses its acceptance of said documents. In regard to the issues on which it formulated, at the session on February 14, 1996 of this second part of the Resolutive Plenary Meeting, proposals for additions and substitutions or eliminations in the text of same, in accordance with the results of the consultations carried out by the EZLN, it expresses the following:

1. The delegation of the EZLN insists in pointing out the lack of solution to the grave national agrarian problem, and the need to amend Article 27 of the Constitution, which should reflect the spirit of Emiliano Zapata, summarized in two basic demands: the land belongs to those who work it, and Land and Freedom. (Document 2 "Joint proposals that the Federal Government and the EZLN agree to submit to national debating and decision-making bodies, in respect of point 1.4 of the Rules of Procedure," page 11, paragraph 5, "Constitutional and Legal Amendments," subparagraph B.)
2. With regard to sustainable development, the delegation of the EZLN considers it insufficient for the government to compensate indigenous peoples for damage caused on their lands and territories, once the damage has been caused. There is a need to develop a policy of true sustainability that preserves the lands, territories and natural resources of indigenous peoples, in short, that takes into account the social costs of development projects. (Document 1 "Joint declaration that the Federal Government and the EZLN shall submit to national debating and decision-making bodies," page 3, in the subtitle "Principles of the new relationship" subparagraph 2.)

3. In regard to the topic Situation, Rights and Culture of Indigenous Women, the delegation of the EZLN considers the present points of agreement insufficient. Owing to the triple oppression suffered by indigenous women, as women, as indigenous persons and as poor persons, they demand the building of a new national society, with another economic, political, social and cultural model that includes all Mexicans, both women and men. (Document 3.2 "Actions and measures for Chiapas. Commitments and joint proposals of the State and Federal Governments and the EZLN," page 9.)
4. In general terms the delegation of the EZLN considers it necessary that, in each case, the times and terms in which the agreements should be put into practice be specified and that, to that end, the indigenous peoples and the pertinent authorities should program and schedule their implementation by mutual accord.
5. With regard to guarantees of full access to justice, the delegation of the EZLN considers that the need to appoint interpreters in all trials and lawsuits involving indigenous persons should not be ignored, ensuring that said interpreters are expressly accepted by the accused and that they know the language and are familiar with the indigenous culture and legal system. (Document 2 "Joint proposals that the Federal Government and the EZLN agree to submit to national debating and decision-making bodies, in respect of point 1.4 of the Rules of Procedure," page 6, subtitle "Guarantees of full access to justice."
6. The delegation of the EZLN considers it essential that legislation be passed to protect the rights of migrants, both indigenous and non-indigenous, within and outside national borders. (Document 1 "Joint declaration that the Federal Government and the EZLN shall submit to national debating and decision-making bodies," page 5, point 8, subtitle "Protecting indigenous migrants".)
7. In order to strengthen the municipalities, the delegation of the EZLN considers that explicit commitments by the government are required to guarantee their access to adequate infrastructure, training and economic resources. (Document 2 "Joint proposals that the Federal Government and the EZLN agree to submit to national debating and decision-making bodies, in respect of point 1.4 of the Rules of Procedure," page 3.)
8. With regard to the communications media, the delegation of the EZLN considers it necessary that access be guaranteed to reliable, timely and sufficient information on the government's activities, as well as access by indigenous peoples to existing communications media, and that the right of indigenous peoples to have their own communications media (radio broadcasting, television, telephone, press, fax, communication radios, computers and satellite access) be guaranteed. (Document 2 "Joint proposals that

the Federal Government and the EZLN agree to submit to national debating and decision-making bodies, in respect of point 1.4 of the Rules of Procedure," page 9, point 8 "Communications media".)

C. In regard to the parts of the documents to which subparagraph B refers, both delegations agree that, at the time that they identify by common accord during the dialogue, they shall exhaust negotiation efforts on same.

D. The parties shall submit to national debating and decision-making bodies and to other pertinent bodies the three accompanying documents, which contain the agreements and commitments reached by the parties.

E. Both parties assume the commitment to submit the present resolution to national debating and decision-making bodies and to the pertinent bodies of the state of Chiapas, in the understanding that the points indicated in subparagraph B should also be considered by said bodies as material resulting from the dialogue.

The present document and three documents that accompany it have been duly legalized as agreements under the terms of the Rules of Procedure and of the Law for Dialogue, Conciliation and Dignified Peace in Chiapas, and are incorporated as such into the Agreement for Concord and Pacification with Justice and Dignity.

February 16, 1996.

СОПРОТИВЛЕНИЕ И КУЛЬТУРНАЯ АВТОНОМИЯ ИНДЕЙСКОГО ПЛЕМЕНИ ЦЕЛТАЛЬ

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Настоящая работа посвящена проблеме выражения духовности аборигенов и их адаптации к католицизму как способу выживания культуры, а также формам сопротивления локальной культуры угрозе тотальной ассимиляции. Племя целтал народа майя в мексиканском штате Чьяпас неоднократно подвергалось неприятельским вторжениям и на протяжении пятисот лет являлось объектом миссионерской деятельности. Власти штата Чьяпас и Федеральное правительство Мексики не раз пытались искоренить традиционный уклад жизни индейцев и навязать народу рыночные отношения западного образца. Во многих случаях общения властей с туземным населением третьего мира доминирующая куль-

тура постулирует отсутствие у них связи с традиционными формами выстраивания культурной идентичности. Мы полагаем, что связь с землей, культурная идентичность сохраняются и имеют важное значение для современной культуры. Глубина подобной связи и ее значение демонстрирует церковное сообщество, в культуре которого сохраняется связь с традициями племени целтал, противостоящего таким образом культурной гегемонии.

Данная статья — плод совместной работы теолога освобождения и культурантрополога. Совмещая методы наших дисциплин, мы выстраиваем модель *преемственности идентичности* и того, как идентичность формируется и наследуется новыми поколениями. Идентичность племени целтал претерпела ряд *переходов*, и была сохранена в нашем постоянно меняющемся мире благодаря религии. В данной работе мы оперируем понятиями «идентичность» и «переходность/преемственность», а также очень важной для культуры целтал идеей приоритета *общества* перед личностью. Эта противоположная западному приоритету личности ориентация лежит в основе способности индейцев сопротивляться западным вторжениям, сохранять и развивать мировоззрение народа майя в XXI веке.

TAOIST PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURAL IDENTITY

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The Essence of Taoist Philosophy is the Model of the Unity of Opposites

Before examining how Taoism views the issue of cultural identity, I would like to elucidate the Taoist model of the unity of opposites. Because according to *I Ching* and *Tao Te Ching*, this paradigm is the archetype of the natural, human, and mental worlds and epitomizes the essence of Taoist philosophy. This is also why the Tai Chi Diagram (the oneness of yin and yang) is viewed as the best embodiment of Taoism. According to Lao Tzu, "All things carry Yin and hold Yang, with the interacting energy to balance the relationship" (*Tao Te Ching*, Chap. 42). "When the sky obtains the oneness, it is clear. When the earth obtains the oneness, it is calm. When our awareness obtains the oneness, it has the spirit. When the valley obtains the oneness, it is full (Chap. 39)." Namely, the paradigm of the unity of opposites operates not only in the natural world (including the oneness of feminine and masculine forces, water and fire, night and day, passive and active, as well as receiving and approaching), but also in human domains. Indicating that all apparently separate or opposite systems (individuals, nature, and the mental experiences) are parts of the whole universe and are governed by the same oneness that penetrates and transcends the boundaries of all individual entities.

The Taoist unity of opposites has three related meanings in the psychological domains. First, it suggests that the interactions between our mental opposites (the self as both subject and object) and between interpersonal opposites (the self and others/nature), rather than being direct, are mediated and regulated by our mental unity or perceived Tao. Second, this model refers to the patterns of interaction (antithesis and unity) between the fundamental yin and yang in human domains. The yin refers to one's mind or mental microcosm. The yang, on the other hand, designates the macrocosm, including evolving nature, time, space and individuals' mental structures and processes. Third, this model postulates that human balance, tranquility, joy, and harmony are the product of comprehending and applying the Tao that governs, transcends and prevails over invalidations generated by the opposing entities in the human relationships. On the other hand, human discord, tribulations and calamities result from using Tao-inconsistent guidelines or schemas to define, understand, evaluate, explain, regulate, maintain, and adjust thoughts, feelings, attributes, and actions.

The Model of the Unity of Opposites and Cultural Identity

Differing from the sociological approach that defines one's cultural identity in terms of common characteristics shared by people in a society such as language, history, tradition, economic, social, and/or political systems, the Taoist model suggests that our cultural identity is defined by our perceived unity of opposites. Including principles we believe as having the power in balancing the interactions between our internal and external opposites.

The supporting evidence comes from two sources. First, practically, regardless which culture we look at, there is always a perceived "Tao" that defines the nature of the culture. For example, since the onset of Chinese civilization, Chinese scholars have been obsessed with discovering the universal principle called Tao, which is believed to govern the operation of social, natural and political worlds, and individual activities. During the later Zhou period, two different definitions of Tao emerged. Tao as "what is" or as matching the awareness with natural patterns (the unity of Yin and Yang, as elaborated in *I Ching* and *Tao Te Ching*). And Tao as ethics and moral values or "what ought to be" as elaborated in Confucius and Mencius' writings.

Second, philosophically, our relationships with the selves and with others/nature are two of the most fundamental interactions in the human domains. We have to define the selves and cultures according to our perceived Tao because we use the perceived consistency (unity) and inconsistency (antithesis) between the target entities and the criteria to define, understand, and evaluate our attributes and entities, and adjust our attributes, cognitions, and actions.

According to Taoism, every entity in our mental and interpersonal relationships (i.e., the self and others acting in mental, social and physical contexts), is a unity of yin and yang, possessing the dispositions to be separated from and to be united with other systems. Because each system in our mental and interpersonal interactions has the ability to invalidate and validate communications from other systems, only our mental structure that embodies the reality of interaction between the opposing sides possesses the power to vanquish the disconnection/invalidation and engender the connection/validation between the mental and the interpersonal yin and yang (including creating and maintaining love and friendship, defending the self, diminishing hostility, and repudiating denunciations).

We believe that our deviations from our mental oneness, which is assumed to reflect the transcending power of the universal oneness over both the self and others, can explain our experiences of obstructions or invalidations. Whereas maintaining our link with the internal unity will restore our connection with Tao as "Reversal is the movement of Tao" (*Tao Te Ching,* Chap. 40) and secure the validity of our negotiations and communications with mental and interpersonal realities.

Identity is a Developing Concept

The Taoist model also suggests that because our cultural identity is defined by our perceptions of Tao, our identity changes when we develop new cognitions about patterns that govern our relationships with our selves, others and nature.

According to Lao Tzu, our perceived Tao has the potential to develop to a higher level, because there is a discrepancy between the two types of the unity of opposites: the universal oneness of yin and yang (the reality of interaction) and one's mental microcosm or mental unity of opposites that regulates his/her relationships with the self and with others/nature (*Tao Te Ching*, Chap 77). We are motivated to mirror our mental microcosm to the macrocosm. The antithesis between the two systems is caused by the interaction of both objective and subjective factors.

On one hand, the human and physical systems, including time, space, social situations, individual cognitive structures and processes, motivations, behavior and feelings are always developing and changing. On the other hand, however, the structure and functions of our perceptions of Tao tend to dwell upon our inadequate awareness of the human and physical reality. As Fritjof Capra summarized in *The Tao of Physics* (1975), all the concepts or categories we use to describe the world are not features of reality, as we tend to believe, but are creations of the mind; they are parts of the map, not of the territory.

The Concept of Gobal Identity

The Taoist model of the unity of opposites also explains why people across various cultures, nations, traditions, beliefs, economic and political systems share a global human identity, though Taoism does not deny the differences among individuals and cultures. This model maintains that if there are differences among opposing entities, there must be the oneness that unites, transcends, and connects all the opposites. For example, people in all cultures use their perceived oneness/Tao, including schemas, categories, ideas, and paradigms, to regulate both their internal and their external relationships. Assuming that the guiding principles they use have the same validity for the interacting others, with the power of transcending differences and invalidations of other cultures.

Based on the same logic, current social changes (e. g., population growth, technology, mobility, media, and commerce,) have provided new criteria and opportunities for people of the world to evaluate and define themselves, rather than have created "identity crises." In particular, the more people recognize differences in others, the more they also obtain the awareness of similarities and connections, because there cannot be opposites without unity. In Lao Tzu's word, the unity of opposites is the formula of all things under heaven (Chap. 22).

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ДАОССКАЯ ФИЛОСОФИЯ И КУЛЬТУРНАЯ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТЬ

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В настоящей статье представлена даосская точка зрения на проблему культурной идентичности. Во-первых, с позиций даосской парадигмы единства противоположностей культурная идентичность предстает как функция принципов, которыми люди руководствуются для установления внутренних и внешних контактов. Во-вторых, идентичность развивается. Углубляя познания о единстве противоположностей (а именно, о формах установления контактов с самим собой, другими людьми и природой), человек трансформирует свою идентичность. В-третьих, существует глобальная идентичность и все люди связаны друг с другом, поскольку представители разных культур руководствуются постигнутым дао для организации внутренних и внешних контактов и предполагают, что сходные принципы, лежащие в основе этого процесса, помогают преодолевать различия и объединять культуры.

WESTERN AND EASTERN VIEWS OF THE IDEAL: WHAT KIND OF STUDENTS ARE WE TRYING TO TURN OUT?

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Americans have traditionally been uncomfortable with the concept of the "ideal." Defining the ideal person or, more specifically to our concern, the ideally educated person, is something many are reluctant to do. Yet ideals clearly exist. They are imbedded in our culture, in our patterns of accepted behavior, in the skills we teach our students. These ideals range in specificity from "be to class on time" to proscriptions such as the golden rule. If ideals exist, why not bring them out? If not talked about overtly, our ideals come out covertly in the theories and skills we choose to develop or avoid in our classes and what we choose to reward in our classrooms. Perhaps, then, we should not shy away from defining and suggesting ideals.

If we think about the ideal in education a question emerges: if humans were completely developed — physically, mentally and spiritually, what would we look like? Here, each culture has its own and often different notions of the ideal. It seems clear that there is no one universally accepted definition of the ideal.

This is most clearly revealed when one set of ideals comes into contact with those of another culture. I had the opportunity to teach one academic year in Hong Kong. I taught typical western communication courses such as communication theory, interpersonal communication, group communication, and gender communication to non-western students. It was a fascinating experience and one shared by many professors from western countries that have the opportunity to teach in China. Many of these individuals, like me, have no instruction in cultural differences in the ideal, and many may naively assume that the ideals of their university education are similar to the ideals possessed by their Chinese students. This is not likely the case.

This paper explores the collision and collusion of western and eastern ideals of a university education. The paper is divided into three parts: a) a review of western ideals of education, b) a discussion of selected Chinese values related to education and a review of published ideals, and c) areas of overlap and difference.

Goals of Western Higher Education

There are a wide variety of descriptions of the goals of a western university education. The question of educational goals seems to come down to the fundamental notion of "If we were doing it right, what would an educated person look like?" The

question is not one of specific learning objectives, but a macro view of the educated human being as seen by western writers.

Examples of suggested answers to this question abound. While not possible to list them all, a representative sample can illustrate the point. An obvious recurring theme in these samples of educational goals is the concept of a "liberal" education. Let us examine first what this means and how this notion is defined. Dance (1980) spoke of the "education which prepares a person to make wise choices in the pursuit of individual and social goals" (p. 328). Oraison (1959) spoke of the "progressive acquisition of autonomy." He stated that "education in the final analysis consists essentially in the cultivation and the promotion of liberty of future adults" (p. 18). What is a liberating education? In answering this question, and to distill from them a picture of the goals of a liberal education, several definitions of an educated person are presented.

The following passage from John Henry Cardinal Newman's book *The Idea of a University* (1941) clearly summarizes the classical western view of a liberal education.

> It is the education which give a man (sic) a clear conscious view of his own opinions and judgments, a truth in developing them, an eloquence in expressing hem, and a force in urging them. It teaches him to see things as they are, to go right to the point, to disentangle a skein of thought, to detect what is sophistical, and to discard what is irrelevant. It prepares him to fill any post with credit and to master any subject with facility. It shows him how to accommodate himself to others, how to throw himself into their state of mind, how to bring before them his own, how to influence them, how to come to an understanding with them, how to bear with them. He is at home in any society, he has common ground with every class; he knows when to speak and when to be silent, he is able to converse, he is able to listen, he can ask a question pertinently, an gain a lesson seasonably, when he has nothing to impart himself; he is every ready, yet never in the way, he is a pleasant companion, and a comrade you can depend on, he knows when to be serious and when to trifle, and he has a sure tact which enables him to trifle with gracefulness and to be serious with effect . (196–197)

Other definitions echo Newman's beliefs. Theodore Greene (as cited in Henderson and Henderson, 1974) also maintained that the goal of education was the development of the power of the mind. He believed the following outcomes were the goal of a liberal education:

> ...training in the accurate and felicitous use of language as the essential condition of all reflection, self-expression, and communication with other; training in the acquisition of factual knowledge of ourselves, our society

> and other societies, the physical world and ultimate reality, so far as it is humanly possible; training in mature and responsible evaluation and decision in the controversial areas of science, social policy, morality, art, and religion (pp. 14–15).

Greene was discussing the development of the mind, but for what end? The answer, again, is to be free. Free to assume a commitment by choice rather than from conditioned socialization. Henderson and Henderson (1974) provide us with another opinion on what it is to be free:

> We assume people are free when they have become masters of themselves, of the forces of nature, and of their own destinies as communities and nations. They have become masters of themselves when they have learned to utilize harmoniously and creatively their own individual abilities — intellectual, emotional, and physical... A few illustrations will serve to make these generalizations more specific. People are free insofar as they possess the tools of learning and techniques of action: to verbalize, to calculate, to analyze and synthesize, to create, to organize, and to administer. People are free who possess, or know how to acquire, the available knowledge pertinent to courses of action that they are undertaking (p. 24).

We can see considerable agreement in the preceding quotations. While certainly not exhaustive, these definitions provide us with a picture of the long-range goals of a western education.

Self-actualization. Perhaps the closest western equivalent to Chinese views of the universe and communication can be found in the work of the Humanistic Psychologists of the 1960s and 70s. Maslow (1968), in *Toward a Psychology of Being,* attempts to define the self-actualized person and the process of self-actualization. Self-actualization is the process of becoming a fully functioning person, one who can realize all (or at least most) of his/her potentialities. Maslow said that self-actualized people tend to see themselves realistically, to accept themselves and others, to fit into the world around them and to identify with the human race as a whole. One of his contemporaries, Carl Rogers, was even more direct. In *On Becoming a Person* (1961) Rogers said the goal is to become oneself — to see oneself as a process, not a state of being; a direction, not a destination, as being open to experience and as one who could connect with the universe. His description included these other characteristics: One who can get outside of oneself and fully enter into the life experiences, feelings, and self of another person. One who has the ability to reconcile dichotomies and to see them as being meaningfully related — love and hate, life and death, freedom and commitment. Rogers believed that every person could develop in themselves a deep sense of faith and recognition of the justice of fate. The core of

the person is fundamentally loved, accepted, and respected by others and by him/herself. This person brings out the inner nature, to recognize inner nature rather than to suppress or repress it.

These brief descriptions above are included to illustrate the point that at least some western thinkers have followed a path that seems quite Chinese.

Let us summarize to this point. One central and recurring point of a liberal education is the concept of "choice." In this regard, Dance (1980) stated, "Choice is necessary for freedom. Intentional choice is the instrument of freedom, the instrument and the sign of liberation and of being liberated. The education which prepares a person to make wise choices in the pursuit of individuals and social goals is a liberating, or liberal, education" (p. 328). In addition to choice, the following is a list of the common goals:

1. The development of a free-thinking person who understands his/her relationship to society.
2. The development of the appreciation of freedom — of the ability to make free choices, and a commitment to the freedom of others with awareness of potential risks and costs.
3. The development of the ability to use language effectively, to speak well, and to clearly communicate oneself to others.
4. The development of a clear knowledge of the self, of other individuals, and of the world.
5. The development of the ability to evaluate, analyze, and to make informed decisions.
6. The development of the ability to continue to learn.

The Chinese View of the Ideal in Higher Education

China has a five thousand-year history, and many of its ideals are ancient by western standards. Chinese religion and philosophy shaped and continued to shape Chinese life and education. As a means of introducing the possible conceptions of the Chinese ideal education, the following points are offered. These are derived from a series of lectures at the East/West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii given during July 2003. They are organized using a traditionally western title to highlight the contrast.

1. Rationality. The idea of universality or rationality doesn't exist in China as it does in the West. In China, rationality is the historical instances of reasonableness, of what works. Rational thought is not the god-term that frequently is in the west. It would be rare for one Chinese to say to another, "Be rational about that."

2. Relational. In making life meaningful, for the Chinese, one cannot ignore the inseparability of the one and the many. It is all about the relationship. In the west, we exaggerate the "body" — everybody, anybody, somebody, nobody, etc. The "body" refers to the individual. The Chinese do not necessarily have a "body" in the sense of

an individual self. The Chinese are a self and a field of selves. Being an individual is an intellectual exercise reserved for western thinking (Bond, 1991). The most interesting contrast in this regard can be seen by comparing the famous western statement "I think, therefore I am" to the Chinese "I am because we are." For Chinese, the point revolves around relationships and context. The point is not "know thyself" but know thy relationships. If you want to know me, know my relationships. Even disagreement is seen as based in a commonality in a relationship. Chinese Buddhism focuses on relationships, on integration. For example, when someone dies, it was the collapse of the relationships that is the cause of the suffering, not the death of family members. In the Chinese context, it is the relationships that put it all together.

3. Spirituality. In Chinese religions, there is no transcendent being. There is no fall from grace; there is no "being saved." In China, the path (Dao) is the focus. There is no source of order that is independent of the world. In China, acorns do not become oaks; they become squirrels. This view of spirituality emphasizes the constant struggle, the constant movement toward perfection with the realization that one will never actually get there. The journey, not the destination, is important. Everything and everyone shares the same true nature. This view of spirituality and personal action minimizes personal goals. The ideal is to be utterly responsive to the situation. Be so fully engaged in the situation that you are part of it. When *chi* (force of life) is operating well, things will take care of themselves naturally. When the free flow of energy is blocked, there are problems. Ancient Chinese philosophers argued that *chi* is the origin of all things. It fills the universe "without signs or permanent residences; nor is there a beginning seen, no one can know its ending" (Wang, 1998, p. 490).

4. Process. In China, it is not the destination that really matters, but the process. There is no end game, no reality you can finally get to. There is no closure, only disclosure. "To know" in Chinese is to make one's way. The universe is a great whole in which all is nothing more than a transitional process; nothing stays the same. Everything is constant in flux; therefore, human relationships evolve and change constantly. Human relationships change and transform following the rhythm of the universe, such as the succession of winter and spring, night and day, the rise and fall of the tide. Finally, there is no ending for the transforming process of the universe. The development of human relationship is never absolutely complete or finished.

5. Individuality. In China, the individual is not a thing, but an event. There is no "us and them" and no "you and I." The Chinese alternative to dualistic thinking is co-relationships. People are interdependent, but also interpenetrating. People aren't beings that enter into relationships, but beings that come out of relationships. It is the patterns of contributions that allow a thing to happen. Everything is related. Again, if you want to know me, know my relationships.

These five points begin to reveal the differences between western and Chinese views of the ideal. But to delve deeper we need to review basic concepts in Chinese values that have no full equivalent in the west.

Because of the differences in approaches to what it is to be an individual, the Chinese consequently have different approaches to ideal education. These differences are expressed in a number of ways, but can be most clearly illustrated by summarizing three concepts: *zhan bu*, *yuan*, and *li*. In the author's experience each of these concepts has an impact on how Chinese students viewed their education. In addition, these concepts have no ready equivalent in western educational philosophy.

Zhan bu. Fortunetelling and divination are a significant part of the life of the average Chinese. Chinese regularly frequent fortunetellers for advice on everything from marriage to careers to travel. Chinese believe that a person's life has an inseparable relationship with nature, thus asking about the connection to nature is a very "natural" process.

Chuang (2002) described *zhan bu* as based on movement of life. Movement in the universe controls a turn of fate, or luck. A person can be caught up in "movement" — things move in different directions that cannot be held accountable either way. "The concept of timing and doing things at the right time is pivotal to Chinese thought. ... In accord with the thought of fate, the attitude of fatalism is the prominent philosophical thinking. Neither fate nor effort has any control" (Chuang, 2002, pp. 2–3).

This concept of fate and divining the flow of fate causes enlightened individuals to surpass emotional highs and lows and to see them as part of the flow of nature (Chuang, 2002). Chinese do not seek fortune telling as an attempt to control or influence fate, or to capitalize on the knowledge in the way a westerner might. They seek the information to understand how their actions are fitting into (or not) the flow of nature, of the universe. They seek more propitious timing for certain events, and this information is used to flow more smoothly with nature, not to control it. Thus culture and education are inseparable in the understanding of Chinese fortune telling and divination.

Li. According to Xiao (2002), *Li* consists of a set of rules that regulate almost every aspect of performing in society. *Li* is the system of polite conversation, of obeying the norms and demands of the situation. *Li* is the ability to move smoothly through society no matter the obstacle, much like water moves through a streambed. The system allows for both behavior regulation and behavior creativity. Xiao states:

> Yet at the same time it allows us to choose our own way of performance. ...It has to be regulative and certain so as to reduce the uncertainty in human interaction and communication. Meanwhile it also needs to be open and vague to the extent that people can act on it differently under different circumstances (p. 3).

The Chinese view of *Li* is very similar to Searle (1969) speech act theory. Searle described two sets of rules: regulative and constitutive. *Li* includes both types of rules — rules that govern "independently existing forms," actions such as eating

and drinking, and constitutive rules that govern more abstract forms of behavior. *Li* also includes respect, sincerity, and reciprocity. The Chinese speaker tends to use a polite and humble language in interpersonal interaction, though it is more than just being polite. It is a response to the norms of society in a way that maintains harmony and righteousness. The educated Chinese ideally attend to the rules of *Li,* and the person who can do this well is much admired.

Yuan. *Yuan* is a system where fate, lives, and the flow of nature all influence human relationships. *Yuan* is the direct manifestation of Daoist and Confucian beliefs regarding humans.

Chang and Holt (2002) begin their description of *Yuan* this way.

> ...no cause relates directly to an effect. Rather, multiple causes and results are interconnected with and mutually influence each other. For a cause to produce an effect, conditioning factors must facilitate their occurrence. The entirety of such conditioning factors, or secondary causation, is called *Yuan* (p. 3).

Secondary causation is an interesting concept, and one not frequently considered in the west. For the Chinese, secondary causations may be more influential than any primary causation (deliberate human action).

Chang and Holt continue their description.

> *Yuan* is "...generated through the individual's own actions — decision about his or her karma — throughout countless lifetimes. In an interdependent world, one's actions generate results that influence and interconnect with others. Such effects also are not simply confined by the here-and-how; rather the operation of reincarnation makes one life connected to others, and one's current physical manifestation to previous as well as subsequent physical incarnations. To coexist with others and participate in the rhythm of the ephemeral universe is to be aware of the effects of one's actions, while following the flow of *Yuan* (pp. 3–4).

Yuan is present in every relationship and seems to be a quality simultaneously carried by each relational partner, and also shared with certain relational partners. There are different types of *Yuan*, deep/shallow, long/short term, and good/evil *Yuan* (Chang & Holt, 2002). Through *Yuan*, it is as if we are able to invite the world to join us, enjoying a moment of temporary togetherness.

Sui *Yuan* — following the flow of *Yuan* — is one of the most profound tenets of Chinese wisdom and one that many try to abide by diligently. Regardless of how a given relationship may turn out, given the ephemeral quality of the universe — that is, *wu chang*, no constancy — one must see opportunity to associate as precious by cherishing *Yuan*, or at least learning to follow *Yuan* (Chang & Holt, 1991, p. 7).

Yuan is commonly applied to romantic love. Chinese are great believers in fate when in comes to finding a lover. Chang and Holt (2002) state:

> For the Chinese, *Yuan* immediately invokes the idea of lovers who, through many unknown factors, have been brought together. "They have a lot of *Yuan*," Chinese often say, "so it was meant to be." Alternatively, where there are two lovers who, despite their efforts, can never be together, Chinese will sometimes say, "They don't have *Yuan*," perhaps as a way to reconcile the pressure of having to face their inability to overcome an unknown and unknowable universe (p. 12).

Wen (1988) describes *Yuan*, whether in a good or bad relationship, as denoting a special power extending beyond human control. "Regardless of whether, and the extent to which one's efforts shape one's relational ties, *Yuan* helps cultivate the sense of something being destined, implying one cannot escape those with whom one has *Yuan* nor force a relationship to occur when there is no *Yuan*" (Wen, 1988, p. 13). He makes an interesting point, one not found in western points of view. "Since it may take thousands of years for people to meet each other, any relationship is considered precious" (Wen 1988, p. 14). However, Wen (1988) also contends that *Yuan* has a negative impact on Chinese management of interpersonal life; with *Yuan*, one may experience little psychological pressure, and can become lazy, complacent, and dependent. "Given that *Yuan* dictates the course of relationship development and that whatever is destined cannot be averted by human effort, there is little incentive to try one's best" (p. 19).

These three concepts, *zhan bu*, *li*, and *Yuan*, describe concepts that have no firm equivalent in western views of education. In the West, we do not teach students to consult fortunetellers so their actions can be more in tune with the universe. We do not teach students to value the propriety and harmony that lie at the core of *Li*. We do not teach them to understand the role of fate, karma, and past lives in developing human relationships. Yet these cultural norms are central to a Chinese view of life, and hence to education. These concepts need to be understood by western teachers if they are to succeed with Chinese students.

Goals of a higher education in China.

While the Chinese educational system is one of the oldest in the world, political activities in the past fifty years have resulted in huge changes in the system. Within this context of change, it is not surprising to find that higher education goals and descriptions of the ideally education person are not as prevalent as in the west.

The Goals. In ancient China, an educated person was a man who had memorized the classics Bond (1991). The discipline required to memorize produced what was

considered the civilized mind. In China today there is an almost magical belief in the value of memory work.

Teaching is an exalted profession in Chinese culture, commanding the same respect as is due one's father. This results in particular classroom behavior that varies considerably from western classrooms. Students respond to teachers as to a stern parent — with attention, silence, and respect. They do not question teachers, or challenge their judgments, provided the teacher behaves with moral integrity (Bond, 1991). Not surprisingly, students in class show their respect by keeping quiet.

According to Zhu (1992) the five characteristics of a Confucian education of the middle ages included: training talent loyal to the government in power; a utilitarian education, that is useful to those in power at the time; mastery of the classics, mastery of the techniques of power needed by the government of the time to maintain its rule; and the ability to draw analogies from the sacred savings of the classical texts. Confucius' idea that it was possible to become a superior person through education became a point of departure in laying out the objectives of official education. Confucius affected thought in Chinese education, but a wide variety of forces has since both altered and diminished the reliance on his teachings in Chinese higher education.

More recently, Ridley, Godwin, & Doolin (1971) describe education as a political tool whereby the Chinese leadership inculcates its citizens, beginning in primary school. The major part of a child's socialization process occurs in any society's formal educational system. "Education systems are designed, in fact, to socialize their students — to teach them the values of the society and to teach them to accept these values. Education, then, is a tool of politics; in China, it is a tool of political leadership" (p. 23).

> It has long been held that political socialization begins before the beginning of a child's formal education, and comes from parents, mass media, and other sources (Dawson and Prewitt, 1962). The west, however, has had a relatively uninterrupted period of educational development. As noted earlier, sources describing the ideal education in the west that stretch back two hundred years have elements still ring true today. In contrast, China has undergone major changes in the past one hundred years and its citizens continue to adjust to changing demands of the current political system (Ridley, Godwin, & Doolin, 1971). Yet, despite the upheavals of the past 100 years, China does have a strong sense of historical continuity. Students develop a notion of the abstract concept of China, while the specific periods (imperial, Kuomintang, and Communist) are identified very distinctly.
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> Li (2002) quotes Zheng, in *History 6:* "the goal of education is first and foremost to bring forth the nobility inside each and every scholar, and these scholars, in turn will influence the populace to reach its best, and hence the peace of the Universe" (p. 54).

The assumption is that human nature can be perfected through institutional education. The teaching method employed, as seen in *The Analects*, are dialogical, interac-

tive, and personal. The shift from a humanist education to a more scientific study and specialization in disciplinary knowledge began about 1867 with the establishment of the Capital Teacher's Learning Institute. The classics were not part of this education. In fact, Turner and Acker (2002) say that at the end of the first Opium War, in 1842, brought an end to China's culturally-uninfluenced indigenous education system.

Ridley, Godwin, & Doolin, (1971) described the ideal child-citizen in Communist China as having core value clusters which include devotion and allegiance to the new society, benevolence of the new society, social and person responsibility, achievement, altruistic behavior, collective behavior, basic farm knowledge, knowledge about Chinese Communist institutions and history, knowledge about traditional china, and basic scientific knowledge.

As China struggled with modernization in the 1970s and 80s, Henze (1992) identified five questions that impacted education. 1) what makes some cultures more "modern" than China? 2) why has China not reached the stage of development of these other societies? 3) What should be done, or more specifically, what can China learn from those modern societies in order to accelerate the developmental process? 4) What steps should be taken in the restructuring of the education system in order to develop some kind of "modern person?" 5) What role does traditional Chinese culture play in the modernization effort? The search for answers to these questions was a guiding force in the changes to China's educational system in the 1980s.

> Price (1992) quotes then vice- minister of education, Peng Peiyun, using words from the May 1985 decision of the CCP on education: "they must unceasingly search out new knowledge, possessing the scientific sprit of seeking truth from facts, thinking things out for themselves, and having he courage to create" (p. 214). Price makes the case that China's schools have always been dominated by moral-political teaching from the classical schools by Confucian teaching to the schools of the republican period, to the communist edicts. He details efforts in the 1980s to strengthen courses in Marxist-Leninism, the Chinese Revolution, Political Economy, and Historical Materialism. Price draws material from the 1988 Political Ideology Office of the State Education Commission's statement on higher education goals published in the house journal of People's University. China's socialist construction included goals such as
>
> 1) A scientific understanding of the historical stage in which our country finds itself
> 2) A correct choice of a strategy of economic development
> 3) Realizing a multidirectional opening to the outside world
> 4) Studying an economic system that conforms to the requirements for the development of a socialist commodity economy
> 5) Constructing an effective economic dynamic mechanism
> 6) Improving the distribution patterns
> 7) Constructing a socialist democratic politics

8) Developing a united line and strengthening national unity
9) Strengthening the construction of socialist spiritual civilization
10) Supporting and improving the party's leadership.

As the decade continued to develop, Deng Xiaopeng reinstated the exam system as an entrance requirement for Chinese universities. The tests were in Chinese, math, science, and politics. Li (2002) suggests the learned person in China needs to be a decent writer. He echoes the fear that the influx of ideas and language from the West is a threat to the purity and integrity of a literary heritage held close by many even during the tumultuous cultural revolution.

A recent Ministry of Education brochure (as quoted in Li, 2002). states: During the teaching process, teachers should guide students to further broaden their horizon, enrich their knowledge, foster fine sentiments, and develop intellect, personality, and specialty. Teachers should cultivate in students love for their native language and fine national cultural heritage, cultivate in them healthy and noble temperament and interest and certain aesthetic abilities, cultivate in them socialist ideology, moral values, a patriotism.

> *The changes obviously continue, and some fear the direction. Turner and Acker (2002) examined the prevailing assumptions of the supra-national sponsors of education development initiatives and aid institutions. They say a "key preoccupation appears to lie in concern about the degree to which apparent globalization, nominally a force for the evolution of a new transnational culture, represents, in fact, the progress of political and cultural hegemony driven by the powers of the West" (p. 11). They make an interesting point relevant to those western teachers who teach in China. "This educational debate becomes pivotally important when considering the cultural implications of different teaching practices for education professionals working aboard, because they are conduits of the cultural transfer that is taking place (p. 11).*
>
> *They go onto say, overall, the thrust of reform and with it internationalization seems to be haphazardly eradicating the last remains of both formal Confucianism and Maoism in the eagerness to embrace economic development and co-operate with the international aid agenda (p. 27).*

At the end of the section describing the goals of a western higher education, a brief list of common points was developed. The list below attempts to accomplish the same purpose regarding the above Chinese higher education definitions and university sources reviewed. A note of caution needs to be inserted here. The above samples were drawn from universities in the PRC, from Taiwan, and from Hong Kong. It would be a mistake to assume university goals in each location were in complete sympathy with each other.

1. The development of an individual who can make a contribution to society.
2. The development of the person who will persevere.
3. Develop a person who will work hard for the betterment of their society.
4. Develop a person with a moral character and integrity.
5. Develop a person who will adopt a scientific and rigorous attitude.
6. Develop the appreciation of freedom — of the ability to make free choices, and a commitment to the freedom of others with awareness of potential risks and costs.
7. Develop competence in mind and character and ability to promote social and cultural development and contribute to national construction.
8. The development of the ability to evaluate, analyze, and to make informed decisions.
9. The dominant theme appears to be an emphasis on the continuing contribution to the development of the Chinese social and political system.
10. The focus on understanding one's self through understanding relationships and roles, A recognition that people, events, and objects are defined relationally.
11. The process of being and becoming, of seeing the self as a process, and the person as an event.

Areas of Similarity and Difference

To begin the analysis of similarity and difference, we can begin by recalling the points listed at the end of the first section of the paper that summarized the goals of a western higher education. These points were:

1. The development of a free-thinking person who understands his/her relationship to society.
2. The development of the appreciation of freedom — of the ability to make free choices, and a commitment to the freedom of others with awareness of potential risks and costs.
3. The development of the ability to use language effectively, to speak well, and to clearly communicate oneself to others.
4. The development of a clear knowledge of the self, of other individuals, and of the world.
5. The development of the ability to evaluate, analyze, and to make informed decisions.
6. The development of the ability to continue to learn.

It does not take a deep analysis to note some immediate differences and similarities. Differences include the western emphasis on the individual contrasted with the Chinese emphasis on society, the western emphasis on knowledge of self contrasted with the Chinese emphasis on relationships, the western emphasis on personal skills contrasted with the Chinese emphasis on personal morals and integrity, and the

western lack of emphasis on contribution to society contrasted with the Chinese sharp emphasis on societal contribution,

Only two areas of similarity appear in this analysis: the ability to continue to learn (though the Chinese view it more as an internal process rather than an accumulation of information) and the ability to make informed and free choices.

The differences run much deeper than the relatively simple statements above. For individual disciplines, the differences can become much more specific. For example, my own discipline of human communication contains a number of useful illustrations. Chinese, Zouren ('zou' means 'to do', and 'ren' means human beings) is a term that means a person can function and move within a complex web of relationships without creating unwanted fractures or harsh feelings. Chang (n. d.) suggests that people are either born with this talent, or have reached a developed stage in life, achieved only after gaining rich life experiences. In reference to the western value of blunt speech and of individual expression Change says, "Direct speech is as coarse as the broken glass whose sharp edges injure those with whom one interacts" (Chang, nd, 5). In China, the ideal communicator is one who moves through social situations like water, the metaphor used so frequently in the Chinese Daoist classic, Dao De Jing. Water assumes no shape and yet leaves nothing unaccomplished. By being seemingly weak and devoid of sharp edges, while accomplishing all involved, while helping to achieve a round and full situation.

The differences noted above may have interesting impacts on western teachers in China. For example, Bond (1991) states western teachers of Chinese students at university find their charges weak in responding to general essay questions. Such questions require students to identify a pattern, select facts to support that pattern, and organize facts and themes in a persuasive way. However the Chinese pattern does not follow such a track, for this would require more individual force in self-presentation than most Chinese students would find comfortable. Instead, Chinese students often produce a paper with an avalanche of facts, which fit the general topic, but lack any sense of development and conclusion.

The western system is about the individual. The Chinese system is about the group, the society. Their society needs people who can produce, who have the skills to develop the country's systems. This requires a diminished focus on the individual. Gao and Ting-Toomey (1998) suggest that Confucianism asserts that individuality and the true self to not belong together. Social and ethical responsibilities define the self. The self is further defined by multiple layers of relationships with others. The self is not an independent entity and the self is not complete by itself. Confucianism suggests that the civilized person should always be aware of his or her position in society and perform duties accordingly (Chiu, 1984).

These differences affect the entire context of higher education in China. Zhang (2004), in an unpublished paper, effectively described how these ideals influence behavior in a Chinese classroom. The powerful desire to save one's own face and that of one's classmates deters openly challenging a classmate (let alone the professor!)

or even discussing equivocal points. This again points to the difference between an education that focuses on individual development and one that focuses on one's role in contributing to society.

This brief summary has yet to do justice to a meaningful comparison. But the reader can readily see the degree of overlap, the commonalties present in both systems. It is these areas of commonality that could form the basis of a common education in both cultures.

Conclusion

Chinese and western views of the ideal higher education are not a perfect match. As we have seen from this review, western views of the ideal accentuate the individual, individual skills, the moment, and products. Chinese views accentuate process, the relationship, and harmony with the universe. Differences do exist, but so do similarities. Chinese and westerners are different, but only in degree, not in kind. But if we differ in degree, is the degree of difference decreasing? Apparently so. Recall the quote from Wang and Zhou (2002). They concluded that "what the China experience can offer to other developing countries is just what other countries have offered to China: erosion of traditions and westernization of schooling" (p. 12). As more western professors spend time teaching in China, this westernization will likely expand. One wonders what long-term consequence this will have on Chinese higher education.

The differences noted above, if not understood, can also negatively impact the experience of a western professor in china. At least one researcher (Maley, 1990) suggested that many foreign teachers return from China with feelings of disappointment due to a poor understanding of these differences.

One also wonders if some common and deeper principles and ideals — ideals that may be common to all humanity. This struggle for development, for movement was perhaps best expressed by Leland Griffin in his analysis of Kenneth Burke's rhetoric of movements when he said:

So the wheel forever turns. Man's movements, in time, come to an end. And they come to an end in tragedy — for tragedy involves defeat, the failure of our ends, and the ultimate death of the good... And if the wheel forever turns, it is man who does the turning--forever striving, in an 'imperfect world,' for a world of perfection. And hence man, the rhetorical animal, is saved: for salvation lies in the striving, the struggle itself (Griffin, 1969, p. 472).

Our students need to hear about the ideal, about ideals. Our students need to hear about our own culture's description of the ideal, but also those of other cultures. Only then can they, and we, understand what it is to be fully human. Perhaps these are they kind of students we want to produce.

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ПРОБЛЕМА ИДЕАЛА В ЗАПАДНОЙ И ВОСТОЧНОЙ ТРАДИЦИЯХ: К ЧЕМУ МЫ СТРЕМИМСЯ В УНИВЕРСИТЕТСКОМ ОБРАЗОВАНИИ?

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С активным развитием китайско-американского обмена в области образования, возрастает число иностранных преподавателей в высших учебных заведениях обоих стран. Однако многие их них неизбежно сталкиваются с труд-

ностями при адаптации к местной системе. Сложность заключается в том, что преподаватели могут быть не готовы к работе в новых условиях, что связано с различиями учебных программ. Обнаруживаются отличия студенческой аудитории, а также, методов руководства и подходов к определению целей и задач учебных дисциплин. Трудности могут вызывать новая обстановка и отношения с коллегами. К тому же, в период адаптации эффективность работы преподавателя может быть снижена, что негативно отражается на студентах. Автор данной статьи имел собственный опыт преодоления подобных трудностей во время работы в университете Гонконга. Трудности возникли из-за недостаточной осведомленности в области культурных различий, что зачастую требовало внесения существенных корректировок в ход работы. Было очевидно, что принципы и методы преподавания, принятые на Западе, расходились с ожиданиями китайских студентов. Таким образом, было предпринято исследование различий западного и китайского подхода к образованию и представлений об идеальном студенте. В настоящей работе проводится сравнение и противопоставление взглядов на принципы образовательной системы, целей университетского обучения и ожиданий студентов на Западе и в Китае. Представленные результаты сравнения могут быть полезны для преподавателей, работающих в иностранных университетах.

CONSTRUCTING A PROCESSUAL PLURALITY OF IDENTITY

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Conflict, both personally and globally, often arises as the result of challenges to a sense of identity. Wishing to maintain a static conception of selves and culture, typically located within the context of a religious or cultural orthodoxy, humans have traditionally resisted the forces of social change. In our desire to experience individual and social continuity, we construct rigid systems of thought and practice designed to protect ourselves from the intrusion of outside, alien, forces. Challenges to our cherished identity therefore often produce a backlash of violence and charges of heresy, heterodoxy and infidelism. Given today's sweeping global changes, how do we combat such identity crises and the resultant conflict? Taking a cue from Daoism, the indigenous high religion of China, this paper suggests that we begin viewing identity as a process that allows for a rich plurality of identities within a global community. Notoriously difficult to define, Daoism has been the single major religious tradition that has avoided the need to declare its rivals heretical or anathema. Instead, Daoism has maintained an amorphous identity, one that has evolved over its two thousand year history in intimate interaction with Confucianism, Buddhism, popular religion and ethnic creeds. The challenge to its identity has been met by employing the continuous interaction of the forces of differentiation and integration, constantly changing in alignment with political, economic and social developments. Rather than resistance and the creation of a moribund orthodoxy, Daoism has revised its identity trough the ongoing adoption of new and vital forms.

Bart Simpson (speaking of Principal Skinner after being fired): "*It's weird, Lis: I miss him as a friend, but I miss him even more as an enemy*."

Lisa Simpson: "*I think you need Skinner, Bart. Everybody needs a nemesis. Sherlock Holmes had his Dr. Moriarty, Mountain Dew has its Mellow Yellow, even Maggie has that baby with the one eyebrow*."[1]

Conflict, both personally and globally, often arises as the result of challenges to a sense of identity. Wishing to maintain a static conception of selves and culture, typically located within the context of a religious or cultural orthodoxy, humans have traditionally resisted the forces of social change. In our desire to experience individual and social continuity, we construct rigid systems of thought and practice

designed to protect ourselves from the intrusion of outside, alien, forces. Additionally, as exemplified by Bart Simpson above, we often construct personal identity in juxtaposition to perceived "others," those to whom we can point as an opposite, or nemesis. In some cases, our own individual character gets lost in the attempt to define ourselves solely in opposition to that perceived threat.

Challenges to our cherished identity therefore often produce a backlash of violence and charges of heresy, heterodoxy and infidelism. Given today's sweeping global changes, how do we combat such identity crises and the resultant conflict? Taking a cue from Daoism, the indigenous high religion of China, this paper suggests that we begin viewing identity as a process that allows for a rich plurality of identities within a global community. Notoriously difficult to define, Daoism has been the single major religious tradition that has avoided the need to declare its rivals heretical or anathema. Instead, Daoism has maintained an amorphous identity, one that has evolved over its two thousand-year history in intimate interaction with Confucianism, Buddhism, popular religion and ethnic creeds. The challenge to its identity has been met by employing the continuous interaction of the forces of differentiation and integration, constantly changing in alignment with political, economic and social developments. Rather than resistance and the creation of a moribund orthodoxy, Daoism has revised its identity trough the ongoing adoption of new and vital forms.

One of the most telling examples of the rigidity of personal identity, and the resulting conflict, is the relationship between the United States and members of the extremist Islamic positions, such as Al Quaeda. In their respective analyses of the causes and aftermath of September 11, President Bush and Osama Bin Laden point to the irreconcilable differences between the competing identities. As Bruce Lincoln so insightfully observes, both implicitly and explicitly establish a kind of Manichaean duality of absolute evil versus righteous purity. As Bush characterized the beginning of military action, "We're a peaceful nation ... defend[ing] not only our precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear... In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers, themselves."[2] Bin Laden makes the distinction even more clearly. Calling upon all Muslims to join the struggle against US imperialism and "defend his religion," Bin Laden announces that "these events have divided the world into two camps, the camp of the faithful and the camp of infidels."[3] Throughout their speeches, and by way of conclusion, both invoke the presence and support of God. President Bush modifies the usual closing, "God Bless America," by concluding, "May God continue to bless America."[4] For his part, Bin Laden continuously alludes to Allah's protection and sanctioning of the attacks, claiming in his opening that "America [is] struck by God Almighty in one of its vital organs," and petitioning that "God shield us and you from them."[5] This stark division of the world into "us" and "them" and "you" is based largely on the creation of irreconcilable identities tenaciously clung

to and posited in much the same way that Bart views his relationship with Principal Skinner. "Our" identity, as individual and collective defenders of righteousness, depends upon the clear delineation of "them" as the nemesis.

How do we as individuals and communities combat such rigid characterizations and avoid the resultant conflict? Can we create identities that do not depend on defining ourselves in opposition to the "other"? I believe that an alternative mode of understanding personal and collective identity is available, and can be found in what Russell Kirkland has recently characterized as the "enduring tradition" of Daoism.[6] As he and many other recent scholars have pointed out, defining Daoism and who qualifies as a Daoist, is at times a bewildering enterprise. Much ink has been spilled over the issue, in large part because we continue to insist that there must be an ongoing essence of the tradition, or signpost of "difference" that demarcates a "Daoist" from, at least within China, a "Buddhist" or "Confucian" or "popular religionist." Our inability to locate such demarcations, I would suggest, is not due to a lack of knowledge (although we are only beginning to study Daoism in a truly phenomenological manner) or sophistication, but rather that the tradition does not embrace such rigid dichotomies. Daoist identity is not a static, "us" versus "them" construction; instead, the "enduring tradition" is one that sees identity as an evolutionary process, adapting and incorporating a variety of "foreign" elements into its collective sensibility.

As noted above, Daoism has never seriously entertained notions of orthodoxy and heterodoxy or heresy. Part of that is the result of a lack of institutionalization (in contrast to what we saw in the medieval European church). Even when Daoism became the "state religion" of China or one of its powerful "states" (here I am thinking particularly of the so-called "theocracy" established by K'ou Ch'ien-chih in the Northern Wei Court, 425-451), no attempt was made to eradicate or convert "non-Daoists." The history of the tradition is one in which we see a continuous adaptation to changing social and cultural conditions, including the introduction of foreign religious traditions such as Buddhism. Accommodation, rather than suppression or even merger, marks the continuing evolution of Daoist identity. In addition, while quintessentially Chinese in origin and spirit, Daoism has both embraced and included such traditionally marginalized groups as women and the vast number of ethnic minorities within China.[7]

Utilizing anthropologist Hans Mol's characterization of religious identity as a combination of objectivation ("the tendency to sum up the variegated elements of mundane experience in the transcendent frame of reference where they can appear in a more orderly, more consistent and more timeless way"), commitment (focused emotion or emotional attachment to a specific focus of identity...Anchoring [them] in a salient system of meaning"), ritual (as a "means of articulating and reiterating a system of meaning") and mythology (a "shorthand for basic personal and social experiences"), we can see how Daoism has consistently resisted the temptation to create a dichotomous sense of identity.[8]

A couple of examples can serve to illustrate this tendency. As discussed by Kohn and Roth, throughout its history, the Daoist tradition has objectivized its fundamental worldview via the medium of scriptures. Unlike the western traditions, however, which tend to view their sacred writings as singular (*Hebrew Bible*, *Christian Bible*, *Qur'an*, though obviously consisting of several separate "books") and closed due to the cessation of revelation, the Daoist canon (*Daozang*) contains over 1400 volumes, inclusive of texts normally classified as Confucian, Moist, Legalist, etc. While the majority of these texts harmonize with the basic assumption of a universal underlying force (*Dao*) within the cosmos, how that force is understood and "communed" with differs dramatically. Rather than a single unified body of philosophical or doctrinal writings, the *Daozang* exhibits a bewildering array of texts deemed philosophical, ritualistic, quasi-political, health-oriented, etc. etc. New revelations and pronouncements continued throughout the development of the tradition. Ranging from the stereotypically "foundational" texts *Daodejing* and *Zhuangzi* to the Tianshi (Heavenly Masters) revelations of Lord Lao to Zhang Daoling of 142 CE, to the Shangqing (Highest Clarity) revelations to Yang Xi in the fourth century, to the Lingbao (Numinous Treasure) transmissions of the fourth century, and to numerous successive transmissions and revelations. In fact, far from being a closed canon, the *Daozang* includes new texts from as late as the early twentieth century.

Commitment is located in the traditional Chinese practice of establishing lineages. In this respect, a certain degree of continuity prevails among the vast number of "schools" that make up the Daoist tradition. Incorporating historical, legendary and otherworldly figures, some lineages trace themselves back as far as the early Heavenly Masters (e.g. the *Zhengyi* tradition of southern China) and some to the legendary Laozi's companion, Yin Xi. Such lineages seek to preserve the foundation of the schools' practices and doctrines, but most actively incorporate elements and doctrines from other traditions, both within and outside the "Daoist" tradition itself. For example, while adhering to the fundamental principles of Daoist cosmological interests, the Lingbao school very self-consciously and openly added numerous Buddhist elements to its practice and sensibility. Including the adaptation of the Bodhisattva ideal, meditative practices, and the Hindu (via Buddhism) notion of world cycles (kalpas) inexorably moving through a series of declining ages or kalpas.

Ritual is a vitally important component of Daoist life. The everyday practices of "lay" Daoists and the "priesthood" are punctuated by the continuously evolving Daoist sensibility of process and accommodation. From the incorporation of Buddhist *mudras* (hand gestures) and *mantras* (sacred utterances), to funeral rites, temple offerings, and meditative practices, Daoism has consistently sought to weave "competing" practices into its own rich history. While actively seeking to distance itself from popular blood sacrifices, seeing them as barbaric and a violation of the sanctity of life, Daoist ritual — from at the least the Song Dynasty (960 CE) — has allowed for the inclusion of meat offerings in community rituals. Albeit carefully placed outside the most sacred environs of the ritual. In present day Fujian province,

"ordained" Daoist priests such as Huang Zhi Peng, Master of the Huang lineage of the Zhengyi lineage, perform both Daoist and Buddhist rituals on a daily basis.[9] Even the great compendium of Daoist monastic rules, the *Fengdao Kejie*, compiled in the 6th century as a manual designed to codify an "orthodox" Daoist monasticism, contains elements drawn from various popular and Buddhist practices. Most interestingly within the context of this discussion, amidst the highly detailed instructions for the construction of temples, altars, banners, vestments, etc., we find the conciliatory phrases, "in all cases following what is locally suitable" and "each case follows the relevant present circumstances...and available resources."[10]

Mythically, Daoism has also actively incorporated different mythic structures. The best example comes in the figure of Laozi himself. Traditionally identified as the author of the *Daodejing*, the Old Master was originally seen as a scribe or cataloger in the imperial library of the 5th century BCE who grew disgusted with China's strife and rode to the west, leaving behind his wisdom in a two-part manuscript. By the early Han Dynasty, Laozi has been transformed into a celestial being, Laojun (Lord Lao), who appears to Zhang Daoling and transmits to him new revelations. Further elaboration will transform him into a manifestation of the Dao itself, and narrate how, much like the Hindu avatars, Laojun will periodically appear on the earth in times of crisis, bringing revelations of salvation and goodwill to humanity. By the Tang Dynasty, Laozi (whose surname was reported to be Li), was claimed as the direct ancestor of the Li family, founders of the new dynasty.

Numerous other examples could be provided from throughout Daoist history. This short survey should suffice however, to demonstrate both the tolerance and adaptability of a tradition notoriously difficult to pin down. What is Daoism? While rooted in a conviction that Dao permeates all things, and that humanity must in some manner harmonize with it, that harmonization can take many forms that complement, and coexist, with one another. Rather than defining itself in opposition to an utterly foreign, and despised other, Daoism and the resultant Daoist identity reflects the hoped for truths of peace and acceptance.

NOTES

[1] The Simpsons. Episode 100, "Sweet Seymour Skinner's Baadasssss Song," first aired April 28, 1994.

[2] Presidential Address, October 7, 2001. In: Lincoln, Bruce, *Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion After September 11*. University of Chicago Press, 2003. P. 100.

[3] Osama Bin Laden, Videotaped Address. Ibid, p. 103.

[4] Ibid, p. 101.

[5] Ibid, p. 103.

[6] Kirkland, Russell, *Taoism: The Enduring Tradition*, Routledge, 2004.

[7] See for example Terry Kleeman's *Great Perfection: Religion and Ethnicity in a Chinese Millenial Kingdom*, University of Hawaii Press, 1998; and Livia Kohn and Catherine Despeaux's *Women in Daoism*, Three Pines Press, 2003.

[8] Mol, Hans, *Identity and the Sacred*, Free Press, 1976. As cited in Livia Kohn and Harold D. Roth, editors, *Daoist Identity*, University of Hawaii Press, 2002.

[9] Reference the fieldwork of Dr. Ronnie Littlejohn (Belmont University) and Erin Cline.

[10] Kohn Livia, translator, *The Daoist Monastic Manual: A Translation of the Fengdao Kejie,* Oxford University Press, 2004. See p. 117 for an example.

ПОСТРОЕНИЕ ПРОЦЕССУАЛЬНОЙ МНОЖЕСТВЕННОСТИ В ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ

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Конфликт, и в личностном измерении, и в глобальном, зачастую является результатом вызова идентичности. Стремясь поддержать устойчивые представления о культуре и личности, люди, в контексте религиозной и культурной ортодоксии, традиционно сопротивлялись социальным переменам. В нашем желании ощущать индивидуальную и общественную преемственность, мы задаем жесткие рамки мышлению и деятельности, с целью ограждения себя от вторжения извне, чуждых сил. В силу этого, вызов нашей оберегаемой идентичности зачастую приводит к насилию, возникновению ересей, неортодоксальности и скептицизма. Каким образом в условиях глобальных перемен мы противостоим кризису идентичности и вытекающим из него конфликтам? Опираясь на опыт даосизма, древней китайской религии, в настоящей статье мы рассматриваем идентичность как процесс, допускающий цветущую множественность идентичностей в рамках глобального сообщества.

Трудно определимый, даосизм являлся и является единственной крупной религиозной традицией, в которой отсутствует необходимость объявлять инакомыслящих еретиками и предавать их анафеме. Напротив, даосизм поддерживает гибкую идентичность, которая развивается уже на протяжении двух тысяч лет в тесном взаимодействии с конфуцианством, буддизмом, народной религией и повериями. Ответом на возникающие вызовы становится продолжение взаимодействия сил дифференциации и интеграции, изменяющихся в соответствии с уровнем политического, экономического и общественного развития. Сопротивлению и созданию обреченной на угасание ортодоксальности даосизм противопоставляет пересмотр собственной идентичности за счет принятия новых и жизнеспособных форм.

INTELLECTUALS AND "IDENTITY CRISIS": THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS IN MODERN SOCIETY

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Intellectuals as a social phenomenon are known at least since the 19th century. But what is the situation nowadays when the issue of identity — national, cultural, personal etc. is of crucial importance to people? It is important to consider the role of intellectuals in society at the beginning of the 21st century. Do they unite a society or do they exist in their own world, which has nothing common with reality?

Here we must first of all define the term "intelligentsia" as it used in this paper. And it is also necessary to give our interpretation of the term "intellectual" because the opinions of scholars vary in how to interpret these concepts.

One of the possible interpretations is that the intelligentsia is the special social group — they could be teachers, engineers, professors, civil servants, etc.[1] But according to Russian cultural tradition[2] at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century this difference in interpretation was even more pronounced in Russia: an intelligent person was an individual lacking higher education but striving for a better life for the nation (and its citizens).[3]

In other, mainly Western, publications, "intelligence" is characterized as the ability to solve problems in an original way. There are also features which at times can be impossible to explain, for example, those arising from IQ tests.[4] In some editions we find a reference: "See "intellectuals"[5] which shows that this particular author does not observe essential differences between "intellectual" and "intelligentsia." Of course, authors are trying to find new interpretations of these concepts. For example, H. Gardner who writes about the ideal of human intelligence which was popular in the Western culture in the 19th and 20th centuries: namely, the belief that it is necessary to speak about various intelligences and not only about one general concept. He offers eight types of intelligence: linguistic, musical, spatial, bodily, logical-mathematical, kinesthetic, interpersonal and intrapersonal.[6] On the one hand, this interpretation expresses a post-modern method, deconstruction, and an attempt to provide characteristic of wholeness to separated fragments. But on the other hand, such a point of view shows that H. Gardner speaks mainly about the physical and psychological abilities of an individual, but less about the intelligentsia as a social group or the representatives of the society.

In the case of intellectuals there is also the possibility of using various interpretations. Intellectuals are characterized as persons whose main activity is the creation or evolution of ideas. There is a strong tendency to regard intellectuals as a *de facto* opposition group, always ready to challenge traditional values.[7]

Some scholars, for instance, R. Nozick thinks that intellectuals are, for example, poets, literary critics, novelists, many professors and newspaper and magazine journalists. He calls them "wordsmiths" (contrary to "numbersmiths", i. e., those who are interested in the production of, for instance, "mathematically formulated information"). In this case the level of education is as essential as a dealing with ideas expressed in words.[8] A. Guldner, in analysing the formation of the new class states that it will be created by intellectuals (for example, professors) and technical intelligentsia (engineers etc.).[9] But A. Gramsci, asking whether intellectuals are an independent social group or whether every social group has its own intellectuals presumes that there are "traditional" and "organic" intellectuals. And every social group is interested in creating their own intellectuals who could help to solve economic problems and stabilize social life.[10] Gramsci has an idea that every human is intellectual, although not every human takes the position of an intellectual in society, and that every work (mental or physical) is intellectual i. e. "it is impossible to separate *homo faber* from *homo sapiens*."[11] Of course there is some truth to his interpretation, but only if we consider that everybody creates something and has the ability to think. But again, then it is a question mainly about man's qualities.

M. Eder, speaking about an economic democracy and intellectuals, expresses the opinion that the functions of the modern intellectual that are frequently discussed are based on a misconception of an ideal modern society.[12] We can agree with M. Eder that the creation of the ideal society (or state) has been a subject of discussion in every period of history and this question had been the important focus of attention for intellectuals. Here we can recall Plato's "Republic" and his model of government, which has a controversial interpretation, T. More's utopia and his colleagues' in previous centuries utopias of ideal society, which culminated the creation of a Bolshevik state. Unfortunately, we have to stress that very often the idea of an ideal state primarily means changes of the domination of ruling classes. And in fact a road to a totalitarian society, not to a utopian democracy where everybody would enjoy absolute freedom and at the same time — all people could have similar rights. Unfortunately, this ideal is an impossible reality.

In fact, almost all of the previously given examples have common features. Therefore arousing a question whether we can use the terms "the intellectuals" and "the intelligentsia" as synonyms or are these different concepts? From the historical point of view, there could be some differences in interpretation. As, for instance, T. Huszar remarks, the concept of the intelligentsia is not so ancient; major thinkers did not use it before the middle of the 19th century. The Latin word *intelligentsia* was used as a philosophical or psychological term and it occurred in their writings after the Roman period. But then the idea was merely to identify the level of cognition and comprehension. These early thinkers were not interested in the status of the intellectual.[13] In fact, there is no obvious reason to separate intellectuals from the intelligentsia until the second half of the 20th century.[14] As was previously mentioned, intellectuals could be found in every period even though the term "intellectual was

not in use." Nevertheless, the appearance of the intelligentsia is mainly connected with changes in the social strata society. I agree with A. Gella, and I will use the concepts "intellectuals" and "intelligentsia" as synonymous in this paper.

There are many common aspects in their activities. One of the important features of the intelligentsia and intellectual is the inclination and desire to struggle for or against something and the sense of mission. According to L. Feuer, we can call an individual an "intellectual" if we suggest that " in some basic way he stands against or apart from the contemporary dominant culture."[15] We can state that in the 20th century individuals began perceiving themselves as the central or supreme creature of the world. Actually this process already started with the Renaissance, which unsettled the stability of the Middle Ages. In later centuries it transformed into the idea of the God's death or non-presence in people's lives and silence.[16] But it is also possible that doubts and ignorance about the "rationality" of existence have accompanied the individual since the moment he became aware of being a personality. Nevertheless, the image a mission is still topical and sometimes it manifests itself in such concepts of the saving of the world.[17] However, nothing was solved throughout the centuries except technological progress.

The intelligentsia endeavored to prove its significance, but representatives of the intelligentsia do not want to admit that nobody has authorized them to protect its interests. Sometimes such aims are very close to a Russian culture tradition where at least some members of the intelligentsia have no time to study philosophical issues because they are worried about losing their relationships with the people.[18] Notwithstanding that they do not have these relations in reality. Although here we could recall what B. H. Levy has said about the aim of the intellectual — i.e., being an intellectual means having responsibility and care for others.[19] Or for example, F. Rajace. He believes "intellectuals are a group of self-conscious men of wisdom, intelligence, and perception who present an unanachronistic interpretation of the world for their society and thus close the gap between the pressure of the "eternal tomorrow" and the demands of the "eternal yesterday" in the mind of the average citizens of their society. ... The intellectuals are both the guardians of traditions and the vanguards of change."[20] No doubt it is a somewhat poetical interpretation of intellectuals and it is possible to find here some similarities with, for example, M. Foucault's and B. H. Levy's interpretations. This author also believes that intellectuals represent an elite that has a responsibility to other people. There is no doubt this is a controversial question.

Analysing B. H. Levy's and other authors' interpretations we can speak not only about idealism, which has no value in our pragmatic consumers society and where emotions are the privilege of artists, but also about the intelligentsia attempt to seize power (which in this case they call responsibility) over the other groups in society. Of course, the intelligentsia believes they have the rights to have this power — why should anybody else? At the same time some representatives of the intelligentsia await the time when utopia would become reality. These representatives hope that ideas of freedom, fraternity and equality are possible in real life. Although in practice,

the effort to create such a reality often means only the change from one ruling class to another.[21] Unfortunately, intellectuals have not radically influenced the existence of the consumer society, which has promoted the decrease of man's significance.

M. Foucault was right in saying that intellectuals have lost their sacral status. According to M. Foucault, we can speak about the forming of a new type of intellectuals — i. e., a specific intellectual contrary to a universal intellectual such as was popular in previous centuries.[22] If we accept the idea that an intellectual's universality depends on wide knowledge in various scientific areas, then it is not surprising that the quantity of such intellectuals decreases, because nowadays it is much more important to specialize in a very specific scientific area. Moreover, an extensive knowledge is almost impossible because of the enormous flow of information. Also the idea about the appropriate value system for wide sections of the population and its popularization in modern society (which according to M. Foucault is one of the intellectual's duties) is controversial. No doubt, nobody has categorically rejected universal (at least in the Western world[23]) moral categories; nevertheless the acceptance of these values has not been universal since origin. It would be necessary to have a society where individuals would be conscious about realizing moral norms in their daily life, and not only at the theoretical level.[24]

However, exact economic and political factors have great importance in the function of society. Today's world is not the same civilization as it was, for example, at the beginning of the 20th century. We live in a technology-based society where information and an intellectual's knowledge have crucial importance. Both political power and intellectuals depend on each other. It is necessary for the intellectual to be integrated into existing power structures because nowadays he cannot exist only as opposition. But is it possible to exist outside any moral standards? It is typical nowadays that moral norms are transform into various codes and laws whose acceptance depends on coercion and sometimes on fears. Therefore, we can stress that the interpretation of morals and discussions about its importance realizes mainly at the theoretical level — as the privilege of the analytical mind.

There is no reason to allege that intellectuals belong to a special elite group, which excludes the possibility of mass movement. Perhaps we can say that an intellectual has lost his social identity or the aim of the existence. He has lost his special or imaginary status in society and it is necessary to find his new place in the contemporary world. According to the remarks by many scholars, the topical word today is *memory*.[25] What is the origin of the intellectuals' memory? This might be the previously mentioned Plato's philosopher-king (no doubt, we must not overestimate his merits) and thinkers of the Enlightenment (Voltaire, Rousseau etc.). As the intellectual does not have real power, we can speak only about symbolical power, and the philosopher-king is an ideal image and the possibility of justifying his endeavor to obtain power.

Which brings us to the question of morals. Is the existence or non-existence of morality an essential feature and criterion of the intellectual? Of course, in the ideal situation not only an intellectual but every individual needs morals. However, an in-

dividual as a personality and value is accepted mainly at the theoretical level, i. e., as declarations, philosophical essays, etc. Such cases as E. Zola's speech in the defense of Dreyfus, I. Kant's idea about a man as a final aim, K. Jasper's expression that everybody has his/her own responsibility even if this individual can die realizing it, were not popular in the past and are not popular now. Therefore a speculative question may arise: if moral and ethical principles are essential only for some people, why relate these principles to the whole society and also to the intellectual? M. Foucault believes that the objective of the intellectual is not to teach others how to live, because who would give him such a right, especially remembering the countless political, religious, and other propagators of human misfortune. The goal of the intellectual is to revalue all values and principles and also the creation of the political will so the person could realize his duties as a citizen.[26] However, M. Foucault's idea is also idealistic, because who is this "revaluator" of all values? In fact, he is a propagator. However, the main part of society is not interested in his speeches. Therefore in such a context there is a gap between the intellectual and society.

We cannot deny that the role of the specific intellectual has increased especially in the second half of the 20th century. M. Foucault thinks this happens proportionally — assuming the political responsibility of scientists, whether they like it or not.[27] However, here it would be correct to speak about ethical or moral criteria, but not about political criteria. To be precise, which criteria could demand the consequences of his invitation to perform an influential role.[28]

No doubt, intellectuals have utopian ideas. For instance, endeavors to realize Marxist ideas in Europe, while at the same time believing it is acceptable to sacrifice people for the sake of an idea.[ad29] Such idealism becomes very dangerous if it is united with power, e.g., if the intellectual is incorporated within the power structures which could help him implement his ideas. In such cases, there develops a vague border between the power of the intellectual's idea and the power of the political resolution, because in both cases the main objective is to realize the idea in the real life and not to think about the possible consequences for the society.

We can also speak about a special form of escape in the context of the intellectual. Of course, this concept is partially adopted from E. Fromm and his "Escape from freedom." It is a man's opportunity to create his personal existence. An individual may hope to save himself in the world of power relations only if these two alternatives exist, because then there is an alternative, namely the intellectual world. The intellectual world is a "place" which an individual creates for himself to get away from the world's unifying and subjugation tendencies. (While at the same time there exists a hope to change this world.)[30] However, such a necessity arises only if we acknowledge the importance of the moral values: besides, an intellectual cannot remain all the time only in the intellectual world and he is influenced by the problems of the real life.

It is possible to assume material welfare stimulates the creation of independent ideas. However, simultaneously, the development of economics and marketing helps form the intellectual's market value, and therefore it is much easier to manipulate him. If an

intellectual as a personality is valueless like other individuals — for instance, in the case of chaos and poverty — then with the growth of social welfare he obtains market value because there are formed mechanisms that allow his ideas to be implemented in the real world. There is no any reason to assert that an intellectual has a special status, which could allow him to avoid market relations, which influence society. R. Nozick believes that "intellectuals now expect to be the most highly valued people in a society, those with the most prestige and power, those with the greatest rewards. Intellectuals fell *entitled* to this." They consider that they are most valuable people and society must reward people in accordance with their value. But capitalist society does not have anything in common with the principle of distribution "to each according to his merit or value."[31] Our consumer society needs practical ideas, but the ideas of the intellectual are very seldom utilitarian. Perhaps, in the subconscious of some intellectuals there is the image of Plato's philosopher-ruler, which has transformed into utopian ideas about the intellectuals' potential for ruling a state and their importance in the society.

We can assume that a specific intellectual-scientist (in accordance with M. Foucault, and if we agree with his intellectual interpretation) who is involved in diverse fields of research, which have nothing common with power structures in society is, in the first moment, very close to the power elite in reality. Research is very often sponsored by political and economic power "owners." Unfortunately, the role of the representatives of arts is minimal in spite of the possible publicity. However, at the same time somebody must be ready to sponsor the intellectual's publicity and the intellectual must be ready to earn it.

It seems, nowadays, the role of the intellectual who could present opposition is symbolic in society. Protests against the ruling class are possibly expected from the socially lower classes because economic problems and material needs are pressing, at least in the post-soviet countries. Today it is very difficult to speak about the activities of intellectuals such as for example we associate with the French intellectuals in the 1970s and 1980s. Some intellectuals have successfully integrated into power structures. (On the one hand, anything is possible and strange, if we remember M. Foucault's idea that power circulates between individuals,[32] which means that an intellectual can also become the holder of power.) The intellectual very often plays an important role in official power structures. But, does he lose his essence in becoming the representative of the power structure? Power is repressive and depressive in any situation, both for those who are repressed and those who repress.

Intellectuals must maneuver between two worlds: the world of ideals, which frequently becomes his illusion and real life where he is only one of the countless power elements. In such situations the intellectual begins popularizing his ideas and not revaluing the existing values and creating new ones. Contemporary society shows that morals have frequently become the personal choice of the individual, while society thinks only about a political and economic development. Thinking rationally, we must separate these two spheres: the life of ideals where intellectual's moral responsibility has essential role, and the real world of power relations where moral

functions are adopted by political and economic responsibility. These worlds exist in parallel and have nothing common. Perhaps, therefore, it is necessary to liberate the intellectual from morals, as N. Machiavelli has liberated power from morality, because moral obligations, as was previously stated, exist only in small groups and between some individuals. Very often morals are like the disuise of the power elite, which must prevent the main part of society from endeavors to obtain power.

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NOTES

[1] Философский словарь. (Под редакцией И. Фролова). — Москва: Республика, 2001. — стр. 211.

[2] Some authors believe that it is possible to find common features at least in the interpretation of Russian and Polish intelligentsia, if we understand the intelligentsia as a specific social stratum, speaking about the period from the second half of the 19th century till the beginning of the 20th century. See, for instance, Gella A. An Introduction o the Sociology of the Intelligentsia. In: The Intelligentsia and the Intellectuals. Theory, Method and Case Study, London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 1976. P. 9–35.

[3] I. Suvajevs quotes A. Panchenko in his article "Liberation and sado-masochism" where A. Panchenko explains that an intelligent person was an individual without higher education who hoped to improve on the life of the nation. — Śuvâjevs I., Atbrîvoŝanâs un sadomazohisms. // Kentaurs Nr 3, Rîga: Minerva, 1992. p. 40.

Such interpretation reminds of the manner of thinking and living M. Gershenzon expressed (speaking about Russian philosophy) that there everything was mixed together: politics and poetics, a creative mind and masses. — Флоровский Г. Из прошлого русской мысли // Из прошлого русской мысли. — Москва: Аграф, 1998. — стр. 7.

N. Berdiajev also points out the differences of thinking between people in Europe and Russia According to him, Europeans interpret every subject as the reflection of this topic in culture or history which means that this concept is of secondary importance. But Russians analyse the essence of the idea but not as the reflection of culture. Europeans speak about "something" but they do not identify themselves as this "something". — Бердяев Н. Самопознание Самопознание Сочинения Москва: ЭКСМО Пресс, Харьков: Фолио, 1997. стр. 500–501.

Perhaps we can speak here about the dominance of the rational thinking in European thought (what is characteristically in Europe especially since the Enlightenment) and the presence of religious — philosophical interpretation in Russian culture at least at the end of the 19th century.

[4] The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Edited by T. Honderich, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. P. 411.

[5] Dictionary of the Social Sciences. Edited by G.Calhoun, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. P. 234.

[6] Gardner H., Intelligence Reframed: Multiple Intelligences for the 21st Century, Basic Books, 2000. p. 304.

[7] Dictionary of the Social Sciences.Op. cit. P. 234.

[8] Nozick R., Why Do Intellectuals Oppose Capitalism? In: CATO Online Policy Report / Volume XX Number 1 Jan./Feb. 1998.

[9] Gouldner A., The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class, Macmillans P., 1979. p. 160.

[10] Грамши А. Искусство и политика. В 2 т. — Москва: Искусство, 1991, т. 1, стр. 168–170.

[11] Грамши А. Искусство и политика. В 2 т. — Москва: Искусство, 1991, т. 1, стр. 171.

[12] Mine Eder Economic democracy: what can the intellectuals do? // Culture, development, and democracy: The role of the intellectual. (A tribute to Soedjatmoko). Edited by Selo Soemardjam and Kenneth W. Thompson, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1994. P. 60.

[13] Huszar T., Changes in the concept of intellectuals. // The Intelligentsia and the Intellectuals. Theory, Method and Case Study. Edited by A. Gella, London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 1976. Pp. 80–81.

[14] For example, A. Gella who thinks that the use of the term "the inteligentsia" as synonymous with intellectuals is common today because the lack of understanding of the differences between these two terms and also the luck of the proper term to designate two new social phenomena: the "the working intelligentsia" in Russia and Eastern Europe and also their counterparts in western societies — "the well educated but unpropertied segment of the middle class". — Gella A., An Introduction to the Sociology of the Intelligentsia. // The Intelligentsia and the Intellectuals. Theory, Method and Case Study. Edited by A. Gella, London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 1976. Pp. 22–23.

[15] Feuer L. S., What is an intellectual? In: The Intelligentsia and the Intellectuals. Theory, Method and Case Study. Edited by A. Gella, London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 1976. P. 48,

[16] For instance, M. Bubber interprets J. P. Sartre's idea that God does not exist or, more precisely, that He is silent and He is God who hides. He believes that man must recover her/his creative freedom and her/his significance in the world's existence. Or in accordance with J. P. Sartre, there is no another universe in parallel with the universe of the human's subjectivity. — Бубер М. Два образа вери. — Москва: АСТ, 1999. стр. 486–487.

[17] M. Foucault connects such ideas with the "left" intellectual where in the context of Marxism "intellectual by his moral, theoretical and political choice would like to become a holder of universe, but only in voluntary and pragmatic way." — Fuko M., Patiesîba un vara. // Patiesîba, vara, patîba, Rîga: Spekts, 1995. pp. 26–27.

[18] Бердяев Н. Философская истина и интеллигентская правда. — Вехи. Сборник статей о русской интеллигенции. — Москва: Новости, 1990. С. 7.

[19] "Intellectual's credo — I exist, I, who think, I am predictable, I bear responsibility and, quite literally, I owe gratitude to other people. — Levî B. A., Intelektuāļu slavinājums. p. 81.

[20] Rajaee F., Intellectuals and culture: Guardians of traditions or vanguards of development. // Culture, development, and democracy: The role of the intellectual. (A tribute to Soedjatmoko). Edited by Selo Soemardjam and Kenneth W. Thompson, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1994. Pp. 42–43.

[21] We can recall, for instance, H. Saint-Simon's utopian ideas (it is not essential in this case that his conception was created some centuries ago) where the creation of the ideal society was possible only substituting one ruling class with another. Moreover, the main ruling power — the king was invariable. — Сен-Симон А. О промышленной системе. — стр. 93.

Another example — the Russian intelligence's endeavours to help the people who did not need it.

[22] Fuko M., Patiesîba un vara. p. 28.

M. Foucault believes that the universal intellectual developed from a lawyer and he has achieved perfection in a writer. Everybody can identify his/herself with writer's ideas. But the ancestor of the specific intellectual is a scientist — expert.

[23] Very often an opinion dominates in the Western world that this part of the world has universal values for another parts of the world. Of course, there are some moral and ethical values, which are common for the whole world. But unfortunately they are lost in the wars and political, economic, religious conflicts. Actually this situation shows an "identity crisis" of society. Society, which is based on the one truth (perhaps here is some far response from Monotheism), has difficulties to understand other truths. Perhaps in the past the West could be the universe of the world but only the

universe of the Western world. Now the World becomes "smaller", we cannot forget about other cultures and there is no any reason to stress that the West is the centre of the Universe.

[24] For instance, M. Halbwach says (but in a little different context) that there is no united Society but it is possible to speak only about groups, which according to relations between these groups can form unions. Besides, these groups (economic, political, religious etc.) have a definite independence. — Хальбвакс М. Закон в социологии. // Социальные классы и морфология. — С.-Петербург: Алетейя, 2000.— стр. 353.

[25] See, for instance, The beginning of History by E. Portella followed by a debate with: R. Argullol, R. G. Girardot, G. Kutukdjian, Z. Laidi, H. Lopes, E. Lourenco, m. Maffesoli, V. Massuh, F. Riviere, J. Vidal-Beneyto and G. Vattimo. In: Thinking at crossroads: in search of new languages, Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2002. Pp. 103–183.

[26] Фуко М. Забота об истине. Беседа с Франсуа Эвальдом. // Воля к истине. По ту сторону знания, властиі и сексуальности. — Москва: Магистериум Касталь, 1996. стр. 322–323.

[27] Fuko M., Patiesîba un vara. p. 29.

[28] It might be a discussible question what is the original capital of the Nobel's Peace Prize — an invention that has given a death to millions or the invention that could help to improve lives of many individuals? The invention of the "X-ray father" — E. Teller was also a genial scientific discovery. But the use of it is possible to justify only politically, economically but not ethically.

[29] For example, W. Schmid thinks that at least the part of the French intellectual did not want to acknowledge that Stalin's terror had existed if it could dream about the possibility to create classless society. — B. H. L. un aktuâlâ doma. (Demakova H., Śmits V. — saruna 1992 g. vasarâ, Berlînê). // Kentaurs Nr3, Rîga: Minerva, 1992. p. 83–88.

[30] According to P. Bourdieu, a democratic society, which everybody is interested to achieve till nowadays is coming into contact with the problem of the ancient alternative between the monarch — philosopher and educated tyrant. In the modern interpretation it will be technocratic arrogance which tries to bless people even against their will and opposite to this — demagogical submissiveness which every advice (what can be express through television, various ratings etc.) comprehend as a command. — Бурдье П. Социология и демократия. Поэтика и политика. Альманах Российско-французского центра социологии и философии Института социологии Российской Академии наук. — Москва: Институт экспериментальной социологии, С.-Петербург.: Алетейя, 1999. — стр. 119–124.

[31] Nozick R. Why Do Intellectuals Oppose Capitalism. p. 2.

[32] Foucault M., *Society must be defended*. (*Lectures at the college de France, 1975–1976*.), London: Penquin Books, 2003. P. 29.

ИНТЕЛЛЕКТУАЛЫ И «КРИЗИС ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ»: РОЛЬ ИНТЕЛЛЕКТУАЛОВ В СОВРЕМЕННОМ ОБЩЕСТВЕ

Инесе СВЕСТИНА
Латвийская академия культуры

XX век, вне всяких сомнений, явил примеры крупных перемен в мировоззрении и отношениях между людьми. Возможно, это столь остро чувствуется, поскольку все основные события относятся к недавнему прошлому, и многим

из нас довелось их пережить. В этой статье рассматривается проблема отношений интеллектуалов и власти в нашей прагматической и технологичной цивилизации. Могут ли идеалы объединить общество, высказывающее разные идеи? Принимая во внимание тот факт, что государство управляется образованными людьми, а не низшими классами общества или дикарями, зададимся вопросом какова роль интеллектуалов в обществе? «Золотой век» европейских интеллектуалов пришелся на 1970-е и 1980-е гг. Но как обстоят дела теперь? Может быть, мы имеем право говорить о вовлеченности интеллектуалов в современные процессы — конфликты, столкновение цивилизаций — или, по крайней мере, о том, что именно они создали эту ситуацию? Ведь не только смерть Бога, которая по существу была лишь отчаянным призывом к диалогу, общению, является философским итогом современности. Во многих случаях (и на многих уровнях) современная демократия понимается как вседозволенность. Но с чем идентифицировать себя личности, от чего отталкиваться? Зачастую применение власти является единственным способом (или иллюзией) для западного человека почувствовать себя в безопасности. А подавление других часто служит утверждением собственного бытия, когда виртуальная идентичность становится основной формой бытия для большей части людей.

Śūnyatā, POSTMODERN SELF AND THE GREAT *Satori*

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Scholarship on the self and its postmodern context has been enjoying much attention through the years. Spanning works in the fields of philosophy (e. g., Mohanty, 2000), psychology (e. g., Gergen, 1990; Gergen, 1991; Stetsenko & Arievitch, 2004), cultural studies (e. g., Kellner, 1988), comparative East-West studies of religions (e. g., Elwood, 2001) and other multidisciplinary intellectual pursuits. Undeniably, therefore, a flowering of disparities is apparent given the array of intellectual, scientific, and technological knowledge available in understanding human existence.

Despite these intellectual developments, scientific-academic constructions regarding human nature, whether modern or postmodern, obviously fall short in situating the self, free from conflict. Strands of postmodern thought even account for conflict of both culture and the self. Although much has been said about the necessary idealized virtues and characteristics important for humankind to survive in unity and harmony amidst a diversified global world, the haunting reality persists that conflict is apparent.

In its multitudinous forms, conflict creates a breeding ground for hate, prejudice, fear and angst. Where conflict is present; suffering also lingers. Much too often, the experience of suffering is deliberately inflicted on one's self and others, creating much tension within the psychic world of those involved. Despite the need for peace and dialogue, both at an intra-psychic and inter-psychic level, a daunting issue persists, which I would like to argue, is an issue with which the self must contend. Therefore, another way of understanding global conflict is to relegate it to the suffering internal to the self.

The paper argues that global conflict ultimately reflects an unresolved conflict within the self, situated in the context of the circumstances brought about by the postmodern condition. The first part of this paper provides a discussion about the experiences of suffering confronting the self in its postmodern context and how these breed into different forms of conflict. The second part argues that suffering can be re-understood through an East-West comparative analysis of the Buddhist notion of *Śūnyatā* (Emptiness) and Western Postmodernism, in an effort to realize the great *Satori* (Flash of Enlightenment).

The Context of Suffering: Philosophical and Psychological Considerations

Understanding suffering, both as a concept and lived human experience, has long been a contentious issue and concern. It almost seems to go hand in hand with the frailty of the human condition. Existence drags along, with the weight of heavy-emp-

tiness providing the gloomy cast of suffering (Trundle, 2002). For some, the weight of suffering is perhaps too unbearable, prompting one to remove the burden of life. As Camus (1955) mentions, judging the worth-value of life amidst human suffering and the absurdity of the world is truly a fundamental existential-philosophical question for each and every person to answer. Whether or not to commit self-annihilation poses questions regarding the paradoxical sense of both peace and freedom that may be achieved through suicide.

Fortunately or unfortunately, not everyone finds glory or gratification in immediate self-annihilation. For some, the process of annihilation progresses more slowly than the bold leap into suicide. Oftentimes the suffering remains within, undiminished and even growing. Suffering, then, provides a breeding ground for various forms and manifestations of internal conflict running the gamut from hate, to fear, paranoia, anger, frustration, aggression, angst, intolerance, discrimination, and etc. Unresolved, it is these human emotional experiences — whether neurotic or psychotic in orientation — which stir the flow of psychic energies into a state of mental imbalance.

Negative energies constantly re-cycled inwardly have the tendency to create feelings of self-resentment, hate for one's self, self-doubt, and other self-defeating emotions and thoughts. Similar to the psychoanalytic notion of repression and its consequent effects on the psyche, unmanaged internal suffering is analogous to the common metaphor of a volcano waiting to erupt. Persons who experience this kind of predicament either inflict physical or emotional harm on themselves or on others, after having surpassed the period of trying to endure their bout with suffering and having reached that point when the volcano does erupt. Episodic psychic eruptions can situate a person between fleeting experiences of mental balance and imbalance. Directing negative energies outwardly towards the environment perhaps constitutes a more constant form of displacement and projection of these energies, in an attempt by the psyche to reduce the experience of internal tension. Hence, outbound forms of aggression are directed toward other persons or things, or both, in an attempt to regain mental balance by releasing what is perceived as harmful negative psychic energy.

The conflict described can either be an individual or collective predicament. The suffering person may stand alone in one's experience of self-disillusionment or the conduct of outward aggression. This typifies individuals who experience suffering without seeking to affiliate themselves with other persons, since they do not feel the need to share with someone else's misery or for others to sympathize with their own suffering.

On the other hand, the collective consciousness or unconscious of suffering individuals, as brought about by similar experiences, may come together to form a binding fabric of negative psychic energy accountable for large-scale forms of conflict among groups. Collective experiences of suffering can give rise to a common cause or crusade with which a group may come to identify. Shared conflicted lives equally reflect collective suffering.

Suffering and the Self in its Postmodern Context

Ultimately, suffering bears its weight upon the self; not only as a mental health issue, but equally as an existential problem. The self, regardless of how it is conceived as a socio-psychological or biological phenomenon or construct, poses an important concern especially in consideration of its role in integrating and harmonizing the different aspects of the human psyche.

Therefore, unresolved conflicts threaten the self in terms of the psychological disequilibrium stirred within the psychic system. Imbalance that persists consequently weakens the hold of the self on the different psychic energies, thus giving rise to both internal and external conflict that characterizes the re-cycled experiences of suffering being endured by a person. The worse possible scenario is for a state of imbalance to occur at a persistent level, which can lead to the experience of a psychic breakdown or the development of a pathological mental disorder.

In further contextualizing the possible source(s) of this breakdown, a discussion regarding the postmodern condition has much too offer in outlining the circumstances that befall the self. It should be remembered that postmodernism, as a construct and social-cultural phenomena, provides an array of discussion, enough to fill pages with convoluted jargon, cultural observations, and other pertinent ideas (see, Jameson, 1991 and Hassan, 1993 for a discussion on the concept of postmodernism). The focus, therefore, is in narrowing the link between this social-cultural condition and the human experiences of suffering. The following are important considerations in further explicating the points earlier presented: a) Psychosocial Implications of the Postmodern Condition and b) Mental Health and Existential Implications of a Defragmented Self in its Postmodern Context.

Psychosocial Implications of the Postmodern Condition

The postmodern condition is far from being depicted as a "bed of roses." From a psychosocial vantage point, postmodernism is often described as a schizophrenic predicament. As Docherty (1993) mentions, contradictions, incoherence and the experiences of struggle are much too often salient characteristics of this condition. Hence, a postmodern rendition of both cultural and social phenomena deviates from the notion of presenting the state of reality as ordered and stable. Lyotard (in Hassan & Hassan, 1983) accounts for this state as the, "...'lack of reality' of reality." Contradictions and incoherence among cultural and social values are apparent (Ebijuwa, 2002; Lyotard, 1983). And in this regard, the metaphor of schizophrenia is used to exemplify the kind of imbalance ascribed to the postmodern condition as a social-cultural construct. Perhaps, the same metaphor can be adopted in accounting for its psychosocial effects on a person — a similar imbalance as it creates within the psyche.

This rather nihilistic perception stems from the observation that postmodern times correlate highly with the fast and sporadic changes happening around the

world. Rapid changes in the social and cultural environments are responsible for the difficulties encountered by the self. Dissenting values, norms, and the lack of cultural consensus reflect obstacles that need to be muddled through. Transitions over a short period of time are sources of possible insecurity among those who find it difficult to cope with the flux of an unstable global environment.

The self has to contend with an environment that cannot be easily described as supportive, although positive changes can also be identified. Regardless of whether it is more appropriate to categorize the negative social-cultural changes as modern or postmodern, what is clear is that the world has been pervasively affected in ways that have made life more complicated (Heidegger, 1977). It is the occasion of complexity and instability in the world that provides a venue for the self to suffer, given its bout with a condition that is often called postmodern.

Mental Health and Existential Implications of a De-fragmented Self in its Postmodern Context

Consequently, the splintering image of an unstable global environment trickles down as a mental health issue and concern. Social-cultural pluralism does takes its toll on the personality development of an individual who is attempting to cope with the different and often competing social-cultural demands and expectations (Grant, 2004). Alongside the mental health considerations, this condition should also be understood as the disquietude of existence.

First of all, the self is fragmented in certain ways, given the pluralistic emergence of varying social roles and expectations that can lead to role strain, role confusion, and the experience of an identity crisis (Rappoport, Baumgardner & Boone, 1999). With such a predicament, it is inevitable that much stress and anxiety is created within the psychic system. The inability to cope with the experience of role strain leads to prolonged anxiety, and consequently the experience of suffering. Role confusion and the onset of an identity crisis, which are brought about by an inability to delineate among different roles and expectations, are similar circumstances that allow someone to suffer. As competing demands converge, certain roles lived by a person may hinder the performance of other roles being performed by that individual (Stetsenko & Arievitch, 2004). A person may be able to cope with different competing demands, but doing so surely expends a lot of psychic energy. Other persons may perceive the roles and expectations as a heavy burden placed upon their sense of self (Hoshmand, 1988).

This condition bears on the social-emotional adjustment and personality development of an individual. Since persons in postmodern times need to interact simultaneously with varying and competing circumstances, the self in its attempt to cope at times undergoes the re-emergence of a pluralistic sense of identity to address the pluralistic circumstances surrounding it (Watkins, 1999). Hence, the notion of the plural self is a reality for some, in order to cope with everyday pluralistic life (see,

Rowan & Cooper, 1999). Even the emergence of a pluralistic self does not necessarily account for the ease with which a person handles both role strain and role confusion (Rappoport, Baumgardner & Boone, 1999). In fact, the mismanagement of a pluralistic self can easily lead to role strain and confusion. Those unable to cope succumb to crisis.

The Postmodern Condition and Global Conflict

Given the backdrop of global instability, political and economic unpredictability, social-cultural-ideological pluralism, and the haunting grip of stressful living, the postmodern world can aptly be described as a breeding ground for different forms of contention. Whether personal or collective, suffering is definitely present and apparent in the lives of those most vulnerable to the self-destructive gains of conflict.

Suffering perpetuates negative psychic energies that suffuse into the different forms of conflict manifested in the global world today. Because of this condition conflict thrives among certain persons, social groups, communities, cultures, and nations, signifying the processes that wrought global conflict. It is human experiences of suffering, when magnified, which escalate to the suffering experienced not only as an individual predicament but also across groups and cultures.

Regardless of what scale conflict persists and how multi-faceted it may be, ultimately — as a psychological and philosophical burden — its unbearable weight is pressed upon the self. As the self habituates to suffering, it also has a particular vantage point in understanding why it suffers. Perhaps, what is needed is not just a mere achievement of self-understanding of one's experiences of suffering. A greater challenge persists in how wisdom should prevail in spite of such dire circumstances. I would like to argue that the self's attempt to find wisdom in its experiences of suffering is the path towards enlightenment. And to deal with conflict, therefore, one must always address suffering as experienced internal to the self.

Suffering and the Self: A Melting Pot of Oddities From the Standpoint of Buddhism and the Postmodern Context

Interestingly, of all the world religions, Buddhism elevates any discussion regarding suffering as axiological to its religious-philosophical enterprise. In fact, in Santina's (2002) account of the first sermon of the Buddha to his followers — the *Dhammachakkappavattna Sutra* — suffering was immediately given central importance by the Buddha, as reflected in what has become the foundation of Buddhist philosophy — *aryasatya* (Four Noble Truths). According to Elwood (2001), "The Four Noble Truths or *aryasatya* may be said to constitute the central core of the Buddhist conceptual scheme" (p. xxix).

Specifically, Santina (2002) aptly describes this conceptual scheme wherein the Four Noble Truths can be regarded as, "...the truth of suffering, the truth of the

cause of suffering, the truth of the end of suffering and the truth of the path that leads to the end of suffering..." (p. 29). The Noble Truths, therefore, focus on the nature of suffering and its consequent spiritual significance (Hanh, 1991).

Here, it can be deduced that the experience of suffering serves as a catalyst in helping the self achieve a certain level of spirituality (Trungpa, 1976). This way of thinking is starkly different from the Western rendition of the word, which tends to view suffering as a burden to existence. As far as the first noble truth is concerned, the pronouncement regarding the truth of suffering readily sets the groundwork for suffering as an ultimate reality that befalls human existence (Hanh, 1995). Similarly for Elwood (2001), two other distinctive marks characterize this reality other than the truth of *duhkha* (suffering), namely: *anitya* (impermanence), and *anatman* (absence of a substantial selfhood). Elwood further mentions, "In pragmatic and phenomenological terms, liberation follows upon realization of the 'three marks'" (2001, p. 85). It can be surmised, then, that liberation from suffering relies heavily upon the ability to become self-conscious of one's experiences. Hence, a correlative relationship exists between the conscious self and the exertion of awareness towards its experience of suffering.

This relationship is self-liberating and even optimistic, in some ways, compared to the perception of Buddhism as a pessimistic religion (see Deshimaru, 1981; Nishitani, 1982a). The second Noble Truth avers that suffering is caused, and to understand and master it provides a renewed outlook at the pessimism earlier asserted. This assertion reconstructs the notion of human existence as helplessly passive to the experience of suffering. By acknowledging that suffering is indeed a part of life and by identifying the cause, one can come closer to finding a solution guided by self-conscious wisdom. Perhaps, it can be argued that, although the human person has no full control of the absurdities that transpire in the world, control can be exerted in perceiving and understanding one's own predicament. According to Santina (2002):

> If we really want to do something about suffering, to solve the problem of suffering, we must identify its cause.... Similarly, when we recognize the problem of suffering we have to look for the cause. It is by understanding the cause of suffering that we can do something to solve the problem (p. 35).

As mentioned in previous sections of this paper, the cause of suffering takes on different forms, and by integrating a Buddhist outlook with the earlier discussions on suffering and its postmodern context, it can be said that failure to come to terms with the first Noble Truth and the "marks of reality" are the strongest indicators that a person is bound to suffer. As Santina (2002) further mentions:

> The Buddha taught that craving or desire (*Trishna* or *Raga*) is a great cause of suffering — craving for pleasant experiences, craving for materials things, craving for eternal life and craving for eternal death. (p. 35).

Those who are resistant in accepting the inescapable truth regarding the three marks of reality thrive in holding dear the pleasantries they derive from their own existence, the existence of others, and other objects of affection. Furthermore, those who succumb to overwhelming existential defeat are the one's who have failed to realize that they can control their consciousness of suffering, not allowing suffering to take control of their consciousness. Ignorance (*Avidya*), therefore, is equally responsible for suffering. Words such as *accept, realize* and *be self-conscious* all point to the need for the self to overcome ignorance.

Buddhism asserts that to end suffering one must go-back in resolving the issues internal to the self, as the conscious person is challenged to grow in wisdom regarding one's existence and interaction with the world (Daisetz, 1970). In connection to this, a path was laid down by the Buddha to set the direction for liberation, as found in the third and fourth Noble Truths. This path is the way for the self to overcome ignorance by achieving wisdom. And as Santina (2002) avers, "The real heart of Buddhism is wisdom" (p. 72).

I would like to argue that the condition described as the postmodern is, in many ways, the same reality accounted for by Buddhism (see also, Tiangco, 2004). As a catalyst for spiritual transformation, Buddhism provides an understanding of the experience of suffering which cuts through the usual Western ways of thinking. A gloomy cast need not envelop the pessimistic views ascribed to the postmodern world.

Postmodernism and the Standpoint of Zen: Confronting the Problem of Nihilism

Specifically, drawing from works of the Japanese *Kyoto-ha Tetsugaku* (School of Philosophy), such as in Nishitani (1982a, 1982b, 1982c, 1990) and Nishida (1976), and from Elwood's (2001) East-West cross-cultural discussion regarding the problem of nihilism, the perceived absurdity in the world and the experiences of conflict and suffering can be further understood and contextualized from the standpoint of Zen Buddhism. Especially in elaborating on the salient spiritual significance of suffering. Absurdities are often equated with an existential void, especially among those prone to the suffering brought about by resentment and indifference towards the world. Nihilistic despair is often borne out of an underlying breakdown in giving meaning to one's lived existential experiences. As Loy (in Elwood, 2001) boldly states, "It is increasingly obvious that nihilism is our foremost problem, underlying most others."

From a psycho-spiritual Zen point of view, Nishitani (1982; 1990) regards this breakdown in giving meaning as a nothingness, which at the same time presents an opportunity for spiritual transformation. For Nishida (1976), this same nothingness makes the emptiness of reality that exists intelligible enough to determine the course of human existence. Elwood (2001), on the other hand, calls this condition — the problem of nihilism — the crossroads of globalization, technology and the effectual-

ity of the postmodern condition. The discussions these scholars provide regarding the changes that characterize either a modern or postmodern society, touch not only the social-cultural domain but also, more importantly, a spiritual level. Hence, it can be argued that the earlier discussions regarding the postmodern condition as manifested in the epistemological, social, cultural, political, economic, and psychological changes transpiring around the world are not devoid of spiritual implications.

Provocatively, the sense of flux, impermanence, and transformation ascribed to the postmodern condition, on different social-cultural-political-psychological levels, parallel the Buddhist marks of reality described by Elwood (2001) and the discussion provided by Santina (2002) regarding the transience of reality in Buddhism. This perception of reality from an Eastern perspective predates a similar point of view discussed earlier regarding Lyotard's more contemporary notion of the absence of a sense of reality in how reality is commonly experienced. Nishitani (1982) therefore concludes, "'Emptiness' is the real form of reality" (p. 76), and by acknowledging this, the reality of suffering, as a noble truth in fact stems from a vast reality of emptiness.

Change is apparent in a world characterized by constant flux and transformation. Because of this Nishida's (1976) and Nishitani's (1982) philosophy of nothingness is psychologically and spiritually relevant in accounting for the apparent absence of totalizing and grand epistemological structures in the world. It should be remembered that postmodernism, as an intellectual movement, is partly a response to what can be perceived as the aberrant worldviews during the enlightenment period (see Hassan, 1993). These worldviews are considered either grand-narratives or meta-narratives that tend to provide pretenses such as those found in totalizing scientific, religious, and political laws. For instance, the perception regarding the infallibility of the sciences and religion, and monolithic ideologies said to govern a world driven by mechanistic principles.

Knowledge, for some, plays an important role in filling the void — so to speak — a void that is often the result of an existential vacuum. It is the presence of this existential nothingness that leads one to suffer. As recourse, those who bear the fiery burn of suffering within the abyss of their existence attempt to extinguish the flames through soothing meta-narratives.

This is apparently understandable as human existence enjoys a sense of security from what it perceives to be the infallibility of scientific knowledge, or any other forms of knowledge that provide a remedy to existential insecurity — an undeniable pleasantry that every person attempts to realize in one's existence. Similarly, it is through the sciences, whether the social or the natural sciences, that human existence endeavors to control reality — to control the environment, other living things, and even conflict and the experience of suffering — in order to achieve and maintain the pleasantries that can be enjoyed from human existence. Similarly, religious doctrines have always played an important role in shaping both culture and society at a psycho-spiritual level.

Whenever strong adherence to the infallibility of the sciences or religious doctrines take place, this often results in scientism or religious fundamentalism. Such occurrences can be rather problematic if discriminating attitudes are also exerted. Dogmatic perceptions of reality consequently create opportunities for suffering to thrive as a result of contending beliefs, attitudes, and ideologies. In fact, intellectual or religious discrimination and oppression are experiences that much too often are responsible for the historical prevalence of individual, group, or world conflicts that have been in existence since time immemorial.

Apparently knowledge is fallible, as the meta-narratives and grand-narratives of the sciences are regarded as fallible and in disarray (see Feyerabend, 1975; Horgan, 1996). In this vein, Lyotard (1984) avers that postmodernism is "incredulity towards meta-narratives" (p. xxiv). The need is for everyone to be incredulous towards the truth-value of knowledge. Specifically, Kuhn (1962) provided an account of his observations regarding the intellectual revolution in the sciences. Elwood (2001), on the other hand, looks at this concern as manifested among debates and marginalizing attitudes among world religions. It should also be remembered that the historical development and interaction among world religions are far from being considered genuinely peaceful and benevolent.

Such observations can only lead one to conclude that the values of pluralism, separatism, relativism, and subjectivism persist as part of reality. From the standpoint of the *Kyoto* school, this seeming part of reality — relative nothingness — is in fact an absolute (Bragt, 1982).

The Empty-Fullness of Úũnyatâ: The Path towards Realizing the Great Satori

The paradox of absolute negation is a hallmark of the Japanese *Kyoto-ha Tetsugaku*. In connection to this, Nishitani (1982) argues that the absolute emptiness of reality is a reality that needs to be accepted. As nihilism is arguably a central concern, equally provocative is the need to determine exactly how the experience of nihility can be overcome in order to extinguish the fiery burn of suffering.

The flames of suffering are not external to the self, but rather are in the dwelling place of existence reminiscent of the first mark of reality — *duhkha*. This reality thrives in the flames of nothingness — burned and consumed by the flames — co-penetrating with its form and shape, which metaphorically resembles the second mark — *anitya* (impermanence). It is the symbolical significance of the impermanence of both shape and form of the flames that correlates with the condition of the absolute nothingness of both reality and existence. Hence, it is in this same condition of nothingness that the flames burn and consume the self towards its absolute negation. This is the third mark of reality — *anatman* (no self).

As Elwood (2001) argues, the condition of postmodern nihility characterizes a reality that is empty, which is significantly attributable to social-cultural flux and

the existence of contending meta-narratives. This emptiness thrives as a condition of impermanence, flux, and transience, which Elwood (1998-1999) also regards as postmodern ambiguity amidst the flowering of disparities among social-cultural phenomena. Docherty (1993) maintains the same views regarding the social-cultural ambiguities that surround the postmodern. Although perceived as empty, the fact is, the conclusion of emptiness is just another way of accounting for the seeming fullness that can also describe the flowering of disparities characteristic of postmodern ambiguity. As the notion of the flowering of disparities may signify the lack of consensus — therefore understood as a condition of emptiness — such a standpoint similarly denotes the flowering of possibilities as a social-cultural phenomena attributable to the postmodern. The paper, therefore, argues for a renewed understanding of flux, transience, and impermanence, which characterizes empty-fullness as the paradox of the postmodern condition re-understood from a Zen standpoint.

Overcoming nihility, henceforth, simply means the achievement of wisdom in understanding and co-existing with the flames of absolute nothingness vis-a-vis the condition called postmodern. Paradoxically, to overcome nihility is to habituate with the conditions brought about by absolute nothingness. Suffering is not eliminated as though it were a disease meant to be flushed out of existence. Within the existential void, the flames of suffering burn, and by fire-walking through these flames existence can come to terms with absolute nothingness. As this is achieved, the path towards wisdom from then on is illuminated by the flash of great *satori* (enlightenment). The flames burn with the same purpose of providing much needed illumination from the dark spell cast by ignorance.

The Buddhist conception of *śūnyatā* (emptiness) therefore provides insightful meaning to counter the glaring pessimism that accompanies any discussion of postmodern nihilism or the philosophy of nothingness of the Japanese *Kyoto-ha Tetsugaku*. In itself *śūnyatā* is empty, cutting through the dichotomy between signifier and signified and the other dualistic schisms used to describe reality. As Elwood (2001) mentions:

> Buddhist *Śūnyatā* does not denote a relative nihility in the sense of a simple negation of, or antithesis to, being. Rather, it is the nothingness of being concealed by being itself. The nothingness of being is the Great Fire of *anitya* or impermanence. This Great Fire is our dwelling place. Already dead, already empty, we live in this fire of impermanence. In these flames of disappearance "a stone woman dances" and "a wooden man sings" — fiery tongues licking at their winged heels (p. 102–103).

Provocatively, I fall short of providing a concise answer that perhaps satisfies the rules of logic or rhetoric — a stone woman dances and the wooden man sings — and this puts on the stand the emptiness of my own work. This is the paradox of *śūnyatā,* with my own musings consumed by the flames of disappearance. Perhaps in describ-

ing this predicament, my consolation is to heed Nishitani (1982) as he mentions, "It would appear as the field of a wisdom that we might call a "knowing of non-knowing" (p. 121). In connection to this, I would like to maintain a posture of doubt regarding the emptiness of all my assertions. Most relevant is Nishida's (1976) rendition of *śūnyatā* using the logic of Zen, *soku hi* (is and yet is not). Nishida's way of thinking is an appropriation of contradictions (Elwood, 2000). It is a knowing of non-knowing and yet is radically different from ignorance.

All of these assertions reflect the paradoxical way of thinking earlier ascribed to the *Kyoto* school. It is paradoxical to conclude that empty-fullness can co-exist, that wisdom thrives in knowing of non-knowing, and that emptiness empties itself in the standpoint of *śūnyatā* (Elwood, 2001). From a Zen perspective, such is reality that explains the wisdom involved through a proper understanding of the emptiness of absolute nothingness. In return, absolute nothingness empties itself into a plenitude that makes it also full. Mansukhani (2002) avers that wisdom in a postmodern age can be achieved through paradoxes, symbols, metaphors, and contradictions. Postmodernism in itself is laden with surmountable paradoxes and contradictions. Therefore, it is simply a question of becoming self-conscious of these conditions and that the suffering caused by these times can be re-understood as a similar path towards enlightenment. Although the flames of suffering can never be truly extinguished, it is by using suffering to provide a guiding light that the path of wisdom reveals itself amidst the often perceived gloomy cast of postmodern nihilism.

Sooner or later as *satori* is achieved, and fire-walking through the flames of suffering will provide the embracing warmth to sooth the negative energies within the psychic system. It is at this state, in the perhaps fleeting moments of psychological equilibrium vis-a-vis *satori,* that the experience of conflict can be best understood and even dealt with. Hopefully, collective individual strides can translate into lessening the pervasive effects of global conflict.

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ШУНЬЯТА, «Я» ПОСТМОДЕРНА И ВЕЛИКОЕ САТОРИ

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В мире, омраченном глобализацией и условиями, порожденными постмодерном, среди ярких противоречий в идеологиях и социокультурных ценностях неизбежен глобальный конфликт. Там, где конфликт очевиден, страдание проникает в основы бытия человека. В статье выдвигается новое понимание глобального конфликта, основанное на выявлении страдания человеческого «Я». Первая часть посвящена опыту страдания «Я» в контексте постмодерна. Во второй части, исходя из положений, выдвинутых в работах японской философской школы Киото (*Kyoto-ha* ***Tetsugaku***), высказывается мысль о том, что страдание и конфликт в их постмодерной интерпретации могут быть осмыслены с опорой на основные принципы западно-восточного компаративного анализа буддистской идеи *шуньяты (пустоты)*. В этом контексте переживание страдания и конфликта, привнесенных всеотрицающим постмодерном, может быть преодолено благодаря реализации принципа *сатори*.

TOWARD THE NEW HUMANITY: FROM EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE TO SPIRITUAL INTUITION

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The journey toward the New Humanity leads outside the self as part of the transformation of societies-cultures-nations-religions and their many traditions and ways of life and inside the self as a spiritual discovery.

The Contemporary View

Many signs of the contemporary world indicate that we are in a spin from bad to worse, and that this degenerative spiral, which moves at a precipitous pace while creating an impact on all social, economic, and political life forces, is irreversible. Violence, degradation of the environment and sheer inhumanity are well known. The frequently-clamored need for peace with social justice, international cooperation, respect for the environment and for other cultures, more compassion for our fellow man and harmony in our day-to-day existence does not come about by arranging only the "external" social, economic, cultural and world affairs. Such usual efforts as raising more money to solve problems, passing more laws to rule fairly, acquiring more knowledge and developing new philosophies to consider what is and what should be done fall short of building a new humanity. More of the same, however creative, does not nurture the foundation of a new way of life. Our efforts along the lines of "business as usual" might improve the existing conditions or make them worse, but they cannot inaugurate the new.

Signs Pointing to the New Humanity

Other signs point to the new ways of humankind. These signs are more subtle than those reflecting the effects of noisy political expediencies, economic manipulations and the diplomatic efforts of self-centered nation-states. The journey to the New Humanity takes us to deeper layers of existence, characterized by individual, societal, and national strivings. It is emerging from the hopes and dreams of a growing number of individuals from all walks of life, people who are found in the mainstream population and among the new generations of children.

After several hundred years of living in the Age of Reason, and more recently, in the Ages of Modernism and Postmodernism, starting in the middle of the last century some significant signs of change have been emerging which point to the departure from the mainstream's thinking and doing.

Limits to growth: The optimistic conviction of the never-ending progress in the world's development and economy found its challenge in the 1970s, launched by the Club of Rome with the computer-discovered limits to growth (Meadows and Meadows, 1972 and revisited by Meadows, et al, in 2004). The illusion of this never-ending progress still exists.

The "New Age": In the 1960s and 1970s the most dramatic challenge to the somewhat stagnant *status quo* attitude of the society in all its dimensions — whether economical, political or cultural — was the "new age" movement of the hippies and flower children. Their protest was in response to the hypocrisy and loss of basic humanness in the contemporary society, and was manifested in their longing for freedom and for a more authentic expression of love. In order to overcome the lukewarm societal attitudes gradually leading to mediocrity, an unwritten striving of this "now culture" was to regain the intensity of living. For the first time in known human history youth developed a new type of music that departed from the mainstream classical or popular music. The youth culture replaced the traditional dance music of foxtrot, waltz and tango not only with rock and roll, twist, acid rock and rap, but also with folk music and songs of social commentary. "We want to get back to God," was one of the refrains of the Woodstock epoch, while "Hair" and "Jesus Christ Superstar" represented the expression of the New Age in the musical shows. The modern classical music by such composers as Messiaen and many more entered the mainstream of the classical music.

Eastern religions became popular as a deeper way of seeking the meaning of life.

Without saying it, the New Age movement aimed at a new culture that was pointing toward a New Humanity.

Intentional communities: Most remarkably, in their fascination for the "new age of Aqarius" about 128,000 intentional communities explored new ways of human togetherness. Ecology, sane living, Eastern traditions, respect for the environment, freedom and self-determination, self-sustained economy and human brotherhood were some of the many ideas underlying this great experiment in community living. Many communities sought a voluntary simplicity of living that also became an important issue for the mainstream society due to the energy and resource crisis (Elgin, 1993). An emphasis on love as a driving force for seeking a new understanding and "rediscovery" of the ways and power of love was prominent (Sorokin, 1954, also in 2002). Whatever their ideology or foundation, these communities were inspired to seek a new way of togetherness, or a new humanity.

New psychology: While the New Age experiment was rapidly expanding in the youth culture, in the field of psychology a revolution was started by the Third Force of Psychology, or Humanistic Psychology, or Psychology of Being (Maslow, 1962). The network of the new psychologies focused on human growth and being needs, instead of on the deficiency needs as in the dominant Freudian and behavioral psychologies. In addition to Abaham Maslow, the Third Force of Psychology gathered some of the cutting-edge psychologists and thinkers, such as Rollo May, Carl Rogers, Clark

Moustakas, Ira Progoff, Erich Fromm, Roberto Assiagioli, Fritz Perls, Victor Frankl, and many more. Each one of the new voices in psychology offered their own unique contribution to the "psychology of growth and self-actualization" and suggested a "new image of man" as a maturing entity moving toward a new humanity.

New concepts from science: On the other front, the newly raised questions from the sciences challenged the traditional ways of explaining how humans, nature and the universe function; that is, the "old way" of describing the world we live in was critically re-examined. Two brilliant examples are pointing toward the new understanding of the universe and our lives. One is from quantum physics, showing that instead of the predominant atomistic world view in which the universe consists of endless pieces and unrelated fragments, there is a great interdependence and relatedness of everything that exists with everything else, and the universe is one gigantic Cosmic Whole (Bohm, 1980). The other one is from biology (Sheldrake, 1981), suggesting that the immutable laws of the universe might be just changeable habits of the universe and a kind of transphysical morphic resonance that influences learning among similar units, whether biological or not. Crystals, plants, animals and humans form morphogenetic fields that make them interdependent, not isolated from each other.

Other contributions from sciences also began to threaten the comfortable mechanistic way of painting a deterministic universe. Added to the new vision of the universe were such perplexing observations as the following: Our universe has eleven dimensions, atoms are found simultaneously in two places, and the absolute vacuum of the universe — the great nothing — emits a kind of quantum foam that might be the "creation of matter."

The Hidden Remnant: The approaching mega-crisis and its opportunities triggered even up to our days the self-mobilization of little-noticed but remarkable future-oriented individuals. Throughout history they have been called the Hidden Remnant (Roze, 2004). In spite of the impending threat of destruction of human ways, these unusual individuals stand for humankind. Their inner direction is that of completing human destiny. It seems that the Hidden Remnant has appeared time and again in human history at moments when the danger is greatest and humanity is most confused about its values and its future. Plato identified such persons as "the very small remnant," individuals who are searching for the authentically human. Isaiah spoke of a "small remnant" who took it upon themselves to save the land from great dangers. In today's world, in face of the violence, confusions and human selfishness, the Hidden Remnant is emerging as individuals who stand for the New Humanity. Disregarding their own comfort and security, they are deeply committed to the search of a more viable future. Unknowingly, they share a common fire that lights the road towards human maturity (Daloz, Keen, Keen and Parks, 1996). In the midst of these uncertainties which reflect a loss of direction toward a sane society, they are raising such questions as "What does it mean to be human?" (Franck, Roze, Connolly, 2000). The Hidden Remnant consists of selfless people active in

many organizations, institutions, NGOs, in public and in private sectors appearing in all cultures, nations and continents. Being future-oriented and human-centered, they can think and act in many ways and occupy diverse positions, but they are all determined to overcome the contemporary hurdles standing in the way of the creation of a transformed society and a new humanity. At the United Nations some good examples of the Hidden Remnant were such world-servers as Dag Hammarskjold, U Thant and Robert Muller, the Assistant Secretary General of the UN, plus quite a few more known and unknown individuals. In their work, the Hidden Remnant clamors for a society with new definitions, new understandings, and new ways.

The New Humanity will be established neither by a great president, king, or ruler, nor by a dominant nation, a new political or ideological system. The New Humanity will be created by the effort of millions of individuals with a converging vision for a new way of humankind. Indeed, in our struggling world we all are invited to be the Hidden Remnant.

Nine-eleven: Paradoxically, the New Humanity is also being born out of human suffering and despair. It is emerging from such world events as the nine-eleven. For days after the destruction of the World Trade Center, we walked the streets of New York feeling devastated, gathering at spontaneous candle vigils in parks, on street corners and in front of our own buildings. With heavy hearts we marched along the walls plastered with names and pictures of people who had disappeared in the ruins of the towers. "Please, help me find my brother, wife, father, son, daughter, grandpa, lover," these pictures said, and the lists were very long. Many of us knew at least somebody who perished in the collapse of the towers. During this period, we sought to comprehend the reason for this extraordinarily devastating inhumane event. We discovered that we are all humans on the same painful journey.

The nine-eleven tragedy could have been turned into a transformative power as a tragic antidote to violence, vengeance, injustice and as a sobering antidote to inhumanity, social arrogance and blind hate. There is still time to do it. The third day after the collapse of the Twin Towers an unassuming red sticker with a powerful, almost spiritual message appeared on many walls, lamp posts and fences of New York: "Our grief is not a cry for war." It was an invitation to open the road to the New Humanity.

Unfortunately, the rulers of the land have disregarded this invitation.

Signs of the New in the New Generations

In recent decades in many countries new generations of children have been appearing that are born as if with a different blueprint because they carry a new way of thinking and living. They have been called the new children, Indigo children (Carroll and Tober, 1999), star children (Kuehlewind, 2004), psychic children (Twyman, 2002), and by other names. It would be intriguing to explore more seriously this unusual phenomenon. The new children seem to be born as if with a different life intention that diverges from the current way of living and managing human affairs.

Because of their uniqueness, their development becomes all the more difficult in our contemporary society. As the new children apparently have other capacities and needs, they require special attention and help in their childhood years (Croatto, 2004). One way to think about the new children is to hope that we can offer them support and love while keeping the world intact long enough so that when they are ready they can take over the reins of the world society.

A New Humanity?

Why a new humanity? What we do know is that the current ways of human living and its poor partnership with nature are not leading to a mature and more harmonious world society. Half of the world population lives in fear and the other half lives in hunger, misery and poverty. In spite of the efforts to overcome this state of the world, the existing world order breeds more poverty and more fear.

What are the characteristics of the New Humanity? There is no blueprint or cooking recipe for building a new humanity. The New Humanity is emerging from the unrehearsed creativity of human consciousness, propelled by the needs, hopes and the inner spiritual urge of a great many people. The intention of the New Humanity is nourished by the following questions: Why can't we have a better, more joyful and friendlier society with less misery and more human wellbeing? Why can't we have a more just and compassionate world? Why can't we recognize love as the guiding power in shaping the new human togetherness on societal and global scales? The invitation is to mobilize the healing power of compassion and love. However wishful and sentimental it may sound in our materially oriented and self-centered society, we are all longing carriers and eager students of the art of loving (Fromm, 2000). Love is one of the essential ingredients for marching toward the New Humanity.

Evolution: Humankind and Consciousness

Another perception of where humanity stands today and its next steps toward the new ways of living is offered by lifting our sights well above the immediate pressing problems and issues of the "now time" and examining the long "evolutionary time." Cultures and civilizations are not "just there." The psycho-cultural structures and the well-established cultural routines are created and moved by the evolving human consciousness. Every culture can be considered to be a "living cultural body" formed and modified by human individual consciousnesses that together form an interdependent "cultural intent," or an "inter-thinking organism." In a way, this inter-thinking organism is like a biological organism with its life expression. While surviving, changing and adapting, the organism relates to the world around itself and evolves. An organism (culture) without life (consciousness) is nonsense, but life (consciousness) without a body (culture) has no tangible expression. Simply said, without human consciousness there are no cultures.

Most studies of cultures and civilizations have been conducted by looking at the product of the external manifestation of a culture. Old ruins and constructions, old bones, old oral traditions and writings about old deeds, when known, have offered a picture of human historical evolution. However, human consciousness, which creates and guides the cultural expressions, has not been a significant focus in the evaluation of cultures. This is unfortunate since the evolutionary steps of human consciousness offer important signposts of past and present cultures and civilizations (Gebser, 1985). While focusing on its evolutionary-historical context, Mario Kamenetzky (1999) revealed human consciousness as the invisible player in economic, social and political affairs and the "inner content" of all cultures. The unity and diversity of cultures are managed by human consciousness, thus the importance of understanding its dynamics and its evolutionary role.

Evolution: Matter — Life — Consciousness

Consciousness as a completely unique evolutionary phenomenon can be seen within the process of earth in becoming. Accepting all the magnificent and intricate scientific and philosophical explanations of evolution, we could think about this universal process as a manifestation of three different but sequential steps: matter, life and consciousness.

For the first several billion years, earth was a lifeless, silent planetary body moving through space with an effervescent and even violent interplay of chemical, physical and geological features. Matter underwent tremendous complexification in forming organic molecules. Then, some billion and a half years later this interplay generated appropriate conditions for life to emerge. Without really knowing what life is, and without knowing how it started, the appearance of life introduced a completely new game on earth. The distinguishing features of the emerging organisms were self-organization, self-regulation and self-replication, not known in matter. Combined with the instinct of self-preservation, the living organisms became entities that protect themselves, within but separated from the environment. Armed with these features, the living entities entered into the great stream of evolution. Life's appearance on earth dramatically modified its expression.

About five or six million years ago, or maybe even earlier, the human consciousness was born. Building on the existing planetary matter and on the features developed by the living organisms, the appearance of individual self-awareness — consciousness — was the most magical moment of the planetary history. The journey was a long one leading to the expression of an authentic *Ego sum*. Once this "I am" was clearly realized through human consciousness, evolution and life became aware of themselves.

Each one of these three dramatically different evolutionary levels of manifestation: matter, life and consciousness — thus far known to exist only on our planetary body — could be considered as "dimensional punctuated equilibrium." One

evolutionary observation is that each one of these levels contains and is built upon the previous one. There was matter (atoms and molecules), then life appeared (the organisms), and then consciousness made its presence (human beings). In other words, humans have matter as well as life incorporated into a conscious and self-aware entity. Teilhard de Chardin so aptly saw the whole process as a uniquely human phenomenon (1959).

If we would like to accept the existence of a Creator, this is an elegant way to see His creation unfold — a continuous creation at that. Stepping even further away, a la David Bohm, into the cosmic realm of the Cosmic Whole, of which we form an integral part, we could say that the Cosmic Incomprehensible, or the Cosmic Godhead of the infinite expanses of the universe (the Cosmic equivalent of our "local God" on the earth) created matter, then life, and then consciousness.

One wonders what the next evolutionary quantum jump on earth is. A Kingdom of gods? Supermen? Divine men? Saints? Perhaps Buddha, Christ and Mohammed or any other of the remarkable incarnations offered a glimpse of the superbeings to come.

Evolution of Consciousness toward the New Humanity

In its evolutionary march, humanity gradually developed three basic capacities for relating to the environment, interpreting the world, understanding oneself and reaching out to the unknown. These are instinctual behavior, emotional intelligence, and the emerging spiritual intuition. We have them all. In a way, instinct is connected to emotions, emotions to intellect, and intellect to intuition.

Instinctual behavior points to the past. At the present we are dominated by emotional intelligence (Gorman, 1995). The future invites spiritual intuition. It is an emerging capacity of the consciousness that opens the door to a world in which the unknown becomes known.

Spontaneity, creativity and imagination have much to do with spiritual intuition by concretizing ideas and concepts in the rational mind-world awareness. As spiritual intuition reveals its connectedness to the unknown, the perception of possible future events might be possible. Spiritual intuition can reach into the "presence of the future." Prophets, sages of all ages and people foretelling the future, at least trying to do so, such as Nostradamus, have been invoking spiritual intuition.

The search for the spiritual, as well as the search for a deeper understanding of human nature, is opening neglected areas of inquiry and action related to the human future.

Intuition implicates spirituality and consciousness. The spiritual is a perplexing state of affairs or a level of existence. As considered here, it does not imply any particular definition, worldview, movement, religion, or ideology. The spiritual is all that is beyond the conscious awareness and would include God or gods, demons, spirits and nature spirits, ghosts, non-incarnate entities, angels, devas, guardians of the threshold, guardian angels and all the intangible entities and realities of the religions where

the "cloud of the unknowable things" exists. Such phenomena as synchronicity, destiny, causality, miracles and magic are generated by the inner rhythms of the spiritual world. One day we might discover that all existence from atoms, to individuals and humanity, and to the entire visible universe is rooted in the realm of the spiritual out of which the inner rhythms precipitate all that is. In the a-rational cultures, where existence is not limited by that which can be seen and measured by the five senses, such realities as the *dreamtime* of the aboriginal Australians and *aluna* of the Kogi Indians of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Colombia, are two of the many examples of the spiritual realm out of which is projected the known concrete world.

Human consciousness is another elusive and difficult concept to define that we have neglected to explore at length. Yet, it has carried all individual and collective human affairs from the beginning of the "time of man." Without consciousness and self-awareness there would be no human beings, cultures or civilizations. The latter are precipitated by the march of humanity on the world. In the Inca tradition, Viracocha, the highest deity, sends his envoy Tunupa to march on the world ordering it and giving sense to everything that exists. Evolving human consciousness is the most intriguing and magical reality on the planet earth. While contemporary civilization is based on rational handling and explaining the world and our society, the New Humanity, apparently, will be increasingly guided by insights and recognitions of spiritual intuition as a "knowing without knowing." The understanding of the world by rational reasoning is being expanded upon and modified by the intuitional power of the mind.

One way of exploring the possible ways of the New Humanity would be to "look back from the future." Kurt Vonnegut in his science fiction novel *The Sirens of Titan* (1959) offers a view looking back at humanity from the future. Humanity has long ago discovered that the meaning of life is found within every human being. After hundreds of years searching outward for the entity in charge of creation and its meaning, humanity stopped looking outside. One day, the inward discovery of the soul revealed the goodness and wisdom that has always been there.

Our civilization certainly is eagerly looking outward to finding explanations and solutions to every aspect of life, including oneself and a God or gods. In recent centuries this has lead to the development of an excellent science to understand, manage and dominate the outside world. But the external power has also been used for domination and wars and, above else, for achieving personal happiness perceived as a condition dependent on other people and nature. While "the pursuit of happiness" has been a never-ending individual striving, the "living happily ever since" is just not there.

Like consciousness and spirituality, the human soul is another significant quantum for the New Humanity. Zukav (1989) suggested that a new human species is being born — or a New Humanity — in which the personality becomes aligned with the soul. This would lead to the authentic power and express the values of the soul: cooperation, compassion, sharing and reverence for life. A vast majority of humanity would agree that these features are indeed a good and right thing, but their exercise is wanting due to the predominant emphasis on the external power.

The search for the new ways and power of the New Humanity and for a more viable future is an arduous task in which everybody is invited to participate. Some of the issues to be explored are:

- interdependence of nature-humanity-universe
- new human togetherness
- ways and power of love
- deeper meaning of the self and consciousness
- human rootedness in nature and its resacralization
- human soul and its values

In summary, as much as the journey toward the New Humanity is a conscious effort appearing in many parts of the world, in many cultures and societies, it is essentially an inner process moved by the spiritual strivings of many. The new way of being human will be guided by one's spiritual intuition tapping the authentic power of the human soul.

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К НОВОМУ ЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСТВУ: ОТ ЭМОЦИОНАЛЬНОГО ПОЗНАНИЯ К ДУХОВНОЙ ИНТУИЦИИ

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Множество знаков современного мира свидетельствуют о том, что ситуация из плохой становится очень плохой, и в экономическом, и в социальном, и в политическом смысле. Насилие, терроризм, ухудшение состояния окружающей среды и очевидность отсутствия гуманизма — факты общеизвестные. Многое появляется, но не выводит жизнь на новый уровень. Оно может улучшить существующие условия или ухудшить их, но не инициировать возникновение новых. Иные знаки свидетельствуют о новых особенностях развития человечества. Путь к Новому человечеству пролегает сквозь глубинные сферы бытия, как личностей, так и народов. Новое человечество выстраивается на основании идеалов и надежд все увеличивающегося количества людей из самых разных социальных групп. Парадоксально, но Новое человечество преодолевает страдания и разочарования современных людей. Поиск новых способов проявления власти мирового сообщества требует разработки следующих тезисов: 1) Возвращение к пониманию взаимозависимости человека, природы и мироздания. 2) Установление нового рода единства людей. 3) Возвращение к пониманию важности «Я».

Эволюция человечества включала в себя развитие *инстинктивного поведения — эмоционального познания — духовной интуиции*. Всеми ими мы обладаем в избытке. Инстинктивное поведение указывает на прошлое. В настоящем мы руководствуемся в основном эмоциональным познанием. В будущем на первый план выйдет духовная интуиция. Становление Нового человечества происходит рука об руку с повышением роли духовной интуиции. Рациональное познание мира расширяется и модифицируется за счет интуитивных способностей разума, что позволяет осмысливать непостижимое рациональным путем.

TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF OUR TIME: THE EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL IDENTITIES

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> *You feel that there is something behind and beyond all this fleeting fantasy, something that persists through all the success and defeats, all the tears and smiles, all this mirth and moan, but you are unable to grasp it and realize that it is the same entity that underlies the entire universe. You are one with the most distant star, and the least little blade of grass; you shine as dew on the petal of the rose, you swing from star to star. You are part and parcel of all this manifestation.* — Spiritual teacher from India

Introduction

Today we are here to talk about consciousness. We live in a rapidly changing world that is now evolving at such a pace and resulting in such violence that we are at high risk of killing ourselves off, either through direct murder of each other or by destroying the ecosystem. The religious, ethnic and tribal fundamentalisms within Christianity, Islam and Judiasm are variously mutating and hardening all around the world, both for and against secular consumerist materialism. On the one hand, capitalism is steadily and resolutely dissolving the social and economic barriers between nations and transforming entire worlds into blandly uniform markets. On the other hand, ethnic, religious and racial hatreds are rising up in such fervent protest, not only in terrorism and war but also in social unrest, that they threaten to undo and even end the world as we know it.

Some argue that international society lacks the common memory, common culture or other symbols that are present in national cultures and necessary for the formulation of universalizing identities. How do we discover our common humanity? What is "global identity"? How will we know when we are making progress in the development of global identities?

However destructive the policies of government and the products of corporations, I believe that the root of the problem is always to be found in private life, in the inner worlds that we create and live out of. If this is true, it implies that many of our policies and programs deal with effects rather than causes, with symptoms rather than attacking problems at their roots.

We are entering a time when the individual has before him or her a horizon less defined by considerations overly materialist in orientation or theologically abstract,

and more by considerations of a lived spirituality and individual human rights. It is our duty to cultivate capacities that will enable us to better understand how we are all connected at another level, beyond the level of personality, physicality, and national identity. As I hope to show here, all questions regarding the development of global identity, all questions about the possibility of future spiritual development, depend on whether we define ourselves primarily as material beings, or primarily as spiritual beings. In what follows, I will discuss how we need to help our governments and teachers foster a worldwide cultural renaissance that uplifts the dignity and worth of individual life and provides a pathway that fosters identities built on honor, love, and respect for justice within a context of felt interconnection.

Diagnosis: Optical Delusion

This decade presents the United States with its third great crisis of identity as a nation. If the Declaration of Independence was its first crisis, and the Emancipation Proclamation and Civil War its second, then its third crisis has to do with its ability and willingness to lead the world in a dream large enough to inspire unity of world effort.

Thomas Merton once said there is a one-eyed giant loose in the world, and that to not understand this is to foster resentment and violence wherever this giant stumbles.

By this Merton meant to say that those of us who live in the West are ruled by a kind of optical delusion. The single eye of technological prowess and analytical brilliance has encouraged material growth but it has not illuminated the soul. Since the Enlightenment, we have eroded the intellectual basis for adequately comprehending any aspects of life that are intangible or unquantifiable. As a result, we lack our second eye, which Thomas Merton once called the eye of wisdom and genuine compassion. We have knowledge but not wisdom. We hear talk about values, but these discussions generally lack an adequate ontological, or human, basis upon which true brotherhood and sisterhood can be established. The ethical impulse is alive and well, but the understanding of life and respect for its manifestations are anemic and weak. As a result, talk about values divides people rather than bringing them together.

Those of us who live in the West think about individual human identity in a manner quite foreign to many cultures. The quest for identity in American culture, for example, tilts hard towards separateness. According to Robert Bellah,

> It is no accident that the United States, with its high evaluation of the individual person, is nonetheless alone among North Atlantic societies in the percentage of our population who live in poverty and that we are dismantling what was already the weakest welfare state of any North Atlantic nation. Just when we are moving to an ever-greater validation of the sacredness of the individual person, our capacity to imagine a social fabric that would hold individuals together is vanishing. And this is in no small part due to the fact that our religious individualism is linked to an economic individualism which, though it makes no

> distinctions between persons except monetary ones, ultimately knows nothing of the sacredness of individuals. ... What economic individualism destroys and what our kind of religious individualism cannot restore, is solidarity, a sense of being members of the same body (Bellah, 1998, p. 5).

If American concepts of identity tilt in favor of the "I" and some eastern cultures tilt in favor of the "We," then we must develop a way of understanding the "I" in the "We." Only a proper understanding of this dialectic will enable the individual to genuinely matter in relation to the crowd and yet not favor a destructive individuality. Robert Kegan describes this dialectic with his concepts of the individual and the "embeddual." By "embeddual," he means to point to how each individual is not only an individual self but is also a self embedded in a matrix of communal meanings and interconnections (Kegan, 1982). If the individual doesn't receive adequate attention and ontological support, then either the mob rules or the community is organized under the grip of authoritarianism, be it benign or harsh. If the communal aspect does not receive a corresponding degree of attention, then people make decisions that do not sufficiently attend to the impact of those decisions on the larger community.

However, developing psychologies of the self that give adequate attention to both the individual and community will not be sufficient. "We" too often means one's local national group to the exclusion of everyone outside that group. In this day, when the parochialism of ethnic identity (with its accompanying politics of resentment) and the universalism of the profit motive (with its accompanying politics of commodities) are diametrically opposed and structured in such a manner as to be mutually exclusive of each other, it is absolutely vital that the individual and the group be grounded in something beyond themselves. There is no adequate solution for resentment and greed that is not spiritual in origin and universalizing in outcome.

When we lack an adequate understanding of what it means to be human, the political quest for freedom, justice and equality are abandoned for policies rooted in fear. More time is spent fending off the *summum malum*, rather than aspiring to the *summum bonum*. More and more, one knows what one is against, but not what one is for.

All around the world, in every country, we have many people who are standing up for identities that are enslaving us and closing us to the rest of the world. By not paying adequate attention to our common heritage as human beings, we are every day building national, ethnic, religious and sexual identities that eventually become prisons.

Erik Erikson referred to the extreme differentiation of one human group from another to the extent of denying the humanity of the other group as "pseudospeciation" (Erikson, 1969). Pseudospeciation reflects above all a kind of large group egotism, through which people seek to elevate their collective self-regard at the expense of another. As theologian Glen Tinder has noted, idealism, from this perspective, is commonly a form of collective pride. Human beings exalt themselves by exalting a group. Each one, of course, exalts the singular and separate self in some manner. Such pride is alluring. It assumes grandiose and enthralling proportions yet it seems selfless, be-

cause not one person alone but a class or nation or some other collectivity is exalted. It can be at once more exalted and less offensive than personal pride (Tinder, 1989; cited by Mack, 1992).

As John Mack has noted, the polarizing and dichotomizing tendencies of the human mind become exaggerated in the context of hatred and fear. Ethno-national conflicts, with their complex histories of killing, loss, and grief, deepen these polarities in vicious cycles of destruction, rage, and distrust unless new leadership intervenes that can heal and transcend the conflicts. Traditional leaders tend to accentuate the polarities by calls to just or holy wars in which the forces of good are perceived as attached exclusively to one's own cause and all negativity to the other's. The language of religion is especially dangerous when placed in the service of these polarities, as it amplifies their emotional intensity by invoking the greater powers of the universe on behalf of the interests and conflicts of a particular group (Mack, 1992).

A human being is not only an individual but also a member of a society. As such, he or she is not only susceptible to anxiety from internal psychic processes, but also from panic emanating from the group or society. There is no individual anxiety that does not reflect a latent concern common to the immediate and larger group.

The urge for identity is so strong that in some situations it trumps the desire for life itself. Take the case of suicide bombers. Suicide terrorism is the outcome of a contract. The suicide attacker and the terrorist faction enter voluntarily into this contract in expectation of mutual benefit. The suicide bomber trades life for identity. He or she accepts death in order to promote the group's terrorist objectives. In return the group agrees to affirm the suicide bomber's identity in the community as a martyr. However, this is a risky contract because it involves one party dying who cannot then observe its fulfillment by the other party. This risk is covered by the widespread promotion of the living martyr: a few days before the event the bomber records a final statement of joy in becoming a martyr in photographs, videos, and letters. When the recording has been distributed and the letters and photographs have been sent, each side is fully committed and neither can draw back since each will now lose more by breaking the contract than by implementing it (Harrison, 2003).

Why suicide bombers choose identities that result in their death has to do either with the felt reality that the fragmented or oppressed world into which they have been born provides no viable options for a happy or meaningful life, because of wrong information, or because the identities available to them are too narrowly defined to cope with a changing world.

Although the example of suicide bombers is an extreme example, western techno-materialism is no less destructive, though its invisibly constraining consumerism may seem more difficult to detect. Others have long noted that tyranny here is indirect and even friendly. As Alexis de Tocqueville noted 160 years ago:

> Fetters and headsmen were the coarse instruments that tyranny formerly employed; but the civilization of our age has perfected despotism itself... Mon-

> archs had...materialized oppression; the democratic republics of the present day have rendered it as entirely an affair of the mind.... [T]he body is left free, and the soul is enslaved (de Tocqueville, 1838, Book I, Chapter 15; cited by Barber, 2001, p. 220).

One outcome of our materialistic worldview is that we have a world of omnipresent and inevitable strip malls, traffic jams and billboards without them ever having been the willed choice of a democratic decision-making body. As Barber has shown, the politics of commodity offer an expansion of material options in return for surrendering the right to determine the frame. It offers the feel of freedom but actually only gives superficial material choices within an enormously limited worldview. This can seem particularly odious and threatening to other, more traditional cultures, which eventually feel an urge to retreat to traditional safety nets and tribal identities.

Treatment: A New Psychology of the Self and Cultural Renaissance

We need the United Nations and the peoples of the world to cultivate in every corner of the world a democratic idealism of life, liberty and dignity that celebrates life and our common humanity, and that accords the highest possible respect to local traditions, languages and cultures. As one piece of this, it is the sacred duty of every cultured man and woman to read sympathetically the scriptures and traditions of the world. If we are to respect others' beliefs and traditions as we would have them respect our own, it is our sacred duty to seek understanding through friendly study of each other.

It is an understatement to say that it is no easy task to unite all the peoples of the human race into the accomplishment of a common end. Left to itself, human nature tends toward the selfish and the provincial, and is more concerned from day to day with personal success and the acquiring of creature comforts. It will not be possible to build a safe and secure world until the average person is convinced that personal ambition without attention to others renders unreachable the possibility of personal happiness and success.

The opposite of war is not peace. It is creation. Someone once said that the one who goes to war first is the one who has run out of good ideas. Old ways of thinking are replaced easily when something better comes along. In the music field, for example, records and cassettes became obsolete because CDs have clear advantages.

How does Selfhood, with a capital "S," from a spiritual perspective, transcend religious affiliations? How do we appropriate our different faiths in ways that help rather than also destroy?

This in part is the question about the relationship between religion and spirituality, and there is a growing interest, all around the world, in this question. This, I believe, is a vital developmental question for the world.

Paul Tillich defined spirituality as one's *ultimate concern*; i.e., as whatever it is that the person cares most about and orients his or her entire life towards. For some

people, this will be what they regard as God. For others, it may be transcendent values like service or compassion. For still others, it may be the accumulation of material wealth, or some kind of accomplishment. Of course, as any astute observer knows, many believe that their ultimate concern is their faith, but it is quite obvious to others that their ultimate concern is something else entirely, be it their security, material accumulation, reputation, etc.

The *Oxford English Dictionary* offers 10 pages of reference material on the concept of spirituality, and focuses largely on that which animates life or has to do with life's most animating and vital principles and qualities. These factors are often described as distinct from the material world and the evidence of the five senses. In many ways, spirituality can be understood as that which gives life or energy to the material world (Simpson, 1991).

Religion, on the other hand, especially in the past three decades, is increasingly used to refer to the institutions that have been established over time around the spiritual quest. If spirituality is a flame, then religion is the box that holds the flame. Religions tend to be defined in part by their boundaries, and can be differentiated from each other on the basis of particular doctrinal beliefs and practices, requirements of membership and modes of social organization. The cultivation of the spiritual life may be a central focus, but this is typically offset by cultural, economic, political or social concerns that have developed over time (Miller and Thoresen, 2003). As the institution develops, beliefs may take on the status of virtually unalterable dogmas, which simply means that the religion has acquired, through either consensus or decree, certain beliefs that are thought to be particularly important to its identity.

These beliefs are often taken very seriously and become definitive worldviews. I was at a world conference on the development of global culture recently, and at the end of the conference, the leader of a prominent Christian group was asked to bless the meal. He refused on the grounds that his religion prohibits him from blessing food for people outside of his faith. We are all unrepeatable and unique children of God, and this has nothing to do with the different ways in which we worship God, or with what we have or have not done with our lives.

Research is demonstrating that the constructs *spiritual* and *religious* both overlap and can be distinguished in common usage. For example, Woods and Ironson (1999) conducted semi-structured interviews with 60 people who had serious medical illnesses (e. g., cancer, cardiac or HIV). 43% identified themselves as spiritual, 37% as religious, and 20% as both. Those identifying themselves as spiritual viewed God as more loving, forgiving and non-judgmental. Those tending towards the religious depicted God more as a judge. In another study, those who designated themselves as only spiritual were younger, more likely to be female, and more educated than the group which characterized themselves as both spiritual and religious. Those identifying themselves as only religious were reported to be more judgmental, more rigid in their beliefs and more intolerant than all other groups, including those who were neither spiritual nor religious (Shahabi, 2002).

What this seems to indicate is that it is possible for one to have either an *unspiritual religiousness* or an *unreligious spirituality* (May, 1982). In other words, in regards to the former, a person may display strong commitments to the extrinsic forms of religious expression but without a deep commitment to the more intrinsic realities that they seek to contain or point towards. This may be because the person is more interested in the social or other benefits of the organization, or because the religious structures have evolved in such a manner that the spiritual life has become somewhat obscured. It is conceivable that religion, in some contexts, can obstruct one's personal spiritual development. Certainly this is true for some of those who have been hurt by the ongoing clergy sexual abuse scandal that is going on in some areas of the world.

It is also possible to display an unreligious spirituality. In this situation, a person may find ways to cultivate the spiritual life or undergo mystical or transcendent experiences outside of a traditional religious context. There are indications that this is a growing trend, and for all kinds of reasons.

From a spiritual perspective, what the Self desires above all else is union with God, and this is true even if the desire is buried or turned in the direction of attachment to material items or objects of personal security. Questions of our "ultimate concern" arise in this context, such as what it means that each person is a unrepeatable and unique child of God, or what is the deepest purpose of life, and of my life in particular. From a spiritual perspective, all of life is dependent on the Life behind life. All of life is sacred. All of life is equal and as deserving of respect and dignity as all other manifestations of life. All human hierarchies are human constructions, often rooted as much in fear as the need for efficiency and organization.

From a spiritual perspective, Love is God. Whenever one participates in love, one is participating in God. Nowhere is this more true than when one is loving the one who has inflicted suffering or pain. The spiritual life knows love, joy, and wonder. It transforms suffering into joy, resentment into gratitude, greed into generosity. The spiritual life asks one to give up the ego in order to gain freedom, to die in order to live, to go down in order to go up, to be last in order to be first.

To experience the ineffability of the spiritual life is to learn about mystery and humility. I remember a Native American patient who was transferred to me after years of drug and alcohol use in the context of very adversarial relationships with doctors and therapists. He often would see the doctor only because of court-ordered treatment. Shortly before he was transferred to me, he stopped all alcohol and drug use, and used our time to solve personal problems and make plans for attending college. I finally asked him why he was making so much progress. He said that his dead grandmother had appeared to him late one night while he was asleep, sat down at the edge of his bed, expressed surprise at his tatoos, and told him to give up the alcohol and drugs. So he did. She did more for him in ten minutes than had a decade of psychiatrists and therapists! Although these ways of gaining knowledge are largely ignored in many western countries, the roots of all great spiritual systems place a great emphasis on such non-ordinary, mystical forms of consciousness. It is only

as the western world has become more consumed with a material understanding of existence, with a belief that what is real is that which can be touched or seen that these modes of knowing have atrophied. Spiritual enlightenment brings with it a growing experience of the size, power and, finally, the primacy of the invisible world. As Barbara Marx Hubbard has written:

> What sexuality was to the Victorian Age, mystical experience is to ours. Almost everyone experiences it, but almost no one dares to speak about it. We have been dominated by a scientific, materialistic culture which has made us feel embarrassed about our natural spiritual natures. Yet we read that sixty percent of the American people have had mystical experiences. We are a nation of repressed mystics! (Hubbard, 1989, pp. 179-80; cited by Mack, 1992).

Of course most spiritual experiences are less dramatic and more subtle. But they exist everywhere, hidden in people's lives, and have in common the experience that there is another reality beyond that which is immediately visible.

The Self is the doorway into this vast, sacred and ineffable domain. As someone once said, what is most personal is most universal. The Self from the perspective of the spiritual is mysterious, and is fundamentally "posited," as Kierkegaard said, by its ground of Being, which is to say, its Source. Selfhood, then, derives from something deeper than the "I" or the ethnic and political and even religious groups with which one is affiliated.

What is called for, then, is a means of discovering a wider human identity, not one that denies the polarities of nature and human feeling, but one that integrates them in a larger sense of purpose and connection. This shift would continue the process of spiritual transformation already taking place that is manifest now in the multitude of global initiatives that are striving to discover authentic international partnerships while respecting the uniqueness of ethno-national and cultural traditions. For individuals this process requires the discovery of a true core self of *I* through which we connect beyond ourselves to diverse *others*.

Traditional leaders play upon our polarizing tendencies by exaggerating them in the service of their political ambitions and public reputations. They too often ascribe God's blessing to their own political agendas and demonize the opposition in a way that is exactly designed to not understand the legitimate fears and loss of identity that are at stake for the other. This kind of ego-driven and fear based psychology actually requires an evil 'other" around which personal and group identities can coalesce.

To achieve identities that are not dominated by such polarizing tendencies means, in part, that we need deliberate educational programs, encouraged and developed by such groups as UNESCO, that explicitly discuss the ways in which traditional leaders play upon polarizing tendencies in human life in the service of their own political egos and goals. We need clear, unambiguous teaching in our textbooks that facilitates the ability of teachers, children, adolescents and adults to recognize and resist

those who further strictly material and ego-based goals by creating and maintaining enmities, and justifying war.

We live in a day when the underestimation of human possibility has become institutionalized. As a result, any worldview that is built on respect for the divinity and sacredness of all of life also implies a more loosely-held affiliation with all human-made institutions, even as we, of necessity, participate in them. Institutions are essential for meeting basic human needs, but when they are allowed to exact from us a primary identification with their particular goals and rules, they obstruct the Self's primary relationship to itself and its experience of God. Left to their own devices and the people who become overly identified with them, institutions often become vehicles for expressions of congealed power, and historically have considered the self-empowering experience of contact with the Divine to be threatening or subversive. Spiritual experience unites human beings with the primary power behind nature. It liberates and elevates the confidence of individuals in their own thoughts, emotions, and perceptions, and erodes blind loyalty to all human institutions. Spiritual experience reminds us that the world is not what it appears to be. None of us are who we appear to be. We wear masks in this world that at once both reveal and conceal our true identities. This experience connects the Self beyond itself with something greater, and it is in this place, at the Center, where the light is, that personhood receives the quality of internal cohesiveness and wholeness that does not require an external enemy that needs to be killed.

A study of Mohandas K. Gandhi's life provides some examples of this kind of personhood. Shortly after he completed his studies for the bar, he was traveling first class on a South African train in 1893 and was given a choice of moving back to third class or being evicted from the train. Gandhi protested, but was still thrown unceremoniously from the train at the next station. He protested with civil disobedience; he destroyed his South African identity papers and those of his fellow protesters, and spent the rest of his life fighting injustice. In his autobiography, he described how, in this process, he rediscovered the East and his native Hindu through the West and his contact with western Christianity. He came back to his native country and faith with a new vision of himself after making contact with a *universally valid core* of faith that he discovered was common to both East and West. Subsequent to this, he strove to create conditions that cultivated respect for individual human beings and local languages and resisted the tendency of the West to obliterate local cultures and economies in favor of blind materialism. He called himself a Christian, a Hindu, a Muslim and a Jew. Yet he was more than and less than all of these.

There is a wonderful story about the recognition of our true identity in Wolfram von Eschenbach's masterful medieval Grail romance, *Parzival* (Mustard, 1961, section 171, pp. 224–256). In this story, among other things, Parzival was told by the teacher who initiated him into knighthood that a knight never asks too many questions. Following what he thought was proper knightly behavior and disregarding his natural wonder, Parzival made no inquiry into the mysterious things he saw

at a castle in which he chanced to stay one night. Only later did he learn that he had been in the Castle of the Grail.

Socrates once said one can be a good citizen only by being more than a good citizen. Had Parzival shrugged off the bonds of the conventional and answered to something deeper and more honest within himself, if, as Wolfram put it, "(he) had only moved his jaws and asked his host the question," Parzival would have relieved the agony of the Wounded King and won the Grail for himself. His adherence to what he took to be the way of true knighthood led to failure in the greatest knightly task of all. There is, then, a deeper source of knowledge within the self that relativizes conventional knowledge and even traditional teaching about spiritual development. One could argue that it was the teacher's job to provide the instruction he provided; it was Parzival's job to develop himself in relation to knighthood in such a way that he would know when the conventional outer teachings were to be laid aside in favor of an inner understanding of the true nature of knighthood.

Conclusion

The future of the world depends on developing a deeper understanding of our true identity as human beings. There are many aspects of this that we have not examined today, not least of which is our need for a recovery of the sacred feminine all around the world to offset the ways in which current patrist cultures tend to resolve conflict.

But the main point that has been addressed today has to do with whether we are primarily spiritual beings, defined by faith, love, and the infinite dignity ascribed to each one of us as a child of God, or primarily material beings, in competition for limited material resources and in need of absolutely superior technology and security from others. The war facing us is not the war of nation against nation, or social group against social group, but the war between the material and the spiritual for ultimate primacy.

I close with Erik Erikson's discussion of the identity crisis as he considered it when applied to the world and entire cultures:

> In some young people, in some classes, at some periods in history, this [identity] crisis will be minimal; in other people, classes, and periods, the crisis will be clearly marked off as a critical period, a kind of 'second birth,' apt to be aggravated either by widespread neuroticisms or by pervasisve ideological unrest. Some young individuals will succumb to this crisis in all manner of neurotic, psychotic, or delinquent behavior; others will resolve it through participation in ideological movements passionately concerned with religion or politics, nature or art. Still others, although suffering and deviating dangerously through what appears to be a prolonged adolescence, eventually come to contribute an original bit to an emerging style of life: the very danger which they have sensed has forced them to mobilize capacities to see and say, to dream and plan, to design and construct, in new ways (Erikson, 1962, pp. 14, 15).

We need time to grow and learn, but in the interim let us regard it as our sacred duty to treat all others and all other cultures with absolute respect and love. Let us measure all policies and actions by their tangible expression of love of our neighbors as ourselves, so that we may not do business but fail to love, and not create space for our families and parochial groups, but fail to understand.

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К ПСИХОЛОГИИ НАШЕГО ВРЕМЕНИ: ЭВОЛЮЦИЯ ГЛОБАЛЬНОЙ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ

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Мы живем в столь быстро меняющемся мире, что насилие, возникающее как следствие происходящих перемен, угрожает самому нашему существованию, которое может прерваться вследствие физического уничтожения или гибели экосистемы. С одной стороны, капитализм последовательным и решительным образом сносит общественные и экономические преграды между народами и преобразует целые миры в достаточно однообразные рынки. С другой стороны, этническая, религиозная и расовая нетерпимость приобретают столь тревожные масштабы, выражаясь не только в террористических актах и военных конфликтах, но и в общественном беспокойстве, что оказывается угрозой существованию мира таким, каким мы его привыкли видеть.

Можно предположить, что международное сообщество не обладает общей памятью, единой культурой и универсальными символами, представленными в национальных культурах и являющимися обязательными для общей идентификации. Как обнаруживает себя единство человечества? Что такое «глобальная идентичность»? По какому критерию следует определять прогресс в развитии глобальной идентичности?

Какими бы разрушительными не были политика правительства и деятельность корпораций, я убежден, что корень проблемы всегда следует искать в жизни каждого отдельного человека, в наших внутренних мирах. Если это действительно так, то многие из реализуемых ныне программ и направлений в политике нацелены на последствия, а не на причины проблем.

Становление нового безопасного мира возможно при условии формирования убежденности в том, что личного счастья невозможно достигнуть, реализуя амбиции, противоречащие интересам других.

Будущее мира зависит от становления понимания нашей действительной — человеческой — идентичности. Война, в которую мы сегодня вовлечены — это не война между нациями или социальными группами, а война между материальным и духовным началом за единственно возможное неоспоримое и убедительное господство.

Part 4. Trustworthiness // Часть 4. Доверие

TOPONYMS, TOPOPHILIA, AND LIBERATION THEOLOGY

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> *How might attention to names and naming, powerful acts of assumption and ascription alike, provide one point of entry into the complexity of representing the pasts of indigenous peoples of North America and other regions of the world as native societies engaged with the Western imperial world?* (Brooks 2002: 182)

This essay constellates Brooks' question through analysis of one word, property, as it is used in the parlance of historic engineering. My points of entry are Traditional Cultural Properties (TCPs), as defined by the National Park Service, specifically, Native American sacred places. The essay explores the correlations between this definition of TCPs and western American capitalism. What does the act of naming sacred lands as "property" teach us about the structure and method of western American capitalism? Is there a historical precedent? The language of capitalism influences not only representation but also modifies access to the past. The mean by which the language of capitalism articulates its objects is best understood as a product of Western American industrial expansion in the first half of the 20th century. TCPs are one aperture with which to observe how the language of capitalism can initiate a transformation of a place into something less personal and more profitable.

The U.S. Congress and corporations met along rivers in the American West through the 1930-1970s to lay down extractive and transportational infrastructures. Mines, dams, superhighways, and nuclear power plants were constructed. The West transformed into a scenic backdrop for a net of efficient and profitable transportation pathways from wildland resources to urban centers. Eventually, historic and environmental preservation laws, the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (1966) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (1969), emerged to counter the loss of valuable places that followed extractive industry and the construction of transportation infrastructure.

TCPs are one unique type of historic property the federal government recognizes, but only since 1990.

> A Traditional Cultural Property (TCP) is a property or a place that is eligible for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places because of its association with cultural practices and beliefs that are (1) rooted in the history of a community, and (2) are important to maintaining the continuity of that community's traditional beliefs and practices (National Register of Historic Places Bulletin 38 1990, 1-5).

This article focuses on contemporary Western Native American TCPs, particularly sacred lands. TCPs can be ethnic urban neighborhoods, idyllic places, churches, and viewscapes. TCPs are a conflation of the contemporary and historic, immaterial and haptical, physical and metaphysical, the fantastic and the ecological, knowledge and location, interiority and place. In Native America, all places named in a traditional language are potential TCPs. Examples include places everywhere from origin storyscapes to fishing and gathering locations.

The guide to TCPs states that the first step is to "ensure that the entity under consideration is a property" (National Register Bulletin 38, 9). One author of Bulletin 38 recently stated that he did not intend to reproduce capitalism, "we were simply trying to relate to the statutory definition of 'historic property' in NHPA" (King 2003, 165-166). NHPA was instigated by a group of landmark preservationists and architectural historians who had more experience with the economics of the built environment than traditional holy places. The language of historic properties is applied to anthropological places. This language is legalese, divisive and incriminating; scientific, categorizing and dissecting; economic, pricing and retailing; and bureaucratic, ordering and ranking. While anthropological places do not exclude the market-space, the production of mercantile zones eliminates many facets of what makes Native American TCPs important.

The term "property" forces onto the past the language of capitalism. "The past is objectified as property"; subject to trade (Shanks and Tilley 1987, 92). Historical sites are "treated as a commodity. Like any other commodity, sites become abstract equivalents for one another; each has a price tag" (Tilley 1998, 310). American historic preservation requires "the language and framework of logical positivism" and the "'natural' ideology of bureaucratic planners and centralizers" (Lilienfield 1978, 263 in Patterson 1995, 106). The ideology of the market drives the past towards "equilibrium, stability, homeostasis, social control, self-regulation, [and] efficiency" (Patterson 1995, 112). A TCP, a fluid "entity" that bleed from its edges and emanates, is discoursed within a paradigm that translates unfixed, semantically open, and economically viable "resources" into land resource units: Property for Sale.

An example of how the term "property" works in historic preservation is the use of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) in assigning property boundaries. Historic preservationists contracted by federal and state governments ensure compliance with federal legislation. They help to streamline transportation, mineral, oil, timber, nuclear, and steam power leases. To do this, as a State Historic Preservation

Officer is quoted as saying, "boundaries have to be assigned. It may not be fair, and it may not be right, but.... This is bureaucracy" (King 2003: 157). A way of creating property boundaries is to use GIS maps that digitally code geospatial information on a personal computer. GIS maps produce bound property units by reducing TCPs to a point or a polygon. The permitting process is digitized, disembodied, reductive, and travels at an economical speed (Goodchild 2004). After an initial consultation and an overview of the extant ethnographic literature in forming the GIS "property boundary," the archaeologist can perform with little contact from Native Americans.

Historical scientists assume the ability to objectively report on the worth of historic properties. They are the experts helping to arbitrate historical significance and historical resource productivity. Once a veto of the historicity of a place is given, industrial construction begins, often with economic and political support from the federal government. Historic preservationists and corporations constitute an important hub in this triage. For example, The Bush Administration's Energy Task Force, led by Vice President Dick Cheney, targeted the state of Wyoming for major oil and gas development. The Wyoming State Historic Preservation Office responded in 2003, making available online a version of their GIS maps of cultural sites, including confidential TCPs, to resource extractive corporations with access to a special password and internet connection. This will streamline the permitting of oil and gas drilling with minor interaction with historic preservation personnel and no consultation with Native American tribal elders about non-mapped TCPs (Hopkins 2003).

The genesis of for-profit cultural resource corporations emerged from the costly, specialized, and time consuming, archaeological, historical, and anthropological fieldwork needed to comply with federal historic preservation laws. Historic preservationists are business people. They articulate their business in managerial and scientific terms. Science divides nature into manageable units of study; cultural resource corporations are hired to find "property boundaries." Cultural resource corporations write "scientific" reports that help construction corporations comply with historical preservation laws. The reports that satisfy the permitting process require TCPs to be bound properties, their significance rational, and their historicity emerging from linear time. As such, these reports reduce the heteroglossia of the Native American past and trivialize the non-scientific ways traditions are expressed.

When historic property disputes get to courts, judges calculate in economic terms the costs and the benefits to the public of the historic property. The use of the term "property" forces courts to speak a language comprehensible to business, development planners, engineers, architects, and federal land managers working in a capitalist system. Courts conclude for or against business. Non-businesses competing for validation in accessing TCPs and equal protection under the law are excluded from the debate. The laws that encode places as properties marginalize those without property, who are not dedicated to the ideology of private property, and/or experience place as contiguous, eminent, and beyond commodification (Winthrop 1994).

The language of capitalism is so highly specialized or vague that it is divorced from the phenomenological integrity of place. This is so because "Native Americans have a holistic view of their world. Breaking up of TCPs into units compromises the spirituality and cosmology of the TCP" (personal communication Shannon 2004). Capitalism observes nature as alien and an external realm while tribal people experience nature as internal phenomena (Winthrop 1994, 28). The making of property boundaries is a method of analysis as opposed to synthesis; it is divisive not integral. This abstracts and isolates Native American placement (Bard 1997).

Property boundaries make landscapes into fragments. This creates non-places, *spaces*, where absolute speed (efficiency) obliterates material culture and memory (Entrikin 1990, Auge 1995). Fragmentation is possible through legislative phraseology. Philosopher James Olgivy describes this process:

> When local lore gives way to the abstract grid of the real-estate developer the loss includes more than the land. The very vocabulary of intersubjective experience is semantically grounded in a sense of place which, once destroyed, leaves the languages of intersubjectivity impoverished [Olgivy 1977, pp. 124–125].

The American West is characterized by boom and bust economies, marginalizing regionalism, expectant capitalism, transportation infrastructure, hydraulic utopianism, federal feudalism, and industrial manifest destiny. In the dry West, these activities distilled along rivers, places the tribes also favored as traditional landscapes. The order and method of Western American capitalism is to locate, concentrate, transport, and retail raw resources. By the 1960s, nature and historic preservation reached nationalistic consciousness; this was primarily so because of the destruction caused by industrialization. Historic properties became "cultural resources," a romantic and transcendental belief that in the past is knowledge, or at least, therapeutic beauty. Historical places were "registered," listed like endangered species. The best of these cultural resources became tourist destinations. In the late 20th century, Native American sacred sites like Mt. Shasta (Wintu, Yoruk), Chaco Canyon and Rainbow Bridge (Hopi, Navajo), and Mato Tipila and Medicine Wheel (Lakota, Eastern Shoshone) became powerful places for spiritually bankrupt Angloamericans. To the visiting Angloamericans these TCPs are tourist locations, places to get lost or get found, and to test your strength and contemplate. The National Park Service gentrifies these areas with paved roads, "porta potties," and guided tours. Key chains depicting the sacred place are sold in kitsch stores. To the Native Americans, something is lost from these places when they become tourist destinations. When the images are sold on picture postcards, something is taken away. Capitalism transforms the power of place into the power of economy. Whenever capitalism enters a place, space is produced and history is absolved from its duty to inform the present.

The production of Western American heritage management is "the *social production of space*" (Soja 1989, 8). "Space is the practice of place..."; whose emergence from place is observed in history (de Certeau 1984, 117). Spaces are the opposite of localities and placements, the inversion of community, tradition, and history. The individual and community are misplaced in a sea of economic statistics, digital maps, technological infrastructure, obfuscating speed, billboards, economic speculation, and tourist details. As supralocalities, the value of spaces arrives as dividends in foreign markets or as tourist destinations.

In the American West, space was first mass-produced by major federal/corporate extractive and transportation industries. In the late 19th century this meant ranches, lumber-mills, mines, steamboats, and railroads. A century later, the production of space was refined to electricity and military power production in the forms of hydroelectric dams and nuclear engineering. The old economies survived in human bodies, while the newer economies were mechanized and produced power. The quintessential artifact of the 20th century American West is the dam. Dams forced the relocation of farming people, teleported the electrical power of rivers great distances at unfathomable speeds, and destroyed more TCPs than any other construction tactic. These places are transformed into totalizing nodes in the production of electricity. Historical places are drowned by reservoirs, crosscut by high-tension wires screaming with currency, and capped by asphalt. No historical markers exist from which to triangulate place and tradition. In prehistoric times, populations along the lower Snake River in Washington State were close to 10,000 Nez Perce and Palus people. Today, there are four dams and a fraction the population. The sentient quality of place is eliminated.

In non-industrial locations, the place becomes a tourist destination. Here, aesthetic power is geospatially located and repositioned as a nature reserve, wilderness study area, archaeological district, national getaway, and theme park. Permits, tickets, and promises to stay on the path give access to these spaces. Most major sacred places in the Native American West have contested major intrusions of tourism. For example, Mato Tipila, or Lodge of the Bear (Devil's Tower), is a major rockclimbing destination and the center of the cosmological world for several tribes. Southwestern Chacoan kivas and pueblos sacred to the Navajo and Hopi now attract multimillion-dollar industries of tourism, blackmarket antiquities trade, and wilderness adventure. Rainbow Bridge greets yachts full of sunscreen-bedazzled tourists everyday. Native peoples are hugely offended and have fought in courts for decades to minimize the impact of capitalism on these precious lands (Sacred Land Film Project 2004).

That no two people describe or experience a historical place identically is a product of the inability to contain place by using a reductive language. There is a dialectic between observer and observed that resists broad generalizations (Eagleton 1992, 59). The interaction between places and people, and vice versa, is a communication in which both place and person are created, modified, and affirmed, materially and

symbolically (Giddens 1976, 207). Cultures are adaptive and change through time. The object of traditional cultural preservation should *not* be preservation but access and plural intelligibility (Winthrop 1998, 27). A language needs to be written that does not prioritize populations who profit from space but makes places available to all shareholders.

Problems exist in a calculus that equates history with profit. These troubles amplify when applied to sublime and fragile historic places, TCPs. A study of TCPs signifies the health of historic preservation and exhibits the basic contradictions in the conflation of profit and history. As social power becomes less material and more cognitively constructed and deployed, historic preservation may need to retract from its economic materialism or discard its altruistic guise and nakedly enter the late-capitalist ecology (Renfrew 2003). As an historic property type that strives to integrate the social with the tactile, the praxis of TCPs is one optimistic avenue for the future of historic preservation. Regardless of the trajectory, as historic preservationists wrestle with describing the eminent places yet known, a new language that includes Native American philological and cognitive categories will need to be used if Native Americans are going to be equal shareholders in TCPs. A Spokane/Coeur d'Alene poet asks

> How can we imagine a new language when the language of the enemy keeps our dismembered tongues tied to his belt? How can we image a new alphabet when the old jumps off billboards down onto our stomachs? How do we image a new life when a pocketful of quarters weighs our possibilities down? (Alexie 1994, 152).

TCPs are historic. They are also about the future of Native America. The language used to describe sacred places is and always was about the ability of Native Americans to use storied landscapes to adapt, re-enact, re-interpret, re-present, preserve, and perhaps even invent new historiographical traditions.

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ТОПОНИМЫ, ТОПОФИЛИЯ И ТЕОЛОГИЯ ОСВОБОЖДЕНИЯ

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Во всем мире исконно священные земли находятся под угрозой промышленной застройки, идущей под эгидой позднего капитализма. Протест коренного населения Америки против уничтожения священных земель вызвал массовую политическую реакцию и привел к принятию соответствующих законов в Конгрессе. В то время как массовая активность приводит к смешению идей

традиционной религии и современной политики, законодательство, при внимательном изучении, отражает технологии экономической системы, способной не проявлять уважения к религиозным правам коренного населения Америки. Данная проблема существует в контексте правовых и лингвистических отношений между доминирующей экономикой и религиозными правами национальных меньшинств, которые регулирует Конституция США и Декларация ООН о правах человека. Данная статья являет собой диалогический синтез связей между законными топонимами США и религиозной топофилией коренного населения. Идет поиск рождающихся решений наиболее спорных вопросов. Статья анализирует испытания, которые выпадают на долю религиозных меньшинств, если они вынуждены соперничать с постоянно расширяющейся национальной экономикой, равно как и хитроумные методы захвата и коммодитизации, которые система использует в своем постоянном росте. Мы начинаем с рассмотрения религиозных практик коренного населения Америки, переходим к анализу светской практики Запада, а затем нам открывается новый взгляд на религиозную принадлежность американцев и коренного населения Америки в семантически измененном индустриализованном мире.

AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE ON BEING HUMAN: INSIGHTS REGARDING THE NATURE OF TRUSTWORTHINESS

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Personal Note

In these troubling times it is hard to see evidence of a guiding wisdom in any religion. May this paper help people deepen their understanding of the heart of Islam and the significant role religious teachings can, and often do, play in the development of trustworthy individuals. As a counseling psychologist in private practice for over 25 years, and as a trained spiritual director in the Christian tradition, I will also consider core teachings from the Abrahamic traditions as they relate to mental and spiritual health.

Ideas expressed in this paper are drawn primarily from the Qur'an, the spoken wisdom of Shah Nazar Seyed Dr. Ali Kianfar, a modern Islamic scholar and Sufi Master, and from direct experience as a practitioner of Islam since 1990. My views have also been influenced by various translations of the works of Ibn Arabi and Al Ghazali. Any errors or oversights are the responsibility of the author.

Introduction

This paper discusses universal aspects of humanity as seen through the lens of Islam. It explores Qur'anic teachings about reality, human nature, and the requirements of becoming fully human. The concluding sections consider an approach to human development and the spiritual domain that is consistent with modern research findings and teachings of great religious traditions.

It is important for the reader to understand that Western scholars who study sacred scripture as a form of literature will not share the experience of sincere Muslims who read the Qur'an. Revelatory writing cannot be understood through intellectual or aesthetic analysis alone. Revelations contain guidance toward good character, a peaceful heart, and right relationship with God and with others. Only through striving to live by this guidance does one begin to experience the truth behind the words. Muslims believe that the Qur'an, when accurately understood, contains the greatest gift possible, a map for becoming a complete and worthy human being.

Islam is unequivocally theocentric. Practicing Muslims consider everything in relation to an omnipresent Oneness, from which all of creation comes and to which everything will return. The beneficial aspects of this worldview may be difficult to appreciate for those deeply rooted in a secular mindset or alienated by the misuse of religion.

Some secularists dismiss theocentrism out of hand by pre-judging it as naïve, superstitious, regressive or even dangerous. Of course, a comparable judgment rooted in fear or ignorance easily condemns all that is secular. Some scholars claim these dueling worldviews, secularism and theocentrism, are at the root of rising fundamentalism in all three of the Abrahamic traditions.[1] The disdain for dramatically different ways of seeing the world may result in a similarly rigid secular mindset when science becomes the *only* truth-validating institution.

Adherents to this latter view may ignore, deny, or even consider pathological, events that lie outside the range of appropriate scientific investigation. Unlike the sciences, Islam and other theistic religions are concerned with the innermost dimensions of human experience. Compassion, mercy, righteousness — core ingredients of most religions — are not generally amenable to traditional scientific inquiry.

In science the unit of analysis is generally a single object or group of objects. The larger context within which the objects exist is either ignored or controlled to whatever extent possible. In Islam, the *context,* with its laws and governing principles, *is* the focus of attention. All objects are viewed in relation to the ultimate contextual reality called God.

Rather than descriptions of things, religion offers prescriptions for living and for becoming a "good" person. Rather than dwelling on life forms, religion emphasizes the mystery that creates and sustains life forms. Science wants to know how the human heart works and how to prolong its function in the body. Religion is concerned with the source of the heart beat and with a purity of "heart" that must be achieved before a person can be considered fully trustworthy.

Both science and religion deal with the mind. Science seeks to explain what it is, how it works, and how it is related to the brain. True religion seeks to expand the capacity of the mind by helping people recognize universal longings of the human soul and see beyond the delusions, desires, and distractions of this world.

Of course, history is filled with examples of people who have used religion in ways that trap themselves and others in greater illusions and mental bondage. This is not the fault of the religion itself. Rather, it is the fault of individuals with limited understanding and development using religion for their own ego-related purposes.

There seems to be no short cut to integrity and trustworthiness. The road to becoming a complete human being is long and demanding, but open to all. If the founders of major religions were mapmakers for this journey, modern scientists are local tour guides along the way.

I: The Reality behind "Reality"

God's reality is absolute, but our reality is relative. God's reality is permanent and unchanging; it is the standard by which all things are judged. All other realities exist as a function of God's reality. Hence other reali-

> *ties can only be understood in relation to God ... 'There is no god but God' means that everything other than God has to be understood in relation to God.*[2]

The foundational principle of Islam is the principle of divine unity (*tawhid*). This underlying, overarching and thoroughly pervasive unity is most often expressed in the phrase *Lâ ilâha illa'Llâh (there is no god but God)*. The profound meaning of this phrase cannot be derived from any of its numerous translations. Translations using the word "God" can be especially misleading (for believers and nonbelievers) because prevalent concepts of God differ significantly from the God described in the Qur'an. Paul Tillich's phrase "the Ground of All Being" does, however, point in a similar direction.

One of many names of God in the Qur'an is *Al Haqq* or "the Real" or "the Truth." This name seems to have less mental baggage for Westerners who seek truth and attempt to understand reality. In Islam, nothing is outside the realm of God because ultimately, God is the *only* reality. The Qur'an repeatedly says that "everything in the heavens and earth belongs to God" (5:18).[3] It also calls people to recognize and honor the Reality behind the magnificence and precision of everyday occurrences like the cycles of day and night (2:164). We are told that "whithersoever ye turn, there is the countenance (face, or presence) of God" (2:115). At the same time we are reminded that there is nothing whatever like God (42:11).

The Prophet Mohammed said, "... the foundation for this religion is knowledge,"[4] and "the worthiest and most valuable among you are those with greater knowledge."[5] This includes scientific, as well as, spiritual knowledge. This deep knowing leads to an awareness of humanity as a whole. When it is absent, only differences and divisions are understood. When it is present, identification with and compassion for all people becomes possible.

Spiritual knowledge deals with principles derived directly from an unseen world (e. g., as in the case of the prophets) or secondarily from following the messages of the prophets and by observing nature and oneself. Spiritual knowledge combines reason *and* a knowing of the "heart." When wisdom and social justice are sought, this type of knowing is both practical and to a large extent, trans-cultural.

True righteousness is evidence of true spiritual knowledge. Although knowledge of Reality is available to every sincere person, the Qur'an warns repeatedly that "most 'men' do not understand" (30:6). The human mind is easily deluded into thinking that we are independent of the Reality beyond changing phenomena.

The illusion of separation invites replacing God with "self" or "one's group," and easily gives rise to self-righteous attitudes and behaviors among believers and nonbelievers alike. It fails to grasp that righteous action depends on right understanding of oneself and of Reality. According to Islam, the experience of Divine Unity or Reality is the core of spiritual knowledge, the essential message of *all* prophets (21:25), and the source of authentic righteousness.

II: Humanity's Inherent Challenge

There are many arguments among followers of Islam, but there is full agreement on core principles, two of which are relevant to this paper. First, human beings are an integral part of a unified and perfectly ordered whole that is sustained and kept in balance by an omnipresent and merciful God. Secondly, though their approaches may vary, Muslims from various denominations agree that human fulfillment comes from honoring and being in harmony with the Reality behind this exquisitely designed creation.

True righteousness is not self-righteousness

As physical reality submits to the laws governing it, Islam calls people to submit to principles for living. These are the same principles followed consciously or unconsciously by honest, trustworthy people everywhere. Muslims believe that being in harmony with the unity beyond appearances provides the insight and strength necessary to become a truly righteous person. As with most other religions, in Islam belief alone is not enough. Right action is also necessary (30:15).

In the realm of nature, surrender to a particular way of *being* is automatic. In the case of humans, it is a choice and often a struggle. Much human suffering is caused by the disregard for universal guidelines for living, such as: truthfulness, responsibility, and concern for others. Hurtful or foolish actions, according to Islam, result from wrong guidance, partial understanding, or a partially developed self. Righteous behavior is a sign of following good guidance and is evidence of a soul that is developing as it should.

The Reality beyond appearances, we are told in the Qur'an, responds to the degree of righteousness of individuals (49:13,18). Righteousness reflects the degree to which people are in harmony with the spiritual laws governing them, whether they are aware of this or not. Righteous behavior signals an alignment with these underlying laws. Conversely, behavior that is not just, compassionate or wise signals an undisciplined ego, or distorted or incomplete understanding. Common signs of a lack of understanding are arrogance, defensiveness, escapism, a need to dominate others, an indifference to the suffering of others, and self-righteousness.

Our dual nature & unique purpose

Man's situation is like this: an angel's wing
was brought and tied to a donkey's tail. Rumi[6]

According to the story of creation in the Qur'an, Adam (a prototype representing all people) was created from clay and then God breathed His spirit into him. Thus, we are a mixture of clay and spirit, and have two natures, one earthly and the other spiritual. The human story could be described in terms of the struggle between these two natures.

Our earthly nature is strongly attracted to the things of this world. The resulting interaction with the world teaches us about differences, personal choice, and how to survive in this world. Some people become *totally* occupied with the mental, social and physical levels of reality, and neglect the promptings of their soul.

Our spiritual nature inclines us toward compassion, justice, trustworthiness, and wisdom, and toward righteous action. If we fail to pursue these promptings, the Qur'an warns that we become "the lowest of the low" (95:4). Unlike other animals, we can make choices that foster justice and unity, or injustice and hatred.

With regard to human potential, the Qur'an tells us that human beings were made in the best of molds (95:4), that we have a natural bias toward what is just (82:7), and that we are created for a high and noble purpose (2:30). In addition, it reports that our essential nature is good (30:30), and that uncovering our true nature (buried beneath layers of personal and cultural programming) is the goal of human life and of true religion. An increase in praiseworthy qualities such as generosity, patience, and gratitude indicates movement toward this essential nature.

When God told the angels he was going to create "man" to be "His" representative on earth, the angels showed concern and some foresight. They said, "Wilt Thou place (in this position in the world) one who will make mischief and shed blood?" Presumably affirming "man's" true nature and our potential for good, God replied simply, "I know what ye do know not" (2:30).

So that he might fulfill his high purpose, God then gave Adam (and therefore, all of us) a special knowledge by teaching him "the nature of all things" (2:31). This attribution of special knowledge to humanity is very significant in Islam. Muslims place a high value on knowledge, and believe that right understanding of the nature and purpose of life is a critical part of faith. They point to Abraham (who was neither Jew, Christian nor Muslim) as a model of true faith and surrender (16:120), and, ontologically speaking, the first "muslim" (2:128,131 & 4:125).

Looking to Abraham as a model of faith for all people reveals important clues as to the nature of Islamic faith and how it develops. Abraham's story, as presented in the Qur'an, reveals a faith based on observing nature, reasoning, questioning, listening, obeying and trusting. It suggests that spiritual knowledge is received directly from God with no intermediaries, and that true faith is based on clear knowledge of oneself, one's relationship to Reality, and one's relationship to others.

If it is received without distortion, this kind of knowledge facilitates movement toward one's essential purity and alignment with universal principles, inwardly and outwardly. Inward alignment is associated with good character and right thinking, which then expresses itself in righteous action. Abraham becomes a model for the smashing of idols, the acquisition of spiritual knowledge, and becoming a person worthy of representing God on earth. Muslim's believe that such a person reflects God's divine attributes in the world.

Today's idols differ from those found in Abraham's time. The idols we worship are not usually made of stone or wood. Most often they involve ideologies, exaggerated

images of self, distractions based on confused priorities, or worship of symbols or individuals instead of the Reality they represent. Modern idols misdirect huge amounts of life energy toward activities and objects that cannot bring enduring satisfaction. In today's world, it is easy to remain ignorant of the universal principles operating within and around us, and thus be ignorant of our own underdeveloped capacity for good.

Why so few fulfill their high purpose

Affirming the superiority of Adam because of the special knowledge given him by God, the Qur'an tells us that all but one angel bowed before him (15:30-33). Iblis, a symbol of arrogance and rebellion against God, alone refused to bow to Adam as God had commanded. Iblis then made an intriguing contract with God that gives him permission to tempt and to try to deceive humans until their death. The rebellious angel vows that he will "make (wrong) fair seeming" and that he will "put them (humans) all in the wrong," except true servants of God (15:39).

The story continues as the dark force of deception (now called Satan) causes Adam and his wife to disobey God's instruction to avoid a particular tree. God sends all three of them away from the garden to live and work on the earth "with enmity" among themselves "for a time" (2:36). Then, a very important thing happens. Out of mercy, God "turns toward" Adam and says that guidance will definitely come to him (i. e., all people), adding, "whosoever follows My guidance, on them there shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve" (2:38). Elsewhere we are told that anyone who sincerely seeks guidance will receive it (19:76).

Thus, the spiritual history of humankind, according to the Qur'an, includes great potential for good that mitigates a strong tendency toward deception, rebellion, and distraction from our real purpose. When deceived as to who we essentially are, why we are here, and what will bring us happiness, we engage in foolish or harmful behavior. According to Islam, destructive elements in human history stem from deludedness and poor character, while constructive action is rooted in awareness, understanding, perseverance, self-restraint and good guidance.

The Qur'an clearly states that human beings were made to rule the world (6:165, 45:12.13), but in accordance with divine principles. It also explains that we are "inclined toward the earth" and to following our own "vain desires" (7:176). The struggle to become honorable and truly righteous so that we may fulfill our high calling is an important meaning of the widely known, but generally misunderstood, word "jihad."

III: An Outline of Key Islamic Teachings about Being Human

Human Nature & Purpose — As human beings we:

- Are an integral part of a unified whole created and sustained by a merciful, omniscient and omnipotent Oneness;
- Are created to be God's faithful servants and representatives on earth;

- Have an earthly nature that must submit to a divine nature;
- Were made in the "best of molds," and have a bias toward justice, but are inclined toward distraction and delusion;
- Have an essential nature that is good and pure, but hidden beneath personal and cultural programming;
- Must uncover our essential nature and live in harmony with it, in order to fulfill the high purpose for which we were created;
- Were given an immense but often undeveloped capacity to understand;
- Think we have free will;
- Are strongly attracted to things of this world, and inclined to follow our desires;
- Need good guidance, discipline and reminders of why we are here, so we don't neglect our deeper purpose.

Fundamental Human Challenges

- Our earthly nature and our spiritual nature are often in conflict and the mind is the battleground — bloodshed on earth is the result;
- Our minds may serve our untamed ego or help us become worthy of being God's servant;
- To be fulfilled, we must tame our mind and use it to serve our spiritual nature;
- Our minds are easily deluded and distracted from fulfilling our true purpose;
- Understanding and sustained personal effort are required to control the mind and direct it toward our ultimate goal;
- We must learn to see beyond the world of appearances and align ourselves with an underlying Unity or Reality;
- Ignorance — whether about ourselves, the world, or *Reality* — leads to actions with unpleasant consequences;
- We should recognize our wrong choices, ask for forgiveness, and learn from experience to make wise, merciful and just choices.

God's Message to All People

- All of the prophets call us to know and live in harmony with Divine Unity;
- If we understand and follow the teachings of God's messengers, we will find the way to inner peace and right action;
- God is with us wherever we are, and aware of our intentions, actions, and level of understanding;
- if we turn toward God, God turns toward us;
- Anyone who sincerely asks for God's guidance will be given it;
- All the good that we do, however small, will be rewarded; whatever wrong we do will result in pain and regret.

Signs of Moving toward Our Essential Nature

- Freedom rooted in forgiveness, wisdom, and self-restraint;
- Gratefulness, humility, confidence;
- Integrity based upon a balance of virtues;
- Concern for the welfare of others;
- Capacity to understand and respond, rather than, react.

IV. Health Care for Humanity

> *...they may not see with their eyes and with their ears they may not hear, and that their own heart may not understand...* Isaiah 6:10
>
> *A good man brings forth good out of the good treasure of his heart, but a wicked man brings forth what is wicked out of his wicked (treasure); for out of his heart's abundance his mouth speaks.* Luke 6:45
>
> *In their hearts is a disease... They have hearts wherewith they understand not, eyes wherewith they see not, and ears wherewith they hear not. They are like cattle — nay more misguided: for they are heedless (of warning)...* (Sura 2:10, 7:179)

Diseases of the heart

Hebrew, Christian, and Islamic sacred texts often use the word "heart" to refer to a subtle inner locus of perception and awareness, something deeper and more profound than feelings or emotions. The Abrahamic scriptures imply that if it is pure and functioning properly, the human "heart" will understand and pursue principles such as justice. When healthy, it is believed to be the site of conscience and virtue.

Sufi Muslims teach that this subtle faculty of the human being is the place of true guidance and understanding. Like a bridge between the spiritual and the earthly, one's heart must be in good repair and firmly secured in both worlds. The mind plays a role in maintaining a healthy heart if it learns to seek, recognize and value the subtle knowing associated with conscience and insight.

The Qur'an refers often to hearts that are "diseased," meaning a heart that is in "confused ignorance" of the guidance brought to humanity by God's messengers. From a psycho-spiritual perspective, a diseased heart usually exhibits an excess or deficiency of a specific virtue, or an imbalance between two closely related virtuous qualities (e. g., mercy and justice). A diseased heart may also result from uncontrolled or misdirected natural impulses such as the desire for love, control or power.

Most people acknowledge the affects of diet, exercise, rest and a strong immune system on physical health. Scriptures remind us of the requirements and benefits of a healthy spiritual diet and of maintaining a strong spiritual immune system. Symptoms of spiritual health include an enduring sense of wellbeing, balance and harmony, loving kindness and concern for others.

Common complaints such as anxiety, depression, fatigue, resentment, and busyness often have an unrecognized spiritual component. Research has repeatedly shown that people with active religious lives tend to be healthier mentally and physically.[7] Lifestyle differences alone do not account for this positive correlation. Scriptures encourage trust, compassion, forgiveness and gratitude, all of which have a profound affect on one's stress level and relationships.

In America, we have a diminished view not only of health, but also of what it means to be a human being. Can we call people healthy if they cannot be trusted, or cannot feel compassion for others? How about those interested *only* in their own comfort and pleasure? Can they be called healthy? Is our limited understanding inadvertently discouraging personal responsibility and full maturation of people?

The language of integrity

Results of the 2004 U.S. presidential election are relevant to this discussion. Jolted by voter priorities, the mainstream media no longer can avoid the topic of "moral values." Discomfort with this topic is not restricted to the media, for it requires a level of discourse that is rare and very much needed in America. We have substituted pragmatic "positions" for the universal "principles" that should be guiding democratic decisions. More than one position can legitimately be derived from the same principle.

To meaningfully address the values and norms that form the basis of a healthy human "heart" and a healthy nation there must be a common language and shared ideals. A beyond-partisan language containing normative ideals that is consistent with but not dependent on major religions does exist. It is rarely used anymore. It could be called the "language of integrity."

Most people would agree that seeking to live a life of integrity is a good thing. Most people would also agree that certain ways of *being* in the world are better than other ways. For example, few would claim it is better to be dishonest and untrustworthy than the opposite. Honesty and trustworthiness point to values and ideals considered desirable by all religions and cultures, including America's. Individuals and groups may differ in *how they express* these universal ideals, but most agree they are striving (at least within their own group) to embody them.

If we look across time and culture to the great teachers, heroes and heroines, we can see they all embody qualities that people used to call "virtues." Their integrity or honor consists of core virtues such as truthfulness, perseverance, loyalty, and courage, to mention a few. The desirability of praiseworthy personal qualities is an example of a unifying truth even though this may not always be immediately apparent.

If further verification is needed, consider the correlation between integrity, defined by interrelated virtuous qualities, and mental health. The chart below looks at common concerns presented in counseling offices arising from an overabundance or deficiency of some virtue. Too much or too little of a "good" thing is generally connected with undesirable behaviors.

Symptoms of Deficiency	**Virtue**[8]	**Symptoms of Over Abundance**
impulsivity	self discipline	Compulsivity
insensitivity	compassion	over identification with others
unreliability	responsibility	egotism, lack of trust in others
aloofness, isolation	friendliness	superficiality
indolence	work	workaholism
cowardice	courage	foolhardiness
distractibility	perseverance	rigidity, stubbornness
deceit, duplicity	honesty	ruthlessness
infidelity	loyalty	servility, extreme submissiveness
cynicism	faith	deludedness

All the great traditions call people to virtuous action and encourage the development of integrity and good character. The founders of America shared these intentions and acknowledged that a successful democracy depended on the education and character of the populace. Both religion and democracy use the "language of integrity" to describe the "good of the whole" and the "good" of the individual. They offer similar models of being human that include "higher" capacities such as wisdom and service.

Might the language of integrity facilitate a more fruitful national and international conversation about human behavior? Might it help us reclaim the roots of democracy and the fruits of true humanity?

V. Integrity: A Station on the Way to Becoming Fully Human

The Qur'an could respectfully be compared to a spiritual textbook explaining the history and purpose of human life, while describing the anatomy and physiology of the human soul. It provides a backdrop against which to recognize one's potential, one's weaknesses and their correctives, and one's ultimate goal. If properly used, it creates an x-ray of the soul clarifying what is healthy and what needs mending. Once a diagnosis is made, the Qur'an like other scriptures, provides remedies for healing.

The "language of integrity" is a language of mental and spiritual health, and human development. Our innermost health reflects itself through trustworthiness and the right balance of other aspects of integrity. Trustworthiness is a sign that one is making progress on the road to becoming a fully developed human being. Humility, not arrogance, is the traveling companion of the trustworthy, for they can see the distance that remains on this sacred journey toward what Islam calls our "essential self".

All sacred texts provide models of honorable living and some correctives for diseases of the heart. The Qur'an goes further by reassuring humanity that *all* human beings have the capacity to find the path to completeness and fulfillment. It points to our heart's ability to know what is right, and the promise that those who sincerely seek guidance will receive it. It encourages people to pray, to patiently persevere in doing what is right and just, and to trust that God will provide what is needed to complete the journey. Commitment, understanding and knowledgeable guidance are keys to inner progress in Islam.

Essential teachings about what it means to be fully human are periodically buried by people and modes of thinking that are less than fully human, but this does not negate the validity of the teachings themselves. When promoted by people with a diminished view of being human, the sociological entities called "religions" and the systems of thinking called "ideologies" have the power to mobilize the most inhumane aspects of people. Today's circumstances require us to focus on the qualities that scriptures and wise people all over the world call us to develop. Movement in this direction requires some changes.

Will we learn from the great teachers of humanity to expand our understanding of human nature to include the natural inclination to serve others? Will we learn that we not only need to be loved, justly treated and respected, we also need to *express* love, justice and respect for others? In order to act in these ways, we need to think and *be* in ways that lead to authentically righteous action, and to being responsible members of the human family.

Great teachers throughout history call us to a way of thinking and being in the world that manifests itself in justice, consideration and trustworthiness in our interactions with others. Righteousness and good character are everyone's birthright. But they are learned and require considerable effort. It would serve us well to investigate the nature of righteous thinking and behavior, and how they are learned. More importantly, let us evaluate the strength of our own desire to understand what it means to be a complete human being, and the strength of our own motivation for moving in that direction.

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ИСЛАМСКОЕ ВИДЕНИЕ ЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСКОГО БЫТИЯ: ИНСАЙТЫ О ПРИРОДЕ ДОВЕРИЯ

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Понимание того, что в учении Ислама означает «быть человеком», возможно, заставит более уважительно относиться к одной пятой части человеческой расы и пополнит коллективное знание человечества о себе самом. Коран дает новое знание, раскрывая желания и болезни человеческого сердца, и служит компасом, помогающим ориентироваться в широком многообразии человеческого опыта. Подобно социальным и естественным наукам, Коран сквозь линзу вероятности, рассматривает явления бытия и человеческого опыта. Подобно науке с собственной системой координат, учение Корана логично, последовательно и убедительно ведет к истине. Недопонимание, боязнь или недоверие к науке или религии могут в одинаковой степени привести к жесткому догматизму, делая их в равной степени служанками человеческого невежества. По ряду причин многие люди не понимают, боятся или презирают исламское видение мира. Коран и учение Мухаммеда проповедуют достоверность и другие достойные качества и имеют значительно более позитивный взгляд на природу человека, чем принято считать. Зачастую скрытое под культурными наслоениями, это учение способно дать полезное психологическое знание об эмоциях, морали и мирном сосуществовании. В этой статье делается попытка показать, как более глубокое понимание ислама может помочь человечеству решить некоторые стоящие перед ним проблемы. В частности, в статье обсуждаются исламский взгляд на а) связь между реальностью и природой человека и его самоощущением и б) ограничения и выгоды, которые можно получить, развивая «высокую» и контролируя «низкую» природу человеческих существ.

JUSTICE STUDIES — AN ENIGMA?

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Introduction

This paper re-visits the concept of justice as it may take shape under the new paradigm of cultural diversity. My starting points are my reflections on my experiences in developing and administering a legal studies program — a Bachelor of Arts in Justice Studies at Royal Roads University, Canada. The BA in Justice Studies has been designed for prospective justice service workers in Canada. The learners are taught the values/beliefs that have become the fabric of the Canadian legal system and are thus, quintessentially, a feature of Canadian culture.

The delivered content and the applied pedagogy serve a learner clientele that wishes to become justice leaders in Canada. Thus, justice, in this context, is not an absolute universal concept but a concept to encapsulate the Canadian self-understanding. Cultures tend to define justice in this manner. From a supra-cultural point of view, the manifoldness of cultures provides for a mosaic of visions of justice.

There is the implied danger that justice is seen as being located between two extreme positions, that is cultural relativism and cultural supremacy. I argue that this may prevent us from the more fundamental question, which is: "what are the principles we, as a world community, can represent and communicate as fundamental to humanity?"

In this paper I wish to outline my work in progress. I shall present a set of assumptions to be considered for finding the context of an international concept of justice and I shall present suggestions for further research (thus necessitating a study in international justice).

Still, this can only be a rough sketch. The complexity of the subject matter is daunting; there are many blind spots, missed links and possible solutions. The paper is a discussion paper only and I hope it will trigger some thoughts that can bring a few concepts closer to an age-old dream, that is, to define and protect humanity.

Justice Studies: An Enigma?

With the acceptance of cultural diversity, there is the real threat of cultural relativism, which dictates that justice is just a cultural concept. This is, strictly speaking, not correct because for each culture its specific understanding of justice still has absolute validity for its members. A cultural concept of justice can reasonably maintain its validity only if a cultural concept of justice is seen by, at least, the majority of cultural members to have a similar connotation as Truth. Otherwise a totalitarian culture exists, which is rather unstable because it relies on force to maintain its rule.

We are all members of cultures and thus, my cultural understanding of justice has the tendency to permeate my understanding of a universal concept of justice. Does this restrict us to a debate through which — by means of open communication — we try to improve our understanding of justice in light of the experiences of other cultures? Or, at a minimum, does this restrict us to utilize communication to ensure the peaceful coexistence of a whole set of cultural justice perceptions? I would argue that this is too limiting for the human imagination. We have the potential to abstract from our own justice preferences. In doing so, we can develop criteria that allow us to judge justice perceptions — including our own cultural justice outlook — based on what human characteristics are worthy of consideration regardless of cultural preferences.

Naturally, the first glance to find a universal concept of justice would be towards philosophy. In the Western tradition, universal concepts of justice can be found that, depending on the philosophical interpretation applied, supplement each other or stand in contradiction to each other. The classical concepts still debated can be found in the writings of such important philosophical giants such as Plato, Aristotle, Acquinas, Hobbes and Kant. The first break in the presentation of an ideal form of justice may be found in the work of Hegel. He provides for examples of particular concepts of justice that are perceived to be universal in nature. Hegel develops a coherent story of particular concepts of justice by seeing them on a developmental scale. Alas, his concept of *Aufhebung*, vital to explaining a development from a crude vision of humanity to a more humanly adequate view, requires knowledge of all kinds of particular concepts of justice — a task that clearly overburdens the human mind. Regardless of the biological barrier, we now hardly can argue for a gradual development of the Western World towards more humanly adequate phenomena in light of Verdun, Ausschwitz or *ethnic cleansings* of the end of the last century.

Philosophy in the Western tradition faces another impediment to be the sole spokesperson for an international concept of justice. In the Western tradition of philosophy we are now familiar with a crisis of philosophy that centers on a critique of logocentrism and implicitly with other Enlightenment values such as reflection, rationality and education. This crisis extends to seeing philosophy as a tool to find a better understanding of humanity. Curiously, in the Western World, this crisis of philosophy does not breach our self-understanding as a member of a cultural group and its implicit justice assumptions.

Cultural Relativism and Human Ontology

There is the tension between cultural relativism and the desire for an ontological foundation for justice. At the very core of this tension is the question what constitutes individuality and what constitutes culture? If justice is only the expression of a group of individuals sharing a culture, then we cannot pass judgement on the merits of an international — trans-cultural — concept of justice. We must remain

silent unless we are dissatisfied with the understanding of justice in our culture. This is unlikely, because a culture tends to be nothing else but individuals who share beliefs/values, customs and habits. There is a strong suspicion that members of a culture do support the understanding of justice in this culture.

However, I would argue that most of us would be hardly satisfied with this answer. Despite a widespread acceptance that our views are tainted by our cultural situatedness and care must be exercised in passing judgement on justice, we are still eager to make claims such as "Mother Theresa is a hopelessly unrealistic though praiseworthy role model" or, such as, "we, as a world community have the right to condemn events transpiring in Auschwitz-Birkenau during WW II, in Rwanda during May 1994 or in Kosovo" (up to this day). These are arguments that come to our understanding easily and that share widespread acceptance. However, they provide little guidance for justice considerations that are located somewhere between extreme altruism and annihilation.

Where can the key to an international understanding of justice be found? I argue that it can be extracted from the ontology of culture itself. Culture, as already established, is the outcome of shared values/beliefs, customs and habits of individuals. Culture is intrinsically linked to individuality and an international concept of justice, consequently, rests on human ontology.

To be clear, human ontology is not primarily defined in terms of the working of self-consciousness or of rational thinking. Rather, the ability to rationalize is used to detect what is at the core of human identity. Once this core is identified, the means to pass judgment on cultural and individual phenomena are found.

Elusive ontology

The problem with identifying the core of human identity is that it seems to slip away as soon as it is located. Human ontology is intrinsically linked to culture and as long as cultural diversity is accepted, we seem to be at a loss in identifying the core of human identity because human identity is different according to the culture of the individual whose human identity is at stake. A way around the problem is defining an ideal human identity and thus implicitly an ideal culture for all humans — a resolution that has been tried by the Enlightenment and that we have abandoned (and I hope, abandoned for good). Considering that human identity is linked to culture, we must consider cultural values, customs and habits as an intrinsic part of human identity.

Values, customs and habits are best exemplified by the legal system of a culture. Certainly, this is an important element of identifying cultural identity and this can be taught in justice studies or legal studies programs. However, due to the cultural bias of justice studies, its content can hardly be classified as being the core of human identity.

Still, human values, customs and habits must arise from human ontology — though, they may not honor human ontological features. Consequently, justice studies should raise awareness of its ultimate rationale, which is human ontology upon which all

kinds of legal systems are founded. Human ontology is not deterministic for law; thus its actualization in law is always tainted by cultural preferences. The task at hand for a definition of human ontology is to subtract all cultural manifestations of human ontology from human ontology as such. Naturally, this delineation is hard to achieve due to the intrinsic connection between justice and culture. Nonetheless, we have the ability to abstract a cultural perspective of human ontology from human ontology, per se.

Let me re-iterate the conclusions so far: an ontological foundation, or essential human rights, can be honored in different ways and the manifoldness of cultural concepts of justice is the proof of such. Also, a foundation can be plainly negated and there is long list of human rights violations such as genocide, not providing the necessities of life and, though still in the debate, the death penalty. There is still a huge gray zone, where we are not sure whether human rights are the expression of cultural preferences that are often historically conditioned, or whether human rights are truly an outcome of human ontology. I argue that it is worthwhile to investigate and conduct the necessary abstractions due to the implied promised outcome. If we are really able to find a human ontology, then we have a measure to judge cultures. We can view a particular culture as if from a point-of-view outside the culture, *and* we can pass legitimate judgment regarding whether or not the culture honors human dignity (the general concept for the list of ontologically defined human rights) in its manifestations.

First Findings Regarding an International Concept of Justice

One of the abstractions can already be stated. It is the necessity of a rule of law. The rule of law implies that members of a culture can know about the rules and regulations governing their lives. This is the very prerequisite of locating oneself within a culture and it is a requirement for individuals in a culture to address necessary cultural changes to the laws of one's culture. Moreover, the cultural concept of justice can only be found if the values, habits and customs can be identified. This content of justice varies from culture to culture but they are, after all, expressions of values, habits and customs that can be enshrined in law and laws require the rule of law for their proper understanding and working.

Another abstraction reveals that the justice of a culture is a relative concept dependent upon the values, customs and habits of that culture. It is founded on the abstract ability of individuals to adhere to a wide range of beliefs and values. Naturally, individuals only can live a rather narrow set of values, customs and habits. Still, this phenomenon reveals the ontological feature of human freedom that, in its application, greatly restricts the individual's range of choices based on cultural givens for the individual and based on his or her life choices.

Implicit in the understanding that a culture develops its own concept of justice is the ontological entitlement of cultures to develop concepts of justice. Only because of this entitlement can cultures have concepts of justice. Certainly, a recognition of the right to culture is a recognition to the right of this culture to its concept of jus-

tice. If this right is applied broadly, it also implies that one right, that is one concept of justice, may not impose undue restrictions on the concept of justice of another culture. Or, the respect for one's concept of justice implies respect for other, maybe even competing, concepts of justice.

This would be an international justice aspect, and one, though seemingly straightforward, that creates many dilemmas due to incompatibilities with regard to cultural concepts of justice and due to conflicts in areas where different cultural concepts of justice claim to be applicable. As a derivative of the right to one's cultural concept of justice emerges the duty to be clear about incompatibilities and conflicting interests. This duty can only be fulfilled if cultures communicate with each other following rules of discourse that allow for an adequate understanding of the position of the other culture. If conflict cannot be resolved through clarifications, the resolution should be conducted in the least harmful manner to a culture's concept of justice, because of the international justice claim that individuals can form cultures with respective concepts of justice.

Human Dignity Arising from Human Ontology

Surely, all this focuses on cultures and still has not yet addressed international justice claims with regard to the human requirements that must be met for a culture to come into existence. These requirements must be honored by an existing culture, if it wishes to be adequate to its own conditions of origins. These conditions of origins are the individual as such and the requirements for individual existence based on human ontology.

It is here where considerations for international justice should start their journey towards the formulations of human rights. Thus, the investigation must center on the fundamentals for fulfilled human life that can be adopted as the rationale for the scrutiny of legal systems (or, cultural concepts of justice). This scrutiny shall not in any way overcome the myriad of cultural concepts of justice. Quite to the contrary: the wealth of self-actualization possibilities and their respective cultures is a feature of humanity that we should carefully harbor as the real wealth of humanity.

It is a wealth that cannot solely be maintained by assuring that a society remains culture-blind because individuals can only assume certain self-actualizations in such a society. Actually, a society that refrains from insisting on cultural denominators for individual self-development is a culture in itself and certainly a very attractive one for many people. Still, this culture should not be seen as the sole role model for a culture in correspondence with international justice guidelines. This is not to say that we allow cultures to be coercive towards its members or that cultures may impose their rule upon other cultures. Models have been developed where cultural concepts of justice are in correspondence with developed notions of citizenship and with a respect for human rights. Thus, ethno-cultural concepts of justice may very well be in accordance with concepts of international justice.

However, this discourse on the political rights of cultures requires a further caveat. The caveat refers to the conditions that must be met for an individual to become an informed member of a culture and a member of a culture who is aware of his or her constituent influence upon that culture. In addition, a caveat must be made that allows a member of a culture to either confirm the cultural values, habits or customs and to have a fair chance at changing such. Also, a member should have the right to exit in case he does not feel comfortable within his or her culture. In order to achieve such a state of affairs, many, many conditions must be met — conditions which I like to subsume under the concept of human dignity.

The Need to Re-visit Human Rights

It has only been recently that cultural belonging is accepted by the world community as a quintessential characteristic of human life. Furthermore, it is seen as quite distinct from traditional concepts of communitarians, which favored community or ethnicity at the cost of individual freedom. However, cultural belonging must not mean the forfeiture of individual freedoms.

This acceptance, however, forces a re-opening of the discourse regarding the understanding of human rights. It is likely that the definition of human rights requires a modification based on a cultural understanding of the human being. It is due to the fact that our comprehension of human rights is based on philosophical ideas stemming from the Enlightenment tradition. Enlightenment thinking certainly envisioned one ideal culture for all humanity, a culture that is based on principles such as equality, freedom, fraternity or the pursuit of happiness that should prove strong enough to ensure individual authenticity without reliance on social, political or religious bonds that are prone to be abused.

Now it is accepted that human identity is more or less associated with family, community, religion, ethnic background, national origin, educational and professional exposures and our experiences in the world — regardless whether we self-consciously care about it or not. In what follows, I even will argue that features such as our natural environment, as well as bodily experiences have a strong impact upon our identity — as well as on our understanding of authenticity.

The argument is made that the acceptance of culture as a human right also means that many human rights must be dispensed with because they are

a. Enlightenment principles and not fit for a post-modern world and
b. Principles of liberal political theory that is very much the product of the Western tradition and its ideal of liberal democracy.

Human rights cannot be easily dismissed, and there are good arguments to accept human rights as universally applicable, that is, even desirable by cultures that do not share the history that led to the formulation and to the implementation of

human rights as we now accept them. Surely, it is acknowledged that without WW II and the civilized world's horror at the atrocities committed before, during and immediately afterwards, we would have neither the United Nations nor universally accepted human rights. The Holocaust, in particular, fundamentally changed Western culture and can be regarded as a clear signpost pointing to the necessity of human rights. However, recent events give a much bleaker interpretation of humanity, that is, that the slaughter of human beings seems to be part of the human condition. However, this slaughter is clearly unacceptable from an ontological point of view. Moreover, it is likely that an ontological approach to the justification of human rights will not alter much the present list of human rights — rather it provides for a more convincing and thorough grounding of human rights than the reference to the Enlightenment and to Western historical experiences.

If we bracket historical events as the foundation for human rights, we might be able to work out universal principles based on political systems and world views. There is a huge impediment. Human rights can be violated; and political systems and world views guilty of such violations must be excluded from a phenomenological study of cultures with the goal of defining human rights. However, if we do not have a clear understanding of human rights, it is rather difficult to establish which political system or which world view violates human rights.

The acceptance of cultural diversity does dictate that we, as a world community, must be silent with regard to cultural manifestations such as religious affiliations, ideologies, societal values, habits and customs. However, this cannot be limitless. Limitations must be set by human rights and these are most safely found in human ontology.

Human rights based on human ontology can be defined as those basic conditions that 1) must be met to allow for human existence, as such (basic human rights) and 2) that ensure authentic being within a cultural framework, within which the member commits to actions based on informed choice (the concept of human dignity). Naturally, basic human rights are necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for human dignity.

Human dignity dictates that conditions for authentic being must be protected. A protection is necessary because human dignity with the ascribed rationale is the exception if we contemplate a phenomenological investigation into human actuality or human history. This claim discounts an individual's self-perception within a culture, thus, while it adopts "a view from outside" it is considerate of the life circumstances of the individual.

To sum up: human dignity is not a concept derived from political, historical or ideological considerations and it does not rely on either consensus by, at least, the majority of humanity or of its leaders. It is a quintessential ontological concept and it is foundational for all human appearances. Also, human dignity is not inalienable. Its components can be honored incrementally allowing a spectrum of human life plans and cultures far short of what human dignity stands for.

What constitutes an individual and what needs to be done to ensure a person is attributed human dignity?

What are the components of human dignity? Its components can be found in the human condition. Unfortunately, a highly specialized academic world has lost the ability to compile the results of its respective disciplines regarding research into what constitutes us as human beings and into what are the ideal conditions for these constituent parts. A multi-disciplinary effort could provide us with an incredible detailed knowledge with regard to human dignity without having to rely on deductive hypothetical knowledge that surely runs the danger of either adopting an idealist position or being hijacked by a fundamentalist ideology.

There are ontological conditions for human life and there are ontological conditions for culture. The constituent parts of these conditions can be identified. Each part can occupy a range of actualizations, whereby less or more desirable actualizations can be identified. It also must be kept in mind that all the parts of a condition, as well as the conditions themselves, as well as the ontological conditions for individual human life and the ontological conditions for culture influence each other. This phenomenon necessitates a holistic approach to identifying human dignity.

A person's identity (*Bewusstheit*) depends on numerous factors. I suggest for the purpose of discussion four broad categories, whereas each category informs and influences all the other categories.

One category is self-consciousness (*Selbstbewusstsein*): a category that addresses rational thinking and the ability to make choices. Traditionally, this category was overemphasized with regards to identity. *Selbstbewusstsein* is prone to believe in its own importance because it is through self-conscious action that we can detect *Bewussheit*. However, careful analysis of *Selbstbewusstsein* reveals that much of its cognizance rests on triggers and influences that do not reside within rationality as such.

The other category is consciousness (*Bewusstsein*), namely all the factors and impressions that put us on a trajectory path long before we are able to rationally determine the course of our lives. Many cultural traits of an individual are formed at this level, which includes, for example, the impact of recognition and child rearing practices. *Bewusstsein* also includes psychological influences upon the mind that are created by the social environment, such as religion, family, education and work.

Another category would be bodily consciousness (*Körperbewusstsein*). There is emerging evidence that the body itself, and the very functioning of the brain impacts upon a person's constitution. The brain itself can favor a certain approach to values, customs and habits that, admittedly, can be caused by society, such as a gendered understanding or a mindset resulting from having experienced trauma.

I would also like to include environmental factors (*Naturbewusstsein*) as a category that informs an individual's identity. Environmental factors would be all sense perceptions derived from the outside world, such as climate, natural environment, socially constructed environments such as cities, factories, offices.

These ontological conditions for individual identity are a given for all cultures. Each culture develops a preference for a specific emphasis within each category and maintains constituent influences upon each category that promises to maintain cultural values, habits and customs. This explains the relative strength of culture and cultural inertia with regard to fundamental change.

Individuals have a right to be part of a culture by favoring specific identities and by fostering such identities among the membership of that culture. However, this right to culture finds its boundaries where the very conditions for the creation and development of individual identity, thus the very conditions for culture and cultural change, are threatened.

Rights are derived from the protection of the very foundation of each culture, that is the individual and an individual's identity. The right must extend to the protection of culture as well, that is, the protection of cultural assertions. Also protected must be possible alterations to this culture by its constituent parts, that is, its members. Naturally, the conditions necessary for a different cultural orientation of the members of a culture must be maintained — thus necessitating the importance of *Bildung*; that is, ensuring that the members of a culture are informed about features of their culture, their rights and possible alternatives to their cultures.

Each culture must respect boundaries that are in need of possible cultural manifestations. Thus, a culture, for example, cannot destroy the environment to a degree that forces all subsequent cultures to live within a culturally created environment (*Umwelt*).

Conclusion

International justice studies must go beyond law, historical experience and philosophical cultures. Its goal is the elucidation of the very basis of law and involves the study of human ontology — upon which all cultures, all legal systems are built. Certainly, there is no determinism in human ontology. However, knowledge of human ontology allows for an international, that is, purely human evaluation of culture and law (with due respect to other rights-worthy issues such as respecting the plight of animals and the natural environment). Its findings can be enshrined in human dignity that can be used as the rationale for cultural concepts of justice and law and ideally should be used as the ultimate guideline for law and the interpretation of law.

Surely, all the arguments leading to the quest for human dignity are the result of considerations that are strongly influenced by cultures and that would be hardly possible without culturally developed concepts and culturally mitigated experiences. Also, the ideas expressed in this paper are rather summarily developed. Still, I hope that a skeleton is visible that help our ongoing journey to improve the human condition.

Much more work is necessary to develop an understanding of a modified concept of human dignity that accepts the new paradigm of cultural diversity. International

justice studies could be very well the vehicle for such efforts. It would have as its mandate the study of the fundamentals for fulfilled — authentic — human life that can be adopted as the rationale for a myriad of legal systems. It is a myriad that will not disappear and should not disappear. Surely, it can be a curse, and considerable human suffering is based on it. However, by insisting on human dignity there is a fair chance to have a wealth of self-actualization possibilities and its respective cultures. There is much beauty to be found in humanity that requires careful nurturing and protection, tasks that promise to provide for great benefits for humanity.

ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ СПРАВЕДЛИВОСТИ — ЗАГАДКА?

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В настоящей работе исследуется содержание статей о справедливости. Нынешнее представление об истине, видимо, отражает современное состояние человечества, где истина подтверждает и признает философские и психологические различия между представителями различных культур. Это приводит к конфликту культур. Действительно ли существует несовместимость или мы можем найти общую основу, чтобы воспринимать и защищать культурное разнообразие, как удивительную особенность человеческого состояния? Если это не так, изучение справедливости можно считать юридическим или культурным исследованиям со слишком громким названием.

Исследования справедливости должны включать правовые исследования, поскольку закон является основой справедливости. Кроме того, в исследованиях должны рассматриваться принципы, универсальные для всех людей. Исследования справедливости при этом превращаются в целую программу внутри культуры (или нации) для изучения закона и универсальных принципов, относящихся к таким понятиям как «сообщество», «принадлежность» и «истина». Носителями культуры являются индивиды, имеющие общие ценности, практики, язык. Если в центре культуры стоит индивид, то в исследования справедливости должны входить и исследования человеческой онтологии. К сожалению, эта область все еще находится на стадии развития, хотя в области философии, благодаря психологии и, прежде всего, через феноменологию, в последнее время отмечается некоторый прогресс. В этой связи встает вопрос о целесообразности международной программы исследований и ее содержании. Возможно, в данной программе следует использовать более «чистое» определение справедливости, в сравнении с программой изучения культурной справедливости, поскольку в основе многих интернациональных явлений лежат принципы, общие для всех человеческих существ.

WHAT THE NATIVE KOGI TRADITIONAL WAY OF LIFE TEACHES HUMANITY IN CRISIS

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Introduction

I would like to bring you the magic of the Kogi, the great wisdom of their philosophy, their voluntary simplicity and their dramatic call for our help to save our Planet. To listen and to respond to this call requires that we broaden our definition of harmony, happiness, responsibility and compassion and of our relatedness to nature.

Why are the Kogi so unique? First, in spite of the past pressures from the Spaniards, and present pressures from the contemporary Colombian society, their way of life and spiritual richness has remained untouched. Second, they consider our world, living and non-living as equal habitants of the earth. For the Kogi the physical world is the womb of Shibalaneuman, the Earth Mother. It is the womb of existence for all human beings, for all forms of life and for all things on the Earth.

Kogi call themselves the Elder Brothers of the humankind, while we are the Younger Brothers, the ones that have been misbehaving, torturing, destroying and causing suffering to this Cosmic Mother and to all other creatures.

Kogi Natural world

The world of the Kogi is the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (SNSM), a mountain of triangular shape in the northern part of Colombia, completely isolated in the great Andean system. It has only 1600 sq. Km, with a maximum altitude of 6000 m above sea level. It is a "mountain island" on the northwestern tip of South America.

The greatness of the Kogi civilization was discovered in 1976 when some of their major urban centers in the Sierra were unearthed, telling of the splendorous architectural and cultural organization of their past.

The insular character of the mountain allows us to consider it a relatively discrete unit. In addition, SNSM is considered a micro-continent, because all the climates and major vegetation types found elsewhere in the Andes are present in the Sierra. Thus, the desert is found in the lowlands around the massif; the rain forest range from 0 to 800 m; the cloud forest extends from 700 to 1800 m. in the west, the Andean forest is found between 2300 and 3200m; and the paramo is located above the treeline between 3200 and 4500 m.

For the kogi, the paramo is the most sacred part of the mountain. This is the most inhospitable environment for plants and animals; temperatures are between 5 to -10 C, or lower, during the entire year.

It is in the paramo in some deep caves that the Kogi lay to rest their high priests, the mamas. The naturally cold environment acts as an embalming process.

Kogi past and present

Kogi Indians as well as two smaller tribes, the Arahuaca and the Asarians, belong to the Tairona culture. In the past, the high level of development and political integration among the Taironas, characterized by the presence of a high authority and a well-developed hierarchical structure, greatly impressed the conquistadors. The political, economic and religious powers appear to have united in the person of "Mama" or chief priest, who was at the top of the social pyramid of each community.

Western doctrines clashed violently against the Tairona's most sacred institutions and, with the introduction of new Christian values, the Indians began to lose their traditions, myths and rituals, and with them the desire to live and preserve their culture. So, the early years of the 17th century presented a desolated panorama: thousands of Indians killed, captured, facing hunger or in hiding, towns and fields abandoned or razed to the ground, paths overgrown by the jungle, ceremonial temples destroyed, and the Indian priests — the leaders of the civil and religious activity — tortured and killed. In short, a magnificent culture in ruins.

A great part of what is known today about the collective ways of life and the spiritual world of the Tairona culture is due, without doubt, to the Kogi Indians of the Sierra Nevada. Studying the way of life of these Indians we have an excellent opportunity to discover and appreciate the original America, the one that was almost completely destroyed by the Spanish conquest.

For 500 years the Kogi have been living in this mountain. This isolation helped them to survive, not only as individuals but also as a culture. Their world is only 20 miles away from the city of Santa Marta, the nearest civilized town. For an Indian this distance is nothing, but for a white man it is an endless path because of the difficulties in climbing the mountain.

Today, the Indians are restricted to the Sierra because during the conquest they were evicted from their fertile lowland kingdom. Even today, they are abused by the Colombian land-holders, the guerrillas, the missionaries and the drug dealers who have occupied the most fertile land in the lowlands. For this reason most of the Kogi settlements are found above 3000 m.

Knowing the Kogi

In 1989 I visited the Sierra in order to collect amphibians and reptiles from this region as part of my doctoral dissertation. It was then that I contacted the Foundation Pro-SNSM and through them I had the opportunity to meet and learn about this unique culture and their way of life. A valuable source for understanding the Kogi are the explorations by the Colombian anthropologist Dolmatoff and the more recent incursions into the Kogi world by Alan Erreira and the BBC film crew.

This Foundation is a nonprofit organization with an extensive and interdisciplinary program that has as its highest priority efforts to preserve the entire SNSM and its inhabitants and to study it not only as a scientific reserve but also as a philosophical one. My professional activities are related, in part, to the conservation program of the Foundation.

Warning of the Kogi to us, the Youger Brothers

The Kogi believe they are the guardians of life on Earth and therefore they call themselves the Elder Brothers, the ones who have the wisdom and the knowledge to save and care for the planet.

To them, we are the Younger Brothers, the ones who are killing the planet with our attitude and technology.

Observing what we are doing to the planet they look at us as dangerous, irrational and essentially helpless children.

Now, the planet is dying and the Elder Brothers are warning us. They know how to teach us. In order to heal the planet we have to explore our personal and collective attitudes toward nature. This is not a matter of rational mechanisms, but a work of the spirit.

Kogi believe that we have to work together to save the planet. They demand that we behave responsibly and begin to take care of the world. They are demanding an ethical revolution on our part, in which greed and selfishness are tempered by awe and by sensitivity toward the Earth as a living planet. If we fail to respond, they say, all life will be destroyed very soon.

Tairona, the ancestors, and Kogi, the present people

In the past, SNSM was an important Tairona center. Several archeological settlements have been discovered in the valleys of the northwestern side of the Sierra Nevada. The largest one was found only in 1976 and is known as Ciudad Perdida (the Lost City). In the northwestern part of the Sierra 32 additional sites have been identified.

"Ciudad Perdida" is the indisputable capital of the region, having the largest number of terraces and the greatest monumentality. Ciudad Perdida undoubtedly stands out within the region because of its size and density. Here we can observe the monumentality of its stone constructions on the central axis. It has a political and religious character where the most prominent public buildings were located and where the elite had their place of residence. The terraced areas of Ciudad Perdida and those immediately around them were almost certainly cleared. The small areas surrounding the terraces were frequently subdivided into small plots by the paths and were used for growing domestic plants such as tobacco, coca, chili peppers, potatoes, fruit trees, pumpkins, etc. It is possible that here they kept beehives described by a Spanish soldier: "They had large pots or mucuras where the very sweet honey was made by small bees, not in honey combs but in large bags of wax."

In this region of abundant rainfall the system of terraces and their retaining walls were designed to prevent erosion and to control the rainwash. The terraces collect and slow down the speed of the water as it flows at an angle along the slopes.

Most of the urban settlements are connected by stone pathways built in a similar manner to that of the terraces. Many of these tracks are archeological works that are still being used and maintained by the Indians. Along the pathways a system of signs has been detected, represented by specially shaped stones which act as points of reference.

Kogi walk a lot. They criss-cross the Sierra going from one town to another or from farm to farm. Moving from one place to another carrying their products and fruits, stones and shells is essential to the harmony of life. The roads made by the ancestors are sacred, and must be maintained and must be walked. Animals that move on the ground, like snakes, are older brothers who walk the roads.

The entire Kogi population dedicates several weeks per year to repairing the old tracks and to building new ones. The paved pathways, besides being an answer to the social needs, constitute a system that illustrates a respectful relationship with the natural environment in a variety of ways. The tracks that are a longer distance away from the towns have some huts that serve as a refuge for the traveler. Some crops grow around these huts. Pots, firewood and tools are also available. In general, these huts are also built as a communal work and nobody lives permanently in them. The Kogi know their land in a very different way we know ours. For us it is important to know the rivers, the mountains, the valleys and the plateaus. In our cities we give names to the avenues and numbers to the streets. For the Kogi each particular site of the mountain has a meaning in terms of historical, cultural, familiar or religious events. This is an important characteristic of these people, who are so intensely aware of their own past history.

We could say that the Kogi are totally fascinated about the geography of their habitat. To give names and to identify the land with the events of their own history means to be part of the environment.

Kogi worlview: Aluna and the importance of the Mother of the Universe

The fundamental principle of reality in the Kogi life is Aluna. Aluna is a state of mind, is thought, is the past, the present and is the future. Aluna is also the spiritual world. The physical word is shaped in Aluna. Kogi conceptualize the version of the origin of the world as follows:

> First was the sea. Darkness was everywhere. There was no sun, nor moon, nor people, nor animals, no plants. Only the sea was. The sea was the mother. She was water, and water was everywhere. And she was river, lake, stream, and sea. So, at the beginning only the mother was. The mother was not peo-

> ple, not anything. She was aluna. She was the spirit of whatever was to come, and she was thought and memory. The mother existed in aluna in the deepest world alone. ... Every tree, every stone, every river has the Mother's spirit, a spirit form invisible to us. At the same time, it implies that everything in the physical world is also an event in the spirit world. This is the World of Aluna, the world of thought and spirit. Acts and decisions are also shaped in Aluna. All of the material world is given life and generative power in Aluna. Aluna is the stuff of life, the essence of reality. We do not understand this concept, so we cannot grasp the significance of our actions or understand their effect.

I would like to invite each of you to ponder on this concept to penetrate very deep into this new way of seeing life and nature around us.

The concept of the Mother of the Universe (Haba or Shibalaneuman) personifies first the biological principle of the human mother developed through successive phases, from conception to birth and from childhood to the relationship between the mother and the adult child. The birth of a child does not imply for the Kogi that the connection between the mother and the newborn ends.

Childbirth corresponds to a new conception relating the death of an elder to a new childbirth. A Kogi does never grows apart from his mother. When he is born he leaves one womb and enters into a new one. This womb is the universe, the great egg where he lives and within which he will develop again into a new adult, until the time when he dies and enters into a new intrauterine world. Kogi wish to die as an elder. For them to die young means an abortion. In a way, death does not exist in the Kogi's philosophy.

The Cosmic Mother is omnipresent. First, she is the biological mother. Then the Mother takes multiple forms. The universe is the womb and the Cosmic mother is in her ninth month of pregnancy; that is, in the ninth world. Second, the mother manifests in every woman, mother or not. In nature, She is water in any form: the sea, the river, or the rain. Water is worshipped in all forms. The Mama lying in his hammock in the ceremonial house is connected through the umbilical cord to her. The hammock is the placenta that protects him. They twist the threads of the "umbilical cords" for the clothes.

All the moral rules of the Kogi are essentially based on the behavior of the son before his mother. To observe the Law the Indian must learn and practice all the rules that the Mama knows and that will please the Mother. The utmost goal in the Kogi's life is to know the Mother's law.

Social life and settlements

Each Kogi settlement still has the basic construction technology used by the Tairona ancestors. Differing from the meaning of towns in our culture, Kogi towns with a relatively large number of houses have the rank of ceremonial or social centers.

Each settlement is made up of series of round huts with conical roofs; the walls are built of a variety of materials according to the function of each space and the resources available in the region. Few families own houses. When there is a special event several families may occupy one house within the town.

There is no specific urban planning, nor are there streets or a main area. The garbage is dumped in specific communal holes, usually outside the town. Another area is used as a communal latrine. Around the village are cultivated coca and some other useful plants such as medicinal herbs.

A very conspicuous feature of these villages is that the ceremonial houses are bigger than the other houses. Some towns have the government house, where the occasional visiting white man is lodged. The communal kitchen is used to prepare food and, in some villages, there is also a jail, which is the smallest house of the whole town. Near to villages is the cemetery, but there is no visible sign to recognize it as such.

These villages are not inhabited permanently and are only used for collective gatherings and special events, or sporadically by families in route to their farms. Sometimes a priest and his family may live there.

People gather in the villages every week to hear news about the community, to decide on future activities, and to carry out any other tasks that for religious reasons need to be done only in the ceremonial house. Such as toast the coca leaves, make the rope belts or just get together with other families. Usually these gatherings are on Saturdays or Sundays.

The center of Kogi life is the ceremonial house. In addition to its practical use, the ceremonial house has a deep spiritual-symbolic meaning. For the Kogi it represents the mountain, the heart of the World. The World lives in the Mother, in the world of Aluna. The roof of the ceremonial house represents the Kogi's universe that rises through lower worlds until it reaches the Earth level, the ninth world. Beneath, in the world of spirit the ceremonial house is mirrored upside down. Our world is not only the highest of the nine lower worlds; it is also the lowest of the nine upper worlds. Nine is the cultural number of the Kogi. The nine months of pregnancy give the key for a large number of manifestations and concepts of daily life.

The ceremonial house is the ideal place to sit and be in harmony with the universe. It has four fires representing the cardinal points, which sustain and support the world. There are stones around these fires, and these stones are women. The Mama carries out all his activities in the center of the ceremonial house because it is there where the wisdom and the advice of the nine upper worlds come down to the womb of the Mother where life and death meet.

Throughout the year, the Kogi families move across the region visiting the various farms in the upper and central lands of the Sierra. In this way, each family has access to a varied range of agricultural produce ensuring their own self-sufficiency. The farms are therefore inhabited only temporarily. Each farm is inhabited by only one family. Two huts facing each other serve as the home, one for the man and the other for the woman and the children.

Kogi use only self-made clothing. Men always carry mochilas made of cotton, which cross on the chest. Women carry mochilas only when they need to pick coca or other products. Their mochilas are made of fique, never of cotton. All of the dresses and the mochilas are white, and the mochilas sometimes have transversal brown bands. Men use hats of different shapes. In the case of the mamas they wear a conical hat that represents the roof of the ceremonial house. This hat symbolizes the permanent communication of the mama with the universe and the enlightenment of the priest.

Women never wear hats, but women and girls use necklaces made of seeds, stones, glass or sometimes of archeological pieces inherited from their mothers or grandmothers. For the Kogis, objects of archeological value also have a religious value. Everybody wears a waistband made of cotton with two or three black stones as amulets. Kogis do not practice body painting or mutilations or deformations of different parts of the body.

Women

The division of labor by sex is the general rule. In each hut the woman cooks in clay pots. The man weaves his own clothes, as well as those of his wife and children. He hunts, collects firewood, builds the hut, takes part in communal work and tills the land. Women cook, weave mochilas for their husbands and sons, wash the clothes, look after the children, and take part in agricultural tasks. They also pick the coca leaves.

The coca and the poporo

Coca leaf is the source of cocaine, but chewing it has a very different effect from ingesting the refined powder. It takes more than 6 pounds of leaves to make a single ounce of the commercial drug. The Kogi constantly chew small amounts of the dried leaves. In these small quantities the coca is released very slowly and it acts as a mild stimulant and a medicine. Chewing the leaves dulls sensations; it stops a person feeling tired or hungry; and it enables the Indians to walk long distances, work long hours and go without sleep for nights on end.

To till the land and cultivate coca is man's labor, but harvesting the leaves is a woman's task. Since coca is a perennial plant the leaves can be collected any time during the year. Women carry the harvested leaves in large mochilas and hand them to the men who take the coca to the ceremonial house to toast them in special pots fabricated for this particular purpose. The leaves are toasted very slowly stirring them constantly. The leaves should acquire a golden light green color. Once toasted, the leaves are put into small bags, which in turn are put into larger bags that they carry across the chest. To get the intended effect from coca leaves the Kogi mix the leaves with a powder of seashells in a special gadget called poporo.

Coca is consumed using this special gadget. The poporo is the mark of manhood, but it is a female's sexual symbol. It represents the womb and the stick is a phallic symbol. The movements of the stick in the poporo symbolize the sexual act. For a man the poporo is a good companion that means "food, woman, memory" and "meditation." Women are prohibited from using coca.

It is important to stress that poporo is the symbol of manhood. But it is the woman who gives a man his manhood. When a boy is ready to be married, his mother will initiate him in the use of the coca. This act of initiation is carefully supervised by the mama.

The Girl

The initiation of the girl as an adult woman is determined by Mother nature. Every female is the Mother; every female is nature herself. The onset of the menstrual bleeding is a manifestation of the power of fertility, which is the energy of LIFE. At the first menstruation the girl is isolated for seven days, kept on a vegetarian diet and in meditation weaving mochilas. The first bleeding is the recapitulation of the creation of the World. The sea, the land the stones and the animals were the product of the Mother's menstrual blood. Thus, the girl at this moment is a sacred creature!

When she has had a second period, she has become a woman.

Music

Music has always a religious and ceremonial character, but it is not always related to the dance. The main instruments used by the Kogi are two types of flutes, drums, horns, and rattles. Dancing is more associated with singing. Men and women never dance together and most of the times the dance is done for a given purpose, such as to call the spirits, for a healing process, or to produce rain to obtain good crops, etc.

Mamas, the priests

The term Mama also means the sun. So mama means "the enlightened one."

The position of Mama is not inherited, but depends on divination. However, it is quite common that the son of a Mama becomes also a Mama. Usually the education of a future Mama starts before the individual is born. During the pregnancy, the mother of the future mama has to observe a vegetarian diet, including only white food. The baby may stay with his mother up to the age of 2–3 years. In the ceremonial house the child receives a special training. First he should be active at night and sleep during the day. At the end of the first year, the child is taken to the ceremonial house in the paramo, where he is totally isolated from the society. Today there are 3 or 4 ceremonial centers where future Mamas are educated.

The future mama is called the Kuivi, which means "The one who cannot eat everything." He cannot eat red meet, chicken, plantains, or onion. He is allowed

to eat fish, clams, worms, mushrooms, cassava, a white bread made of yucca, vegetables and on a few occasions some native animals. A Mama never includes salt in his diet.

He wears a white tunic and at the age of 5 years starts wearing some golden bracelets and collars. The first thing the Kuivi learns is to sing and dance, and to talk only about the teachings he is receiving. Kuivis are not allowed to play, except with water. He always has long hair. At the age of six he receives a mask that he wears every night from now on.

His instructor, the Mama, lectures him on the Mother's Law, how to weave his own dresses, the rituals, the myths, the ceremonies and how to make pottery. Since the Kuivis only contact is this mama he develops a great love for his master. The child is learning not only from the Mama, but also from his isolation, which keeps him in a close contact with Aluna. The Kogi said referring to this: "From darkness a voice speaks... Nobody knows who it is; nobody sees it. This invisible voice sings and speaks. ... The Kuivi listens to it and learns..."

At the end of the ninth year of training, between his ninth and twelfth year, the Kuivi may decide to continue his education as a Mama or to go back to his family. The Mama helps to decide by divination. However, it seems that in a very few cases the child decides to go back to a family that he doesn't know. If he stays...

The second cycle of training begins.

The training is, of course, now more intense. Active at night, fasting, meditation, songs, and dances are more frequent. The Kuivi learns divination. At the end of the second period he receives the poporo, is instructed about sexuality and marriage and the rituals and the myths related to these.

Eighteen years have passed by. Dances, songs, myths, advice, fasting, meditations are followed year by year. The Kuivi lives only at night. He hasn't seen the sun. He hasn't seen any other human being except the Mama. The only landscape that he knows is the one around his ceremonial house, under the moonlight. He is at the end of his tough training. Now he is allowed to go out. He leaves the ceremonial house and for the first time he meets the light, the sun, his people, the women, the children, the houses...

Everybody greets him with veneration, talking and touching him when he gets closer. Everybody looks at him, their future guide, their future companion, and their new master of life. HE IS THE MAMA, THE GREAT ONE.

After the training, the new Mama may go to another town to visit and learn from other Mamas and to discover his own new way of learning about the things that he likes most. In this way, each Mama develops some sort of specialization. Some Mamas know more about certain topics than others; some are wiser than others.

Later on, the Mama may get married and work on his own farm. However, for the rest of his life he should observe the diet and should never taste salt. Some Ma-

mas decide to stay for the rest of their lives in total isolation dedicating to meditation and divination. Usually these are considered to be the wiser Mamas of the tribe and the other Mamas ask them for advice. These "isolated Mamas" were the first to become aware that the planet is dying. They saw that the paramo, the most sacred place of the Mountain, is drying out.

The death of a Mama is taken as a great loss for the whole community. It affects the whole tribe and it is believed that the death is associated with earthquakes and storms. The Mama is buried in the Paramo where there are many caves. The Mama's influence in the tribe is omnipresent. Each Mama knows the economic situation of each family of his community and he knows their individual genealogies.

Confession and advice

Two important events in Kogi life are confession and advice. Confession may be public or private depending upon the divination of the Mama. In general, any man, woman or child should confess any previous important act in their individuals lives. Before a baby is born the parents confess repeatedly. The confession is always followed by an advice. The "advice" may be a fine, a summon or a punishment. But the most important part of the advice is the parabola. An important task of the mama is to know how to give advice.

Divination

The Mama must prepare himself for divination. For nine days he will meditate, dance and sing, eating only small fish and water. He should abstain from sexual contact. The ceremony takes place near the ceremonial house. He sits facing east. During the divination he formulates the question in aluna then he submerges some beads in water and counts and observes the bubbles that are produced. Since the question was made in aluna the answer should also come from aluna from the Mother. Remember, for the Kogi everything is so interconnected and the intimate presence of the loving Cosmic Mother within everything and everyone calls for our compassion, responsibility and simple communion with everything we see or touch.

Thanks to my personal experience with the Kogi, I discovered that the world is much smaller, much more interconnected and vulnerable. Also through this new way of seeing the world I came to recognize the true value of fully facing up to my own responsibility toward the planet, my own suffering and the suffering of other beings. Our individual activities are intimately related. The Kogi can see so clearly how human actions affect all life on the Earth. Our fingerprints are present all over the planet, in every natural event. It doesn't matter how far from our actual civilization it takes place. Seeing nature in the way the Indians see it is a continuous act of initiation.

ТРАДИЦИОННЫЙ УКЛАД ЖИЗНИ КОГИ: ЧЕМУ ОН МОЖЕТ НАУЧИТЬ НАХОДЯЩЕЕСЯ В КРИЗИСЕ ЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСТВО

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«Мама», мудрецы племени Коги из Сьерра Невада де Санта Марта, Колумбия, говорят, что «Парамос» (высокогорные плато в Андах) высыхают. Это означает, что «Маленькие братья» (латиноамериканцы и остальные люди) в долине разрушают мир. Посетив индейцев племени Коги и побеседовав с ними, я убедилась, что их образ жизни и мудрость позволяют говорить о деструктивности «цивилизованного мира». Индейцы-коги живут в соответствии со своей религией и ценностями. Они полностью отвечают их образу жизни, а не отдельным его аспектам, как это принято в западном мире. Для коги все вокруг — одна жизнь, которую отражает Алуна — мир (или мысль, или дух) из которого проецируются предметы и который является путем к перерождению. Правильное поведение одного человека важнее, чем поведение общины. Люди могут вести себя плохо, но при этом деревня будет «хорошей». Магия их жизни рождается из их последовательного стремления правильно обращаться с окружающим миром. Этих так и не побежденных людей отличает почтительное отношение к природе и всему, что ее составляет.

RECONCILING THE POTENTIAL OF THREE WORLD RELIGIONS IN THE MOVE TOWARD SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

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Introduction

The fundamental missing dimension for a worldwide move toward sustainable development is that of worldviews and beliefs. While some of sustainable development's most forceful early proponents, like John Cobb (Daly & Cobb 1989), Charles Birch (1990), and Thomas Berry (1990) have been theologians, recently most sustainable development research and thought lies in the realm of science and policy research. As a policy researcher whose usual research focus is the creation of urban sustainable development policy, I am personally implicated in this shift in thinking about sustainable development. The new understanding that sustainable development is something that can be achieved rationally, rather than something that can only be achieved with the assistance of faith, divine guidance, and possibly a miracle or two. If the goal of sustainable development is to create and perpetuate a process of development that is equitable and hopeful for creatures the world over, then 'baby steps' by way of tinkering with pollution levels, mortgage and car insurance structures, and park borders are clearly insufficient. To move beyond tinkering with existing structures, that are sorely and perpetually inadequate and inequitable, we must tackle the difficult terrain of diverse and sometimes incompatible worldviews.[1]

Not only is the investigation of what comprises sustainable religion and sustainable worldviews important for the realization of change toward sustainable development, this is also the most powerful avenue for human development and peaceful change. Among ten reasons recently given for hope by ecological and political scientist David Orr (2004, 48), he cites:

> ... a global spiritual revolution underway the likes of which we've not seen before. People across the major faith traditions are organizing, talking, singing, chanting, and praying. There is power being unleashed and, despite differences, there is common ground. ... Said differently, it is not possible for long to organize our affairs around greed, illusion, and ill will. We are called to higher things. And in silence one can hear the birth pains of a new order of things — a new enlightenment.

Some evidence exists of a movement among theologians and other thinkers toward greater understanding of the role of religion in the change toward sustainabil-

ity. In 1993, 8000 people from around the world came to Chicago for the Parliament of the World's Religions. This, the first such official assembly since the first World Parliament of Religions, also held in Chicago in 1893, questioned in a systematic way the proper relationship between humans and all other species, as well as human rights, roles, and needs compared to those of other species and the planet, and religious responses to the revelations of 'science' (Coward 1995, Teasdale et al. 1996). This event led to a declaration of ethical common ground, *Towards a Global Ethic*, neighborhood-based programs to create relationships among diverse religious communities, and a strategic plan to continue to engage in both global-scale and local-scale events and programs. A 1999 Parliament was held in Cape Town, South Africa, and in 2004 was held in Barcelona, Spain. Work to date suggests that a common basis of respect for nature and humans in their interdependence is possible and is occurring, especially through the work of feminist Western religious scholars (e.g. Coward and Maguire 2000, Ruether 1992). Commitments made at the 2004 Parliament in Barcelona in particular point to the convergence between issues of religious integration and finding new and effective solutions to the global problems addressed by sustainable development: religious violence, international debt, access to water, and refugees, among others.[2]

European scholars have come together to produce the 1995 Klingenthal Appeal, and symposia held again in 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2001, advocating spiritual education toward global respect for non-human nature and intercultural celebration of our common natural heritage (Ribaut & Del Rey 1997). At Yale University, the schools of Forestry and Divinity recently collaborated toward a conference on "The Good in Nature and Humanity" addressing similar issues (Kellert and Farnham 2002). Harvard University hosts the Forum on Religion and Ecology, a medium for the expansion of dialogue among religious thinkers and other types of thinkers toward the end of solutions to environmental problems (Tucker & Clugston 1998).[3] Other scholars work more independently on these questions, like Selin & Kalland (2003) who present the views of a wide range of non-Western religions and the perspectives offered by each toward realizing sustainable development. Truly integrative investigations of the different and maybe complementary potential of world religions are more rare. In practice, numerous nongovernmental organizations around the world are beginning to seek the complementarity between indigenous and Western systems of knowledge for land use decisions. Ecotrust Canada, for example, recently published the first guide for native people to the use of modern technologies such as geographic information systems in negotiations with government land managers and corporate interests (Tobias 2000).[4]

Beginning with the watershed article in *Science* by White (1967), much has been said to discredit the potential of Judeo-Christian religious traditions to contribute to sustainable development. It is undeniable that the damage wrought upon our natural, social, and cultural capital worldwide is due to the effects of Western technological and scientific advances springing from Judeo-Christian worldviews. This

does not mean that these religious worldviews are bad throughout their roots. Much can be said, as well, about the ways in which world religious traditions differ. Many would claim that the differences among Native, Christian, and Jewish religious beliefs create a chasm too wide to bridge, and that the only task left to the designers of multicultural society is to avoid religious issues very carefully in creating space for liberal democracy.

This paper asks whether avoiding religious issues is the only option, or whether more might not be gained toward a new sustainable kind of liberal democratic and multicultural development that moves toward a potential common place in the world of religion.

This paper searches for points of complementary contributions in a move toward sustainable development from Native religious traditions, Jewish religious traditions, and Christian religious traditions. The approach taken is one of selective scanning for positive contributions from each tradition rather than systematic evaluation of the relative merits and demerits of each tradition in its own right. In considering the potential contributions of Native religious traditions to sustainable development, the focus will be primarily on the writing of Native American philosopher Vine Deloria Jr., whose penchant critiques of Christian traditions and their negative impact on Native cultures have made his work less accessible to Christian readers. The focus on the potential of Jewish traditions in the move toward sustainable development will be guided by the thought of Martin Buber, a Jewish mystic and spiritual leader. In looking at the contributions possible from Christian worldviews, the discussion will consider the work of Charles Taylor on available tools for multicultural and multi-religious reasoning and discussion. In seeking convergence here, we begin to seek the thread of human cultural commonality in relation to the tools and rules of engagement. Finding this thread is a precondition for approaching sustainable development in a manner that may allow the concept of a defensible claim to the lofty ideal of progress that it tries to embody. The argument proceeds in search of a defensible thread of cross-cultural agreement on truth in sustainable development in order that societies may move, united, away from epistemological notions of truth toward moral and democratic sustainable development practice.

There are many reasons for choosing these three types of religions in the hopeful quest of sustainable development. It is best if I confess to personal reasons. The love of my life is a Jewish man and, as we grow together I become at least part Jewish. I was born Catholic, of Irish descent. My father's dying wish to me was in fact that I learn more about the Catholic faith. So, I have inherited Catholicism and am in a position of helping to pass on Judaism through my own family. I am also North American, and in this capacity also inherit a colonial heritage of the oppression of First Nations peoples of this land, which certainly includes the oppression of the religious beliefs of the Native peoples. This heritage of oppression behooves me as a Canadian multi-culturalist and democrat to better understand the beliefs of the First Nation people at whose expense my people have prospered here. Moreover, I am

one of many in the North America positioned at the intersection of these particular world religions.

Sustainable Development from First Nations' Perspective

In his treatise on the differences between Native and Christian religions, Native American philosopher Vine Deloria Jr. (2003) paints a picture of Native religion as perhaps the only tradition that could move North American society toward sustainable development. Two of the main characteristics of Native religion that support this view are: an ability to be "in touch with the spirits constantly" (Deloria 2003, xvii) and an understanding of relatedness within space more than time. These two unique characteristics allow adherents of Native religion to feel suffering communally rather than individually and to feel a deep emotional attachment to places to which they are indigenous. This communal rather than individual basis for experience and responsibility and specificity of feelings for places sacred and mundane are key to the potential of Native North American religions for sustainable development. Deloria sees the possession of these characteristics as traditional ideals of Native religious people and ones Native peoples should again strive to reach, primarily in order to ensure their own survival.

First, to be "in touch with the spirits constantly" is to maintain a type of access to the world of religious feeling and experience that is unmediated and normalized, rather than the work of intermediaries or miracles. In this state, religion can be experienced at-large without the use of metaphors and without the use of specific religious structures, such as temples or churches. Instead, feelings of being able to access the spirit world in many different places and situations leads Native people to a sense of reciprocal responsibility with the spirit world. Nelson describes the notion of reciprocal communication among Alaskan natives like this:

> According to Koyukon teachers, the tree I lean against feels me hears what I say about it, and engages me in a moral reciprocity based on responsible use. In their tradition, the forest is both a provider and a community of spiritually empowered beings. There is no emptiness in the forest, no unwatched solitude, no wilderness where a person moves outside moral judgment and law (1989,13).

To the Koyukon connectedness with their environment is not ethereal and spiritual but based on the practical wisdom "of establishing a moral contract with the natural world which gives sustenance" (Nelson 1989,12). Many indigenous groups have such a two-way conception of human communication with other species and the world around us.

Second, the indigenous person's religious relationship with specific sacred spaces, more than with time, springs from and feeds his or her deep sense of emotional

attachment to place that is the birthright of someone who is native to a place. Sacred spaces, where both the mundane activities of life and religious ceremonies are conducted, are crucial to the practice of Native religion and are, according to Deloria, "determinative of the way that we experience things" (2003, xvii). Because everything occurs in place, the idea of completely abstractable knowledge is foreign to the indigenous worldview (Holmes 1996). Most knowledge only makes sense in a particular context and all meanings are cultural as well as referential. Practical information is gathered and, considered alongside knowledge of the sacred or religious dimension of the places in which the information is gathered, leads to better understanding of the lived environment and human actions (Berkes 1999).

Indigenous cultures generally set areas off-limits to human use to ensure continued resource productivity. Human use of resources, for groups as disparate as the Cree and the Maori, obliges maintaining interdependent reciprocity as well as human humility toward what the world provides. This makes obvious the notion of intergenerational equity within sustainable development, the idea that we should provide for our own needs without detracting from the ability of future generations to use available resources to meet their needs. Preservationist environmental ethics, or conservation without use, is a purely Western conception which may actually be anathema to sustainable development by further alienating people from nature because it severs use rights and guardianship responsibilities.

The advantages that Native religions offer in the pursuit of sustainable development — the reciprocal connectedness to the spirit world and space-richness — are not intact. These traditions have been threatened since European settlement in North America and continue to be threatened by the effects of the dominant worldview in western culture. For example, according to Deloria, Native religions' value of space-specificity over time-specificity may now be detrimental because history becomes critically important for Native peoples living through the changes imposed by contemporary Western society. As the realities of Native life change, the contrasts between traditional values that hold promise for change and the mainstream values that allow people to get by from day to day become starker:

> Tribal religions thus face the task of entrenching themselves in a contemporary Indian society that is becoming increasingly accustomed to the lifestyle of contemporary America. While traditional Indians speak of a reverence for the earth, Indian reservations continue to pile up junk cars and beer cans at an alarming rate... To survive, people must in effect feed off one another, not share with each other. (Deloria 2003, 248)

In reviewing the contributions of Native religions to the potential for sustainable development, the issue is not whether the worldview works toward change. Rather, as Deloria wonders, if "the very existence of an Indian community in the modern electronic world does not require a massive task of relating traditional religious val-

ues and beliefs to the phenomena presenting themselves" (2003, 237). Specifically, in seeking reconciliation and complementarity between Native religions and other religious traditions — in seeking to transfer the place-care and communal notions of Native religions across cultures — we must ask how much the essence of Native religion depends on the peoples' location in particular places of origin and their relative isolation from dominant Western society.

Adding and Subtracting from Judaism

Deloria directs toward Christian traditions most of his critique of the dominant worldview that threatens Native worldviews. In the scant treatment he gives to Jewish religious traditions, he finds points of comparison with Native traditions. The two aspects of Jewish traditions that Deloria finds most comparable with Native traditions are the concept of community and the habit of preserving traditions in exile. Deloria approximates the Jewish experience of membership in an exclusive community to the experience of communal lives in Native traditions. The common use of the Hebrew language, along with a complete set of rituals and cultural traditions, offers willing Jews a feeling of unified cultural tradition comparable to that of Native peoples. The common problem with this exclusive community-based tradition, according to Deloria, is that "many Jews, like many Indians, refuse to acknowledge their membership in an exclusive community" (2003, 214).

The Jewish habit of preserving traditions in exile supports the sense of exclusive community traditional to Judaism. Following the destruction of the temple and the exodus of the Jews, as described in the Torah, the Jewish people instilled strong values of scholarship that have enabled the preservation of stories, beliefs, and ceremonies with remarkable uniformity throughout the Jewish diaspora. Like other Native scholars, Deloria finds the situation comparable in the Native diaspora. Except in the case of indigenous people the space traveled may be much less, while the contextual difference is no less drastic: "The people often live less than 100 miles away from their traditional homelands; yet in the relative complexities of reservation and urban life, they might be two thousand or more years apart" (2003, 250).

Jewish traditions, then, bear certain similarities to Native religious traditions that can complement attempts to move contemporary society toward sustainable development. At the same time, Jewish religious traditions are implicated in the destruction of natural and cultural resources and unsustainable development practices, as criticized by White (1967) and many others. Fink offers an alternate Jewish interpretation of the Biblical passages which are often considered as "a divine carte blanche to exploit nature without remorse" (1998). Distinguished commentator of the Torah Rashi recognized as early as 900 years ago that the Hebrew word for "take dominion" is similar in meaning and can be translated "to descend." While dominion over the earth's resources can come to those who act as proper stewards, worthy of such authority, those who do not take their responsibility for right behavior seriously

are always liable to find themselves superceded by other creatures for this authority. As Fink explains: "We are preeminent only when we act in keeping with the highest standards of responsibility. Abusing the rest of creation is a sign of debasement rather than dominion. To cite a modern example, if we destroy human life on earth through a nuclear accident or war, the cockroaches will, in all likelihood, succeed us as the 'masters' of the planet" (Fink 1998).

In his classic study of the proper position of human beings in relation to the life of the spirit, Jewish scholar Martin Buber (1970) discusses his perspective on what Deloria calls being "in touch with the spirits constantly." Buber discusses the vital role of language and of continuous, infinite conversation in helping human beings to approach their "You," which is the life of the spirit, the eternal that resides in the relationships between all beings. People, to Buber (1970, 89), stand inside language and express themselves:

> *in many tongues — tongues of language, of art, of action — but the spirit is one; it is response to the You that appears from the mystery and addresses us from the mystery. Spirit is word. And even as verbal speech may first become word in the brain of man and then become sound in his throat, although both are merely refractions of the true event... so it is with all words, all spirit.*

If people can learn again to use language for the purpose of greater relation, language can again serve as a guide to help us grasp: "the truth which, though supra-rational, does not disown reason but holds it in her lap. What [man] does in communal life is no different from what is done in personal life by a man who knows that he cannot actualize the You in some pure fashion but who nevertheless bears witness of it daily to the It, defining the limit every day anew, according to the right and measure of that day" (Buber 1970, 99).

Buber considers the value of rapprochement of Jewish traditions with those of indigenous people in order to assist the development of these relationships. He sees the language of indigenous people reflects the wholeness of their relation to one another, their environment, and their Creator. To use Buber's example, when Zulu people say: "where one cries, 'mother, I am lost,'" to denote the concept "far away," they are "still embedded like reliefs" in their living world; they are not independent of it and neither is their language. Such language is used not so much to convey concepts or other thought products but to represent continually this material, unmediated dependence: "What counts is not these products of analysis and reflection but the genuine original unity, the lived relationship" (1970, 70).

This type of lived relationship Buber calls genuine subjectivity, which "can be understood only dynamically, as the vibration of the I in its lonely truth. This is also the place where the desire for ever-higher and more unconditional relation for perfect participation in being arises and keeps rising. In subjectivity the spiritual substance

of the person matures" (Buber 1970, 113). Subjectivity is a state of being not simply subject to experiences and objects, but also subject to beholding and encountering experiences and objects as elements of our relation to the divine. The way our small will exists within a great will, the way what we perceive as cause and effect exists within a larger fate.

Buber believes these relationships of "actual reciprocity" that people share with beings, even though they may not communicate in a normal way, add heavy meaning to human life. The experience of reciprocity is the experience of "being admitted, of being associated while one is altogether unable to indicate what that is like with which one is associated, nor does association make life any easier for us — it makes life heavier but heavy with meaning" (1970:158).

The closest Buber comes to attempting to reconcile communal relationships with the spirit world and individual experiences and actions in the world is in his caveat that comes across in defense of self-interest. Buber assures us that in the proper context of connectedness to one another and to our world, self-interest is no evil: "Man's will to profit and will to power are natural and legitimate as long as they are tied to the will to human relations and carried by it. There is no evil drive until that drive detaches itself from our being" (1970: 97).

Adding and Subtracting from Christianity

As the religious tradition most tightly tied to the dominant worldview, with its apparent reliance on technological and scientifically-based solutions to all the world's problems, Christianity faces great challenges in its ability to assist societal change toward sustainable development. Compared to Native traditions as well as Jewish traditions, Christianity puts less emphasis on family and community unity. Compared to the place-sensitivity of Native traditions, and the traditions-in-exile of Judaism, Christianity offers only sentimentality for a mythical sod-busting, pioneering past. Deloria is not alone in his criticism of Christianity as a strikingly failed attempt to provide a means to unify and pacify the peoples of the world. Deloria's critique is clear: "Where Christianity has most successfully entrenched itself into the lives of people, it has been on an ethnic or racial basis and has had to adopt the cultural and political outlook of the people of the land in which it has chosen to exist. In America it has become virtually impossible for Christianity to have positive effects on our society's movements" (2003, 215).

In Western-style development to date, Christian theology has played the largest role in the damage done because of the dominant rational-scientific worldview that it spurred. However, according to some Christian theologians, there is an alternate interpretation of Christian theology. Hessel (1998), for instance, perceives an "ecological reformation" on the rise in Christianity, arising from the need to conserve resources, to recognize and strengthen relationships among people and between people and the natural world, and to strive for justice and benevolence.

In addition, it bears remembering that Christianity has been widely adopted by adherents of Native traditions worldwide, although in most cases this conversion has occurred under dubious circumstances. In converting to Christianity and then leading other tribal community members in the new religious rituals, Christian Indian ministers have often been able to reconcile Christian with Native religious rituals. Feeling that both Native and Christian traditions could play a role in contemporary Native life since "the ceremonies were as much Indian cultural expressions as religious acts." In embracing the universal goal of Christianity some have gone so far as to interpret their culture within the new given context of Christianity as "in effect an 'old testament' with the 'new testament' topping [it] off and making sense of all earlier cultural reaching toward God" (Deloria 2003, 37).

Two movements operating within and outside Christian traditions (and Native traditions as well), ecofeminism and environmental justice, offer potential that this reformation will indeed bear fruit. Ecofeminists charge that "the Church must discard the pattern of colonial thinking and gender hierarchy that was built into its doctrine of creation and that shaped the popular map of social relations." Environmental justice advocates the discarding of "religious beliefs and rituals that are solely preoccupied with human salvation" and dismissive of the need for equity in the justice achieved by different groups. In both cases of reformation, Christians are recognizing and acting on the need to foster greater stewardship responsibility for places and living things, solidarity with other people and living things, sharing resources and fair consumption, and more democratic habits for decision-making (Hessel 1998).

Because of its dominant position in mainstream secular customs and rational-scientific habits, contemporary traditions in secular Christianity may offer some strong strategies for change. Christian philosopher Charles Taylor advocates using Gadamer's method to move toward cultural openness without sacrificing a view to reality. This linguistic method involves overcoming blocks to understanding others by allowing ourselves to be challenged, recognizing our peculiarities in the eyes of the other and, at the same time, trying to grasp differences. This process of recognizing our own horizon and those of others does not make all truths relative. It expands our understanding: "Horizons can be different, but at the same time they can travel, change, extend — as you climb a mountain, for instance" (Taylor n.d., 8-9). Truth-values remain the same; we come to see the differences in respective views as resulting from different questions being asked, different issues being raised, and different features of reality standing out. Also, different accounts still can be judged better or worse, depending on which "tell us more about human beings and their possibilities" and more or less comprehensive depending on which "allow more human beings to understand each other, and to come to undistorted understandings" (Taylor n.d., 7).

Taylor suggests "strong evaluation" as a tool for judging moral goals not merely by personal commitment but by the test that "were we to cease desiring it, we would be shown up as insensitive or brutish or morally perverse" (1995,37). Strong evaluation can involve a number of approaches — all very common forms of practical

reasoning that make no appeals to external criteria. I will mention three. One approach is to see a disputed point as a special plea taken erroneously from a similar base premise and to prove to the interlocutor that the special plea is in fact unconscionable or confused. The proof should be based on a comparative judgment of the performance of both views in reality, as well as how each idea explains the mistake in the other's position. This method, for example, disproved the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake in extending the idea that people desire happiness to the idea that people's happiness is desirable. Here, the first idea (people desire happiness) only suggests that happiness may be like an addiction that people cannot help but desire; any number of real-world facts and observations could show how happiness still is not central to all people's commitments. Additional evidence could be found to show how the connection between desiring happiness and the desirability of happiness has been made erroneously.

A second approach is to attempt not to convert the interlocutor from one idea to another, but to demonstrate how both views share similar ideas, only with different emphases or degrees of clarity. The appeal to understanding, therefore, is based on views already fashioned by the interlocutor, but with a twist in emphasis that offers an indisputable contribution to the perspective.

A third approach is to reason one way in order to directly and indisputably overcome an error in the other way of thinking: something ignored, contradictory, or confused. For example, one's love may be doubted when one simultaneously feels resentment, but when it is pointed out that being in love can include feelings of resentment, one may overcome doubt immediately, recognizing this as an obvious, truer statement of feelings.

Study and attention to indigenous ways of relating human-to-human and human to more-than-human nature may provide the most available means of broadening our horizon of available alternatives to current patterns of exploitation and destruction. The challenge, in this as in other tasks of intercultural understanding, is: "to be able to acknowledge the humanity of their way, while still being able to live ours [although the process] will almost certainly involve a change in our self-understanding and hence in our way" (Taylor n.d., 11).

Suggesting that Christian traditions, in line with rational-scientific thinking models, make available certain tools for reasoning toward mutual understanding and complementarity among different religions, is not to suggest the only role Christians can perform in the move toward sustainable development is the bringer of tools. Christians have considerable work to do in order to ready their own traditions for openness to others, including, according to Deloria: "disclaim[ing] the use of history as a weapon of conquest today" and "honestly fac[ing] the problems of the Western societies and consider[ing] what real alternatives now exist for those societies to survive in a world that is growing smaller — a world that must contain a great number of smaller groups whose existence is guaranteed and whose rights are not to be trampled underfoot" (2003, 266).

Conclusion: Negotiating toward a Reconciliation Point?

The fact that conversation strategies such as Taylor suggests exist and are commonly used suggests that such approaches could all be more systematically applied to public moral debate. The general task of reason would thus become, first, to work out and develop "an insight which is marginally present in all cultures" (Taylor 1995, 55) and then to challenge the practices of people against the background of their (semi-articulated) beliefs which can be proven inadequate. An example of a universal insight is respect for fellow human beings. That is: "recurrent in history, new doctrines have been propounded which called on their adherents to move toward a relatively greater respect for human beings, one-by-one, at the expense of previously recognized forms of social encapsulation" (Taylor 1995, 56-57). Various degrees of inhumane institutions and activities can be challenged on these grounds, using historical proof.

People define themselves around the quest for a morally-relevant horizon that can give their lives direction and meaning. "I can define my identity only against the background of things that matter... Only if I exist in a world in which history, or the demands of nature... or the call of God, or something else of the order matters crucially, can I define an identity for myself that is not trivial" (Taylor 1992, 40-41). The greatest challenge facing modern Western society is not, in fact, the ecological crisis, as troubling as this crisis is to our souls. The greatest challenge is the search for the most relevant and reciprocal realm of complementarity among people who ground themselves in a startling diversity of traditions. In the modern context in which we live, no single religious tradition or worldview provides a satisfactory answer to the question of where to look for the hope of survival and prosperity around the world and into future. If we are unwilling to relinquish the hope of democracy, it is no exaggeration to say that all religious traditions or worldviews are in some way necessary to the path forward. Finding the good in each active worldview can be assisted by the quest for sustainable development, a form of economic, ecological and social development that must be radically different from what we now know.

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NOTES

[1] Some would argue that in today's secular society worldview and religion are separate. This was an easier position to maintain in the late 20th century than it is today, when once again most if not all major world conflicts stem from religious differences, passionately held.

[2] Information on the Parliament of the World's Religions can be found on-line at www.cpwr.org, and the Barcelona commitments specifically at: www.cpwr.org/2004Parliament/Barcelonacommitments/

[3] Information on the Forum on Religion and Ecology can be found on-line at: environment.harvard.edu/religion/

[4] At least as often as there is a positive example of complementarity released, a negative example emerges as well. One instructive example of the kind of conflict between these same two knowledge types comes from northern Canada, where traditional ecological knowledge has been officially recognized by the Northwest Territories as a valid and essential source of information. Thus, traditional ecological knowledge was given equal consideration with science in assessing the impacts of a major proposed mine (Stevenson 1996). Heated public policy debate ensued, with many bureaucrats arguing that traditional knowledge impeded a rational understanding of the world because of its 'spiritual' component. They saw the legitimation of traditional knowledge as nothing more than a power and cash grab by aboriginal leaders who thus abdicated themselves of the responsibility to explain their knowledge in rational language (Howard and Widdowson 1996). The notion of 'spiritualism,' rather than belief or world view, was picked up by the media and flavoured as New Age fuzzy thinking.

ИСПОЛЬЗОВАНИЕ ПОТЕНЦИАЛА ТРЕХ МИРОВЫХ РЕЛИГИЙ НА ПУТИ К УСТОЙЧИВОМУ РАЗВИТИЮ

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Для того, чтобы обеспечить устойчивое развитие необходимо дать определение истины. Движение к устойчивому развитию — это задача, решить которую ученые должны не только используя инструменты науки и техники, но и обсуждая природу истины на уровне общества, общины и индивида. В обществах, где существуют различные культуры, необходимы особые формы диалога, в основе которых должны лежать принципы разнообразных культурных и религиозных традиций, важных для понимания таких базовых идей как истина и прогресс. В данной статье сравниваются приемы, предложенные католическим философом Чарльзом Тейлором, еврейским философом Мартином Бубером и индейским философом Вайном Делорией младшим. Сравниваются, прежде всего, понятия «сильной оценки» Тейлора, «неограниченной беседы» и «подлинной субъективности» Бубера, а также мощная критика западных религий и объяснение различий между религиями коренных народов Делории. В поисках общих черт между ними мы начинаем искать нить культурного сходства, относящуюся к приемам и правилам поведения. Найти эту нить необходимо, чтобы концепция устойчивого развития могла претендовать на роль высокого идеала прогресса, которую она пытается воплотить. Далее в статье идет поиск способа достижения согласия относительно того, что есть истина в устойчивом развитии, которое бы позволило различным обществам вместе перейти от эпистемологических представлений об истине к моральной и демократической практике устойчивого развития.

PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY IN A UNITED WORLD: A NEW BASIS IN FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL THEORY

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Introduction

How different can we be and still be united? One who contemplates the changing ideas towards unity, diversity, and tolerance through history will probably agree that the wider the answer to that question, the more mature, the more conducive to peace and happiness, will be one's attitude towards others and one's expectations of one's own behavior.

This paper proposes a specific principle of Goodness that gives the widest possible answer to this question: How can we be and still be united? This paper proposes that no limitations of family, race, nationality, or even membership in the human species need limit our attempts to form connections of genuine unity with others. This principle of Goodness is not new. It seems to be already present, though perhaps unrecognized as such, in the great religions and philosophies of the world. It is the intuitive belief of a great many thoughtful people, although many might not have been able to explain in words their beliefs about respecting and caring for the welfare of others as well as themselves.

In this paper we shall first explain the Principle of Goodness. Then, because, as a matter of fact, it is easy to mistake the Principle with a simplistic and naive appeal to everyone to "be good," we will show why the Principle of Goodness differs from such appeals, which have in the past been tried with less than satisfactory results. Then we shall explore some implications of the Principle for both individuals and cultures. Lastly, we shall make an abbreviated survey of some of the world's great religions, where we shall uncover some tantalizing hints that this Principle is already present, however hidden or disguised, within their highest ideals and teachings. At the deepest level, there may be something of the greatest value that we all have in common; perhaps the many destructive ideas that threaten to divide us are based on superficial differences and might not prevail.

The Principle of Goodness

Many of our greatest thinkers have maintained there is much more that unites us than divides us. The names of Martin Luther King and Mahatma Gandhi spring to mind, but there are many more. Unfortunately, communities have all too often listened to the siren songs of the dividers rather than to the soft voices of the reconcilers. Those of us participating in this congress are finding a myriad views and per-

spectives to show how it is *not* a hopeless task to overcome the divisions. One cause of division is fear, and a cause of fear is uncertainty as to how others will act towards us. But what if we knew that a stranger of another race, religion, and nationality was no more likely to hurt us than our own best friend? Would not such knowledge about that stranger help us to overcome our fear and defensiveness towards that stranger? And what if the stranger knew the same about us — knew that we in turn cared for that his or her welfare, even though we had never met that person before? What if there was a universal ethic, a fundamental principle of moral behavior, that we all shared, and what if that principle required us to care for all others? And what if that principle is already hinted at in all the great religions? And what if it is a perfectly *practical* principle, not merely a grand emotional exhortation?

Let us start by stating the principle, and then situate it by determining its relation to some other well-known ethical theories; then we shall look at some evidence for the promises just given. Our starting point is that good and evil are realities. Therefore, our principle is first of all a description of these realities, and only secondarily a definition of the words "good" and "evil" (to make the words accord with the realities). In its simplest formulation, the Principle is this:

Goodness is to attempt to benefit everyone. **Evil** is to harm even a single innocent one.

One can make headway in understanding the Principle of Goodness by comparing it with utilitarianism. Utilitarianism and other consequentialist ethics are popular moral principles of our time. What, after all, could be better than making as many people happy as possible? Consequentialist theories may be regarded as making a statement such as: "One's moral duty is to maximize the measure of welfare X." X differs between variant philosophies of consequentialism, where "maximize" is often shorthand for the tedious "maximize, or, where that is impossible, minimize the loss of, or minimize the opposite of." Here, we are not concerned with any further subtleties of consequentialisms, such as "rule" or "act" utilitarianism, as we already have all we need to situate the Principle of Goodness relative to consequentialism.

Perhaps the most noticeable distinction between these theories is that the Principle of Goodness is absolute: "... benefit *everyone*. Don't ... harm *any* innocent one." Consequentialisms make no such recommendation, because it is obvious that benefiting everyone and harming no one is, usually, quite impossible in the actual world. Every ethical theory must somehow allow for this practical defect in our universe, and the consequentialisms do it by reducing the extent of the obligation. Thus utilitarianism tells us to make as many people as happy as possible, not to make all people optimally happy, and it tells us to hurt as few as possible, rather than hurting no one, or to balance the harm to some against benefit to many more.

This brings us to the less obvious difference between these theories: utilitarianism is, as the generic name for all such theories attests, *consequentialist*: the mo-

rality of action is judged by its consequences. Yes, allowances are made for things not turning out the way we expected; for example, someone trying to grow a crop to feed starving people might spray it with a pesticide that poisons the waterways and destroys the only source of drinking water. In that sense, a utilitarian might say, "Yes, things turned out badly, but at least he meant well." Such allowances for human fallibility do not alter the fact that if one knew the consequences beforehand one would be compelled to act so as to maximize the outcome.

The Principle of Goodness allows for the universal defect mentioned above in a different way. The principle has an end in view (benefit all) and an end to avoid (harming any innocents), but it does not judge morality by achievement of the benefit or avoidance of the harm. Instead, it is a principle of the willed intention, that is, the attempt to put the moral choice into action. That willed intention may fail, but the goal of the intention should not change on that account. The correct moral choice is not determined by the consequences, actual or anticipated, but by the intended consequences. For example, a criminal might threaten "You must kill this one person, or else I shall kill those ten people." According to utilitarian reasoning, "The deaths of ten are worse than the death of one, so I shall kill the one." One who strives to implement the Principle of Goodness cannot reason thus. If I attempt to kill one, then that is my willed intention, and is, according to the Principle, evil. I can refuse to kill the one, but then go on to attempt to benefit the ten, by trying to persuade the criminal, by trying to intervene, or by getting the police on the scene in time. I can do these things even if I feel sure the measures will fail. The paradox here is that the action may even be in accord with utilitarianism. For, if criminals knew that my ethical behavior was unbendingly in accord with the Principle of Goodness, such a threat would be seen as pointless at the outset, and might not even be made at all.

Because it is concerned with willed choice informed by anticipated outcomes that have a moral value, but that is not determined by those outcomes, the Principle logically may work out differently. In acting according to Goodness, I may fail. Modifying the previous example: Instead of a criminal making a threat, I find myself confronted with a lever. One setting will kill a single person now; the other will kill ten people later. The lever is connected to a senseless mechanism (a pre-programmed computer, say); I know how it is programmed, and there are no other possibilities except one death now or ten later. I have the choice of setting the lever to one position or the other. It makes no difference how the lever is set when I first confront it; an intention can be a choice to not act as much as a choice to act, and so I cannot "opt out" by leaving the lever on its original setting. Clearly, I am going to fail. I am not being evil, as I have no intention to kill anyone, no matter what I do to the lever. Neither can I be good, as either setting represents a choice that someone's benefit matters less than someone else's.

In practice, faced with such a choice, the intuition of a person guided by the Principle of Goodness will probably be to postpone the evil: to choose the later deaths of the ten. That allows for other action, after the one is safe, on behalf of the ten, such

as trying to sabotage the controlling computer. There are important questions that need to be addressed following from this, but we shall look at only one in this paper: what is the difference between our original and our modified scenarios that is relevant to making these different choices?

A key difference relevant to this conference is that in the former case, the criminal has *free will*. My actions do not flow mechanically and unfailingly to the deaths of the ten, should I reject the blackmail threat. If I judge the two situations identically (that is, regard them both as instances of my having no non-failing options), then I must judge that the criminal lacks free will, and that is a terrible judgement to pass upon a human being. Nevertheless I might, on occasion, pass it. For example, a group acting undercover within an evil totalitarian regime might mutually agree that, if some are captured the rest will take whatever option gets the greatest number out unharmed. Such an agreement would be based on an assessment that any likely captors would, in effect, be automata acting out the regime's orders, and not individual humans with free choices. Whatever scenarios one might posit along these lines, it is clear the Principle gives space to "breathe." That is, acting in accord with the Principle of Goodness allows genuine moral choice, rather than a continuing string of failing harm-minimization choices, and it is based precisely on the belief that other people are free souls. They can *choose!* Determinism, whether based on theology or on recent theory about people's acts being non-culpable due to upbringing, etc., is not fatal to the Principle of Goodness, but it limits our confidence that we will be able to put it to good use. However this is probably true in relation to any theory of ethics at all, if the analysis were to be pushed to the limit.

Another relevant difference is whether, when we must fail, some failing options result in the abandonment of selected groups. We need to draw out the difference between utilitarianism and the Principle of Goodness in this case. Let us construct a thought experiment to illustrate this from the circumstances of the sinking of the Titanic. When the first officer saw the iceberg dead ahead, he ordered turning the ship to port in an attempt to miss the iceberg entirely and thus save every life. The outcome was disastrous. Some recent commentators have proposed that the "correct" choice was to order full astern and allow the ship to impact the iceberg head-on. This, so the argument goes, would have collapsed the front few compartments, but would have left the rest undamaged and would have allowed the ship to remain afloat.

Let us say that the number killed by hitting the iceberg head-on would be N and the number killed by trying, but failing to miss the iceberg entirely would be $3N$. A utilitarian might argue that, "Yes, $3N$ is larger than N. But given the lack of knowledge before the disaster, the first officer might have expected a three-quarters chance of missing the iceberg. So the deaths of $3N$ are only 25% likely, whereas the deaths of N by ramming the iceberg head-on are completely certain. Thus trying to miss the iceberg has the lower *expected* (in the statistical sense) toll." So let us say that somehow the first officer knows for sure that trying to miss will fail. Now he has two failing options: hit and kill the N in the bow, or try to miss and kill $3N$. In this case

the utilitarian must either answer "Kill the *N*" or be convicted of special pleading or mere rationalization, as Finnis has persuasively shown. The Principle of Goodness requires another consideration. Ramming the iceberg head-on is a *choice* to sacrifice the *N* in the bow for the rest of us. Trying to miss, although it kills 3*N*, is not such a choice. If we try to miss, knowing that 3*N* of us will die, we have not sacrificed anyone "for the rest of us" because we each take our chances as to whether we are in or out of the 3*N* who die. We have not *abandoned* anyone; we are all in it together and we can still act to mutually support any and everyone that we find ourselves in a position to help as the ship goes down. This example shows that the Goodness is a principle of universal care, which utilitarianism is not.

The Principle of Goodness and the Individual

This paper does not comprehensively situate the Principle of Goodness in the landscape of existing ethical theories, but we have seen it is inconsistent with utilitarianism. The comparison with utilitarianism was chosen because it can be argued that the common tendency in the west today is to judge all social theories, including ethical ones, by their workability, which usually collapses into whether they recommend the course of action that is "best" — in a utilitarian sense! The western thinker unless very careful is thus on a pre-set path to rejecting non-utilitarian theories, which are generally considered "wrong" by definition.

Our thought experiments above challenge this general preconception by showing cases where Goodness recommends action that is less than the "best" in terms of the final outcome. These experiments also bring out a key benefit of the Principle, which no utilitarian theory (again, see Finnis) can possess. There is irreducible direct concern and care for each and every "victim" of a wrong or unjust act. No amount of average benefit or long-term effect can cancel this concern. Whilst this is surely a good thing, it poses the basic question about individual living: whether the individual is handicapped or overburdened by irreducible universal care?

The concern about overburdening is allayed by the fact that the theory of Goodness concerns the willed intention, not the outcome. I need not succeed in benefiting everyone; nor, if my irrelevance to some others' welfare is obvious, need I worry or agonize over them. The Principle doesn't tell me to be worried or to torture myself with my compassion in situations that I cannot fix or affect. It tells me only if I *can*, I should. And in this regard, we must remember that we ourselves are included within the category of "everyone" for whom we must have regard. Indeed, it is easy to show that I must have primary regard for myself — not in the sense that I must selfishly favor myself, but in the sense that, of all people, the one primarily obligated to benefit me is me. Consider if it were otherwise: what would happen if others had to spend their time and divert their concern into checking that I was not starving to death as a result, for example, of giving everything I had to the poor. It is clear a workable approach based on Goodness must be for each of us to plan to live a flourishing and

happy life built around generous care for others. Others will care for us, will never "let us down" when we are in need, but they will also care for themselves and promote their own interests, if for no other reason than not to burden us with feelings of ethical obligation. Likewise, we will do the same in relation to them.

As an aside, we note this shows that Goodness is not an ethics of duty, in the sense of Kant's view that only acts performed out of duty may be described as ethical. We argue that being joyful simply from doing a good act, or from seeing the happiness in others brought about by one's good acts is just as valid a way to benefit oneself as any other.

Another personal issue is safety. In a diverse world, a world in which we might not necessarily understand or know the intentions of others, am I handicapped by adopting the Principle of Goodness? The Principle requires me never to attempt to harm the innocent. If my intention is to adopt the Principle only to the extent of avoiding evil (but not necessarily to do positive good), it would seem the Principle of Goodness is a very easy standard to live up to. One can defend oneself against an attacker, or take realistic decisions in business or other affairs to protect one's interests against wrongful or unfair practices by others. None of this is compromised should one wish to practice the positive aspect, actually promoting goodness rather than merely avoiding evil. Because of this, the Principle of Goodness is *robust*. It would be best if the whole world practiced the Principle, but even if just a few or even only one person does so, they will not be handicapped in their dealings with others.

The Principle of Goodness and Society

In this section we briefly look at some of the ways in which the Principle of Goodness provides guidance for the arrangement and conduct of human social and political affairs. That it can do so may seem surprising, as the Principle might seem too simple or too naïve to have such influence. Indeed (as I shall show in the next section), virtually every part of the Principle has already been recommended before, somewhere in the world's great religious teachings or other philosophies. For example, many ethics of duty contain the precept: "Do not harm the innocent." Indeed, Socrates' refusal to kill Leon (See Plato), even though it seemed for all the world the result would be both his own death and Leon's, is a clear-cut refusal to do evil standing on precisely the correct principle, as stated above. Socrates could not intend the taking of Leon's life, and that was that.

The reason why this Principle is so ancient, so well-known, and yet largely bypassed, is that it is usually believed to be a *consequence* of some other moral reasoning rather than the very source of morals that (I believe) it is. For example, if indeed Socrates' actions were morally correct, they were correct *because* of something *else*. Whether that something is an intuition, a duty, the law of God, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, a categorical imperative, or enlightened self-interest, "Do not intend the harm of the innocent" is seen as a *consequence* of some

principle rather than an immediate translation of the description of a reality: Evil is to intend the harm of an innocent.

Consequentially, when policies, social choices, laws, and so on are made "Do not intend the harm of the innocent" is seen as just one more competing claim to be adjudicated in some way. The reality of our world is that the adjudication is commonly made on pragmatic grounds, which in turn almost always means some form of consequentialism. The examples are unending and range from the individual, through local and regional matters, to issues upon which the future of our planet hinges: "The toxic waste dump has to be in *someone's* back yard!" "We have to strike a balance between human rights and security." And so on, and on.

We have enough room to examine just one social question and that only in brief. The example is intellectual property (IP) law. IP is an important issue, and yet is not so highly emotive as to obscure the argument. Patent and copyright laws were invented for a distinctly utilitarian reason: to promote the sciences and arts. They were written to ensure some reward for the inventor or creator. If the means and ends were reversed here, we would have an instance of the Principle of Goodness: the reward ensures that the donor (the inventor or author), having benefited the rest of us, also receives a benefit; the consequence being to spur creativity and forward the sciences and arts.

The copyright system, since the passage in the U.S. of the Digital Millennium copyright Act (DCMA), is in a mess. The mess is so bad that criticism from the point of view of Goodness can only point to the obvious. For example, the DCMA law criminalizes the circumvention of copyright protection mechanisms. Imagining a similar law in normal life shows how ill conceived is such a prohibition. Imagine a law that criminalized breaking a lock. Now imagine a lock being used by a kidnapper to imprison a victim! No further comment is necessary, and so we turn to patent law.

Patent law grants a right of exclusive use to the creator of an invention for a specified period of time, during which others are required to license the invention in order to use it, thereby providing remuneration to the inventor. This applies whether one copies the invention or reinvents it independently. Second, because of the significance of being granted a patent an application is (supposed to be) examined in depth to ensure originality and non-obviousness. Therefore a costly fee is charged for a patent — typically many tens of thousands of dollars. From the viewpoint of the Principle of Goodness, we can immediately criticize the fee: wealthy companies can patent anything and everything, from the radical and brilliant to the trivial. A poor person, maybe someone living hand-to-mouth in rural India or Africa, devising some new process of the utmost value, simply can not obtain a patent. Yet, the Principle tells us that we should attempt to benefit everyone. Laws must, if possible, be designed to ensure that happens. The structure of patent law guarantees that the neediest inventors will not benefit, and so is a wrong law.

Even worse, the law is used to steal from the poor. Indian villagers, aware for thousands of years of the benefits of the neem tree, have had rights to use and develop neem products taken from them because deep-pocketed multinational companies

have been able to patent the tree. Although this is undoubtedly a misuse of the law, it is also an effect of the law's basic fault that the villagers could not afford the patents themselves, nor could they afford to challenge in court the presumption of validity attaching to a patent.

There is another, more subtle flaw in patent law that also harms the less affluent: one can violate a patent even if one is unaware of the patent exists and created the innovation independently. This means, especially since patents are allowed now on intangibles such as computer programs, that a vast patent search is required before one can comfortably market anything, even if one devised the product entirely oneself. Computer programs in particular are a good target for the more educated among the poor, as, apart from access to a computer (and outmoded ones can be very cheap and yet suitable at a pinch), there is little cost except one's time. But what about the patent search? And how does a poor individual gain the skill to know how to conduct a search unaided? This requires a whole other skill domain, requiring knowledge on quite a higher level. After all, writing a program has a positive result: the program, if successful, will work. A patent search has a negative result: if successful, no prior art will be found. How can a poor person be sure of that?

We see the Principle of Goodness requires us to replace patents with something quite different. A suitable replacement will be automatic (no expensive fees or processes, beyond maybe a small administration fee). And it will require that one actually gained one's knowledge from the patented material for an infringement to occur (to remove the need for expensive searches). This should by no means be considered an adequate treatment of the patent issue, but rather a sketch to illustrate how the Principle of Goodness may be applied in practice. In this regard, there's one final remark. The above discussion does not rely merely on an appeal to our intuitive ideas about equity or fairness. It arises from the rule, which follows from the Principle, that governments should not be partial. They should not frame laws so as to exclude a subset of innocent people from partaking in a benefit they themselves created. On the other hand, the Principle makes no objection to other distinctions between rich and poor. For example, one cannot likewise show that everyone has equal rights to receive goods from a store, whether or not they have the money to pay for them. (Although this example does bring about certain responsibilities at the level of social services.)

The patent and copyright issue was chosen, in part, because its ordinariness is far removed from the inspirational wording of the Principle itself. Yet, as we have seen, even with such a practical, down-to-earth question, the Principle gives us specific guidelines. It is just as helpful, or more so, with almost any other issue troubling people in our time.

The Hidden Jewel: The Principle of Goodness was here all along

I have also promised to provide some indications that the Principle is already present in the world, in particular, in the great religions and other philosophies that have inspired our species through millennia. To trust others, we would all like some

assurance that a unifying principle such as this doesn't come "out of the blue," that it has grounding in the great teachings of our species. We can point immediately to the Golden Rule, which, in one form or another, seems to be present everywhere. Its concern for others "as for ourselves" is clearly in accord with Goodness. But there are other, less obvious but perhaps more suggestive or specific passages in scriptures and teachings from many cultures that convey the Principle. Such writings often have many interpretations, and the comments below should not be taken as implying that any different way of understanding these passages is invalid or less valid.

A passage I have always loved occurs in the Bhagavad Gita, where Krishna says:

> *The essence of the soul is will and it is really single... have done with all dualities, stand ever firm on Goodness. Think not of gain or keeping the thing gained, but be yourself! ... (But) work alone is your proper business, never the fruits (it may produce):let not your motive be the fruit of works nor your attachment to (mere) worklessness. Stand fast in Yoga, surrendering attachment; in success and failure be the same and then get busy with your works. (2:41...48 — trans. R.C. Zaehner)*

The above might indicate a simple ethic of duty. On the other hand, it first emphasizes will, the free choice for good or evil; and significantly it emphasizes that outcome, as in consequentialist ethics, is not one's "proper business." And yet, by talking of success and failure, it teaches that ethics does have a goal that might or might not be achieved, and it stresses that one cannot avoid choices by inaction. This sounds tantalizingly close to the Principle of Goodness recommendation that we seek the benefit of all whilst not judging one's acts by the actual outcome.

Buddhist writings provide a wealth of apposite references, many focussing on the importance of having regard for every single being, for example:

> *A man is not a great man because he is a warrior and kills other men; but because he hurts not any living being he in truth is called a great man. (270 — trans. Juan Mascaro)*

The Qur'an also contains similar injunctions:

> *...he who slayeth one, unless it be a person guilty of manslaughter, or of spreading disorders in the land, shall be as though he had slain all mankind; but he who saveth a life, shall be as though he had saved all mankind alive. (V.35. — trans. Rodwell)*

Rodwell quotes a similar passage from Jewish writings:

> ...him who kills a single individual of Israel it shall be reckoned as if he had slain the whole race.

Sikh scripture also mentions harming a single one, and singles out intent as the key factor:

> *In whose heart the calumny of another is harbored, he will never do well... Justice is not administered by mere words... (Rag Gauri. Var: Ramdas: XX — trans. Trumpp)*

Jesus' teachings provide us with a wealth of material teaching the Principle, of which we have room for just one:

> *See that you do not despise one of these little ones; for I tell you that in heaven their angels always behold the face of my father who is in heaven. What do you think? A man has a hundred sheep, and one of them has gone astray, does he not leave the ninety-nine on the hills and go in search of the one that went astray? And if he finds it, truly, I say to you, he rejoices over it more than over the ninety-nine that never went astray. So it is not the will of my father who is in heaven that one of these little ones should perish. (Matt 18:10–14)*

Conclusion

This paper has introduced a new ethical principle with vast ramifications. It provides a means to develop proactive approaches to world problems, suggesting methods of analysis that can be pursued before crises occur. It is a new way to understand commonalities in seemingly disparate religions, and yet it does not suggest there is a single right answer to each problem that trumps diverse individual and cultural preferences. It is necessarily impossible, in the time available, to do such a Principle justice. The following are some areas upon which future papers must focus, or in which further investigation needs to be done:

- (Fundamental) What does the Principle of Goodness actually say? What are "benefit, harm, innocent, justice? Does intention make sense (free will)? Degrees of good or evil. How to tell failure from failure of will. To whom does the Principle apply? Who is included in "everyone?"
- (Comparative) Further investigation of precedents and similarities in extant religious and ethical systems.
- (Rationale) Exploration of reasons why this should be considered an objective description of good and evil.
- (Practical) What does the Principle say about individual choice, law, social policy, etc.? Is this approach practical? How will it compare with outcomes

from other ethical principles? (But beware in the last case, of merely concluding that "It isn't utilitarianism" and imagining that this is in itself is an ethical argument.)

In the immediate future, the author, with the other developer of this Principle, Gitie House, will be considering the Principle in relation to ethical philosophical theory, further connections with world religions; further practical analysis, human responsibility, and choices facing humanity as the planet's guardians.

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Further material about the Principle will be found at: http://www.sci.usq.edu.au/staff/house/goodness.

ЗАЩИТА ЛИЧНЫХ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ И РАЗНООБРАЗИЯ В ЕДИНОМ МИРЕ: НОВАЯ ОСНОВА ФУНДАМЕНТАЛЬНОЙ ЭТИЧЕСКОЙ ТЕОРИИ

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Вопросы о том, как сохранить индивидуальность и сформировать единое процветающее мировое сообщество, тесно взаимосвязаны. Прежде всего, это касается вопроса о том, как людям следует обращаться друг с другом, и как они могут доверять кому-либо кроме себя самих. Это основополагающий вопрос морали. В данной статье предлагается новый подход к этим вопросам. В основе предлагаемого принципа лежит осознанный выбор добра и зла, осуществляющийся в соответствии с установленными объективными критериями. Сами критерии универсальны: добро служит пользе всех без исключения, в то время как зло стремится навредить даже невинному. Принципу сознательного действия не противоречит тот факт, что несовершенный мир может помешать добиться цели, поставленной с позиции добра, и породить обстоятельства, которых че-

ловек стремился избежать, отказываясь сделать выбор в пользу зла. Эти критерии могут служить руководством в частной жизни, отношениях внутри и между группами, создании законов и социальных систем. Кроме того, в мире, где существует подобная этика, индивидуальность, личная безопасность и принадлежность каждого находятся под защитой, поскольку все люди верят в то, что все окружающие заботятся друг о друге. В статье рассматривается вопрос о том, как принцип добродетели на практике обеспечивает эту идею.

VIETNAMESE CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS FEMINITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND SYNERGY

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Cultural and Religious Roots of Vietnamese Feminity[1]

Viet Nam is often erroneously viewed as a satellite of China — a fairly patriarchal and structured, "yang" or masculine society. A thousand years of Chinese occupation did impose some masculine characteristics on the dominant Vietnamese group in North Viet Nam delta — the "Kinh" group. Yet if we look up the mountain from the delta, or to the area of South Viet Nam, where the Chinese influence was weaker, the feminity is quite clear. Let's first examine feminization of two masculine religions, Hinduism and Islam, which were practiced by the people of Champa, an ancient kingdom in north central Viet Nam.

One way to see the deeply rooted feminity in Viet Nam is to trace the gradual feminization of the foreign male gods as they endured in Viet Nam. The largest standing Hindu temple in Viet Nam is Thap Ba, which can be roughly translated as Mother Temple. Built in 871, the original altar was dedicated to the masculine God of war, Siva, symbolized by a pure-gold linga (phallus) — the utmost male characteristic. After the temple was robbed, in year 965 the linga was replaced by a statue of Bhagavati, who was the wife of Siva. Furthermore, even Bhagavati is further feminized. Commonly Bhagavati has ten arms holding ten weapons — still fairly masculine. At Thap Ba, eight of the ten arms of Bhagavati blended into the background, with only two arms forwards, with two hands in a calm, meditating position. Her breast and bosom were also transformed into one of a mother after having numerous children. Numerous other Hindu temples are also dedicated to mothers, just like Thap Ba.

Even the highly structured Islamic religion was feminized in Viet Nam in various ways. Male circumcision was modified into Katat, a symbolic ceremony, in which only a wooden knife was used. People also invented a correspondent rite of passage for women, called Karoh, which became more important than the male Katat. The pilgrimage to Mecca can be seen as another masculine aspect because it leads to one supreme place. In Viet Nam, that pilgrimage was not emphasized. The fast during the whole month of Ramadan was also relaxed into a three-day fast for the Imams

only. Meanwhile other local and feminine practices took central place: for example, the women went out to marry their men.

Even in the Kinh area, where China dominated for a thousand years, the feminine aspects still remained dominant. The two religions discussed above, Hinduism and Islam, were in the southern part. In the northern delta was a combination of three main traditions: Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. Of these three, Confucianism is the most masculine.

The influences of Confucianism on Vietnamese culture flourished in 15th century and declined at the end of the 19th century when French came. However, before Confucian ideology took power, Buddhism and Taoism had been the greater influences on Vietnamese culture. Even when Confucianism took power in the 15th century, Buddhism and Taoism still silently developed and continued influencing on the lives of the Vietnamese. The influences have been manifested through a variety of religious practices. Thousands of Buddhist temples and Taoist shrines were built in Viet Nam during the 10th to 15th centuries which contributed to nurturing the spiritual life of the Vietnamese people and forming a special cultural characteristic. Note that Buddhism and Taoism were similar to the Vietnamese culture and in its indigenous religion in many ways, so the Vietnamese warmly received and seriously practiced these two religions, even when they were out of favor by the political platform in the 15th century.[2]

Some enduring influences of Confucianism on Vietnamese culture include: 1) familial and social structure; hierarchy has been commonly practiced in Vietnamese society (however, some Confucian teachings have been eliminated by the Vietnamese, especially some practices in family such as "Tam tong" or "three bonds in relationships of a woman": obey her father when she is single, obey her husband when she is married, and obey her son after her husband died); 2) an emphasis on filial piety in relationships; and 3) an emphasis on education, generally and moral education particularly.[3]

Therefore, Confucianism provides some *forms* in Vietnamese culture because it focuses more on structures, functions, and government, rather than the *contents* of the Vietnamese lives. The core cultural characteristics of Vietnamese culture can be named as 1) spiritual dimension supported by indigenous religion, Buddhism and Taoism. 2) Community nurturing manifested through a variety of festivals — a characteristic of *yin* dimension. According to Phan Ngoc,[4] the presence of women in Vietnamese festivals plays a decisive role in making the festivals happen. Without the presence of women, there would be no festivals, for one of the main purposes of the Vietnamese festivals is to strengthen relationships between men and women. 3) The dimension of femininity in different religions manifested through the worship of female Gods such as Mother Heaven (Mau Thien) Mother Earth (Mau Dia) Mother Water (Mau Thuy, worshiped by fishermen), and Mother Mountain (Mau Thuong Ngan). The worship of female Gods came into existence in Viet Nam most prominently after the 15th century when the Confucianism took power and caused crises in

Vietnamese spiritual life. These female Gods came as loving mothers, who support, nurture and comfort Vietnamese women who suffered with the yang system of Confucianism.[5] In addition, there are other popular female deities in other religions such as the Blessed Virgin Mary in Christianity and Quan Yin in Buddhism. Also, some female Gods worshiped by minority groups are Mother Fire, Mother Wind, Mother Rice and so forth.[6]

Before any of these religions or traditions came to Viet Nam, it had been an agricultural society. As in many other agricultural societies, fertility is important. Though it commonly takes both sexes to be fertile, the female side appears more important.

Suffering has colored most of Vietnamese history. There are many wounds of many types. War has been on-going for thousands of years. Natural disasters, from flood to drought, regularly test this agricultural country. The feminine side provides at least two important saving functions in this situation: nursing, and expressing. Children commonly play with their fathers, and run to their mothers when they are sick or wounded.

One image of how the Vietnamese yin is different from American yang is manifested in a game. Vietnamese author Quyen Di noticed a sharp contrast between Vietnamese and American kite flying. In Viet Nam, people fly a one-string kite with a wind pipe, tie it to a branch, then lie down and passively listen to the soothing sound of the wind blowing through the pipe. In the US, people use two or even four strings to control every movement of the kite: forward and backward, up and down or standing still, with constant vigilant and manipulation, using precision strings that respond quickly by not stretching at all.

Further Manifestations of Vietnamese Feminity: The Care Orientation[7]

Carol Gilligan's *In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*[8] argues through case studies that women are more likely to understand moral issues from a "care" orientation, as compared to the "justice" orientation more typical of men At the core of the care orientation are human relationships.[9] There are many evidences to prove the strong human relationship in Vietnamese culture, but we want to highlight the three significant pieces of evidence. 1) Human relationships as the foundation of ethics; 2) a strong emphasis on respect for the other; and 3) responsibility for the other to the point of self-sacrifice.

Relationships: Vietnamese philosophy can be regarded as a reflection on lived experiences that orient people toward a harmonious life with the other persons in the community. The object and the end of Vietnamese philosophical studies are focused on human persons, and its goal is to aim toward service for human life. Moreover, because human beings are the center for philosophical studies, a deep reflection on human relationships is one of the most important dimensions of Vietnamese philosophy.[10]

Truth, to the Vietnamese, is not an abstract system of thoughts, but it is first founded in the lived experiences among human relationships. These experiences are pervasively manifested through literature, folktales, and conventions in society. In other words, to the Vietnamese, philosophy is focused more on mutual relationships between individuals than to force each person to follow some general principles which stand outside human relationships.[11]

One of the most obvious practices of human relationship can be seen through Vietnamese forms of address. Vietnamese language has various forms of address based on age, sex, and marriage status. For example, Vietnamese younger siblings are addressed as *em,* literally younger brother or younger sister. Also, older siblings are addressed as *anh* (older brother), or as *chi* (older sister). Or upon conversing with uncles or aunts, nephews and nieces should use the term *chau*, literally nephews and nieces to indicate their position in the relationship. Similarly, uncles or aunts should use the term *chu* or *co,* literally uncles or aunts to indicate their position in their relationship with their nephews and nieces. Many other similar forms of address are practiced by the Vietnamese to express close connection among people in a family. Moreover, these forms of address are also extended to social domains to include everyone in the human family. These forms of address not only function as a proper way of behavior between people in a hierarchical society; they bear a profound philosophical meaning. That is, human relationship is highly respected and strongly emphasized.

In addition to the above-mentioned forms of address, human relationships are also manifested through the way people live and support one another in the community. One of the most dominant characteristics of Vietnamese culture is the "village culture."[12] In this cultural context, people need to build a strong relationship so that they can relate harmoniously to one another. Thus, the bonds of neighborhood, friendship, as well as social groups are very crucial in the Vietnamese culture.

The third evidence of human relationship in Vietnamese culture is manifested through literature and folksongs, as well as traditional teachings. The most popular story about the origin of Viet Nam is a myth that talks about the birth of the first hundred Vietnamese children who were born to the same mother. The story not only indicates the independency of a country, but it also holds a very profound philosophical value, that is, everyone has the same root and each person needs to be considered as brother and sister in the same family. As a result, when talking about the Vietnamese community in general, a special term *dong bao*, literally "born to the same womb" is always used to indicate the whole group of Vietnamese people.

Respect. Respect toward the other is one of the most crucial ethical teachings in the Vietnamese society. Some people misunderstand the concept of respect toward the other in Vietnamese culture. They think that only older people deserve respect from younger ones. In fact, although older people have a special respect from younger ones, the younger definitely have their positions in the community and they

deserve respect from the older ones as well. Thus, the teaching "kinh tren, nhuong duoi" or "respect the older, and yield to the younger" has become one of the most important ethical codes for mutual relationships among the Vietnamese. Given that, each person, whether they are old or young, has his/her position in society and he/she should be respected.[13]

Responsibility. Responsibility for the other to the point of self-sacrifice for the other is one of the crucial ethical standards for the Vietnamese. Responding to the needs of the other is regarded as an ethical demand to each member in the community. The needs of the other call for my awareness of my responsibility, and by responding to the other I fulfill my obligation to that human being. Moreover, ethics requires each person to love the other as him or herself. One should do and must do something for the needs of the other even though he or she might be disadvantaged or even face loss of life.[14] Selfishness and individualism is strongly criticized; the attitude "your survival or death is none of my business" is strongly condemned by the Vietnamese tradition.[15] Life cannot be like a snail shrinking in its shell and only concerned for itself. To live is to live for the other and with the other, reaching out to the other and responding to the needs of the other. One of the most popular teachings to each Vietnamese is "love the other as your self" or "full leaves cover the broken ones." This teaching is not a religious ideal, but it has been an ethical standard and has been practiced by the Vietnamese over the course of history. Although responsibility for the members in a family is emphasized, one is required to reach out to everyone and to embrace everyone is my responsibility. In so doing I not only fulfill my responsibility to the other, but I also enrich my existence. As Tran Van Doan explained, an authentic human person needs to be faithful to the innate goodness such as humanity and natural goodness endowed in his/her heart. A perfect person is the one who knows how to cooperate with the creation and contribute to building a perfect society with perfect individuals.[16] These ethical guidelines indeed help orient the Vietnamese toward a responsive life and to be open to the needs of the other.

Moreover, Vietnamese people are taught to include "brothers and sisters of five continents and four seas" as siblings under the same roof. One can easily recognize this practice through the way the Vietnamese warmly welcome strangers, for hospitality has been one of the core characteristics in the Vietnamese culture, and it reflects a deeper meaning of the responsive dimension that each person should practice for their fellow humans.

Critoforo-Borri, a Jesuit missionary who lived in central Viet Nam for five years remarked that compassion for the other especially for the poor and the hungry is the nature of the Vietnamese. They never refuse to do good deeds, for refusing to do so is considered as lacking responsibility to the other. The justice towards human beings, no matter who they are, requires them to help and respond. If they see a hungry foreigner standing in front of their doors asking for food, all people in the family are to hurry and respond by getting some food for him.[17]

Implications for Conflict Management

The same pattern of feminization might explain a number of apparently disparate phenomena today. A better understanding can lead to effective coping methods.

A common complaint in many Vietnamese communities is that Vietnamese people congregate but cannot unite. There are many organizations, but there is also fighting between and within organizations.[18] Seen as such, this is clearly and simply a negative characteristic to overcome, possibly by enforcing a stronger centralized organizational structure and power.

Yet, from the historical analyses above, the dominant feminine side of Vietnamese resists power play. What this people respect is relationship, not structure. Instead of going to the king or to Mecca, people focus more on their own villages, where every person counts in some way.

Religious institutions have both the hierarchical and the relational aspects. Knowing the Vietnamese orientation, the proper aspect is utilized. For example, Christian Churches can emphasize the central hierarchy or the mystical body. Theologian Ronald Rolheiser expresses the latter as "mellowness of heart," which he considers one of the non-negotiable essentials of Christianity.[19] Emphasizing this relational aspect would be more congruent with the characteristic of this people. Of course both components are needed, but emphasizing the right one can lead to success instead of turmoil.

Some of the most intense community conflicts happen in the Vietnamese American Catholic communities. In these communities, a frequent place of friction is between the two sources of power: the priest and the parish council. We are experimenting with ways to emphasize the relationships in these communities instead of the power, in order to transform the conflict into energy of love and harmony. This experiment is in progress, and will be reported later.

Implications for Synergy between Vietnamese and Others

Synergy can happen both at the state and at the individual levels. During the Viet Nam war, three superpowers — US, China, and USSR — poured much resource into Viet Nam, but not much of that influence remains in Viet Nam. This is not surprising after we consider how Viet Nam has changed the traditions that came to its soil, like the examples with Hinduism and Islam mentioned above. The feminine or yin element did not propel an impressive technological development, but it has preserved the people. Some Americans have been surprised by the warm reception they receive in North Viet Nam, their former enemy. From a relational perspective, this is quite understandable.

The market economy is entering Viet Nam. The clear difference between the two systems is demonstrated in the table below:[20]

VIETNAMESE TRADITION	MARKET ECONOMY
Rural agricultural villages	Industrial & commercial cities
Valuing flexibility, communal, ethical relationships and local norms	Valuing stable, objective, analytic, legal judgments and economic principles
To achieve balance and peace	To compete for profit

Even within market economy, Richard Nisbett has documented similar contrasts in his book *The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently... and Why*. For example,

> In the West, the goal is satisfaction of a principle of justice and the presumption going into the arena of conflict resolutions is typically that there is a right and a wrong and there will be a winner and a loser. The goal in Eastern conflict resolution is more likely to be hostility reduction and compromise is assumed to be the likely result... As a citizen of pre-revolutionary China put it: "... A Chinese judge cannot think of law as an abstract entity... any law which is not personal enough to respond to the personality of Colonel Huang or Major Li is inhuman and therefore no law at all."[21]

In the West, applying the law differently to different people is consistent with the ethic of care that does not, in Noddings's philosophy, require that a decision needs to be "universalized" (applied to all people in similar situations).[22] However this approach might be considered not "blind" enough to be seen as right from a conventional understanding of a justice orientation. Applying this to market economy, Westerners might view the flexible, relationship-oriented approach in Viet Nam as unjust and possibly corrupt, and with the power of capital, Americans might push Viet Nam into what they consider transparent and objective. Viet Nam might subvert this power the same way she has dealt with China, France and other external forces, leaving both sides frustrated. The West might see construe this as being passive aggressive, which has a negative, manipulative tone.

At the individual level, we reflect on situations when some of us Vietnamese Americans have failed or were successful in collaborating with other Americans. Of course the three Vietnamese American authors of this article cannot represent all Vietnamese, so we can only suggest hypotheses. We tend to do worst when we are confronted with power and an impersonal structure, which is pervasive in an overly litigable society. We tend to do better in more influx situations, where relationships hold together the work instead of the other way around.

The East-West and feminine-masculine difference became most interesting when an American female scholar recognized that she has been socialized in the name of academic vigor to become more masculine, task-oriented than a male Vietnamese colleague. The following reflection is from the American female scholar:

> ...I met Thao [the male Vietnamese colleague]. From the very inception of our research project, I became aware of differences between us that, although not altogether alien, were nonetheless striking. I believe many of these differences stem from what happens when feminine and masculine ways of knowing and seeking knowledge come together. Indeed, through our research relationship, Thao's feminine approach to knowing and being made me all the more aware of some of some surprisingly masculine tendencies. Awareness of this contrast, and an ability to recall older feminine tendencies were essential, allowing me to not only contributing to the relationship, but to grow within it as well. *For example, activity opposed to passivity. From the beginning of our work together, I felt a strong need to be active. Let's organize this; let's develop that. I was a flurry of activity, creating ridiculously long outlines, sending out information-seeking emails, driving the reference librarians mad with my obscure and plentiful interlibrary loan requests. Throughout this phase, Thao had the wisdom to let me be. I always had a vague suspicion that he was sitting back; mildly amused by my chaos, but confident that it would "all come out right in the end." I remember feeling frustrated that he wouldn't join me in the action: was he reading my outlines? What were his thoughts, his feedback, his criticisms? We have a deadline, let's go, go, go...! This was my masculine side coming out in full force — it surprised me, and also energized me (I hadn't felt so energized in a while). But in the midst of my activity and frustration, I was also reassured by Thao's quietness, his standing back. He was letting me do what I needed to do (be active, master a new topic area), and he had faith that together we would find a meaningful path. When I reflected more on this, it reminded me of my own work with students on their research, and of my relationship with my daughter. Sit back; let's see what happens. You try things. We'll talk.*

And talk we did. After my whirlwind of panic-stricken activity died down, Thao and I met frequently and for long periods of time. I had never had such an experience. My own research is usually such a solitary endeavor. Even during the dissertation, I managed to be 500 to 3,000 miles away from my committee. And although I consciously regretted the distance, I am also vaguely suspicious that it was functional: it protected ownership of ideas, as well as a fairly fragile ego. But with Thao, such distance was unrealistic, indeed, impossible. And although I initially feared our meetings (Would I understand him? Would my ideas prove wrong or silly? Would he be able to understand me?), fairly soon I eagerly anticipated them. Our ideas developed together as part and parcel of our developing relationship. We weren't simply clarifying concepts, working out logically structured arguments, and playing with rhetoric (more concept-based, masculine, and perhaps Western ways of knowing and use of relationship), we were discovering them, creating them, and sitting with

our results. I started watching Thao more carefully. Looking for signals of what he might or might not be thinking — until I realized that all (or enough) of that would become apparent if I gave it and us enough time. It was awareness well-rewarded.

How did the female American scholar acquire such masculine habits? She reflected on the socialization process in Academia:

> *It can be profoundly confusing to be a feminine, female scholar in the United States. On the one hand, you are taught (if lucky) to be proud of your femininity, and to celebrate your gender. On the other hand, the further you go in academia, subtle and not-so-subtle structures, practices, and lessons rub against you, pushing you to fit a more masculine model. For me, until recently, the tension resulting from these dual processes (as well as the processes themselves) was decidedly outside of my awareness. After all, as a psychologist (arguably a fairly feminized discipline) specializing in the history of Psychology (again, a focus which has decidedly feminine characteristics), the contrasts were not as great as they might have been. My femininity worked within the context of my department, and the masculine forces which had been at work throughout my life in the Academy were whispers at most, and unseen undercurrents more often.*

How did the male American scholar come to an understanding of caring and justice approaches to ethical reasoning and action? He reflected on his experience as a doctoral student at Harvard influenced by both the philosophy of Lawrence Kohlberg[23] and Carol Gilligan?

> *After Gilligan's* In a Different Voice *was published, the issue of gender difference in moral reasoning became a major focus of research and philosophical investigations. Perhaps it was the result of hearing a calling to be an elementary teacher (historically a feminine profession) or the result of growing up with a closeted gay father and the absence of a stereotypical male role model, but I never sensed a conflict between the* care *and* justice *orientations and doubted the claims of gender differences. I focused more on the research methodology in the study of gender differences. For example, selective presentation of interview data, generalizing from case studies to the general population, etc.*[24] *For me, it was Nel Noddings's philosophical articulation of caring that allowed me to recognize the ethic of caring as distinct from an ethic of justice. Subsequently, I seek to examine the insights of both as I try to understand others — particularly Vietnamese and Vietnamese-Americans as well those from other cultures different than my own — and grapple with ethical issues in my personal life, professional life, and the community / citizenship responsibilities.*

We are still processing the narratives of the Vietnamese Americans who participated in this experiment. Following is a composite, raising both the tensions and the possible fruitfulness in diversity.

> *My American mentor told me to rewrite the tenure application from scratch. I was really surprised and alarmed, because I wrote it with the best of my ability and sensitivity, careful to give credits to all the wonderful people whom I have had much pride and privilege to collaborate with. "How come?" I asked in a hushed voice. "Because you did not say anything about yourself!" I consulted another advisor, who was even more helpful by writing out for me all the achievement, action-oriented terms in competent voice. I went through the process feeling pretty numb, having no idea whether I appeared competitive and confident, or just egomaniac — I did not have the sensitivity to distinguish between the two.*
>
> *...The super-organizing structures often get us into big and small problems. The small ones are more amusing than bothersome, especially if we know the rituals; for example, when two people want to meet for pleasure, both sides pull out calendars to mark an hour a month later. In contrast, we still meet friends on whims for hours at a time, several days a week, nearly always over food and drink, discussing both work and other things. We feel energized after such long encounters, while drained after shorter former meetings. Big structures become more deadly. Once we collaborated with some Americans to organize a conference. The American members took charge, obtained budgets and ran planning meetings a year ahead of time, in which several of the Vietnamese American members politely sat through. Several days before the conference, some of the Vietnamese Americans partied together and suggested some radical last minute changes. One American leader felt so stressed out by such changes that she quit the leadership team. Another American leader said "whatever" and went along. By the third year of these annual conferences, we had almost no formal planning meetings except for fun meals together plus occasional phone calls and emails, and the conference still went smoothly. There was much laughter and little conflict. The American leader asked, "How could things fall in place so effortlessly?" We admire the advanced planning, the budgets and other products by our American collaborators very much; without their efforts, there might not be any conference to start with. Yet, for us, the achievement of community building and networking comes by more naturally. That's why we need collaboration.*
>
> *It appears that we have been more successful in collaborating with Americans who are unusual in some way: those who are very successful in their careers (and we play a supporting role), and those who are more open to different and unpredictable ways of doing things (including trying unusual dishes).*

Caveats and Implications

The concept of Vietnamese feminity probably still startles many people. Though there is abundant evidence over thousands of years, the concept remains, at best, a working hypothesis. We accumulate some phenomenological data, but need much more. The outcome of the proposed community projects will also test the validity of the concept. In addition, to make the case clear in this short article, we have intentionally ignored the diversity within groups. We hope to prompt some alternative concepts and approaches in a world full of hurtful conflicts. Our dream is to generalize even beyond Viet Nam: if each person or nation is better understood and approached properly, there might be more peace and synergy on earth.

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NOTES

[1] We use the less common spelling "feminity" instead of "femininity" partly to distance the term from the common connotation of being women, to emphasize a cluster of personality characteristics which can be developed by men and women, Easterners and Westerners.

This section draws liberally from a Vietnamese book, *Tim Ve Ban Sac Van Hoa Viet Nam* (Ho Chi Minh City: Nha Xuat Ban Thanh Pho Ho Chi Minh, 2001), in which the author, Prof. Tran Ngoc Them, provides one of most up-to-date synthesis on the topic. He articulates clearly the femininity of Viet Nam, yet advocates for a change toward masculinity for development. The book is not available in English yet.

A source available in English is Neil Jamieson, *Understanding Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). Jamieson uses the lens of yin and yang to interpret the history of Viet Nam, and argued that a recent excess of yang led to troubles, which can be solved by a restoration to a balance between yin and yang. Them says that a perfect balance would be so stable that it would be deadly.

We would like to thank Prof. George Kunz and Tran Quoc Anh, SJ, for feedback on an early version of this paper, and Ms. Karen Lutz for editing it.

[2] See Nguyen Van Thuan, *Dai Cuong Lich Su Van Hoa Viet Nam*, Ho Chi Minh: Nha Xuat Ban Giao Duc, 1999.

[3] See Nguyen Dang Duy, *Nho Giao Voi Van Hoa Viet Nam,* Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Hanoi, 1998.

[4] Phan Ngoc, *Ban Sac Van Hoa Viet Nam,* Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Van Hoa Thong Tin, 1998. P. 389.

[5] Ibid., 368.

[6] Ibid., 374.

[7] Most of this section is derived from a paper by Nguyen Ngoc Thao and Le Xuan Hy, *The Other in the Ethics of Kant, Levinas and the Vietnamese Culture*, to be presented in Hanoi, Viet Nam, in December 2004.

[8] Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.

[9] In our view, the best articulation of the philosophy of caring is by Nel Noddings, *Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and moral education,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

[10] Tran Van Doan, http://www.catholic.org.tw/vntaiwan/thanhoc/banthe.htm (27 October 2004).

[11] Truong Ngoc Dung & Le Anh Minh, *Triet Giao Dong Phuong,* Ho Chi Minh City: Nha Xuat Ban Dai Hoc Quoc Gia TP Ho Chi Minh, 2003. P. 39.

[12] Tran Ngoc Them, 180.

[13] Respect is highly valued in Confucianism.

[14] Tran Quoc Vuong, *Van Hoa Viet Nam Tim Toi va Suy Gam,* Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Van Hoc, 2001. P. 77.

[15] Ibid., 76.

[16] Tran Van Doan, The Role of Li-yi in the Confucian Morals, in: *Triet Dao*, no.6, Washington, DC, 2003.

[17] Ngo Gia Huy, Y Duc Viet Nam va Van Hoa Viet Nam, in: *Van Hoa Viet Nam Dac Trung Va Tiep Can*, ed. Le Ngoc Tra, Ho Chi Minh City: Nha Xuat Ban Giao Duc, 2001. P. 110.

[18] Some of these issues sometimes gain the attention of the media in the United States; for example the issue of whether the flag of the former South Viet Nam government or current flag of Viet Nam will be used in public ceremonies (e.g., Powell Steps In on Vietnam Flag Bill, *Los Angeles Times,* February 15, 2003) and a controversy in Orange County California that was created when a Vietnamese store owner displayed an image of Ho Chi Minh in his establishment (e.g.., Mai Tran, "In Print, Another Vietnam War ' Hatred of communism moves many of the immigrant publishers -- often to excess, *Los Angeles Times*, December 2, 2002).

[19] Rolheiser, Ronald, *The holy longing: The search for a Christian spirituality*, New York: Double Day & Company, 1999.

[20] This is part of Table 27.1 in Tran Ngoc Them, 584.

[21] Nisbett, Richard, *The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently... and Why,* New York: The Free Press, 2003. P. 194.

[22] Noddings, *Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and moral education.*

[23] See, for example, Kohlberg, Lawrence, *Essays on moral development, vol. I. The philosophy of moral development,* San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981 and *Essays on moral development, vol. II. The psychology of moral development,* San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984.

[24] While we differ with her in several ways, one account of the issues is presented in two places by Hoff-Sommers, Christina, *The war against boys,* New York: Touchstone, 2000, or a summary of her arguments in "War Against Boys" in: *Atlantic Monthly* May 2000, (available at http://www.theAtlantic.com/issues/2000/05/sommers.htm).

ФЕМИНИННОСТЬ В КУЛЬТУРЕ И РЕЛИГИИ ВЬЕТНАМА: УПРАВЛЕНИЕ КОНФЛИКТАМИ И СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО

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В культуре Вьетнама много женского. Мы описываем это ее свойство и прослеживаем его культурные и религиозные основания. Эта особенность позволяет нам лучше понять ряд проблем, таких как конфликты среди вьетнамских лидеров, разрушение насаждаемых мужских структур, сложности кросс-культурного сотрудничества, приоритет отношений над слепой объективностью и т. д. Понимание этого диктует нам новые подходы в различных областях, от работы в приходах до академического сотрудничества, как среди вьетнамцев, так и между вьетнамцами и другими народами. В настоящее время эти подходы мало описаны. Далее предлагаются дальнейшие выводы и высказываются определенные опасения.

GENERATING TRUST THROUGH MORAL MATH

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While most of us recognize theoretical mathematics as a source for many of the gains humankind has made in science and technology, fewer of us are aware that some of these same mathematical ideas can be and are being applied to issues of social behavior. This essay explores several of the most recent of these ideas. Specifically, it examines concepts drawn not only from simple algebra, but also from the theory of complexity and its offshoots, from fuzzy logic, and from non-zero-sum game theory. An underlying assumption of this essay is that we generate trust whenever we engage in the Golden Rule. Thus, the kind of social behavior that we hope to stimulate with models drawn from mathematics is that which focuses on treating the "other" as you yourself would like to be treated.

> Therefore all things whatsoever you desire that men should do to you, do you even so to them. (New Testament, Matthew 7:12, from the Christian tradition, circa 30 CE.[1])

Many of us have seen various formulations of this Golden Rule, but here is one version, drawn from the world of mathematics, which you may not be so quick to recognize:

> The mathematical golden rule states that for any *fraction*, both *numerator* and *denominator* may be multiplied by the same number without changing the fraction's value.[2]

For example, one half equals two fourths ($^1/_2 = {}^2/_4$), derived, of course, by doing unto the "one" ("1") as you would do unto the other (the "2"). While it seems to take a lifetime (or more) for us to learn to practice this golden rule in our social lives, it only takes a few years of elementary school for most of us to grasp the concept through mathematics. In spite of the simplicity of this observation, only recently have social scientists begun to consider mathematics as a source for ethical guidance.

Once discovered, however, this notion — that we can make better moral decisions with the help of theoretical mathematics — seems to be spreading rapidly. Today, scholars are using a number of mathematical ideas and techniques to better understand the social behavior of cooperation, fairness, and altruism.

As an easy starting place, consider the issue of slicing a pan of newly baked brownies into equal pieces for an *odd* number of people. Sharing the brownies fairly with

an *even* number of people is a trivial problem, rapidly done by some combination of halving, quartering, and re-halving the baked batter. A slightly more complicated situation is, say, dividing the brownie cake in a 10-inch square pan into 5 equal pieces. To do this, you need only mark off the 40-inch perimeter into 5 equal segments of 8 inches each (40 ч 5 = 8), then slice along the imaginary line which connects each of the resulting 8 marks on the perimeter of the pan to the center point of the dish. The five pieces formed by these slices will be the same size, a fact readily verified by using the familiar algebraic formula for the area of a triangle, A = S bh (see diagram).[3] By extension, this process will work for any number of individuals.



Although a 10x10 inch brownie cake would obviously yield sparse refreshment for a large quantity of people, the principle behind this exercise nonetheless introduces what's been called the "mathematics of envy."[4] In fact, mathematicians have developed intricate algorithms for cutting a cake of any size into any number of pieces in a manner that reassures the recipients the split was fair. Such cake-cutting algorithms might seem frivolous or even insignificant were it not for the fact that these strategies are being successfully adapted to the resolution of tricky conflict situations such as property division after a divorce, allocation of an inheritance, or the division of territory following a war.[5]

> This is the sum of duty. Do not unto others that which would cause you pain if done to you. (Mahabharata 5:1517, from the Vedic tradition of India, circa 3000 BCE.)

Another mathematical area that has stimulated recent scholars to think creatively about social behavior is complexity theory. Formally known as nonlinear dynamic systems theory, complexity theory is popularly identified with one of its offshoots, chaos theory. An easy introduction to one of the major ideas of complexity theory can be found simply by watching the 2004 movie *The Butterfly Effect*, in which small changes in initial conditions lead to substantially different outcomes in the life-story of the main character. The movie takes its name from a similar concept found in the mathematical theory. Tagline: "Change one thing, change everything."

Two related ideas also drawn from complexity theory are the notions of *self-organizing emergence and strange attractors*. Somewhat over-simplistically, self-organizing emergence refers to the self-generation of repetitive patterns of order within chaos. This process is ubiquitous in our universe, found in everything from weather patterns to genetic DNA. In biological systems, self-organizing emergence is often referred to as the process of "autopoiesis," from two Greek roots meaning "self" and "making." Similarly simplistically, strange attractors are points or spaces in a system where significant changes in the basic structure of the system occur. Strange attractors may be loosely identified with certain other mathematical concepts called bifurcation points, phase transitions, and critical or threshold points, some or all of which are present in more popular contexts. When Malcom Gladwell defined the title of his recent book, *The Tipping Point*, as "that magic moment when an idea, trend, or social behavior crosses a *threshold*, tips, and spreads like wildfire (emphasis added)," he was essentially speaking of strange attractors.[6] Strange attractors generate sudden, all-at-once change.

The butterfly effect, self-organizing emergence, and strange attractors are all computer-dependent ideas. Without the dramatic ability of the computer to solve complex nonlinear equations and then print the results out in colorful, meaningful patterns,[7] we would never have identified any of the behavior we now understand as chaotic determinism. Chaos, in this newer computer-generated understanding, "is not entirely random"; it is, instead, "an occult, 'hidden,' or implicate *order* within nature (emphasis added)."[8]

Psychologists, physiologists, and neuroscientists have begun to explore the "human dimensions" of complexity theory, noting, for example, strange attractor behavior in human trauma and healing. Thus, while one traumatic event may shape a life, it may only take one intense therapeutic event to reshape it. In the words of two such theorists, "Healing spreads out through the individual life like ripples on a pool of water. This changeability is the prime characteristic of many chaotic systems. It is not harmful to the brain. In fact, it may be the very property that makes perception possible."[9] Or, again and to be more explicit, "Mathematical metaphors help us visualize the bigger picture."[10]

Hurt not others in ways that you find hurtful. (Tripitaka, Udanga-varga 5, 18, from the Buddhist tradition, circa 525 BCE.)

A second important branch of mathematical complexity is network theory. Network theory has come into full social bloom only in the last four or five years. It is based on a view of reality in which everything is inseparably connected. Abstract laws of network theory help us understand more about the diverse ways in which we can be connected and reveal dynamics about relationships which previously have been poorly understood or totally overlooked. In particular, some of these laws suggest new, more altruistic approaches to human relationships.[11]

By way of illustration, consider a variation on a procedure known in mathematical network theory as the *Contact Process*. Imagine a large room filled with individuals, each of whom has received (randomly) either a red or a green card from a giant stockpile of green and red cards. Assume that the group is sitting in chairs in a large meeting room and that the chairs are arranged in an orderly, grid-like fashion (as on a checkerboard), so that each person is surrounded by anywhere from zero to eight neighbors.

The action rules for this Contact Process are simple and limited. Following some purely random selection process (such as picking a number from 1 to 6 and then comparing it to the roll of a die), all the people in the room who have red cards trade them for green cards from the central stockpile, while the people who have green cards either trade them for red cards, or not, according to two guidelines:

1. If a person with a green card has x or more neighbors (the "shifting probability") holding red cards, the individual exchanges his/her green card for a red one.[12]
2. Otherwise, the individual with the green card keeps the green card.

The "game" continues by repeating this process indefinitely. The exciting element of this procedure is that, over time, various color-clumps of either red or green tend to spontaneously emerge out of what was initially a purely random distribution of color in the room. In fact, depending upon the shifting probability, at some point the room will likely be almost entirely filled with cards of all one color. If you have an opportunity to test this contact process with a group of people, you will experience the surprise of watching the color-clumps "self-organize." The colors might even oscillate between periods of dis-organization and organization. Chaos (randomness) begets order, and order begets chaos.

Network specialists have explored this "game" in many variations and have determined some basic laws that seem to apply across all situations. For example, if the shifting probability is high enough, a critical point or threshold is reached at which a new structure (such as "all one color") will suddenly emerge. Similarly, if a system is growing and newcomers have an *attachment preference* (e. g., they like "red"), then the newcomers tend to gravitate to *hubs* (e. g., tiny clusters of red). Such hubs in turn become the focus of a much larger cluster, and then the large clusters become even bigger clusters, or strange attractors. This behavior is a "rich get richer" phenomenon. Altering a behavior evident throughout an entire system is best done by focusing attention on the small hubs.

The red/green card game is a concrete way of illustrating the abstract principles at work in a network. In recent years, researchers have applied these abstract laws of self-emergence to a variety of real-life arenas. In inanimate systems such as economics, the rich do, in fact, tend to get richer. In computer systems, the Internet gets viruses. In engineering systems, electric power grids collapse like dominoes. In health systems, disease spreads in epidemics. In social systems, fads prevail.

The latest system being explored is, of course, that of human social behavior. For instance, consider a growing social community such as a church or residential area to which a newcomer arrives with a strong preferential attachment, not for some colored card, but for the color of human skin. According to network theory, that person naturally searches the community for others with the same attachment preference — he or she finds the like-minded hubs and joins them. And the hubs in this case can grow into "segregation." This is how racism emerges in such a social system. In fact, given preferential attachment, it is hard to see how segregation and other forms of discrimination can be avoided! To stop this emergence, we need to find ways to alter the preferred attachment, which is why the notion of eradicating subtle *internal* racism may warrant special attention.

Similar conclusions have been drawn about the growing prevalence of various kinds of cheating in America. For instance, without any direct reference to formal networks, social strategist David Callahan nonetheless describes a contemporary societal situation consistent with the "rich get richer" aspect of network theory.[13] Cheating is becoming pervasive at all levels of American society, Callahan maintains, and the growing gap between winners and losers in our country is having a lethal effect on personal integrity. Network theorists would say that the idea of "cutting corners" has become a strange attractor. Callahan's extensive list of practical ways to transform this trend (e. g., a higher minimum wage, more tax credits for lower earners, increased government investment in transportation infrastructure, greater energy efficiency, better moral education, and extensive policing of financial markets and corporate behavior) may be arguable, but they are also all potential methods of reducing the temptation to cheat by lessening the rewards that support the strange attractor behavior of this moral decline.

New as network theory is to the realm of social behavior, it is not surprising that there are still wrinkles to be ironed out. For example, according to the theory, the efficient approach to the AIDS epidemic is to offer the most prolifically sexual individuals (the center of the hubs) the expensive and scarce treatment plans for AIDS, while ignoring the plight of more innocent victims. Thus, we find ourselves faced with the probable selection of a treatment plan that rewards promiscuity — truly, a moral dilemma.[14]

> Do not do to others that which would anger you if others did it to you. (Socrates, circa 470–399 BCE.)

Still another area of mathematics which researchers are adapting to social behavior is that known as fuzzy logic. Western science — our science — grew up under the strong influence of Aristotle, that ancient Greek philosopher who insisted that truth is a yes or *no* creature. In the Aristotelian view, a proposition is either true, or it is not-true. A color is red, or else it is not-red. Water boils at 32 degrees Fahrenheit, or it doesn't boil at 32 degrees Fahrenheit. A light is switched on, or it's off.

In such classical thinking there are no grays, no in-betweens, no partial truths, no middle-ground. For most of its existence, Western science has championed this law of the "excluded" middle.

Fuzzy logic, however, pays attention to that excluded middle. Fuzzy logic can be traced back to 1965 when Iranian-born Lofti Zadeh, then a Berkeley professor of electrical engineering, wrote a landmark paper called *Fuzzy Sets*. Humans, of course, have always used fuzzy reasoning, but after Zadeh's paper appeared this very natural thought process acquired a new name and a whole new mathematical framework.

There is nothing fuzzy or vague or uncertain, however, about the mathematical framework of fuzzy logic. The math of fuzzy logic is as explicit as "Two plus two equals four."[15] In fuzzy logic things are assumed to be true *to some degree*, and simultaneously false *to some degree*, where, by mutual agreement, a numerical value between (or including) 0 and 1 is arbitrarily assigned to represent that degree.[16] Because the number selected is purely subjective, the choice sometimes leads to dissension. Generally, however, we can do a surprisingly good job of quantifying vagueness. We can even quantify the fuzziness of purely linguistic notions such as "surprisingly" or "somewhat" or "quite."

The first commercial application of fuzzy logic was the development in 1980 of an improved cement kiln, one that effectively managed the highly complex set of chemical interactions involved in the cement-making process. This improved process, fuzzy though it was, efficiently monitored four different internal states of the kiln and managed four dozen or so "rules of thumb" about their relationships. To instruct the kiln what to do, the fuzzy system used rules such as "If the oxygen percentage is *high* and the temperature is *high* then *slightly reduce* the coal feed rate."[17] (emphasis added.) "High" and "slightly reduce," of course, were translated into numbers between 0 and 1.

While our world currently uses a plethora of practical applications of fuzzy logic,[18] most recently and most importantly for us here are the ways in which fuzzy logicians are applying this new mathematical tool to human social behavior and issues of ethics. One example of how fuzzy logic can be applied to moral choice involves what researcher Bart Kosko refers to as the unfairness of our current tax laws. According to Kosko, many of us feel pretty powerless when it comes to our taxes, and quite rightly so, because, even though we theoretically live in a country where we can democratically decide how our tax dollars are spent, few of us believe we actually enjoy such choice. "The state spends our tax money on what it wants and does not directly ask us to help it choose."[19] Such a process, as the founders of our nation well knew, can lead to a kind of political elitism that oppresses the ordinary individual.

Kosko's solution is to use a fuzzy tax form.[20] Such a form would allow ordinary people to select on their IRS forms just what they would like to have their tax dollars spent on. Since there is a certain amount of common need which governments can predict, a portion of the tax money might be set aside for general revenues — per-

haps half of our tax dollars, or a third or four-fifths or whatever. (Here's where the dissension comes in.) The remaining amount goes to social categories that you help choose even as you send in your portion of the total tax money.

Some people would resist a fuzzy tax form, Kosko claims, because they "think most people are too dumb to choose wisely."[21] Kosko points out that there is a prejudicial IQism behind such a reaction, where the smart think less of the less smart. "Smart" and "less smart" are, of course, vague terms; all of us are smart to some degree and not smart to some degree. Nonetheless, IQism is prevalent in today's society — it's right up there with racism and sexism and ageism, except IQism is more politically correct. In Kosko's words, "Intelligence is a form of power. The smart find little comfort in letting the less smart have power. They find even less comfort in letting the less smart have power over them. Who wants to take orders from someone with a lower IQ? And just about everyone sees themselves as smart."[22]

There are other examples of how fuzzy thinking can assist us in our moral choices. In confronting the abortion issue, a fetus might be viewed as alive to some degree and also not alive to some degree;[23] some fuzzy logicians are suggesting an extension and refinement of this notion in the form of partial rights for partial life. In deciding who owns the rights to genome space, fuzzy logic might help us more methodically identify and weigh the many various concerns about pre-birth DNA programming. In considering issues of euthanasia, fuzzy thinkers see potential value in quantifying the degree of aliveness. In determining fairness and justness about who gets access to the best of modern medical techniques, fuzzy scientists predict equality not only through fuzzy decision-making, but also with the aid of fuzzy technology, as in the form of a fuzzy computer chip which tracks your physical health. Similarly, crime and punishment might be made fairer through fuzzy decision making, where the severity of the consequences can be more precisely matched to the seriousness of the crime.[24]

Like all tools, fuzzy logic is just that—a tool. It can serve society well or poorly.[25] One thing is clear, however. Fuzzy logic adds a new and potentially powerful tool to our toolbox for making moral decisions. Can we save souls with it? Michael Shermer offers an interesting take on this issue when he sets forth what he calls a theory of *provisional* morality.

Provisional morality is not the same as absolute morality, which is what we find in fundamentalist thinking. Holding the Ten Commandments as absolute standards of right and wrong is an example of fundamentalist moral thinking. Provisional morality allows for exceptions. At the same time, provisional morality is not the same as relativistic morality. Relativistic ethics is well-illustrated by the Non Sequitur cartoon in which Moses has been reading to his flock from the famous stone tablet. "I don't care what your lawyer said," Moses tells his flock. "They're not called the Ten Recommendations."

As Shermer puts it, scientific facts "are conclusions confirmed to such an extent that it would be reasonable to offer our provisional agreement." Similarly, in professional ethics, "moral *or immoral means confirmed to such an extent it would*

be reasonable to offer provisional assent.[26] Here, the Golden Rule appears to be golden to a degree, and also not golden to a degree. Perhaps it is enough to be charitable.

> Be charitable to all beings, love is the representative of God. (Koran, Sunnah, from the Islam tradition, circa 620 CE.)

One last mathematical area of particular note for its social implications is the study of non-zero-sum games. *Zero*-sum games are those in which someone wins and someone else loses; the sum of their "scores" adds up to zero. Tic-Tac Toe, Scrabble, chess, and Trivial Pursuit are common illustrations of zero-sum games. The lead sentence in a recent front-page news article, "Aristide Choice: Flee or Die," indicates a typical adaptation of this mathematics to the global political scene. "For President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, all the international pressure to step down had an impact, but what really forced his quick exit Sunday was the lethal reality of Haiti's *zero-sum politics* (emphasis added)."[27]

The promise of non-zero-sum strategies is the hope of more cooperative, fairer, win-win solutions to problems that initially seem to lead only to someone's victory at the cost of others' punishment and/or "sucker" status. The classic illustration of a non-zero-sum game is the Prisoner's Dilemma, a game wherein two conspirators in crime are arrested and the police, lacking enough evidence to convict either of them, offer them both a deal. Confess and, if your partner doesn't confess, you go free. If you both confess, you both serve some small amount of prison time. If neither of you confess, you both serve a larger amount of prison time. If you don't confess but your partner does, you serve the maximum prison sentence allowable.

There are several variations on this dilemma, the ramifications of which mathematicians have carefully mapped out. One of the easiest ways to comprehend the collective possibilities of these games is to consider a version of the Prisoner's Dilemma known as the Dollar Auction. In this variation, we auction off a dollar bill, starting with a bid of 2 cents, and increasing by increments of 10 cents or less. There is one special rule; the auctioneer must be paid not only by the highest bidder, but also by the second-highest bidder. The highest bidder pays what he bid and takes the dollar. The second-highest pays what *he* bid but gets nothing.

What is fascinating about this dollar auction is that, in play, it quickly becomes apparent that what begins as a bid-to-win strategy quickly degenerates into a bid-to-minimize-loss effort. After the critical juncture of 100 cents ($1) is passed, the nature of the game dramatically turns, for both bidders stand to lose more than they can gain. Even more fascinating is that whenever this auction is held someone nearly always bids more than $1, and the game therefore degenerates into a non-cooperative effort to avoid loss. This happens even when people *know* the potential outcome; the fever of the game gives rise to irrational decision-making. The only way out of the game is for someone to just cut his or her losses and stop playing.

While a friendly Dollar Auction may be highly entertaining, and even fun, it takes on more serious overtones when it is compared to, for example, a nuclear arms race. Indeed, a nuclear arms race is really nothing more, nor less, than a variation on this dollar auction. Once begun, the only way out is for someone to stop. The game-theory hope is that sufficient educational experience with strategies such as the Dollar Auction will convince those contemplating or beginning a weapons race to make decisions more conducive to the long-term good of all the parties involved.

There are a number of general conclusions suggested by research into non-zero-sum-game theory. For one thing, cooperation is optimized when the individuals involved are nestled in a network of cooperators. Not everyone has to be "nice" for "niceness" to evolve, but there must be at least some cooperators in order for the nice guys to benefit from their own niceness. Otherwise cooperators are "suckers" who eventually disappear.[28] Furthermore, those inclined to cooperate in one context usually do so in other contexts.[29] Cooperation is also more likely in small groups than in large ones. In small groups, "bad apples" are more transparent, personal efficacy is greater, expectations of reciprocity are higher.[30] Likewise, in non-zero-sum games, most players defect (decline to cooperate) most of the time, even when they are permitted to communicate about their strategies. Some defection is stimulated by the impulse to compete. This impulse might be modified if people initially (i. e., as children) learn how to play non-zero-sum games, rather than the zero-sum games so pervasive in our culture.[31]

Political liberals (as the term is commonly used in the U. S.) tend to be cooperators, making the assumption that it is better to risk that someone may cheat if it means society as a whole could benefit. Political conservatives are defectors. They place a high priority on personal autonomy, feel that they shouldn't be forced to cooperate if they'd rather not, and believe that by pursuing private gain, an individual frequently also promotes the public good.[32] Moreover, trust is an important factor in playing non-zero-sum games in a win/win manner. "Technologies of trust" (ranging from governmental laws to non-zero-sum games played online by many people living many miles apart) foster cooperation so that it can culturally evolve.[33] Finally, ethical prescriptions such as the golden rule or Immanuel Kant's "categorical imperative" address Prisoner Dilemma-like conflicts by urging us to set aside our self-interests for the common good. The bottom line is this: if we follow the golden rule, we automatically terminate the Prisoner's Dilemma.[34]

> What is hateful to you, do not to our fellow man. That is the entire Law; all the rest is commentary. (Talmud, Shabbat 31a, from the Judaic tradition, circa 1300 BCE.)

The suggestions explored above are all lifted from the research of others; none is original to this author. The originality of *this* (the author's) redaction is two-fold. First, this essay collects these ideas into a succinct *beginner's guide* to ways in which we can utilize mathematics as a tool of ethical decision-making. Second, the treatment of these ideas is intentionally *slanted toward the more trust-engendering aspects*

of social interaction, that is, to practices and attitudes that foster such behaviors as cooperation, fairness, and altruism. May the success of this essay be measured by the degree to which the reader is inspired to use and/or explore these mathematical tools in greater depth; after all, to extend the role of trust in our global society, we must:

> Regard your neighbor's gain as your gain and your neighbor's loss as your loss. (Tai-shang Kang-ying P'ien, from the Taoist tradition, circa 500 BCE.).

NOTES

[1] All citations herein of religious expressions of the Golden Rule can be found on "Quotes of Wisdom: The Golden Rule." http://www.diamondhelpers.com/loveandlife/famousquotes/goldenrule.shtml.

[2] Weisstein, Eric W., "Golden Rule." From MathWorld — A Wolfram Web Resource. http://mathworld.wolfram.com/GoldenRule.html.

[3] Eastaway, Rob and Wyndham, Jeremy, Why Do Buses Come in Threes? New York: Barnes and Noble Books,1998. P. 83.

[4] Ibid., p. 85.

[5] See, for example, Browne, Malcom W., Biologists Tally Rewards of Generosity, In: New York Times, 14 April, 1992; Hill, Theodore P., Mathematical Devices for Getting a Fair Share, in: American Scientist 88, July–August 2000. Pp. 325–331; Peterson, Ivars, Formulas for Fairness: Applying the Math of Cake Cutting to Conflict Resolution, in: Science News 14(18), May, 4, 1996. Pp. 284–285.

[6] Gladwell, Malcolm, The Tipping Point: How little Things Can Make a Difference, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 2000. Back cover material.

[7] Mathematicians associate these patterns with yet another offshoot of complexity theory called fractal geometry.

[8] Miller, Iona and Swinney, Graywolf, Human Dimensions of Chaos Theory: Consciousness, Physiology, Perception, and Psychology. On The Human Dimensions of Chaos Theory at http://www.geocities.com/iona_m/ChaosTheory/chaostheory1.html 1992, p. 3.

[9] Ibid., p. 17.

[10] Ibid., p. 19.

[11] Several recent books, highly appropriate for the lay reader, are excellent references regarding the application of network theory to social behavior: Barabási, Albert-Láslzó, Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life, New York: Penguin Group, 2003; Buchanan, Mark, Nexus: Small Worlds and the Groundbreaking Theory of Networks, New York: W.W. Norton, 2002; Johnson, Steven, Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities, and Software, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001; Watts, Duncan J., Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2003.

[12] Note that x is an arbitrary selection. It might represent "3" as in "3 or more neighbors," or it might have been "1 or more neighbors" or "7 or more neighbors" or even "all 8, or 100%, of the neighbors. This initial but arbitrary condition is formally known as the shifting probability because it ultimately determines the rate at which the exchange occurs.

[13] Callahan, David, The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead, Orlando: Harcourt, 2004.

[14] See Barabási, p. 135–142.

[15] See Kosko, Bart, Fuzzy Future: From Society and Science to Heaven in a Chip, New York: Harmony Books, 1999. P. 15.

[16] It is easy to misinterpret fuzzy thinking as probabilistic thinking because we are trying to numerically interpret the level of certainty to which, say, "Harry" is old. However, probabilistic thinking maintains the law of the excluded middle and hence belongs to classical logic, not fuzzy logic. When we say Harry has a 79% chance of being old, we are talking about the probability that Harry is old, which still means either Harry is old or he isn't. No middle ground here. Just a better chance that he is old than that he isn't. Black and white. But when we are thinking according to fuzzy logic we say that Harry is partially old, or, more precisely, that Harry's membership within the set of "old" people is. p. 79. The mathematical rules for operation on fuzzy quantities are different from the rules for operation on probabilities, so while the numerical relationships between probabilistic and fuzzy thinking bear a superficial resemblance to each other, they are still two very different species of math.

[17] Kosko, 16. Also see James F. Brule, Fuzzy Systems: A Tutorial, at: Http://www.austinlinks.com/Fuzzy/tutorial.html.

[18] Other applications of fuzzy logic in engineering include fuzzy control of the extraordinarily smooth Tokyo subway, baggage handling at Denver International Airport, and a meteorological system in China for identifying the best places to plant rubber tree orchards. We find fuzzy thinking in the production of automated cars, traffic light controllers, robot graspers, TV tuners, graphics, automated police sketchers, washing machines (which automatically adjust for size and amount of dirt), self-focusing cameras (which consider multiple targets), "smart" ovens (which provide more uniform cooking), "smart" weapons (which provide more accurate "hits"), the thermostat on your air conditioner and the water setting on your shower (which keep the temperature "just right.") Fuzzy thinking is also effective in all sorts of decision-support systems, including financial planning, diagnostic systems for determining soybean pathology, biomedical applications to diagnose breast cancer, rheumatoid arthritis, post-menopausal osteoporosis, and heart disease. In hospitals, fuzzy logic helps monitor anesthesia, blood pressure, insulin for diabetes, and post- operative pain control. There are fuzzy applications in geography, ecology, nuclear science, the stock market, handwriting analysis, and even the weather.

[19] Kosko, p. 49.

[20] Ibid., p. 60.

[21] Ibid., p. 61.

[22] Ibid., p. 62.

[23] Legally, in fact, abortion is currently viewed in precisely this way in many places. In the U. S., we usually draw the line at about 12 weeks, or the end of the first trimester of pregnancy. In India, the line is at 20 weeks, and in China, in the 1990s, the state forced abortion as late as the sixth month of pregnancy in order to meet its one-child-per-couple population goal. However, the sense in which this line is drawn still invokes an arbitrary cut-off point where the fetus is seen as passing from 0% alive to 100% alive in one big jump. Fuzzy logic avoids this all or nothing thinking. For more on this topic, see Kosko.

[24] These illustrations are all discussed in Kosko. Another source on similar material is Bob Bishop's Shades of Reality (Lakewood, Colorado: Glenbridge Publishing, 1998).

[25] An Associated Press article by Diedtra Henderson, for instance, details the pros and cons of a tiny computer chip which tracks a patient's medical history. Approved by the FDA on 10/13/04, the VeriChip is the size of a grain of rice. When implanted under the skin, the chip can be readily scanned to unlock an individual's private medical database, a procedure which could be either a medical milestone saving lives or, alternatively, a privacy invasion used for purely security purposes (The Associated Press, 2004). Similarly, computer-enhanced data mining techniques which draw on network and "order" theory allow "Mathematicians [to] help

in [the] global war on terror" (headline in the Omaha World Herald (10/17/02, 6A) for an Associated Press article, Piscataway, NJ). The emphasis in this article is less on the uses of mathematics for facilitating trust and cooperation than on developing sophisticated procedures for defense.

[26] Shermer, Michael, The Science of Good and Evil, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004. P. 167.

[27] Omaha World Herald, 3/1/04, 1.

[28] Barash, David, The Survival Game: How Game Theory Explains the Biology of Cooperation and Competition, New York: Times Books, 2003. P. 139.

[29]Poundstone, William, Prisoner's Dilemma, New York: Anchor Books, 1992. P. 177.

[30] Barash, 139.

[31] Poundstone, p. 174–175.

[32] Barash, 135.

[33] Wright, Robert, NonZero: The Logic of Human Destiny, New York: Pantheon Books, 2000. P. 343.

[34] Mér, László, Moral Calculations: Game Theory, Logic, and Human Frailty, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1998. Chapter 4.

КАК ПОСТРОИТЬ ДОВЕРИЕ ПРИ ПОМОЩИ МОРАЛЬНОЙ МАТЕМАТИКИ

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В то время как большинство считает, что теоретическая математика прежде всего способствовала достижениям в области науки и техники, немногие из нас знают, что те же самые идеи можно использовать для изучения общественного поведения. В статье обсуждаются наиболее современные из этих идей. В частности, в статье описаны концепции, построенные на теории сетей (раздел теории нелинейных динамических систем), нечеткой логике, и на теории «игр без нулевой суммы». Простые примеры демонстрируют, как подобные идеи помогают по-новому понять природу конфликта и методы борьбы с ним, такие как доверие и сотрудничество. В заключительной части статьи кратко описывается метафорическое понятие, взятое из матеологии (науки о математике и теологии). Неоднозначная природа этой метафоры ложится в основание дальнейшего диалога о различиях в трактовке понятия «Истины». Хотя в «моральной» математике часто используются сложные математические знания, эту статью легко поймет непосвященный. Здесь не нужны глубокие познания в математике, необходимо всего лишь желание «выглянуть из ящика». В статье указаны источники для дальнейшего изучения.

REASONS OF THE HEART: EAST-WEST DIALOGUE AND THE SEARCH FOR MORAL TRUTH

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Introduction

In a book titled *Moral Discourse in a Pluralistic World*, I undertake to show how it is possible for people from very different religious, spiritual, political, philosophical, and cultural traditions of inquiry to seek moral truth together, in part through arguing productively about the issues that divide them. By clarifying the ways in which genuine agreement on moral values can be pursued through moral discourse, I hope to promote co-ordinated collective action in response to the social and environmental problems facing humanity in the twenty-first century. In particular, I hope to support conversations within and across spiritual traditions on how, individually and collectively, we might resolve the fundamental psychological problems underlying global conflict.

In this paper I summarize two key components of my prior work on moral discourse. (Please see Vokey, 2001, for references to sources for my claims in this paper and for acknowledgements of my intellectual debts, particularly to Alasdair MacIntyre's reconstruction of the rationality of traditions.) The first component is my account of the search for wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) through which traditions of inquiry develop or decline. This account clarifies the processes through which and the criteria with respect to which advocates of incommensurable traditions — including traditions of scientific, philosophical, religious, historical, and literary as well as moral inquiry — might assess the strengths and limitations of their rival points of view. The second component is my interpretation of the role our *reasons of the heart* play in the search for moral truth. This latter account illustrates the value of dialogue among eastern and western traditions by drawing from Mahayana Buddhist teachings to inform an Aristotelian view of the parallels between perceiving the beautiful and recognizing the good.

Traditions of Inquiry and the Search for WRE

A tradition of inquiry is embodied in a historical succession of communities of inquiry. Members of a community of inquiry operate within a shared *paradigm*, that is, a set of interrelated beliefs, attitudes, interests, norms, priorities, and practices. This set of shared agreements makes rational debate productive in any particular form of inquiry, whether philosophical, literary, historical, scientific, or moral. For

example, within communities of scientific inquiry there is typically considerable consensus on what the aims of their scientific discipline should be, what theoretical frameworks are relevant to those aims, what problems are should take priority, what heuristic models are helpful in conceiving solutions, what methods of inquiry are sound, and what standards or criteria should be used in evaluating competing theories and claims. In addition, because they share the same tradition, members of a community of inquiry draw upon a common history of customary practices, exemplary figures, notable achievements, and significant failures. They also generally pursue their investigations in similar concrete contexts of practice — universities or research institutions, for instance — which shape the direction and form of their inquiry through such things as administrative structures and reward systems.

In my view, the fundamental agreements that constitute a community of inquiry's paradigm or point of view develop through an on-going search for *wide reflective equilibrium*. As I define it, the search for wide reflective equilibrium proceeds through dialectical interactions within and among all forms of human sense-making activity. Its goal is to achieve the most overall satisfactory set of agreements in a given context of theory and practice, where *satisfactory* means *coherent*, *mutually-supporting*, *successful*, and *defensible*. That is to say, wide reflective equilibrium is achieved among a community of inquiry's explicit beliefs, implicit assumptions, attitudes, interests, norms, priorities, and practices when they meet the following four conditions.

1. They are internally-consistent and mutually-supporting.
2. They are consistent with and contribute to the worldview and way of life of the larger social and historical context in which the community of inquiry is embedded.
3. They assist in the accomplishment of the aims and objectives of the members of that community of inquiry.
4. They are defensible in dialectical encounters with competing paradigms.

Conversely, equilibrium can be disturbed within a community of inquiry on *any* of the following four occasions.

1. There is a perception of internal incoherence among the assumptions and commitments directing their particular form or forms of inquiry.
2. There is a perception of incoherence between those shared agreements and the other beliefs, assumptions, attitudes, interests, norms, priorities, or practices of their broader worldview and way of life.
3. Their point of view proves inadequate to fulfilling intentions to which they assign a high priority.
4. There is a perception that the set of assumptions and commitments shared within a competing community of inquiry provides a better means of accomplishing their own fundamental intentions, and a better explanation of their own limitations and failures, than their own framework can provide.

In this account of rational justification, a set of assumptions and commitments guiding inquiry and practice is vindicated to the extent it achieves wide reflective equilibrium. ***The relative merits of competing perspectives are properly assessed by determining which approaches the state of wide reflective equilibrium more closely than its rivals***. Thus competing paradigms are assessed, not by appeal to any single measure of rational superiority, but with reference to their respective combination of internal and external coherence, success in furthering their fundamental interests, and ability to account for the limitations of other points of view.

Catherine Elgin provides a similar account of justification in her analysis of the development and evaluation of particular scientific conclusions and their corresponding theoretical frameworks:

> Justification is holistic. Support for a conclusion comes, not from a single line of argument, but from a host of considerations of varying degrees of strength and relevance. What justifies the categories we construct is the *cognitive* and *practical utility* of the truths they enable us to formulate, the *elegance* and *informativeness* of the accounts they engender, the *value* of the ends they promote. We engage in system-building when we find resources at hand inadequate. We have projects they do not serve, questions they do not answer, values they do not realize. Something new is required. But a measure of the adequacy of a novelty is its fit with what we think we already know. If the finding is at all surprising, the background of accepted beliefs is apt to require modification to make room for it, and the finding may require revision to be fitted into place. A process of delicate adjustments occurs, its goal being a system in wide reflective equilibrium. (Elgin 1989, 91; italics added)

The process of seeking wide reflective equilibrium is both non-circular and non-foundational because, although it begins with the interests, assumptions, and commitments of a particular group of people in a particular context, any of its starting points are open to revision or rejection as the process unfolds. In this it differs from foundational forms of justification, which have generally fallen into one of two broad groups. For those *Rationalists* who took geometry as their ideal, a conclusion was justified if it was correctly deduced from self-evident or otherwise indubitable first principles. For those *Empiricists* who looked to natural science for their model, a generalization was justified if it was formulated by careful induction from direct sense impressions. In contrast, the search for wide reflective equilibrium privileges neither self-evident first principles nor immediate perceptions. As Rawls (1974/75, 8) observes, in this process "there are no judgments on any level of generality that are immune to revision." Similarly, justification and evaluation through reference to the achievement of wide reflective equilibrium involves not one but many forms of argument, and many different kinds of "good reasons." For the various agreements shared within a community of inquiry can be assessed with regard to a wide variety of criteria, including the following:

- Logical compatibility: Have all of the logical implications of that community's explicit beliefs been worked through, and are they compatible?
- Internal coherence: Is there at least a loose fit among that community's implicit and explicit beliefs, attitudes, interests, norms, and priorities?
- External coherence: Are those agreements and commitments consistent with the broader sets of implicit and explicit beliefs, attitudes, interests, norms, and priorities in which they are embedded?
- Congruity with "accepted wisdom:" Are those agreements and commitments consistent with what has been accepted as true because it is part of a time-tested tradition?
- Economy: Do they presuppose or postulate a minimum of unsupported premises?
- Performative consistency: Are the espoused commitments of that community of inquiry consistent with its actual practices?
- Feasibility: Can those commitments be put into practice without taxing limited resources in an unsupportable way?
- Comprehensiveness: Does the community's theoretical or conceptual framework account for a wider range of human experience than its competitors?
- Empirical support: Are the empirical claims of that community of inquiry's theories compatible with evidence that those theories were not specifically developed to explain?
- Generic merits: Do those theories represent a balance of simplicity, generalizability, and accuracy that is appropriate to the scope of that community's particular form or forms of inquiry?
- Intuitive Appeal: Do the assumptions and commitments, singly and/or together, "feel right" and "ring true?"
- Aesthetic Values: Are they (for example) elegant, beautiful, bold, symmetrical?
- Fruitfulness or fertility: Do they spark innovative ideas, solutions, and/or ways of thinking?
- Success: When put into practice, do the assumptions and commitments further the interests or purposes for which they were developed?
- Ability to be self-referential: Do they provide or are they consistent with a context in which their development and success is intelligible?
- Ability to accommodate new perspectives: Does that community's conceptual scheme prove elastic enough, and its members creative enough, to translate into their own language the beliefs of radically different points of view?
- Ability to account for and integrate rival claims: Does that community's set of agreements explain the plausibility of competing theories or perspectives in a way that is consistent with those theories or perspectives being mistaken and that accounts for those errors arising in the first place? Do they incorporate everything that is sound within their rivals?

- Freedom from distortion or bias: Is it possible to know the motivations behind having those assumptions and commitments and still hold to them? Or, would they be rejected if the reasons or motivations for holding them were known?

Unlike foundationalist forms of justification, the process of seeking wide reflective equilibrium makes no claims to attain certainty. This is in part because the search for wide reflective equilibrium is an ongoing process; its conclusions are open to revision in the light of new developments or discoveries. Furthermore, evaluating the degree to which a community of inquiry's agreements achieve wide reflective equilibrium involves reference to an assortment of distinct and irreducible criteria, and *these may conflict*. Consequently, assessments of the relative strengths and limitations of a community of inquiry's overall point of view will vary according to how much weight is assigned to the various distinct criteria. And the relative importance of those criteria in particular contexts of inquiry is itself open to debate. Consequently, the possibility of productive argument among members of rival and incommensurable communities of inquiry does not guarantee that discourse will always lead to consensus, particularly in the short term.

Reasons of the Heart and the Search for Moral Truth

How does this generic account of the search for WRE apply to moral discourse; that is, the attempt to reach genuine agreement on moral values among people representing very different moral points of view? The answer turns on my understanding of the kind of evidence that distinguishes moral inquiry. To what, then, should we appeal when seeking moral truth?

The distinction between what is *moral* and what *non-moral* has been drawn in a variety of ways within different religious, spiritual, political, philosophical, and cultural traditions. As I understand it, the distinction between moral and other kinds of intrinsic values — and, even more so, the distinction between moral and egotistical concerns — is important because we commonly feel that some kinds of considerations should have more weight than others in establishing norms and priorities for human living. I believe that *moral* is appropriately as well as commonly used to designate those values that *ought* to take priority over other considerations in guiding action (however *ought* is interpreted). This way of differentiating *moral* from other kinds of values is consistent with the understanding that moral commitments provide good (and perhaps even sufficient) reasons to choose one course of action over others and so cannot be reduced to purely egotistical, non-generalizable interests.

In my experience, arguments over what is morally good or morally bad directly or indirectly appeal at least in part to the degree and quality of our responses to certain kinds of events. That is to say, in part because people are *profoundly moved* in positive ways by experiencing or witnessing freedom, solidarity, and compassion; and *profoundly moved* in negative ways by experiencing or witnessing oppression,

alienation, and indifference, the corresponding moral values are given priority (if in different ways) in practical judgements. Accordingly, I believe that it is in part with reference to these kinds of profound human responses that claims to moral truth should be assessed.

In asserting this view I take Aristotle as my exemplar, for it is with reference to the quality of human experience that Aristotle differentiates what is intrinsically noble and fine (αλόν, *kalon*) from what is only pleasant or useful. According to Owens (1981, 261–262, 268), *kalon* is the neuter form of *kalos*, meaning *beautiful*, precisely because people in Aristotle's day named as noble or fine what they experienced as inherently and profoundly *appealing*. Furthermore, and most significantly in this context, Owens argues that *kalon* means for Aristotle what we would mean by "moral goodness" precisely because part of perceiving something to be noble or fine is experiencing it as intrinsically *compelling*: "In its own way it prescribes fulfilment. It presents itself as something that *ought* to be done." Indeed, it is precisely because what is *kalon* is experienced or perceived as something that by its nature *ought* to be done that only those who do what is noble or fine for its own sake are deemed to be genuinely virtuous in Aristotle's ethics. Furthermore, it is also precisely because what is genuinely virtuous is recognized by the quality of human response that, for Aristotle, the person of good *character* is the measure of what is truly intrinsically good (*Nicomachean Ethics,* 1113a30). And finally, as Aristotle points out, precisely because what is *kalon* is apprehended through the quality of human response, moral arguments will have no effect upon those unfortunate souls who, through lack of proper education, "have not even a conception of what is noble and truly pleasant, since they have never tasted it" (*NE* 1179b15). For this reason the cultivation of dispositions to *feel* as well as act correctly is so important within Aristotle's ethics.

The notion that moral goodness is analogous to beauty in its apprehension has been advanced by many philosophers, saints, sages, and poets other than Aristotle. And, in contemporary discourse, one can still encounter exhortations to do "the right thing" with their implicit appeals to an intuitive, qualitative, quasi-aesthetic sense of what is *right*. At the same time, the views of those who have thought of the good as analogous to the beautiful have been severely criticised. One objection points to the radical disagreements that exist between people's deepest moral convictions; another to the difficulty of explaining what it is that apprehensions of intrinsic moral value are responses *to* — what it is about something that would make it categorically right or wrong independently of human interests. Moral relativists have concluded that, contrary to what I have proposed, the degree and quality of human response is simply a product of our psychological makeup and it justifies no inferences about the nature of that to which it is supposedly a response.

To provide the conceptual resources to address these objections, I have drawn upon Mahayana Buddhist teachings on the egolessness of self (*anatman*); emptiness (*śnyat*); Buddha-nature (*that gata-garbha*); the distinction between absolute truth (ultimate truth, *param rtha-satya*) and relative truth (conventional truth,

samvriti-satya); and the skilful means (*upaya*) of a *bodhisattva* (Vokey, 2001, 213–227). In this context, the key teaching concerns Buddha-nature. Mahayana Buddhism reports that, if we learn to relax our clinging to a sense of self, then in the gaps between our thoughts we will discover an awareness that is completely unconditioned. It is unconditioned in the sense that it is not created or manufactured, but is always already there, primordial. It is unconditioned also in the sense that it is prior to and so free from all concepts and other frames of reference, including the basic duality of *self* and *other*. Buddhism reports that, contrary to what we might believe, it is not the "self" that is aware. Rather, all self-centred emotions and all thoughts of self arise within the "space" of unconditioned awareness. One traditional analogy for glimpsing this is the experience of being on an elephant and discovering that, rather than you riding the elephant, it is the elephant that is carrying you!

Mahayana Buddhism teaches that unconditioned awareness or wakefulness is our basic nature. (It is called Buddha-nature because *buddha* is Sanskrit for *awake*.) It is what we most fundamentally are. Mahayana Buddhism also reports that this unconditioned awareness naturally manifests both intuitive insight and compassion, and it is only our habit of imposing the reference points of *self* and *other* that obscures its boundless clarity and warmth. In one traditional analogy, Buddha-nature is compared to the sun and the sky; self-centred thoughts and emotions are likened to clouds. As the light and warmth of the sun can be blocked by clouds without being altered in any way, so the transcendent insight and limitless compassion of Buddha-nature is not affected when obscured by our confusion. Unconditioned awareness itself is like the sky: vast, fathomless, without measure.

To attain our full human potential is, according to this point of view, simply to realize our true nature. To do so, we do not need to fabricate anything or import anything from an external source because *unconditioned awareness, insight, and compassion are always already there*. The Mahayana path to the realization of Buddha-nature is essentially a process of allowing it to manifest, which happens naturally when the habit of self-attachment is unlearned.

To my thinking, what Mahayana Buddhist and other non-dualistic philosophies suggest is that it is in the state of unconditioned awareness prior to the imposition of relative reference points — particularly and most fundamentally the reference points of *self* and *other* — that intrinsic value, moral and non-moral, is apprehended. That intrinsic value is apprehended non-dualistically is suggested by the very idea of something being good or bad in a non-relative way; that is, independently of particular human interests. Dualistic judgements of value by definition presuppose the distinction between *self* and *other*. Therefore, they necessarily presuppose human interests, however altruistic those interests might be. Conversely, then, apprehensions of what is categorically good or bad presuppose a perspective that is completely free of subject-object duality and its attendant self-preoccupation.

To refer to non-dualistic apprehensions of intrinsic value I have used Pascal's (1910, 99) phrase *reasons of the heart*. (I do not wish thereby to signal approval of

or even familiarity with his overall point of view.) The reference to *heart* captures something of a Mahayana view of wisdom and (I hope) makes what I am trying to describe more familiar to readers unused to the notion of non-dualistic (intuitive, non-discursive) insight. I worry that the unconditioned experiencing to which I refer might seem very mysterious, something achieved only through years of esoteric spiritual exercises. It is my understanding that, on the contrary, non-dualistic experiencing is perfectly ordinary. According to Buddhism, we do not exist independently of the world and never have. Those who "wake up" to the true nature of things realise that perceiving, feeling, thinking, and acting are and always have been non-dualistic. In other words, experiencing does not result from the interaction of an independent subject and independent world, even when that dualistic interpretative framework is subsequently imposed. Therefore, what takes training is not experiencing phenomena prior to conceptualization, but relaxing our habitual preoccupations long enough to notice. For example, we all have many moments of "pure" perception in any given day, such as when a flash of colour arrests our eyes, or a sudden noise cuts through our internal dialogues. If such moments are unfamiliar, it is only because of how quickly we generally pass from precept to concept, from "Thusness" to "whatness". And we all have experiences of non-dualistic activity of the kind described by musicians, dancers, athletes, and other performers, wherein there is no separation between action and agent. It is my understanding that, similarly, we commonly experience what I am calling reasons of the heart: immediate responses, both "positive" and "negative", that arise in the unself-conscious space of Nowness. These responses are *reasons* because the degree and quality of the response exercises a cognitive function. Indeed, I think it is precisely because non-dualistic apprehensions of intrinsic value happen constantly "in the gaps" between our thoughts that the notion of non-discursive moral intuitions is a perennial feature of ethical theories, whether traditional, modern, post-modern, or post-post-modern. One of the strengths of Mahayana Buddhist traditions, and one of the reasons that I draw from their teachings, is that they include well-developed ontological, epistemological, and psychological frameworks within which the notion of moral intuition becomes philosophically and educationally workable.

If non-dualistic experiencing is as common as I have claimed, then one would expect that references to it would not be limited to Buddhist teachings — or even to "Eastern" philosophy altogether. It is true that, for whatever reason, mainstream "Western" traditions of inquiry have tended to take dualistic interpretations of experience for granted. Even so, expressions of and arguments for "oneness" of things can be found throughout the history of Western religion, literature, and philosophy. For example, the accounts of their experiences left by Western contemplatives exhibit a striking set of similarities to those left by their Eastern counterparts — differences in worldview notwithstanding — including wide agreement that the highest form of knowledge is non-conceptual and so ineffable, transcending our usual *self* and *other* frames of reference. Similarly, throughout the ages there have been those who describe aesthetic experience in a non-dualistic way, contrasting such experience to our more familiar, conceptually-mediated perception. Iris

Murdoch makes the link between ethics and aesthetics, referring to a kind of "unselfing" that is important to moral virtue as well as to art. Her description of this captures well the "ordinariness" of immediate experience that is prior to subject-object differentiation:

> I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of mind, oblivious of my surroundings, brooding perhaps on some damage done to my prestige. Then suddenly I observe a hovering kestrel. In a moment everything is altered. The brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared. There is nothing now but kestrel. And when I return to thinking of the other matter it seems less important. (Murdoch 1970, 84)

Erazim Kohák also restores the link between beauty and goodness in his characterization of a quasi-aesthetic form of perception through which we apprehend the moral value of nature.

> The sense of nature includes also a dimension of value, not merely as utility but as intrinsic, absolute value ingressing in the order of time. The chipmunk peering out of the stone fence is not reducible simply to the role he fulfils in the economy of nature. There is not only utility but also an integrity, a rightness to his presence. When humans encounter that integrity in a trillium or a lady's slipper, they tend to acknowledge it by speaking of beauty, and it is not inappropriate. It is, though, also more — the presence of absolute value, the truth, the goodness, the beauty of being, the miracle that something is though nothing might be. (Kohák 1984, 70–71).

Conclusion

In my generic account of non-foundational justification, I proposed that the agreements shared within a community of inquiry are considered *satisfactory* when they are internally and externally coherent, inform successful practice, and are defensible in dialectical debate. I also proposed that what counts as successful practice is constrained by the fundamental interest of a particular form of inquiry. It thus follows from my interpretation of *Reasons of the heart* that the explicit beliefs, implicit assumptions, attitudes, interests, norms, and priorities of competing moral traditions should be assessed according to the extent to which they meet these four conditions.

1. They are internally consistent and mutually supporting.
2. They are consistent with the assumptions and commitments of the other, more specific traditions of enquiry and practice in which we are engaged (physics, sociology, literary criticism, medicine, education, and so forth).
3. They yield a way of life that is consonant with our apprehensions of what is more and what is less genuinely worth caring about.
4. They are defensible in dialectical encounters with the points of view of competing moral traditions.

Conversely, we might become dissatisfied with our moral point of view for *any* of the following reasons:

1. There are contradictions among the assumptions and commitments directing our overall way of life.
2. There are contradictions between those overall assumptions and commitments on the one hand and, on the other, the beliefs, attitudes, interests, norms, and priorities that direct the more specific forms of enquiry and/or practice in which we are engaged.
3. There are conflicts between our way of life and our apprehensions of what is more or less genuinely worth caring about.
4. Our moral point of view proves less adequate to our deepest concerns than an alternative and incommensurable moral perspective, which also reveals the source of the limitations of our own assumptions and commitments.

In this view, two things distinguish the search for wide reflective equilibrium in moral enquiry. One is its scope, for it is concerned with worldviews and overall ways of life. The other is its appeal to moral values that we apprehend in the depth and quality of human experience. It is this concern with our reasons of the heart that differentiates moral from other forms of enquiry with a broad scope, such as science. At the same time, because satisfactory moral points of view are those which achieve *wide* reflective equilibrium, the outcomes of all forms of enquiry and practice are relevant to assessing their strengths and limitations.

To argue that at least a partial convergence of moral points of view is philosophically possible is, of course, a very limited contribution to the cause of reducing conflict and oppression. I appreciate that many people are unable to participate in moral discourse because of economic inequality within and among nation states. Furthermore, for the foreseeable future, there will be people unwilling to participate in moral discourse to the extent their participation conflicts with self or group interest. I have no general solution to this problem. I suspect none is possible: what we would judge to be an appropriate and effective response to people who employ strategic means to effect their goals will vary according to how our moral points of view interact with the particulars of the given context. I can only say both that some degree of moral consensus would be the best long-term solution to economic disparity, and that moral discourse cannot be considered productive in the full sense until whatever agreements are reached effect more just and compassionate forms of social and political life.

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ДОВОДЫ СЕРДЦА: ДИАЛОГ ВОСТОКА И ЗАПАДА В ПОИСКЕ НРАВСТВЕННОЙ ИСТИНЫ

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Как совместными усилиями нам противиться проблемам, возникающим в глобальном конфликте? В книге «Дискурс нравственности в плюралистичном мире» (. *Moral discourse in a pluralistic world*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), я высказываю убеждение в том, что люди разных религиозных, политических, философских и культурных традиций способны к продуктивному обсуждению проблем, их разъединяющих. В настоящей статье резюмированы мои возражения на два релятивистских аргумента, лежащих в основании нравственного скептицизма и популярного убеждения в том, что рациональным способом конфликт не разрешить. Первый аргумент состоит в том, что невозможно понять убеждения людей, чьи точки зрения не соответствуют нашей, а второй — в том, что нравственные ценности являются продуктом не истины, а мнений, предпочтений и обычаев. Первому аргументу я противопоставляю расширенную и дополненную концепцию Алесдера Макинтайра о рациональности традиций исследования. Прибегая к термину *Дискурс нравственности*, означающему процессы постижения нравственных позиций, я показываю, как уважительное отношение к представлениям «Другого» важно для достижения консенсуса. Второму аргументу я противопоставляю учение буддизма махаяны об обнаружении нравственных истин в *Доводах сердца*, нашем предпонимании того, что наиболее заслуживает заботы. Этот довод дает возможность установить продуктивный диалог между восточными и западными нравственными и религиозными традициями через восстановление связи между добром и красотой, обнаруживающееся в аристотелевской этике. Уточняя методы достижения истинного согласия о нравственных ценностях через дискурс нравственности, я останавливаюсь на проблеме становления философской системы взглядов на политические, социальные и экологические проблемы, возникающей на почве неразрешенного нравственного конфликта.

HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS, AMERICAN POWs, AND RUSSIAN ORPHANS: CONTEMPORARY SAGES IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

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As you have done, it shall be done to you;
your deeds shall return on your own head.

So wrote the prophet Obadiah in the Sixth Century BC — the historic principle "what goes around, comes around." Obadiah's insight beckoned retribution to the Edomites for their lack of compassion and persecution toward the Judahites, who, under attack from the north by the Babylonians, had fled south to Edom for aid. Retribution came to Edom, as fierce and bloody and violent she received as she gave — the historic principle in action — so records the prophet Isaiah (11:14).[1] Today's world is just as volatile as the Sixth Century BC. We may not have Babylonians, Judahites and Edomites engulfed in conflict, but the ensuing centuries, as well as contemporary times, could easily find substitute oppressors and oppressed.

History repeats itself and the historic principle is resolute. In our contemporary world, we convince ourselves that the unwavering continuum of violence need not persist because contemporary unity — an integrated symbiotic community from the local to the global level — is a construct embracing diversity. In *theory,* we tell ourselves that modern day equivalents of the Babylonians, Judahites and Edomites would no longer turn to violence if we emphasize and value the very distinctions of diversity. In *practice*, however, there exist a plethora of candidates who today embrace the tactics and violence capable of exceeding the violence of the Sixth Century BC.

The diversity we embrace and advocate can bring unity, but just as often it brings disparity and discord. Which raises the questions: Can we, in practice, advance beyond the historic principle? In particular, must disparity and discord be repaid with violence? The answers in theory are quite simple. Speaking philosophically and spiritually, the construct of Peace already exists within humankind.[2] It has always existed, just as kindness, compassion, and empathy are all attributes possessed by every human being. Human beings throughout the centuries have demonstrated as much, most clearly and poignantly in times of crisis. Humanity likewise possesses an amazing capacity to forget past 'pain' and allow brute to surface over brains when conflict arises, forcing the potential construct of Peace to burrow deep within the recesses of the human being.

This paper draws on oral histories, memoirs, and first-hand experience, and submits select vignettes from three representative contemporary groups — Holocaust

Survivors, American POWs from Slaughterhouse V, and Russians and Americans involved in the adoption of Russian orphans, with the aim of demonstrating the following. 1) A sense of universal humanity in the midst of adversity exists most strongly when faced with challenge and conflict. 2) This sense of humanity weakens and fades with the passage of time, thereby permitting continual conflict, and in particular violent conflict, to resurface. 3) Unity amidst diversity need not necessitate the absence of conflict or challenge, but rather the absence of violence.[3] And 4) ultimately, intellectual means must be embraced against violence, as, for example, in the academy's teaching and remembrance of the realities of past discord, allowing those involved in these past discords to serve as sages of contemporary thought on conflict resolution.

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Midnight. Moscow. March 1994. The light from the street lamp four stories down filtered through the lace curtains of the twelve-foot windows in the small multi-purpose room. It seemed peculiar that a room displaying only the most essential décor for a bedroom/living room would possess such large and finely beveled windows. But this room and the few additional rooms that now formed an apartment were once part of a grand mansion of the Pre-Revolution aristocracy. Where once a small family with an army of servants resided, now four stories of "servant" families of the state visibly embraced the Marxist creed of equality. Ever so gently parting the exquisite lace curtains I beheld Potapovsky Avenue. Empty at this hour, save the sleeping Ladas that lined both sides of the street. No lights showed from the "mansions" across the street. I wondered what spring might be like on this street. Did only the trees and bushes grow foliage now dormant? Or would variegated flowers fill the window boxes on the now darkened windows? Would the gardens within the wrought-iron decorative fences that edged each "mansion" produce bloom? Though mid-March, no signs of spring had yet appeared, but more crucial for our present concerns, no signs of winter, save grayness and cold, were seen or forecasted for the next few days.

A few blocks around the corner was located the KGB's infamous Lubyanka Prison. A few minutes farther would bring one to Red Square flanked by the Kremlin, Lenin's Tomb, the worn but still grand St. Basil's Cathedral, and GUM Shopping Center. The murky Moscow River with its promenades meandered nearby. A few more minutes to Ulitsa Sadovaya-Kudrinskaya one would find Anton Chekhov's Moscow home (now museum) in the heart of the then literary district. Imagine Chekhov, Tolstoy, or Dostoyevsky walking the river's promenade for inspiration! What history had happened in the heart of Moscow! And — as my insomnia was joined with anxiety — that incipient question of many travelers played incessantly in my head: What had possessed me to come here? The snoring grew louder behind me, reminding me that I was physically not alone. Matching shots of vodka one for one with our Russian

host had deprived my husband of the pleasure of insomnia, jet lag and anxiety. One small glass of the most exceptional Moldavian red wine with our Russian hostess did not yield the same results for me. Yet my insomnia provided time to reflect on all that had transpired in reaching this moment, though the climax was yet to come. Tonight we were on the eve of adopting our son, one of approximately 600,000 Russian orphans abandoned by a collapsed social system that had taken their parents, be it through war, sickness, poverty, or even alcoholism. Within this social system, however, Russians from diverse backgrounds were banding together to find families for these orphans, blind to the ethnic, religious or political inclinations of these children, their birth parent(s) or their adoptive parent(s). Internal adoption in Russia was rare; families who did adopt were frowned upon, often relocating to avoid societal scorn. Yet the state had established countless orphanages, delineated by age and district. Though short on funds and understaffed, they persevered in their care for these children until age sixteen at which point they would "graduate" to the real world. The statistics for success of those who were not adopted and remained in the institutions until age 16 was depressing; boys often turned to crime and girls to prostitution.

For three days we had been shown Moscow, stepped into the life of a Russian family and learned so much about their world before and after the fall of Communism. But this evening, the eve of a journey that would take us to the orphanage in Tula, amidst the vodka and Moldavian wine, we talked of life in America and life in Russia. And we marveled that only four years earlier none of us could have imagined we'd be seated around this oh, so tiny kitchenette in Moscow, sharing our aspirations. Our host, a Captain in the Russian Army Reserve, would never have been permitted to match shots with my husband, at that time a federal agent for the Department of Defense. We laughed deeply at this irony, but not at the plight of Russia after the fall of Communism, and in particular not at the plight of the orphans. In the days that would follow in the in-country portion of the adoption process we would witness the intense devotion of the Russian players in this endeavor. We had already experienced the dedication by the American staff of Rainbow House, an international adoption agency based in Belen, New Mexico.[4] Our "fees" just covered our food, lodging, transportation, the filing of papers, and a modest contribution to the orphanage.

As I wrote in my diary entry of March 16, 1994, "I didn't realize how well-educated, artistic and athletic our hosts and 'social' workers were." Gregory and Marina, our host family (with their daughter), were both employed outside the home in addition to their involvement in Russian adoptions. Gregory was the chief of the data processing section in the Russian government, as well as maintaining his Reserve position. His wife Marina was a Nutritionist. By the time they hosted us, they had already assisted in the adoption of ninety orphans. Another host couple one floor up boasted Lena, who worked in the Kremlin and also served as a critic for the Bolshoi Ballet. Her husband Igor was an actor in the Russian theatre. When Gregory didn't also serve as our driver, Serge, a world cup wrestler and Olympic Silver Medalist took over this duty. Our 'social' workers were Nellie and Ada. Nellie, a Ph. D. in

Phonology and Literature, currently taught English to diplomats. Her husband was one of Moscow's top nuclear physicists. And Ada, also highly educated, worked with Nellie teaching at the Institute. Together this dedicated group saw to every detail of our in-country visit — from preparing the finest Borscht, to driving us 120 miles — a four hour drive — to State Orphanage #2 in Tula, to serving as interpreters, to making sure every paper was filed perfectly, to getting us through the stressful inspection at the Moscow airport to catch the Delta Flight, the so-called "baby flight" (though most were not babies) back to America. When it came to the plight of children, past or present political inclinations were irrelevant; unity is constructed when faced with the fate of the most precious "commodity" of humanity — children.

* * *

Evening. Chemnitz, Germany. May 1945. "When we reached the American outpost in Chemnitz, Germany the Americans did not have sufficient shelter for all of us, so the American advance troops just moved a lot of Germans out of an apartment house and we took their rooms. I remember one German lady that had a small child, and she just cried because she did not want her child to get cold. Even though we had suffered so much, we could not put her out. We let her stay with us. There were others that it created a hardship for them to move, so we just stayed with them for that night."[5]

So recalled Clifford Stumpf, one of approximately 170 Americans POWs captured in the Battle of the Bulge, transported to Stalag IVB near Muhlberg, Germany, and sent on work detail to Dresden, Germany. Stumpf survived the Battle of the Bulge (December 16, 1944), the surrender of two regiments (422nd and 423rd) of the 106th Infantry Division (December 19, 1944), a four day march in the coldest winter of the century to Geroldstein with entrainment in the rail cars (December 22/23, 1944), travel to Limberg where, locked in box cars, he among other American POWs endured bombing from the Royal Air Force, because the train was held up due to rail traffic (evening of December 23/24, 1944). Once the rail lines were repaired, overcrowding at POW camps in Bad Orb, a distance from Limberg, he and his fellow troops continued by train to Muhlberg (December 30, 1944), where after spending the night in an open field, the men were finally incarcerated at Stalag IVB (December 31, 1944). At Stalag IVB approximately 170 men were selected for *Arbeitskommando* 557 ("workdetail") to Dresden (mid-January 1945). In Dresden they were billeted in the Slaughterhouse Complex, building five, and engaged in a variety of minor work details throughout the city. About a month after their January arrival, February 13–14, 1945, the fire bombing of Dresden occurred. Their work duty would continue in Dresden, though now altered in purpose, focused primarily on clearing rubble and removal of bodies. Now, however, they were billeted in a South African POW camp outside of Dresden, near Gorbitz. Daily they would march to Dresden, a four to five mile walk, in the first days facing the subsequent strafing of the city by American Fighters. As news of the movement of Russian troops towards Dresden

reached the Germans, the American POWs were moved about 35 miles southwest to Hellendorf, billeted now in a dance hall (mid-April 1945). News of the end of the war reached the men here, resulting in the breakdown of German authority and new threats from Russian 'liberators.' The men who had been physically brought together in Slaughterhouse Five now fled in small groups, working their way toward American lines. Some headed to Aussig, Czechoslovakia, some back to Dresden and on to Riesa, and like PFC Stumpf, some to Chemnitz, Germany (early May 1945).

Despite what he had endured in each stage, from the Battle of the Bulge to the flight to Chemnitz, PFC Stumpf did not lose what he called "our sense of humanity." "No matter what we had been through, I am proud to say that we had kept our sense of humanity and empathy for the suffering of all people who had survived the tribulations of this war."[6] And so PFC Stumpf would not cast out the young woman and child into the chaotic streets, where American and Russian liberators attempted to take control and establish military order. Though physically and emotionally drained, PFC Stumpf, among others in this unique group of POWs, did, however, cast aside the myriad of political, ethnic and religious differences that ultimately led to the war that had brought him to Europe. Having endured the hardships of war and incarceration, when it came to providing for humanity, in this example allowing "the enemy" to keep their shelter, empathy for human suffering — even of "the enemy," transcended the protocol of military housing regulations.[7]

* * *

Sighet, Transylvania. Summer 1945. "Then, at last, at one o'clock in the afternoon, came the signal to leave. There was joy — yes, joy. Perhaps they thought that God could have devised no torment in hell worse than that of sitting there among bundles, in the middle of the road, beneath a blazing sun; that anything would be preferable to that. They began their journey without a backward glance at the abandoned streets, the dead empty houses, the gardens, the tombstones..."[8] Torment worse than this was devised — and not by God. In *Night*, Elie Wiesel will soon follow these autobiographical recollections with perhaps one of the most poignant, encapsulating responses to the Holocaust:

> Never shall I forget that night, the first night in camp, which has turned my life into one long night, seven times cursed and seven times sealed. Never shall I forget that smoke. Never shall I forget the little faces of the children, whose bodies I saw turned into wreaths of smoke beneath a silent blue sky.
>
> Never shall I forget those flames which consumed my faith forever.
>
> Never shall I forget that nocturnal silence which deprived me, for all eternity, of the desire to live. Never shall I forget those moments which murdered my God and my soul and turned my dreams to dust. Never shall I forget these things, even if I am condemned to live as long as God Himself. Never.[9]

Yet amidst the horror that is the Holocaust, survivors not only write of the banality of evil, of how they survived but others did not. In his memoir, *Survival in Auschwitz*, Primo Levi speaks of how the Jews became "things" — not in the sense of how they were inhumanely treated by their oppressors, but how he, philosophically speaking, viewed their transformation as Jews into things as a means of self-preservation. But such a reverse transformation could likewise occur, the rekindling of a flicker of humanity, if but the slightest chance presented itself. As Levi wrote, for him, the Ka-Be (camp-hospital), held such potential:

> Ka-Be [hospital] is a Lager without its physical discomforts. So that, whoever still has some seeds of conscience, feels his conscience re-awaken; and in the long empty days, one speaks of other things than hunger and work and one begins to consider what they have made us become, how much they have taken away from us, what this life is. ... We know where we come from; the memories of the world outside crowd our sleeping and our waking hours, we become aware, with amazement, that we have forgotten nothing, every memory evoked rises in front of us painfully clear.[10]

Levi also wrote of that remarkable bond of friendship that taught him that beyond the evil that engulfed him, the construct of goodness still prevailed, waiting to be once again evoked:

> I believe that it was really due to Lorenzo that I am alive today; and not so much for his material aid, as for his having constantly reminded me by his presence, by his natural and plain manner of being good, that there still existed a just world outside our own, something and someone still pure and whole, not corrupt, not savage, extraneous to hatred and terror; something difficult to define, a remote possibility of good, but for which it was worth surviving.[11]

Perhaps what Levi theorized was that a potential abstract construct of a pure and simple goodness existed somewhere, a construct impenetrable to "hate and terror." Yet the irony lies in that the inlibration of such an exquisite expression of a theoretical and ideal construct, which inspired him to strive to survive, was inspired by oppression itself.

Each of the above vignettes demonstrates that in the midst of oppression, the most valued facets of humanity ironically surface. However, just as ironically, these most precious qualities of humanity, gained through the harshest of venues, are just as often lost through forgetting by the simple passage of time. Holocaust survivor Sara Tuvel Bernstein wrote, "The waste is what grieves me the most, even before the war. The waste of human potential was the worst of all. I would have liked to have been somebody. To have been *somebody*!"[12] Oppression yields waste and loss of potential — this poignant fact is recognized. But forgetting such oppression mag-

nifies the waste of human potential manifold. As times lapses we forget or if not forget, like pain, the intensity becomes only a conceptual memory not a physical pain. We remember that the Holocaust happened. That American POWs not only set aside their "normal" life to fight for our freedom and that of others, but they additionally suffered the daily turmoil of moment to moment survival. We remember that children were abandoned or orphaned because of political proclivities, an orphaning that in many cases is a death sentence.

Timelessness can be a crucial element for survival in each of these circumstances because the oppressed steps into another dimension where the passage of time is not marked as we are accustomed. That sense of timelessness may numb the senses and hence create self-preservation. Primo Levi spoke of it as when a human being becomes a thing. Does a thing mark time? I think not. Slaughterhouse Five survivors spoke of the beauty of time disorientation, where one day was much like another. The sun rose and set and so the fact that a day had passed was recognized, but that it was Monday or Friday or February or March they had no knowledge. Such ignorance can be bliss because no expectations are forthcoming; hope might not die, for no false chronological deadline was established. For Russian orphans, unless one of the lucky in the process of adoption, the change of seasons visible from the orphanage windows or for those fortunate orphans to have a makeshift playground, the scents of summer to fall to winter to spring might allude to the passage of time. However, this passage of time did not knowingly point toward advancement in life. For those not adopted while young (birth to eight), save a few lucky older children, more so girls than boys, advancement did await them, only relocation to the next age dictated orphanage. Graduation from the final home was not greeted with celebration.

Timelessness and forgetting can be a blessing for those oppressed; however, the further removed in time from catastrophe, the passage of time creates a new danger and new meaning to the term "forget," in particular. Such has happened in each of these cases. The Holocaust has been questioned, has been denied. The passage of time has led to forgetting. The Dalai Lama once wrote, "Forgive but do not forget." To forgive is encouraged, but better stated may be that an individual has the choice to forgive; to not forget should not have these same choices. Mr. Leo Hymas, U. S. Liberator of the Nazi concentration camp of Buchenwald, in speaking to a class and then community audience at Central Washington University, related his mother's advice on having returned from his tour of duty in WWII. Her message was that the past is behind you, do not speak of it; move forward with your life. Not speaking of the horrors of their incarceration till nearly 50 years later, many of the Men of Slaughterhouse Five followed such advice and subsequently it is first now that the healing of their suffrage is occurring. But the Dalai Lama's directive "forgive but do not forget" is directed as much to those who may have not personally been involved in such oppression. For those who have not suffered or not been oppressed, those who are not enlightened to the pain of such an intensity, may be less inclined to remember. Crises, atrocities, oppression are impersonal, intangible if not experienced[13] and

in this way the potential for repetition persists. Yet conflict or challenge is integral to growth. Viktor Frankl teaches us that "each situation in life represents a challenge and presents a problem for him [a person] to solve."[14] Consider two examples, one theoretical — the Tree of Life, and one true to life — the March on Drury Lane.

In western religious traditions, disobedience, sin, gender discrimination and mortality are connected with the story of Adam and Eve and in particular Eve's eating of the forbidden fruit. In *How Good Do We Have to Be? A New Understanding of Guilt and Forgiveness,* Rabbi Harold Kushner provides an alternative outcome to the biblical story, an outcome whose lesson lends itself to the necessity of conflict or challenge for growth.

> So the woman saw that the tree was good to eat and a delight to the eye, and the serpent said to her, "Eat of it, for when you eat of it, you will be as wise as God." But the woman said, "No, God has commanded us not to eat of it, and I will not disobey God."
>
> And God called to the man and the woman and said to them, "Because you have hearkened to My word and not disobeyed My command, I shall reward you greatly." To the man, He said, "You will never have to work again. Spend all your days in idle contentment, with food growing all around you." To the woman, He said, "You will bear children without pain and you will raise them without pain. They will need nothing from you. Children will not cry when their parents die, and parents will not cry when their parents die." To both of them, He said, "For the rest of your lives, you will have full bellies and contented smiles. You will never cry and you will never laugh. You will never long for something you don't have, and you will never receive something you always wanted." And the man and the woman grew old together in the garden, eating daily from the Tree of Life and having many children. And the grass grew high around the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil until it disappeared from view, for there was no one to tend it.[15]

The message of this revisionist version teaches us that the absence of challenge or conflict is stagnation. Western societies pining after a lost paradise is the equivalent of envisioning tranquility and happiness as the reward for simply doing nothing.

Summer 1967. Drury Lane. Milwaukee, Wisconsin. "Ee, Ay, Ee, Ay, Ee, Ay, Oh! Father Groppi's got to go" — a familiar tune that bore the words of that summer's — just before my ninth birthday — social unrest. We sang the little ditty, learned from whom I don't recall, as we jumped rope throughout the slow summer days of the Midwest. Father Groppi was a local white advocate of the Civil Right's Movement in Milwaukee. As a Catholic priest, a white Catholic priest, who ministered to the black population on the North Side of Milwaukee; and that he took up their cause of Equal Rights was perceived as radical.

That a white Catholic priest would embrace the non-violent protest policies of Martin Luther King, Jr. was unconscionable to "white Milwaukee." The announcement

of his non-violent March was received with suspicion, trepidation and uneasiness, for the preceding summer months had not embraced the doctrine of *ahimsa*. Rioting in the housing units on the North side headlined the nightly news; the constant shrill of fire engines to yet another house or business fire sadly became a common sound. The plea was to procure equitable, safe housing for the black population on the North side; the approach was not peaceful. About a week of rioting at the end of July 1967 was not met with success. The strategy was changed to 268 days of open housing marches, highlighted by one most unique march. Father Groppi chose one Sunday in August for this famous march across the 16th Street Viaduct, crossing from the predominately black North Side of Milwaukee to the predominately white South Side of Milwaukee and the city was put on high alert. Crossing the viaduct the procession was greeted by egg-throwing and vulgarities, yet they persevered. Leading his community on foot, quietly singing "We shall overcome," their destination was Drury Lane, a quiet south side street replete with the famed Milwaukee bungalows and oak-lined streets. At the corner of Drury Lane, only six houses from our bungalow, was the home of Congressman Clement J. Zablocki, a short, stocky, kindhearted Democrat whose opinion would carry weight in Washington D. C. Returning from church that Sunday morning, we were greeted by "Milwaukee's finest," clad in riot gear.

Families on Drury Lane and the surrounding streets off Oklahoma Avenue were directed to close their front curtains, take shelter in their basements and under no conditions to peek out the front windows until the proper authorities had personally released us. We spent the better part of that afternoon huddled in our bomb shelter in the basement — the bomb shelter bore witness to another past concern of that era, the Cuban missile crisis. We waited and listened. Inside the Zablocki home, their daughter — my sister's friend — later told us they, too, huddled together in their basement around her brother's birthday cake. We all listened, hearing nothing but the soft shuffle of feet back and forth on our Drury Lane with an equally soft hum of singing. I never saw Father Groppi or even one black face on Drury Lane that Sunday afternoon. Before nightfall the March had returned to the North Side without a shout, a tussle, any noise louder than a hum on Drury Lane. I'm told the March on Drury Land was a success; Congressman Zablocki gave his support to the Federal Legislation for a National Open House Statute; Drury Lane though one long block in length became famous in Milwaukee. We never again jumped rope to the Father Groppi ditty and, barring a neighbor or two who didn't stay long, Drury Lane itself remains a peaceful and ethnically respectful neighborhood. An example wherein tension, peaceful conflict and the absence of violence led to the resolution of conflict and the betterment of humanity — at least in one little corner of the world.

Today's world is volatile. We "seek" conflict perhaps with the intent of avoiding human stagnation — as in Rabbi Kushner's scenario, or to correct the injustices humanity has created — as in the Drury Lane vignette. But just as often we "seek" conflict because of disparity and discord prompted by the very diversity we teach is the construct of our contemporary unity. The past sixty years have witnessed such reli-

gious, ethnic and political discord. However, three representative examples of people in crisis demonstrate that in the face of adversity an underlying sense of humanity pervades the seeming inhumanity of mankind. The sense of humanity was alive in Holocaust Survivors (1939–45), American POWs held in the Slaughterhouse Five Complex in Dresden, Germany (1944–45), and Americans and Russians involved in the adoption of Russian orphans after the fall of Communism (1990-Present).

Despite these potential lessons from the past the most disturbing tensions persist and reappear today because we have not learned from the past. Only in part can we blame this "failure to learn" on the old adage "time heals all wounds," that is, time weakens the intensity of the experience and hence in some cases permits us to forget past pain. Such forgetting could be perceived of as fortuitous because it promotes the healing process. Forgetting also sadly permits the repetition of atrocities. Forgetting and the historic principle together beseech us to promote the proposition: response to challenge or conflict need be hatred and violence. Contemporary humanity's challenge is to deny them their plea. The sages to teach this wisdom are already present; they are the past atrocities and the survivors of these oppressions. Holocaust survivors, American POWs, and those involved in the adoption of Russian orphans — to name but a few examples, preserve the wisdom for contemporary conflict resolution. They teach us 1) how horrible such conflict is, and 2) despite the horror, there were those who could hold on to their sense of humanity. These two antitheses — horror and humanity — would be the message of these sages. The key, however, is to discover a way to grasp that glimmer of humanity without descending to the horror. This key is educating about the horror experienced by these past sages, a constant retelling to prevent forgetting, with the hope that what will be acted upon and replicated is the glimmer of humanity rather than the horror of the violence. In this way the theoretical construct of Peace will become a reality, a Peace that is both blind to and appreciative of diversity.

* * *

Over a simple meal of potato soup and black bread, the last meal Sasha would share with his friends at Russian State Orphanage #2 in Tula, they teased him because today was finally Sasha's day; his Mom and Dad had come to take him home. Sasha's friends pointed at him, then at us, as we peeked in the dining room. The three to five year old boys and one girl giggled, hid their faces and sipped soup as they beamed, like the bright midday sun through the lace curtains, at Sasha, the lucky one. Like any proud parents we beamed back and were allowed to snap a quick photo of this most special moment in time. From time to time we take out this photograph among others to look back on the world that gave us our son. As the years passed — and Sasha became Alex, we looked not only at how our son — clad in plaid — had grown, but wondered what had become of the other children in this photograph. Ten years have passed; the children are now aged 13 to 15, and if not adopted they are living in the last age-dictated orphanage. If not adopted by now they are most likely never become

the lucky one for a day. At age 16, they will be sent out into the world to a bleak future of crime, prostitution, street life or worse.

I would like to think that each child now has a family, but statistics dictate this is not so. I would like to think that if others looked upon the faces in this photograph they would realize that the conflict we so embrace to achieve our goals is tantamount to excising one or more of these little faces forever. I would like to think that we who were involved in the adoption process of Russian orphans are sages of contemporary conflict resolution, because we set aside our political proclivities for the welfare of these children. But perhaps the true sages are the Russian orphans who will one day help us to refocus on what is truly important in life — potato soup, black bread and to be lucky for a day. Perhaps that the historic principle "what goes around, comes around" might now signify repaying kindness with kindness.

NOTES

[1] See also Lamentations 4:20–21.

[2] Consider the Platonic Forms or from a spiritual perspective the contemporary teachings of Rabbi Ted Falcon of Bet Alef Meditative Synagogue (Bellevue, WA) on the CD Soul Calling by Ira Fein, Track Three 'Od Yavo' Shalom Alenu.

[3] This sentiment is expressed by Rabbi Ted Falcon as referenced in note 2 above.

[4] See http://www.rhi.org The director and her husband had themselves adopted eight children worldwide.

[5] "A Day in May": 8.

[6] "A Day in May": 8.

[7] Vignette developed here draws on the paper, "Religion under Oppression: The Men of Slaughterhouse Five." Second International Conference on New Directions in the Humanities. Monash Institute. Tuscany, Italy (July 2004), submitted to the Journal of Conference Proceeding for New Directions in the Humanities. Among the men of Slaughterhouse Five is renowned author Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. and my father, Ervin E. Szpek, Sr.

[8] Wiesel, Elie, Night, Bantam Books, 1958. P. 14.

[9] Night, 33.

[10] Levi, Primo, Survival in Auschwitz, Touchstone, 1996 [First published 1958]. P. 55.

[11] Levi, Primo, Survival in Auschwitz, Touchstone, 1996 [First published 1958]. P. 121.

[12] Bernstein, Sara Tuvel, The Seamstress: A Memoir of Survival, Berkley Books, 1997. P. 24.

[13] This is not to say that the families or friends of those who have suffered might not also consciously or unconsciously experience second-hand the oppression.

[14] Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, Pocketbook, 1984 [First published 1946. P. 131.

[15] Little, Brown and Company, 1996: 32–33.

ПЕРЕЖИВШИЕ ХОЛОКОСТ, АМЕРИКАНСКИЕ ВОЕННОПЛЕННЫЕ И РУССКИЕ СИРОТЫ: СОВРЕМЕННАЯ МУДРОСТЬ ДЛЯ РАЗРЕШЕНИЯ КОНФЛИКТОВ

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Современный мир изменчив, хотя мы говорим, что единство современного мира мешает разнообразию, это разнообразие часто вызывает неравенство и раздоры. В последние шестьдесят лет имели место религиозные, этнические и политические конфликты. Три группы людей можно использовать в качестве примера, свидетельствующего о том, что перед лицом опасности скрытый гуманизм берет верх над кажущейся бесчеловечностью: жертвы холокоста, американские военнопленные, содержавшиеся на бойне номер пять в Дрездене, и американцы, усыновившие сирот из России после падения коммунизма. Несмотря на возможность извлекать уроки из прошлого, в мире сохраняются участки острой напряженности. Мы не учимся на прошлом опыте, возможно, потому, что время стирает его остроту. В статье использованы устные рассказы, воспоминания и свидетельства очевидцев, показывающие, что (1) вселенский гуманизм сильнее всего проявляется перед лицом проблем и конфликтов, (2) чувство гуманизма слабеет и тускнеет со временем, что делает возможным продолжительный конфликт и особенно конфликт с применением насилия; (3) единство среди разнообразия необязательно требует отсутствия конфликта или угрозы, а скорее отсутствия насилия; и, наконец, (4) для борьбы с насилием следует использовать интеллектуальные средства через адекватное возрасту обучение и напоминания о прошлых раздорах, что станет воплощением современной мудрости и послужит разрешению конфликтов.

WANDERERS OF ANOTHER FAITH: CREATING COMMUNITY THROUGH INTERFAITH DIALOGUE

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Developing an Interfaith Dialogue

A dialogue is *not* a debate. The goal of dialogue is the fostering of *mutual* understanding, respect, appreciation, and compassion. A dialogue, therefore, is *not* a forum for *argument*; rather it provides an opportunity to open up a *two-way* channel for *Listening*. Indeed, dialogue creates a safe place for a very special kind of listening, one that is both empathetic and accepting.

The ultimate goal of an interfaith dialogue, then, is the *honoring* of another's beliefs or traditions, of seeking to provide a compassionate support (one *transcending* our individual religious doctrines or dogma). In other words, a dialogue is *not* a staging ground for judging the truth or falsity of another person's religious experiences, their faith system, or their cultural perspectives. Rather, a dialogue begins by acknowledging that we have differing views, but we also understand that even divergent views carry *Equal Worth* and are *Equally Valid* for those who cherish them: the sanctity and piety that you experience from *your* religion is, likewise, shared by *others* in *their* religion. Thus, spiritual or transformative power is *assumed* to be available in *all* religions.

But, let me be clear on this last point. Interfaith dialogue does *not* require that we always "agree" with another person's theology or cultural values. Moreover, dialogue does *not* seek to suppress anyone's right to affirm the "correctness" of their *own* religious beliefs, nor to express pride in their *own* cultural traditions. What Interfaith dialogue does require is that participants accept that no single religion has *exclusivity* on the Truth.[2] Now, if this covenant of civility cannot be met, *as a prerequisite*, then we will be having a debate, *not* a dialogue.

Recall, in a debate the primary objective is to "prove" that one's view is the "right" position to hold. Therefore, opponent's views are presumed to be "wrong" (or, at best, sincere yet still "misguided.") But, as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. instructs us, in a dialogue, "We do <u>not</u> seek to defeat or humiliate our opponent; rather we seek to win their *understanding* and *friendship*."[3] In stark contrast to Dr. King's dialogue model of caring and polite civility, we find that debates are often fiery and aggressive:

> Deep in disputes, fighting and attacking each other with wordy warfare, contentious and quarrelsome they dwell, stabbing each other with verbal daggers. They could *neither* convince each other nor be convinced by others; they could *neither* persuade each other nor be persuaded by others.[4]

Now, the above quote could be describing any number of today's on-going debates, such as environmentalists verses the logging industries, Palestinian verses Israeli, Presidential candidate debate forums, Pro-Choice / Pro-Life arguments, local school boards, police / community relations, etc. But, remarkably, the quote actually references the religious and philosophical debates raging in northern India during the 6th century BCE![5] Yes, some 2,500 year ago, and yet the description sounds like disputes of *this* morning. In fact, the ancient Buddhist texts called the Sutta-Pitaka, (of the Pali Canon) often details such inter-religious debate:

> ...some... remain *addicted* to disputation saying:
> "*You* don't understand this doctrine — *I do*!"
> "How could *you* understand this doctrine?"
> "Your way is *all wrong-mine* is right!"
> "*I* am consistent-*you are inconsistent!*"[6]

> "What you had so carefully thought up has been turned *inside out! Your doctrine is refuted*. You are *proved wrong*! Go and learn better, disentangle yourself if you can!"[7]

> *"You're defeated,* go off and rescue your thesis."[8]

At their worst, debates over religion descend into unyielding yelling matches or a shameful series of insults:

> Those wishing for dispute brand each other as fools *mutually*, they go to others and pick a quarrel...calling *themselves* (the *only)* expert.[9]

> *This* is the *only* straight path; this is the *direct* path, the path of salvation that leads one... to union with Brahmâ (God).[10]

> Misguided men learn the Dhamma only for the sake of *criticizing* others and for *winning* in debates.[11]

> I have seen certain learned (people) who were clever, knowledgeable about the doctrines of others, as sharp as hairsplitting marksmen; they wander *about demolishing the views of others* with their sharp wits.[12]

> ...entering *exclusively* (they) say that *in their own way* there is something firm... he holds his opponent to be a fool; thus *he himself brings on strife*, calling his opponent a fool and impure.[13]

Sadly, such entrenched dogmatic thinking is all too familiar in contemporary society. But whether it is today, or over two thousand years ago, the negative repercus-

sions and results can often be the same. In an environment of debate participants too often create a "discordant company," a crossfire of criticism, a hurtful atmosphere that is "quarrelsome, wrangling, (and) disputatious" where people are "wounding each other with weapons of the tongue."[14]

Fortunately, Interfaith dialogue provides both a nourishing and a compassionate alternative to such debate.

A Buddhist Blueprint for Developing Interfaith Dialogue: Invocation

As the Buddha states in Dîgha Nikâya:

> ...it is hard for you, holding *different* views, being of *different* inclinations and subject to *different* influences, following a *different* teacher, to understand the doctrine *I* teach my disciples...come on then, (I'll) ask about *your own* teaching...
>
> At this the wanderers (of different faiths) made a great commotion and noise exclaiming: "It is wonderful, it is marvelous how great are the powers of the ascetic Gotama in *holding back* with his *own* theories, and in inviting others to discuss *theirs*!"[15]

Around 150 years *before* Aristotle wrote his treatises of argumentation and debate, the Venerable ascetic Gotama was speaking his discourses on the Dhamma.[16] Known to the world as "The Buddha" (or "The Fully Enlightened One") his teachings provide the earliest and most comprehensive analysis of both Inter-religious Disputation and Interfaith Dialogue.

The Buddhist Blueprint that follows has been drawn from the Sutta-Pitaka or "Basket of Discourses" containing the Five Nikâyas, which represent the Dhamma as established during the First and Second Buddhist Councils.[17]

Key Ground Rules for Entering into Dialogue:

1. First, we must acknowledge that "the way wanderers of another faith conduct themselves... is *different*" from our own.[18] Indeed, what is "sacred" to others may well appear "strange" or even "sacrilegious" to us (given our upbringing, traditions, and theology, etc.). Suspending our judgment, and accepting the *validity* of different spiritual pathways, is foundational to a successful dialogue.
2. Freely admitting that there are *many* obstacles and impediments that one faces when attempting to learn about the doctrines of another's religion. This enterprise is *not* an easy undertaking. Learning to *diffuse* our defensiveness takes patience and considerable practice. We need to become aware of our own "influences" i. e. cultural contexts and conditioning, as well as our own doctrinal "filters," *before* we can effectively *suspend* them.

3. As we see role-modeled by Buddha, an essential strategy for overcoming obstacles is for us to *volunteer* Active Listening. That is, to initially forego discussing our *own* religious perspective and, instead, shows a willingness to learn about another's belief system. Such openness, when *mutually conferred*, helps to dissolve tensions. Thus Honoring All Paths.

Remember, when entering an Interfaith Dialogue one's purpose is *not* to convert, undermine, or belittle another's religion, rather we are here to *reassure* all participants by saying:

a. "Let *your* teacher *remain* your teacher."
b. "Let *your* rules *remain* as they are."
c. "Let *your* way of life *remain* as it was."
d. "Let those things *you* consider wrong, *continue* to be so considered."
e. "Allow what *you* deem allowable and reject what you deem should be rejected."[19]

In this way a powerful, respectful, and truly ecumenical position is established and maintained (thus there is *no* threat to our theology or belief system). We can be *open* and *trust* in the intentions of our dialogue partner. In the case of Buddhism, "one enters *and exits*...having the Dhamma as your badge and banner."[20]

Six Steps For Conflict Resolution in Religious Dialogue

If you think that someone "has misunderstood the sense [of a doctrine] or expressed it wrongly" then respond with the following procedure:

1. First, their "words should be *neither* rejected nor disparaged."[21] This courtesy is always appreciated, we must not jump to conclusions nor dismiss another's doctrines. Rather, we seek *understanding*. Of one thing we can be sure, a mocking tone will certainly instigate conflict. Instead, one should politely ask the individual to *clarify* their position by the use of paraphrase:
"*Friend*, [do] you mean such and such?"[22] Honest investigation and inquiry should be encouraged: "Question each other, and open discussion thus: 'What is the meaning of this?'"[23]

2. Next, elaborate upon the meaning and expressions that *you* believe to be "correct" (while openly admitting that different interpretations are always possible):
"Friend, these words can mean *either* this or that."[24]

Thoroughness, context, and informed research aid the process:

"Explain the unexplained and dispel doubts on diverse points of doctrine."[25]

3. Now, offer up an *alternative* reading:
"Friend, if you mean such and such (perhaps) you should put it like *this* or like *that*."[26]

4. Invite the person, as well as yourself (given the above discussion) to *reassess* the differing position i. e.
"Which sense [do you feel] is the most appropriate?"[27]

5. "If he replies, 'This meaning is better expressed like *this* (his original stand) than like *that* (your stand),' then his words should be *neither* rejected nor disparaged."[28]

This last situation does *not* constitute an impasse in dialogue, (though it likely would in a debate). For here we gain valuable "clarification" on our differing stands and thus our dialogue purpose is actually reinforced. So, in order to move on, we may simply reiterate our position (without negatively critiquing each other). It is also helpful to consider that gaining "understanding" does *not* imply "resolve," i. e. a satisfactory mediation of tensions. Indeed, the best we may achieve (at times) is simply "clarification" of our "irreconcilable" differences.[29]

6. Then, to continue forward, both parties should agree:
"In matters (where) there is *no* agreement, let us *leave them aside*."[30]

Techniques of Dialogue That Diffuse Conflict

When one's goal is to support the ethical principle of *equal worth* among different faith systems, then "debating" is not only completely unnecessary, but also unproductive:

"...leave off disputing, for there is no *advantage* to obtain"[31]
"...let no one dispute, for *purification* (does *not* take place) by that"[32]

For our discussion, spiritual "purification" may refer to gaining a deeper *understanding* of another's faith (*without* the need to judge or to criticize it).

"I understand, I see *likewise* this."[33]

Another practical strategy for us, as individuals, is to uphold a strong personal commitment to Dialogue:

"Those who dispute and maintain 'this *only* (is) true,' to them say, '*Here* is no opponent for thee'"[34]
"...wander...about...*without* opposing view to view:"[35]

Admittedly, all of these well-meaning ideas sound deceptively simple. In reality holding such a moral stance of non-dispute is *extremely difficult*. Thus, even though all the parties "say" they agree to "dialogue," the temptation to "debate" and argue is always hiding just below the surface. After all, we have been repeatedly schooled in various forms of debate, but *not* so in dialogue. Moreover, we all (on some level) would love to persuade the other party "to our side" of the holy house! But, again, *our agreed upon contract* is for dialogue, *not* debate.

Interfaith dialogue becomes far more challenging, however, when a participant (due to anger or deeply ingrained habits) slips-up and actually insults another participant. *Nothing can trigger our abandonment of peace faster than when a demeaning or mocking remark is aimed at our religion, our spiritual teachers, our congregation, our doctrines, etc.*

Such tension-filled confrontations are not just found in current events, they happened quite often in the time of Buddha:

> ...if anyone should speak in disparagement of me, of the Dhamma or of the Sangha, you should *not* be angry, resentful or upset on *that* account. If you were to be angry or displeased at such disparagement, *that* would only be a hindrance *to you*...you must (calmly) explain what is incorrect as being incorrect saying: "...that is *not* our way, that is *not* found among us."[36]

The Sutta Pitaka offers us many techniques and insights for gaining such a stance of equanimity, dispassion and neutrality, all essential elements for successful mediation of conflict.

Like Carving Water

In the *Anguttara Nikâya* Master Gotama gives us a profound simile for mediating conflict. He says we should become one "who is like carving water."[37] This simile offers us a strategy, and a process, for peacemaking. "Carving water" suggests that the best way to confer freedom is to surrender our chisels. That is, to lay-down our sharp criticisms and to stop trying to force others into agreement with our views.

In the West we are taught that reason and logic provide the chisel for sculpting out agreement from our opponents. But a chisel is dependent on rock, or other hard substances, in order to work. The Buddha's admonishment is that we *become like water*. In this way we remove the essential condition necessary for chisels to function, i.e. an oppositional force. Gotama says,

> "What is carved on water soon disappears and lasts not."[38]

If we resemble water, instead of stone, then even in the face of conflict we stay as supple and resilient as a river. Thus, "though harshly spoken to, sharply spoken to, rudely spoken to, yet is (one) easily reconciled."[39] By contrast is the person "who is like carving on a rock...a rock carving is *not* soon erased by wind or water or by lapse of time."[40]

The inevitable result of holding "rock hard" points of view is *anger*, *not* conciliation. Buddha states, "even so is the anger of him that is always getting angry, and his anger lasts long."[41]

Another key simile used by Master Gotama is that we become "like milk, and water *mixed*."[42] Here, we are able to introduce flavor and nourishment (milk) *without* any imposition. "(Thus we) dwell together in unity, without quarreling; such a company [which] is called harmonious."[43] This is an ennobling goal in a dialogue that we remain a friendly fellowship as *"mingled* milk and water."

Other practical guidance, and reassurance, includes the following:

> By rousing (oneself) by earnestness, by restraint and control, the wise may make an island which *no flood* can overwhelm. [44]
>
> Do not speak harshly *to anybody*, those who are spoken to (harshly) will answer thee in the *same* way. Angry speech is painful.[45]
>
> Beware of the anger of the tongue, and control thy tongue! Practice virtue with thy tongue.[46]

> One who repays an angry man with anger
> Thereby makes things *worse*
> Not repaying an angry man with anger
> One *wins* a battle hard to win
> He practices for the *welfare of both* —
> He achieves the *cure of both*
> His own and the other's — [47]

A final and telling observation occurs, however, when our resolve is *tested*. For it is easy for someone to *appear* "gentle, meek, (and) peaceful"...so long as disagreeable courses of speech do *not touch him*...it is when disagreeable courses of speech *touch him* that it can be understood whether (one) is *really* kind, gentle, and peaceful."[48]

The ethical response when we receive abuse is to ensure that:

> "Our verbal conduct shall be...*clear* and *open,* restrained; we will *not*... disparage others"[49]

This ethical posture is reinforced by Master Kong Fuzi (i.e. Confucius) in the *Lun Yu* ("Ethical Dialogues"):

> "When seeping slanders and skin-pricking accusations *fail* to prevail on you, you may be said to be *clear-sighted*."[50]

So, to conclude our contemplation of compassion through Interfaith Dialogue, we are admonished that even in a worse case scenario, i. e. if "harshly spoken to, sharply spoken to, rudely spoken to"[51] we will be "like water on a lotus leaf (which) does *not* cling."[52] Finally, we must commit ourselves to the practice of peace by embodying the tie-source principle of Interfaith Dialogue:

"...I shall utter *no* evil words, I shall abide compassionate for *his* welfare, with a mind of loving-kindness, *without* inner hate."[53]

Sacred Commandments Shared in Common Judaism, Buddhism, & Christianity

The inspiring ethical precepts contained within the "Ten Commandments" are certainly not the sole province of The Torah of Judaism. Nor are they a unique resource for Christianity (who adopted them over half a millennium later and recast them into their New Testament). In fact, most of the key principles of the Ten Commandments were arrived at independently by Buddhists, who codified them centuries before the birth of Jesus. Thus revealing a deep and unifying commitment to moral standards of conduct which, in turn, are applicable to *all* religious traditions.

Judaism	**Buddhism**	**Christianity**
First spoken: 1,100's BCE ; First written: 700's BCE; Finalized text: 586–450 BCE	First spoken: Mid 500's to late; 400's BCE	First spoken: 30's CE; First written: 70–80's CE
Holy Scripture: *The Tenankh:* (The Torah)	Holy Scripture: *Sutta Nipâta, Dīgha Nikāya, Mijjhima Nikāya Anguttara Nikâya* (The Pali Canon)	Holy Scripture: *The New Testament*: (The Gospels)
"You Shall Not Murder" (*Exodus,* Chapt. 20 verse 13); "You Shall Not Murder." (*Deuteronomy,* Chapt. 5, verse, 17)	"Let Him Not Kill Any Living Being" ; "Let Him Not *Cause* to be killed" any Living Being."; "Let Him Not *Approve* of Others Killing any Living Being."; "Let Him Refrain from hurting *ALL* creatures (both those that are strong and those that tremble)." (*Sutta Nipâta*, Chapt. 2, section 14, verse 19)	Thou Shalt Not Murder" Ye have heard it said 'Thou shalt not kill; and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment;' But I say unto you, that whosoever is *angry* with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment..." (*St. Matthew*, Chapt. 5, verse 21)

Judaism	**Buddhism**	**Christianity**
"You Shall Not Steal" (*Exodus,* Chapt. 20, verse 13) "You Shall Not Steal" (*Deuteronomy*, Chapt. 5, verse 17)	"Let Him Abstain From (Taking) Anything That Has Not Been Given (To Him)" "Let Him Not *Cause* anyone to take anything that has not been given." "Let Him Not *Approve* of those that take what has not been given." (*Sutta Nipвta*, Chapt. 2, section 14) "Abandoning the taking of what is not given... by not stealing he abides in purity" (Majjhima Nikāya, Sutta 27, verse 13)	Thou Shalt Not Steal. "Thou knowest the commandments... do not steal..." (*Mark,* Chapt. 10, verse 19)
"You Shall Not Commit Adultery" (*Exodus*, Chapt. 20, verse, 13). "You Shall Not Commit Adultery" (*Deuteronomy*, Chapt. 5, verse, 17)	"Let Him Not Transgress With Another Man's Wife For there is the short pleasure of the frightened in the arms of the frightened." (*Sutta Nipâta*, Chapt. 2, section 14, verse 21; *Dhammapada,* Chapt. XXII verse, 310)	"Thou Shalt Not Commit Adultery" "Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, 'Thou shalt not commit adultery,' But I say unto you, that whosoever *looketh* on a woman to lust after her hath already committed adultery in his *heart*." (*St. Matthew*, Chapt. 5, verses 27–29)
"You Shall Not Bear False Witness Against Another" (*Exodus,* Chapt. 20, verse 13) "You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor." (*Deuteronomy,* Chapt. 5, verse 17)	"Let No One Speak Falsely To Another" "Let Him Not *Cause* (anyone) to speak falsely." "Let Him Not *Approve* of those that speak falsely." "Let Him Avoid *All* (sort of) untruth." (*Sutta Nipвta*, Chapt. 2, section 14, verse 22) "Abandoning false speech...When summoned to court, or to a meeting, or to his relatives, or to the royal family and questioned as a witness." (*Majjhima Nikāya*, Sutta 114, verse 6)	"Do Not Bear False Witness," "Thou knowest the commandments... 'Do not bear false witness, defraud not'…(*Mark,* Chapt. 10, verse 19)

Judaism	Buddhism	Christianity
"Honor Your Father and Your Mother" "Honor your father and your mother that you may long endure on the land that the Lord your God is assigning to you." (*Exodus,* Chapt. 20, verse 12) "Honor your father and mother as the Lord your God has commanded you, that you may long endure, and that you may fare well, in the land that the Lord your God is assigning to you." (*Deuteronomy,* Chapt. 5, verse, 16)	"Let Him Dutifully Maintain His Parents" "A son should minister to his mother and father, 'I will support them...I will perform duties for them. I will keep up the family tradition. I will be worthy of my heritage" (*Sutta-Nipâta*, Chapt. 2, section 14, verse 29, *Digha Nikāya*, Sutta 31, verse 28) "The wise pay honors to parents. By right conduct towards mother, father, a man...begets much merit." (*Anguttara Nikāya*, Vol. II, Part II, Chapt. I, Section IV (4); Vol. II, Part II, Chapt. vii, Section III (63)	"Honor Thy Father and Mother" "Thou knowest the commandment... honor thy father and mother..." (*Mark,* Chapt. 10, verse 19)
You Shall Not Covet "You shall not covet your neighbor's house; you shall not covet your neighbor's wife, his male or his female slave, or his ox, or his ass, or *anything* that is your neighbor's." "You shall not covet your neighbor's wife, you shall not crave your neighbor's house,or his field, or his male or female slave, or his ox, or his ass, or anything that is your neighbor's." (*Deuteronomy,* Chapt. 5, verse 18)	We Shall Be Uncovetous"Here he does not covet the wealth and property of others thus 'Oh, may what belongs to another be mine!'" (*Majjhima Nikāya*, Sutta 114, verse 7) "One given to covetousness has uncovetousness by which to avoid it [and] to lead him upwards." (*Majjhima Nikāya*, Sutta 8, section 12, subsection 9, section 14, subsection 9, section 15, subsection 2)	Thou Shall Not Covet"Thou shall not covet; and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly or comprehended in this saying, namely 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." (*Romans,* Chapt. 13,verse 9)

An Ancient Precept Known As "The Golden Rule" (As reflected in 12 religious traditions)

1. Hinduism

This is the sum of duty: do naught unto others which would cause you pain if done to you. (Mahabharata 5:1517).

2. Jainism

In happiness and suffering, in joy and grief, we should regard all creatures as we regard our own self." (Lord Mahavira 24th *Tirthankara Sutrakritanga* 1.11.33).

3. Buddhism

Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful."(UDANA-VARGA, 5:18).

4. Confucianism

What you do not wish for yourself, do not impose on others. (Master Kong Fuzi; *Lun Yu* [Analects] 12.2 / 15:23).

5. Zoroastrianism

That nature only is good when it shall not do unto another whatever is not good for its own self. (Dadistan-i-Dinik, 94:5).

6. Judaism

What is hateful to you, do not to your fellowman. That is the law: all the rest is commentary. (*Talmud,* Shabbat, 31a).

7. Christianity

All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them. (New Testament, Jesus, Matthew 7:12).

8. Islam

None of you has faith unless he loves for his brother what he loves for himself. (Muhammad, Al Hadith [*Bukhārī* 2:6]).

9. Sikhism

Don't create enmity with anyone as God is within everyone. (Guru Arjan Devji, 259 *Sri Guru Granth Sahib)*

10. Bahá'н

Blessed is he who preferreth his brother before himself. (BAHÁ 'U'LL'ÁH, *Tablets of Bahá'u'lláh)*

11. Native American

Respect for all life is the foundation. (The Great Law of Peace)

12. African Traditional Religion

> *One going to take a pointed stick to pinch a baby bird should first try it on himself. (Yoruba Proverb [Nigeria])*

References and Endnotes

[1] The phrase "the wanderers of other sects" (accatthiyâ paribbâjakâs) and "the wanderers of another faith" appear in many suttas of the Buddhist Pali Canon. The term "wanderers" encompasses a broad number of spiritual and philosophical groups (i.e. Sramanas, Brahmins, Jains, etc.) For us, it serves as a general designation meaning "the believers" or "the followers" of a specific religion, faith system, or sect (particularly one *different* from our own religious tradition).

[2] The results of extensive polling done by U.S. News and PBS, completed in 2002, reveals that "...more than 3 in 4 Americans believe *all* religions have at least some elements of truth." See "The Ways of Worship" by Jeffery L. Sheler in *Mysteries of Faith*, a Special Edition by *U. S. News & World Report* that hit new stands and bookstores in November, 2003. The citation of the polling results is found on pages 8–9.

[3] "Nonviolence and Racial Justice" in *Christian Century* 74 (6 February 1957); 167 Reprinted in *A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr.,* edited by James M. Washington, San Francisco: Harper, 1991. P. 9.

[4] "Sutta 48, verse 2; Kosambiya Sutta: The Kosambians" in *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya*. Translated by Bhikku Ñananoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001. P. 419.

This speech formula has been augmented by the phrase, "...fighting and attacking each other with wordy warfare" taken from "Sutta 29, verse1; Pāsādika Sutta: The Delightful Discourse" in *The Long Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Dîgha Nikāya*, by Maurice Walshe, Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995. P. 427. Also from a similar speech formula the words "contentious and quarrelsome...they dwell" was edited in, taken from Sutta 36, verse 19; BookIV, Chapt. II; in *The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Samyutta Nikāya* byBhikkha Bodhi, Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2000. P. 1275.

[5] Throughout this essay I use BCE (Before Common Era) instead of BC (Before Christ). The same goes for the use of CE (Common Era) over AD (Anno Domini or In the Year of Our Lord). In my view the use of BC and AD unduly limits history to a single religious tradition, that of Christianity. The change, however, is not intended in any way to be derogatory towards Christianity. I also note that the change has not been universally adopted by scholars of religion.

[6] "Sutta 1, verse 1.18; Brahmanjâla Sutta: The All Embracing Net of Views" in *Dîgha Nikāya*. From henceforth, all Pali Canon citations will simply identify the Sutta number, followed by the verse (in some cases, however, a separate section or chapter number is also necessary).

[7] Sutta 77, Chapter One, verse 6, *Majjhima Nikāya*.

[8] Sutta 56, Book V, Chapt. XII, Part I, subsection 9, *Samyutta Nikāya*.

[9] "The Sutta — Nipâta: A Collection of Discourses, Chapter IV: Atthakavagga," Section 8, verse 2 in *The Sacred Books of the East Volume 10*, Translated by V. Fausböll, edited by F. Max Müller, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1998, P. 153.

[10] Sutta 13, verse 4–5, *Dîgha Nikāya*. It should be noted that this quote reflects a debate of doctrines between two Hindu (Vedic) Brahmins, and *not* followers of the Buddha. Thus "Brahmā" here is considered to be Mahabrahmā or the "Great Brahmā" the "Lord Maker and Creator...the Overlord, the Untranscended...Infallible" (see Sutta 49, verse 5, *Majjhima Nikāya*)

[11] Sutta 22, verse 10, *Majjhima Nikāya*. Note that the spelling of "Dhamma" is from the Pali, while the more common spelling "Dharma" is from the Sanskrit (as are "Sutta" and "Sutra," respectively.)

[12] Sutta 89:14 and Sutta 27:4, *Majjhima Nikāya*.

[13] *The Sutta Nipâta*, Chapt. IV, section 12, verse 15–16.

[14] *The Book of the Gradual Sayings (Anguttara Nikāya)*. Volume 1 is translated by F. L. Woodward, London: Luzac & Company Ltd., 1960. The quote may be found in Part II, Chapter 5, Section 2.

[15] Sutta 25, verse 7, *Dīgha Nikāya*.

[16] Dates differ as to the life of the Buddha. A number of scholars, however, place his life around 563 BCE-483 BCE. (See Maurice Walsh in his "Introduction" to the *Dîgha Nikāya*.) It should be noted too, that earlier dates, 623 BCE-543 BCE, have currency in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia. Karen Armstrong, for example, places the beginning of Buddha's ministry at about 532 BCE and lasting some 45 years.

Aristotle's birth is 384 BCE with his mature work being composed circa the 350's BCE.

[17] The First Buddhist Council is said to have convened in the months immediately following the Parinibbana (final passing) of the Buddha, circa 483 BCE. This inaugural and auspicious occasion consisted of some 500 leading Elders who gathered at Rājagraha, the capital city of the Magadha Kingdom (in northern India.) The express purpose of the First Council was to orally transmit the Dhamma and thus to authenticate the discourses of the Buddha (establishing all of his sermons and suttas) as well as to recite the monastic rules of Discipline (Vinaya)

The Second Buddhist Council was held a century later, circa 383 BCE at Vesalī. The Pali Canon was drawn from these two seminal Councils and is contained in the five Nikāyas (or large "collections" of Buddha's discourses.)

[18] Sutta 25, verse 4, *Dīgha Nikāya*.

[19] Sutta 25, verse 23, *Dīgha Nikāya*.

[20] Sutta 26, verse 5, *Dīgha Nikāya*. As is always made clear in the Pali Canon, the "banner" of one's Buddhist belief is displayed without "lauding one's own Dhamma and no disparaging of the Dhamma of others"

[21] Sutta 29, verse 18, *Dīgha Nikāya*.

[22] Sutta 29, verse 19, *Dīgha Nikāya*.

This presumption of "friendship" is a positive and powerful element for effective Interfaith Dialogue. It contrasts dramatically from debates where fellow participants are usually referred to as "opponents" or "adversaries," (even "enemies").

[23] Vol. I, Part II, Chapter 5, section 6, *Anguttara Nikāya*.

Acknowledging the *multiple* meanings of religious terms and ideas is helpful for developing healthy dialogue.

[24] Sutta 29, verse 18, *Dīgha Nikāya*.

[25] Vol. I, Part II, Chapter 5, section 6, *Anguttara Nikāya*.

[26] Sutta 29, verse 19, *Dīgha Nikāya*.

[27] Sutta 29, verse 19, *Dīgha Nikāya*.

[28] Sutta 29, verse 18, *Dīgha Nikāya*.

[29] While unsatisfying and frustrating, gaining such clarification is nonetheless a *positive step* forward.

[30] Sutta 29, verse 19, *Dīgha Nikāya*.

Learning to "let it go" foregoes seeking any further explanations (this is certainly *not* easy to do, yet it is *often* required to avoid creating impenetrable obstacles.)

[31] Chapter IV, Section 8, verse 5, *Sutta Nipâta*

[32] Chapter IV, Section 8, verse 7, *Sutta Nipâta*

[33] Not that I am, necessarily, in *agreement* with my dialogue partners, but rather I can now honestly observe the issue from *their* point of view. This marks a singular achievement in the dialogue experience.

[34] Chapter IV, Section 8, verse 9, *Sutta Nipâta*

[35] Chapter IV, Section 8, verse 10, *Sutta Nipâta*
[36] Sutta 1, Chapter 1, verse 1.5, *Dîgha Nikāya*,
[37] Volume I, Part III, Chapter XIII, section 130, subsection 1, *Anguttara Nikāya*.
[38] Volume I, Part III, Chapter XIII, section 130, subsection iii, *Anguttara Nikāya*.
[39] Volume I, Part III, Chapter XIII, section 130, subsection iii, *Anguttara Nikāya*.
[40] Volume I, Part III, Chapter XIII, section 130, subsection 1, *Anguttara Nikāya*.
[41] Volume I, Part III, Chapter XIII, section 130, subsection 1, *Anguttara Nikāya*.
[42] Volume I, Part II, Chapter V, section 2, *Anguttara Nikāya*.
[43] Volume I, Part III, Chapter X, section 93, subsection iii, *Anguttara Nikāya*.
[44] Chapter I, verse 25, *Dhammapada*
[45] Chapter X, verse 133, *Dhammapada*.
[46] Chapter XVII, verse 232, *Dhammapada*.
[47] Sutta 7, Chapter I, section 2, *Samyutta Nikāya*.
[48] Sutta 21, verses 9 and 10, *Majjhima Nikāya*.
[49] Sutta 39, verse 5, *Majjhima Nikāya*.
[50] Book 12, verse 12.6, in the *Analects of Confucius* (*Lun Yu*), translated by Chichung Huang, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. P. 127.
[51] Volume I, Part III, Chapter XIII, section 130, subsection III, *Anguttara Nikāya*.
[52] Sutta III, Chapter 9, verse 32, *Sutta Nipâta*.
[53] Sutta 21, verse 6, *Majjhima Nikāya*.

СТРАННИКИ ИНОЙ ВЕРЫ: СОЗДАНИЕ СООБЩЕСТВА ЧЕРЕЗ МЕЖРЕЛИГИОЗНЫЙ ДИАЛОГ

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В данной статье содержатся практические советы относительно того, как организовывать межрелигиозный диалог. Межрелигиозный диалог требует межкультурного понимания и сочувствия, в каком бы пространстве его не вели — на территории университета, на рабочем месте или в обществе в целом. Подготовка диалога предполагает получение участниками определенных инструкций:

I: *Основные принципы организации и проведения межрелигиозного диалога*. В этом разделе постулируются отличия диалога от дискуссии. Обсуждаются основные правила и предпосылки эффективного межрелигиозного диалога. Помимо этого предлагается ознакомиться с «Буддистским проектом диалога», в соответствии с каноном Пали (в частности, Сутта-Питака или «Корзина рассуждений», включающим пять агам, в которых содержится учение о Дхаме, утвержденное на Первом и Втором Буддистских Советах). Эта модель, несмотря на свое древнее происхождение, полезна в настоящем. Нравственные принципы, которые она закладывает в основание процесса межрелигиозного

диалога, представляются универсальными и экуменическими (*не* сектантскими или провинциалистскими) и подходят для *всех* без исключения религиозных традиций.

II: *Эффективные практики и стратегии, предлагаемые рядом мировых религий*. Во втором разделе раскрываются еще более глубокие основания для начала диалога, что предполагает ознакомление со священными текстами разных религий, в которых говорится о важности межрелигиозных взаимодействий. Кроме этого предлагается две хрестоматии. В первой представлена древняя моральная заповедь — «Золотое правило» — и ее представление в двенадцати мировых религиях. Во второй — сведены ключевые этические принципы «Десяти заповедей» в том виде, в каком они предстают в иудаизме, буддизме, христианстве, индуизме и джайнизме.

Closing Part. Community // Заключительная часть. Единство

EXPERIENCES AND REFLECTIONS: WORDS TO THE WISE

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Everybody is the Other and Nobody is himself.
Martin Heidegger

Creativity can only take place where there is a difference.
Yehudi Menuhin

Introduction

A survey conducted among Austrian youths in the context of the terror-attacks of September 11, 2001, revealed that one out of five respondents felt threatened by Islam. Half of those surveyed were unable to associate anything with "Mecca," and one-third did not know what the "Koran" is. Forty percent expressed fear of further attacks by "Islamic groups."

Why are people in Europe afraid of Islam? Obviously not because Islam as a religion poses a factual threat, but because a specific policy of interests encourages the media to recreate an image of Islam that is based on historical reminiscences, and to construe a Clash of Civilizations, a struggle between West and East and a crusade of good against evil.

This is the very opposite of intercultural communication—the deliberate creation of enemy images and cultural opposition, which is based on a calculated play with prejudices and xenophobia. However, this strategy can only bear fruit if large parts of the population are not sufficiently conversant with the facts and have not gathered enough personal, favourable experience with individuals from this allegedly threatening culture.

This twofold deficit presents an explicit challenge to education, both as the act of imparting knowledge and as the act of facilitating emotional grasp. As a result, educational efforts are called for at the school, juvenile and adult level alike.

Intercultural communication

Intercultural communication as a prerequisite for integration is viewed as a mutual give-and-take process. If we agree that communication in general is "an ex-

change of messages between two or more communicating parties" which is "characterized by the intentional and conscious use of a mutually intelligible system of symbols," it appears that in most European countries this interaction between the respective representatives of the (indigenous) majority culture and the (migrant) minority culture is, at best, functioning with severe limitations.

As a rule we can even observe a pronounced communication gradient between the majority and minority cultures. More specifically, immigrants often know much more about the culture, religion, custom, habits and behavioural patterns of their new environment than vice versa. But how can integration work if large portions of the majority population lack a basic knowledge and hence, the most basic understanding, of the other culture? How, in this situation, are a fundamental acceptance of the foreigners and long-term peaceful coexistence feasible at all?

Cultural exclusion

The lack of this knowledge fosters incomprehension and disassociation, fear and defensive-ness towards all that is unfamiliar. Migrants and their culture are excluded and depreciated, being viewed as a general threat to one's own identity and culture, not as an enrichment of the self. Such "threat imagery" lays the groundwork for racism and the associated depreciating and disparaging treatment of people originating from elsewhere and is the prime breeding ground for violence against foreigners. The general propensity for violence and the rapid increase in violence against foreigners in Europe are indeed alarming.

Cultural acceptance

For all that, foreign influences are generally perceived as enlivening and enriching, particularly among young people, in a world that is drawing ever more closely together. The truth of this observation is clearly borne out by much of today's music and media scene, to say nothing of the fashion industry. When it comes to awakening cultural interest and transmitting cultural acceptance, the emotional sphere dominates over the cognitive one.

It follows that, to make intercultural communication work in an everyday context, a degree of emotional acceptance between the communicating parties is indispensable. This does not just imply passive tolerance, i.e., the practice of reluctantly putting up with the other person and/or leaving him alone because this is how you were brought up or feel compelled to behave as an enlightened citizen. As J. W. Goethe so cogently phrased it: "Toleration ought in reality to be merely a transitory mood. It must lead to recognition. To tolerate is to insult".

Emotional acceptance and active tolerance can be generated in manifold ways. At the level of personal encounter, from the meeting of individuals to the development of mutual sympathies, it is above all the diversity of cultural expressions which

fascinate us in the respective other culture and its different people, the "strangers:" how they move, express themselves, talk, sing, laugh, show sadness, etc. Thus, it is their different language, music and expression or, quite simply, their entire cultural richness that captivates and often even inspires us.

Only if we experience this fascination we can develop an interest, a desire to find out more about these people, their fates, history, culture, religion, and other background. It is therefore essential that access to other cultures, whether for one's one benefit or for that of others, should be gained initially via empathy, i.e., through the realm of the emotional, creative and subconscious. Cognitive interest and the acquisition of knowledge of other cultures will then follow all by itself.

Intercultural respect

As part of this mutual process of emotional and cognitive rapprochement and deepening of understanding, another key element of intercultural communication will evolve; namely, appreciation of the other culture and the resulting fundamental respect for the other person. Such respect is both a necessary condition and key driver for replacing cultural ethnocentrism and hence, the sense of one's own cultural superiority, with a more relativistic attitude. This makes it an important enabling force, allowing cultural contacts as bias-free and as equal as possible.

Intercultural learning

Respecting the culture of others while viewing one's own with a healthy sense of relativism is part of an attitude which has become particularly important in the process of integrating minority with majority cultures a process that is taking place in all European countries today. Both are indeed indispensable if intercultural learning is to work as "a form of social learning which, through the experience of cultural differences and by the means of cultural comparisons, leads to a thorough analysis and the adoption of a relativistic view of one's own standards and social systems, as well as to a reduction of cultural (national) prejudice." Needless to say, this applies to both sides, i.e., representatives of the majority and minority cultures alike.

Cultural production

If the experience and relativistic view of cultural differences is so essential for social and intercultural learning, a focus must be placed not merely on the act of imparting knowledge but also, and more significantly, on emotional learning. An important contributor to this process is scenic understanding, a perception and comprehension technique based on the findings of psychoanalysis. Where knowledge is not enough, language fails and communication is not successful, images and scenes, reminiscences and fantasies, musical and creative elements can facilitate emotional access and reach deep layers of the psyche where cultural boundaries

and differences are cancelled out or, at least, do indeed become relative. Instead, we obtain radically new, hitherto inconceivable patterns of contact and understanding between people of diverse origins.

The methods and media employed in this process are manifold. The range extends from drawing and painting memories and fantasy images to photographing and documenting impressions and events, narrating folk tales and histories, developing and performing various forms of theatre, making music and celebrating festivities together, learning new dances and songs, etc. Only creativity and imagination are the limits.

Cultural awareness

Regardless of which methodical approach is chosen subsequent joint verbal reflection is particularly helpful in achieving intercultural communication. Under the guidance of a competent facilitator, it is possible to summarize key findings, fill in knowledge gaps, and convey new insights to all participants—all in an effort to attain a significantly higher level of mutual cultural acceptance. The training of skilled facilitators and moderators with appropriate intercultural experience is of major importance here.

Many such forms of creative methods, media and training were developed, tried and analysed in the participating adult education centres in four European countries as part of the present project, "Enhancing Cultural Awareness through Cultural Production." The results and experience gained should encourage the continuation and reproduction of this approach, which is aimed at facilitating our understanding of our fellow Other and hence, ourselves—as the only way to improve cultural awareness.

ОПЫТ И РЕФЛЕКСИЯ: ОБРАЩЕНИЕ К МУДРЫМ

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Почему европейцы боятся ислама? Очевидно, не в силу того, что ислам как таковой является угрозой, а потому, что особая информационная политика способствует созданию образа ислама, основанного на исторических реминисценциях, и формированию представления о столкновении цивилизаций, борьбе Запада с Востоком, крестовом походе сил добра против сил зла.

Это — полная противоположность межкультурной коммуникации (которая представляется как взаимный процесс заимствований и является поэтому пред-

посылкой к интеграции), предумышленное создание образов врага и культурной оппозиции, базирующейся на продуманной игре с предрассудками и ксенофобией. Однако такая стратегия может быть успешной только в тех слоях населения, которые недостаточно осведомлены о реальном положении дел и у которых недостаточно личностного, благоприятного опыта общения с представителями этой якобы несущей в себе угрозу культуры.

Такое положение дел является вызовом образованию, получению знаний, и эмоциональному постижению. В силу этого, требуются широкомасштабные усилия школы на всех уровнях — от среднего до высшего.

WORKING WITH DREAMS ON THE INTERNET

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Introduction

Historically, sharing dreams, or more accurately, "dream reports," has been a common mode of interaction for members of various communities. The Guarani Indians of Brazil have a tradition of dream sharing each morning with their families. Some of the pre-Colombian Navaho tribes held "dream festivals" several times yearly, and Siberian tribal councils took unusual dreams seriously, whether reported by shamans or other community members. Dream sharing is not confined to indigenous societies; it has been put to use by several community groups in the United States and elsewhere (e. g., Krippner, Gabel, Green, & Rubien, 1994).

In contemporary western society, the Internet has been incorporated into every facet of daily human activity. People use it to run businesses, go shopping, gather resources for academic papers, and even to find and participate in relationships. Since dreams often represent individuals' quotidian activities, wishes, fears, and fantasies, sharing dreams on the Internet has served as a unique platform for new communities. Sharing such intimate material allows a curiosity, trust, and connection that might be unavailable in the dreamers' physical environments.

Herbert's Application of the Ullman Method on the Internet

"Grass roots" dream movements have emerged recently in the United States, Canada, and parts of Europe. Many of these groups are characterized by the absence of a professional therapist to "direct" dream sharing and interpretation. Although the International Association for the Study of Dreams galvanized this grass roots movement, Montague Ullman, a psychoanalyst, broke with tradition by developing a system that ultimately made participants the interpreters of their own dreams. Rather than being the arbiter of the interpretive process, the group leader's function in the Ullman method is to guarantee that interactions between an individual and the group yield maximal insight. The group leader also provides the foundation for the session and establishes guidelines to protect participants. For example, he or she explains that a participant who volunteers to share a dream can stop the process at any point (Robertson, 2004).

In Stage One of Ullman's system, a participant recounts his or her most faithful memory of a dream. The participant does not add any interpretive material or information about his or her life circumstances. Listening participants typically take notes and ask the dreamer questions about the dream's content in order to clarify the dream report.

In Stage Two, the other participants "adopt" the dream report, and approach the dream's imagery with their own feelings. Interpretive statements are often prefaced by saying: "If this were my dream, this is what it would mean." While no one attempts to force these projections onto the dreamer, he or she will usually take notes and determine if, or to what degree the interpretations are a "good fit."

In Stage Three of the system, the dreamer is invited to share his or her reactions to the dream report with the group. Ullman (1996) states: "This is the first step in a continuing interplay between the dreamer and the group, with the goal of deepening the dreamer's grasp of the dream" (p. 52). With the background of the group's input, the dreamer examines recent events and identifies a context or impetus for the dream. To assist this search for context, the leader may read recorded segments of the individual's dream aloud.

The final stage of Ullman's system allows group members to ask further questions and offer additional interpretive material. The group leader's objective during this stage is to protect the dreamer against specious assumptions and allow him or her to determine the personal, if tentative meaning of the dream. At the end, the dreamer can express his or her gratitude to the group or briefly summarize his or her perceptions of the interaction.

John Herbert (2000) used the Ullman method in his doctoral research at Saybrook Graduate School. After attending Ullman's training sessions, he created 29 computer-mediated communication groups, and tested their interaction on five bulletin board systems by way of e-mail. Using action research as his method while acting as a participant-observer, he developed protocols for group dreamwork, writing a manual that provided the rules and procedures for the process. Participants were selected from both America Online and the International Association for the Study of Dreams.

Herbert's groups participated in real-time online dreamwork, including electronic auditoriums and chat rooms (both public and private). Every effort was made to protect privacy and confidentiality, and the Saybrook Institutional Review Board approved his procedures for dealing with human research participants. Herbert's project, as well as other cyberspace endeavors, promulgated ethical codes to address Montague Ullman's imperative of a safe, accepting atmosphere, in which participants benefit from dream sharing without imposition from other members in the group.

Dreamers' feedback attested to the efficacy of computer-mediated dreamwork. Content analysis of their responses revealed a preponderance of metaphorical statements concerned with spirituality and right livelihood; though many of Herbert's group members lacked the emotional involvement found in face-to-face groups. Later, Herbert and others remedied this deficiency with electronic teleconferencing that approximated real time. After reviewing the results of his work, Herbert concluded: "The incidence of dream related Web sites will add to the resources available to those searching for more understanding of their dream metaphors."

Saybrook's Online Dream Course

In 2003, Saybrook Graduate School created a 3-credit online course entitled "Personal Mythology and Dreamworking." During the first year it was offered, 17 students took the course, either from Stanley Krippner or from Jayne Gackenbach. Students were sent a text, a packet of required readings, and a code for online access to the course. They were given three options for completing the course requirements: (1) Following the 23 "personal rituals" as outlined in the text, *The Mythic Path* (Feinstein & Krippner, 1997). (2) Taking one of their psychotherapy clients through these personal rituals. (3) Examining the explicit and implicit mythologies of their families, subcultures, and cultures, and reflecting on how their personal mythologies interacted with these larger systems. Most students chose the first option. Only one student withdrew from the course, due to a family emergency, rather than a lack of interest in the course content or process.

Students completed three 30 to 35 page essays on assigned topics and sent them to the instructor via e-mail. The instructor made comments on the essays and either accepted or rejected them; in the latter case, the essay could be revised and resubmitted. Essays were evaluated using several criteria including: clarity of expression, accuracy of content, lucidity of organization, skillfulness of editorial style, and the acumen with which assigned readings were integrated into the essay.

The course learning module offered a psychologically oriented definition of "myth;" described as an imaginative or hypothetical statement or story addressing human existential issues with behavioral implications. "I like ice cream sodas" is a statement that has behavioral implications, yet is trivial, and does not deal with any foundational existential issues. "Touching a hot iron will inflict injury" impacts behavior, but is factual, not imaginative, nor hypothetical. However, "children who get perfect scores on their school exams will invariably win their parents' love" is an imaginative and hypothetical (as opposed to factual) statement that addresses crucial life issues and impacts one's behavior. Hence, it qualifies as a personal myth.

Students were taught how to use dream reports to identify both functional and dysfunctional myths. In addition, they were taught strategies for revising, transforming, or working through dysfunctional personal myths. Students were shown how personal mythologies (i.e., their collection of personal myths) influence their perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and activities, and have their origins in genetic inheritance, family of origin, kinship group, and sociocultural milieu. They were also introduced to Feinstein and Krippner's (1997) dialectical model: (1) an "old myth" (i.e., the thesis) is no longer viable. (2) The "old myth" competes with a "countermyth" (i.e., the antithesis) that seems attractive yet is often impractical. (3) The dialectic results in a "new myth" (i.e., the synthesis) that combines the best of both perspectives and become a litmus test for future attitudes and behaviors.

An individual's personal mythology may begin in childhood as an ingenious solution to a seemingly impossible dilemma. The cache of encounters and challenges

may incrementally change the dimensions and nature of the myth, or it may vary little over the course of an individual's life. However, early familiar experiences often produce a personal mythology that is notably resistant to change. Some personal myths are dysfunctional from their inception. Others are temporarily function, but eventually become ineffective. Dreams often chart the course of one's personal mythology, reinforcing functional myths and identifying mythic fallacies that have become obsolete.

Students taking the course communicated with each other on the bulletin board, on which the instructor would also write remarks. For example, one student, Marty, shared the following dream:

> *In this dream, there are various piles of commodities stacked in circular rows, just as materials are often stacked in a lumberyard or brickyard. I am in some sort of school and I tell my instructor and my friend Carol that I have found a secret path. I ask them if they would like to join me on my exploration of it. They agree and we leave on horseback. The route is quite appealing and even romantic, wending around trails, many of which seem familiar to me. Others are less familiar. We arrive at the estate of a beautiful woman but, as we arrive, she and the house disappear. Suddenly we are back at the school and suddenly we are getting ready for a ritual. Our instructor asks us to choose whatever we want among the stacked commodities. Someone else has already selected a commodity, one that was already open and that appears to be quite modern in its appearance. I am reluctant to make a selection until my friend Carol encourages me to do so. Someone in a position of authority is standing behind me, and urges me to choose a particular item. This person assures me that this commodity is indeed an antique, but one that has undergone restoration. Even though many of the other members of my class are selecting known and obvious modern items, I follow this suggestion, which resonates with my own feelings, and choose the restored antique that appears to be new.*

Members of the class offered Marty several suggestions. One student wrote: "If this were my dream, the journey down the secret path would signify a preparation for the ritual and for making a wise selection." Another student focused on the word "commodity," which has a substantial, yet fluid quality about it—a commodity can be used, bought, or exchanged, but is a tangible good. The appearance of the dreamer's friend, Carol, was interpreted as a reference to the social support system that would help her confront personal myths.

Marty found all of these suggestions helpful, and concluded that the authority figure was her "higher self," who guided her "toward choosing not the superficially modern, but that which is old yet has been beautifully restored. This speaks to my temptation to completely eliminate the old myth and the pain associated with it.

However, I opted for putting in the hard work required to change and transform the old myth into a beautiful antique."

The dialectical principles of Feinstein and Krippner's model undergird the dynamics of Marta's dream. One of Marta's old myths (a "commodity") no longer performed well, and she therefore found herself in "some sort of school" conferring with others who were studying their personal mythologies. The counter-myth (represented by the "estate of a beautiful woman") was tempting but illusory. Returning to the school, she found a way to renovate the old myth by integrating characteristics of the counter-myth (i.e. "an antique but one that has undergone restoration"). While it was "hard work," it forged a new myth that was "a beautiful antique;" retaining the authentic, familiar form of the original, with the polish and function of the new.

Gackenbach's Dream Class for the World Wide Web

Grant MacEwan Community College (in Alberta, Canada) asked Jayne Gackenbach to write a 5-lesson, non-credit dream class to launch their World Wide Web (WWW) course offerings. Gackenbach (1996) constructed the course as an overview of dreams for the general Internet public. Students using this interactive format designed their own course, choosing their reading materials, and pursuing the aspects of assignments that most interested them.

Gackenbach prepared an outline that contained five "lessons" and accompanying assignments. The lessons focused on (1) current psychological, psychotherapeutic, and anthropological data about dreams; (2) methods of studying and analyzing dream content, especially for group comparison; (3) a presentation of various dreamworking techniques and tools; (4) a discussion of dreams from the point of view of one's family, community, and culture; and (5) a preview of future directions in dream studies, both in the laboratory and in the field.

The assignments were designed to be informative yet provocative. For instance, the fourth lesson focused on the quality of "connectedness" that dreams provide the dreamer. Students were given their choice of two possibilities. Their first option was to join a dream-sharing group with other class members, using Ullman's "if this were my dream" method, and writing a report on their experience. Members of this group were completely anonymous; Gackenbach stripped the entries of details that could be used to identify the individual before sharing it with other members of the group. The other option was an individual focus on problem solving through dreams. Students who chose this option selected a current issue in his or her life and used dream contents to resolve it, or to acquire additional information.

Throughout the course a bulletin board was maintained where students could post messages to each other about specific dreams, course material, or their particular interests in the subject matter. Gackenbach monitored the board for appropriate etiquette (or what she called "Netiquette"). The course also included a questionnaire

about each student's sleep and dream habits, a course bibliography, and a "dream resource page" containing recommended books and dream-related Web sites.

The entire course required a total of 62 pages of writing. The nature of a Web-course demanded writing conducted in small, autonomous information modules. Students could thus select topics of individual interest from 21 available modules. These ranged from "Historical Views of Dreaming" and "Sleep and Dreams Across the Lifespan" to "Enhancing Dream Recall" and "Self Awareness in Lucid Dreaming."

Hyperlinking is one of the primary assets of a web-based curriculum. It multiplies available resources and potential learning structures. In one case, the sleep and dream questionnaire asked the students: "Do you have dreams in which fighting takes place?" They were given four options: often, occasionally, rarely, and never. They could then check a box labeled "norm data" and receive information drawing from other studies (i.e., often=3.9%, occasionally=36.8%. rarely=47.4%, never=11.8%).

At a more advanced level of hyperlinking, students gained considerable latitude in completing their assignments. This was especially true during the third lesson, designed to help them understand the nature of metaphor in dreams. First, students were led through a metaphor generating activity for their chosen dream imagery. Following this activity, they were provided with multiple options to further personalize their dream interpretations. Specifically, they were asked to think of the activity of a dream animal as a metaphor for a particular dream action. Then they answered a series of questions about their choice and submitted their results to Gackenbach. They were given the opportunity to repeat the same exercise up to 10 more times with 10 different dream aspects (e.g., dream characters, dream emotions), which could be associated with numerous potential symbols and metaphors (e.g., buildings, weather changes). The repetition of this exercise was designed to give students several experiences with various types of dream symbols and metaphors.

The final assignment served as a course evaluation and a vessel for selecting future dream classes and online dream groups. Most of the students completed the course; those who did not attributed their incomplete work to "course logistics." Indeed, online instruction introduces a mode of learning that challenges students unfamiliar with its operation. Furthermore, some students prefer classroom settings and interactions to Internet education (Gackenbach, 1998).

Wilkerson's Dream Sharing in Cyberspace

Dream reports on Internet bulletin boards and chat rooms have facilitated new dream-sharing communities. Richard Catlett Wilkerson (1999) described this movement as "a leap from clinical to non-clinical settings." The Internet has opened up what Wilkerson calls "a garden of dreamy delights for people who have never had the chance to experience dreamwork and dream play" (p. 245). A single dream-shar-

ing group might include members from the Bronx, the Left Bank of Paris, and the mountains of Peru. New avenues in which to share dreams are emerging in mediums such as dream-inspired art galleries, virtual conferencing, and long-distance attendance at dreamwork sessions. A single Web site may contain art, text, theory, spirituality, and business in a complex global network of events, organizations, and publishing ventures.

Online dream sharing challenges neat popular dualities, like those of inner and outer, private and public, appropriate and inappropriate, safe and dangerous, and professional and nonprofessional. In 1995, the executive board of the International Association for the Study of Dreams allowed Wilkerson to establish a dream and computer track at its annual conference. The only proviso was that no dreamwork could be done via the Internet in the conference computer room. This restriction developed out of the fear that unsupervised online dreamwork was dangerous and inappropriate at an event approved by the association. Even so, Wilkerson, working with his "Electrical Dreams Community," never found a single complaint of harm or abuse. The 1995 dream and computer track made several pertinent observations concerning personal dream journals, online dream groups, and real-time chat-rooms, and online dream-inspired art galleries.

Wilkerson's work with the Electrical Dreams Community suggested several advantages of Internet dreamwork. With the advent of dream sharing on the Internet, journal keeping is reinforced by a social support system. Furthermore, an online journal can be constructed at little or no cost to the dreamer. These journals can be shared anonymously or opened by community members with a privileged password. Dreamers are free to include as little or as much personal information as they choose. Many dream journals include places to make public comments that become part of the journal record, while other dreamers request that private messages be sent to them personally (via http://www.dreamgate.com/dream/resources, select online resources and then personal dream journals).

After becoming familiar with Herbert's (2000) procedure, Wilkerson modified it for email and took his process to the Electrical Dreams Community. In these groups, all participants sent dream reports to a moderator who would email dreams and instructions to group participants who subscribed to a special service. Subscribers received all email regarding particular dreams and were protected from unwanted intrusion through anonymous participation and a password. In response to Herbert's report that lack of Internet bulletin board groups lacked vital emotional involvement, Wilkerson hosted electronic conferences that approximated real time. This tool provides the group with a real-time screen that allows several text correspondences to take place at once. As soon as one finishes typing, the message is displayed on the screen of everyone else participating in the chat room. People from around the world can connect at the same time with a sense of shared space.

Eric Dewfall "travels" at night in his lucid dreams and searches for pictures on dream walls. With some concentration, he recalls a few of these images upon awak-

ening, and reproduces them on paper. The pictures are then scanned (digitally copied) and put on his online gallery. Using the Internet and a digital medium gives Dewfall greater command over his images, and escapes the expenses of a formal gallery. Dewfall is also a poet, and the coalescence of his poetry and pictures bespeaks a story larger than either could alone. (Wilkerson, 1999, pp. 253–254).

Wilkerson predicts that dream galleries will become more popular as people realize their low development and maintenance cost, the potential audience, and possibilities in multimedia presentations. In addition, these galleries are on Web sites that host a wide variety of dream sharing information, education, contacts, and links to other sites (http://www.dreamgate.com/dream/resources, select online resources and then Dream Inspired Art and music).

Wilkerson envisages a day when a dreamer will be able to type in a dream text and receive a movie in return. The program will locate pictures on the Internet and build a moving graphic. The film would not be an exact replica of the dream, but would provide visual representations open to commentary by members of dream communities. Some visionaries see the Internet as a multidimensional linkup that represents nothing less than the next step in the evolution of human consciousness. Dream sharing on the Internet may well expand the practice of dreamwork beyond previous categories and boundaries.

Discussion

Outside of ordinary wakefulness, dreams are the most regularly occurring form of human consciousness. An anthropological study of the grass roots dream movement in the United States was conducted by Hillman (1990), who found evidence in certain cultural groups of "a more unified view of reality, giving due weight to subjective phenomena" (p. 14). She described the grass roots movement as "community-based," often organized by laypeople, and falling into two styles. One type of group interaction, the "study group" approach, is a forum for sharing and discussing dreams in an unstructured and conversational manner. Attention is often given to developing skills such as dream recall and journaling, as well as building a repertoire of techniques for both shared and private dreamwork.

The second approach is more experientially oriented, often using the structured Ullman dreamworking process. Both types of groups diverge from the therapeutic approach to dreams in which the psychotherapist is the authority and considered uniquely qualified to make definitive statements about dream content (p. 18). Grass roots dream groups share the assumption that dreams are meaningful, but that their value transcends the clinical context. They hold that dreamers themselves can appreciate the significance of their dreams without relying on the interpretive guidance of "experts." By widening the social framework within which dreams become important, dream groups play a vital role in promoting social cohesion and in repairing "the complex social fabric" that weaves people together (pp. 19-20).

Despite claims by indigenous practitioners, modern mental health specialists, and contemporary lay dreamworkers that dreamwork can alleviate distress, foster personal development, and reinforce social bonding through dreams, there is no scientific consensus on dreams and dreaming. Some researchers have emphasized the cognitive aspects of dreaming, others the emotional psychodynamics, and still others the neurological substrate of dream phenomena. Krippner and Combs (2000) have taken an approach that focuses on several self-organizing properties of the sleeping brain. This view attempts a reconciliation of brain-based and content-based models of dreaming, with the hypothesis that during the dreaming process the brain is extremely sensitive to small variations in initial conditions (i.e., the "butterfly effect"). These variations include residual feelings from daytime experiences as well as memories; especially those concerning activities during which conflicts were left unresolved (i.e., "incomplete gestalts"). In addition, the hyper-responsiveness of the dreaming brain reflects the tendency of complex chaos-like systems to amplify subtle cognitive and affective signals (i. e., "stochastic resonance"). These events are driven by the active inhibition of exteroceptive stimulation, and especially (but not exclusively) during periods of rapid eye movement, neurochemical bombardment of the visual cortex. Limbic activity is increased, and activity in the brain's prefrontal region is reduced.

In other words, brain activity during dreaming is more mercurial than during wakefulness, allowing the dreamer to move easily into residual patterns left by the moods and concerns of waking life. Such fluidity enhances the action of the "chaotic attractors" characterizing brain activity, allowing easier connections between thoughts, feelings, memories, and products of imagination, which is to say that dreams are experienced with greater celerity than waking consciousness. Metaphorically, dreams can be seen as the cinema of the brain; they keep it entertained during the tedium of sleep and, in so doing, may perform such useful functions as memory storage, problem solving, and resolution of conflicting thoughts, feelings, and "personal myths." The brain may not have evolved to dream; indeed, dreaming may be an evolutionary byproduct with few adaptive functions. Nevertheless, dream reports appear to have played a part in the development of many societies, promoting group cohesion when shared. The torn culture of the United States and many other nations are in dire need of forces that promote harmony rather than discord; the grass roots dream movement may be one of the agents to play this role.

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РАБОТА СО СНАМИ В ИНТЕРНЕТЕ

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На протяжении тысячелетий люди делились своими снами друг с другом, и это становилось основой для формирования сообществ. В последние годы появление массовых сообществ сновидцев в США, Канаде и Европе исключило нужду в профессиональных интерпретаторах этих видений. Киберпространство, давшее начало появлению специализированных блогов и чатов, является одним из ярчайших примеров таких сообществ. В докторской диссертации Джона Герберта отмечается, что подобные виртуальные комнаты, в которых можно поговорить о своих снах, работают неплохо, но не могут предоставить пользователям эмоциональный контакт, существующий при личных беседах. Этот минус компенсируется электронными телеконференциями в реальном времени. В Канаде Джейн Гакенбах, бывший президент Международной ассоциации исследований снов и фантазий, создала особый курс, студенты могут записаться на него и пройти в Сэйбрукском институте повышение квалификации через интернет. Аналогично Ричард Уилкерсон создает интернет-сообщество под эгидой Международной ассоциации исследований снов и фантазий. Все эти группы работают в соответствии с моральными установками, чем обеспечивается особая атмосфера — безопасная, располагающая для того, чтобы участники могли поделиться своими фантазиями. Среди выгод, которые получают участники этих групп — исцеление, самопонимание и появление местного или «виртуального» сообщества. Поделиться плодами собственного воображения и познать сны другого важно для обнаружения связующих моментов сообщества.

UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN CULTURES: SEEKING AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE ORIGIN OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS

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Throughout history, certain cultures have attempted to influence other cultures regarding right and wrong, good and evil, and in general, in regard to norms of morality. Throughout the history of philosophy, attempts have been made to settle the question of the origin of moral distinctions, so moral claims can find a greater universal audience. One theory that has persisted throughout the ages, and which gained prominence with the publication of G.E Moore's *Principia Ethica* is "Ethical Intuitionism." In my paper, I examine what is probably the fullest critical analysis of this view, namely, the analysis offered by P.F Strawson in his article, "Ethical Intuitionism."[1]

Strawson's article is given in dialogue form in which one of the speakers, North, puts forward the theory of Intuition, and the other speaker, West, attempts to criticize it. Since we are now interested only in the positive doctrine of Intuition as Strawson understands it, I shall, for the present, confine myself to the remarks made by North. According to the latter, the goodness that a thing has is not investigated empirically in the same way as we find out what the color of an object is. Nevertheless, our senses, which make us aware of the sensible qualities of an object, are indispensable as a means of our becoming aware of those characteristics upon which moral characteristics depend. It is the nature of moral characteristics to be non-empirical, and awareness of them is neither sensory nor introspective. "It is a different kind of awareness, which the specialists call 'intuition' and it is only empiricist prejudice which prevents your acknowledging its existence" (p. 251). This kind of awareness belongs only to rightness and goodness. The rightness of a particular action or the goodness of a particular state of affairs is seen as present in virtue of some other characteristics, themselves capable of being described in empirical terms, which the action or state of affairs possesses. This process, North continues, need not take place each time we desire to know whether an action or state of affairs is right or good respectively. Since, by intuitive induction we can derive moral rules, generalizations regarding the right and the good, which can be applied even when an actual intuition is lacking.

Two pages later, North further explains this dependence on sensible qualities in the intuition of moral characteristics. Rightness or goodness is not intuited independently of the other features of the situation. Our intuition yields the judgment *that* an action is right, a state of affairs is good, *because* it has certain other empirically

ascertainable qualities. "The total content of your intuition includes the 'because' clause" (p. 253). This second account has expanded on the first in an important way, for the theory of intuition now provides some sort of evidence for the ethical judgment. The first account was vague in this respect, for North said only that the moral characteristic is seen to be present in virtue of some other characteristic. Hence, as we shall see, after the first account is given, West questions only the contention that moral characteristics are experienced to be intuited. After the second account is given, however, he can examine what sort of evidence the 'because' clause offers for the ethical judgment.

Is his third and final position, North says that the connection between the sensible qualities of an object and the resulting moral quality which is intuited is not an accident of our constitution, and does not require any special faculty, "but *simply that which we use in all our reasoning*" (p. 255). If, as often happens, an action involves inflicting needless pain upon others, then it follows necessarily that the action is wrong, just as from the fact that a triangle is equilateral, it follows necessarily that its angles are equal. It is this kind of dependence which we intuit — one which is synthetic and not analytic — "and this is why the 'because' clause of my ethical sentence does, after all, constitute evidence for the ascription of the moral characteristic" (p. 255).

In this account, then, North asserts that the connection between wrongness and giving pain is similar to the relationship that holds between the sides of an equilateral triangle and its angles. Let us first examine this latter relationship. It is true, of course, that in a triangle, if all three sides are equal, then the three angles are also equal. However, we must now ask how I can know this. It is not enough to say that I can see this merely by looking at such a triangle, for this is not in accord with strict geometrical methods. What I must do is give a formal deduction of this proposition in order to show that it is true. In other words, if I am confronted with an equilateral triangle for the first time, I cannot as yet say, as North wants to say that because the three sides of the triangle are equal, therefore, it follows necessarily that the angles are also equal. What I require is to prove my proposition in a formal deduction involving this particular triangle. Once this has been completed, I can then say whenever I am confronted with any other equilateral triangle that *because* its sides are equal, it follows necessarily that the three angles are also equal. I can only say this, however, if I recall that there is a proof, and can reproduce it if anyone challenges my assertion.

Since North wants to draw an analogy between intuition and geometry, the same must also be true of the former. A formal proof would be necessary in some particular instances to show that, when these empirical qualities are encountered, the object has the characteristic of goodness, or the action has the characteristic of rightness. If this could be done, then we would be entitled to say, by means of intuitive induction, that because the state of affairs or the action has these other sensible qualities, it follows that the state of affairs or action is good or right. However, if our assertion is challenged, we should have to give our reasons for it. Now, if what I have said is

correct, then the following results. In the first place, since moral characteristics it is asserted are deduced in a manner similar to proofs in geometry, intuition resolves itself into deduction. As a consequence of this, the "because" clause, which North introduces, could not possibly function initially "for the observer" as he believes it does, but does so only at the later stage of intuitive induction. Although it might be true that, because we inflict needless pain upon others the action is wrong, we would not, if the analogy with geometry is kept in mind, be entitled to say this until we had deduced in particular instances that it is wrong.

In Strawson's critique against North's first position, it is unclear whether he is presenting one argument or two. Nevertheless, I should like to consider his two paragraphs as presenting two arguments. I do this in order to show that, when the first is directed against North's first position, it can be interpreted as demolishing a straw man, and that the second criticism is a problem which must be faced by all Intuitionists.

West begins be drawing an analogy between intuiting a moral characteristic and perceiving a sensible quality such as the color red. He says that just as we can understand the meaning of the word 'red' only after we have seen red things, so it must follow (from North's account) that we can understand the word "good" only after it has been intuited in some state of affairs. But, West continues that is not good enough. "In order for me to know *now* the meaning of an indefinable word, it is not enough that a certain perceptual or intuitional event should have occurred at some particular point in my history; for I might not only have forgotten what *kind* of an event it was; I might not know *now* what it would be like for such an event to occur.... (I)f the word "good" expresses an indefinable intuitive concept, then it is self-contradictory to say: "I know what the word 'good' means but I don't remember ever 'intuiting' goodness, and I don't know what it would be 'like' to intuit goodness.' If your theory is true, then this statement is a contradiction." (p. 255).

If this criticism had been directed against the position that maintains what West claims it maintains, then I believe it would be a legitimate criticism. However, I cannot see how West is able to direct it against the position put forth by North. North has said that, through intuitive induction, we derive knowledge of moral rules "which we can apply even when an actual intuition is lacking" (p.251). And that these rules come to be taken for granted, with the result that most of our every day moral judgments involve only an implicit reference to them. In such passages, he seems to be saying that he is aware of intuiting moral characteristics, and, in one place, he goes so far as to say that what he had said is a truism, i.e. that there is no doubt, at least to him, about the experience of intuiting rightness or goodness. Therefore, taking only these passages, West's criticism is inappropriate.

There are two other passages spoken by North that complicate his position. In the first, he says: "You may be partly right, too, in saying that access to the moral world is obtained through experience of the moral emotions; for it may be that only when our moral feelings have been strongly stirred do we first become clearly aware of the

characteristics which evoke these feelings. But these feelings are not identical to the awareness. "Goodness' does not stand to 'feeling approval' — as 'excitedness' stands to 'being excited'" (p. 250–1). The other passage occurs at the end of this speech when North says: "But emotions and judgments alike are grounded upon intuitions. Emotion may be the gatekeeper to the moral world but intuition is the gate." These passages, and especially the first, indicate that perhaps we are not aware of an intuition, but rather that we become aware of the moral characteristics that produce these feelings only after we are aware of the feeling. We would then have to account for the appearance of this moral characteristic and, according to North, this can only be done by means of the theory of Intuition. Since the awareness of moral characteristics is alleged to be different in kind from that of any other qualities, and since these characteristic themselves are different in kind from all others are can know, North might consequently hold the position that we should not expect the experience of intuiting a moral characteristic to be identical to the experience (for example) of perceiving. If this is the position North is implying, then, again, West's criticism is inappropriate, for North has already ruled out the possibility of remembering the experience of intuiting a moral characteristic and knowing what it would be like to do so, and he has replaced these by the necessity of employing the theory of Intuition as ultimately accounting for our awareness of moral characteristics.

In West's second criticism, he says that he should be quite prepared to assert that he understood the words "right" and "good" even though he cannot remember ever intuiting them, and he cannot imagine what it would be like to do so. If this is so, he continues, then North is presented with a choice of two possibilities. The first is that the words "right" and "good" have a meaning for some people different from the meaning they have for others. This alternative is rejected. The second is that the Intuitionist theory is a mistake that either describes nothing at all, or else describes misleadingly the kind of emotional experience everyone admits. In other words, West is here raising the problem of those people who understand the meaning of "good" and "right," but yet claim not to have derived them from intuitions. North's answer to this objection might stem from what I said about West's first criticism. North could say that there is no conscious awareness of intuition, and consequently, the majority of people do not realize that it is necessary, if we are to become aware of moral characteristics. The empirical factor in moral judgments is our own moral feelings, and as a result, most people assume that the feeling itself constitutes our apprehension of a particular moral characteristic. Intuitionists, on the other hand, have realized that these feelings are not identical with that awareness, and consequently, they have developed Intuitionism to account for it. It is a philosophical theory, which is used to account for a philosophical problem and not a theory by which we can ever hope to persuade an unreflective person that having an idea of goodness and feeling approval are not the same thing.

It seems to me this is the only way in which the theory of Intuitionism can be stated if it is to overcome West's remark that the Intuitionist theory, if true, should

be a truism. North, as I indicated earlier, affirms this by saying, "What I have said is a truism and that is its strength." Clearly, Intuitionism is not a truism in West's sense, viz. that there is no doubt about the occurrence of the distinctive experience of intuiting rightness or goodness, and about its being the only way to learn the meaning of the primary moral words. This is so, since, as West says: "I should be quite prepared to assert that I understood the words "right" and "good" but that I couldn't remember ever intuiting rightness or goodness — and I think it is quite certain that I am not alone in this..." (p. 252). North can not solve this by saying, as he does, that West's problem of not being able to imagine what it would be like to have moral intuitions stems from drawing an analogy between intuiting and perception, since moral characteristics are dependent upon others whose presence is ascertainable by looking and listening. Even if this is true, I should, if intuitionism is a truism, be aware of the act of intuiting moral characteristics; and yet, I can deny this. It is essential, therefore, that the intuitionist affirm that there is no conscious awareness of intuiting a moral characteristic, if it is to be consistent with our usual notion of what it is to be aware of an experience. Otherwise, the intuitionist encounters the problem of possibly convincing an opponent on theoretical grounds, and yet the latter may deny the truth of his theory simply because he does not ever recall actually intuiting a moral characteristic.

In West's criticisms of North's second position, it is the "because" clause which comes under attack. The issue here is to attempt to determine the kind of evidence which the "because" clause provides. His first remarks center on the possibility of the "because" clause offering a definition of the moral characteristic. However, he shows correctly that this could not be so. "When the chemical analyst concludes that the material submitted for analysis is salt, he does so because it exhibits the defining properties of a salt... But the fundamental moral word, or words, you say, cannot be defined; their concepts are unanalyzable. So it cannot be in this way that the "because" clause of your ethical sentence functions as evidence" (p.253). Now, a different sort of evidence is provided when we say something like, "It will be fine in the morning for the evening sky is red." However, this also does not provide any evidence of the kind needed by North, since the fine morning can be observed without noticing the state of the evening sky, whereas there is no independent awareness or moral qualities. They are always 'seen' as dependent on those other features mentioned in the "because" clause.

The difficulty with North's account, as I understand it, is that he is attempting to introduce two different kinds of evidence into a theory that admits of only one kind. When we intuit the goodness of a state of affairs, our intuition itself is the only evidence we have that we have apprehended the moral characteristic correctly. The empirical qualities in the "because" clause can only be used to settle a question of fact and not a question of value. In order to see this objection more clearly, we might take the example of two people applying an intuition to a certain state of affairs: one claims that it is good, while the other maintains that it is neither good nor bad. The

only thing we can do in this situation (given North's second account) is to show our opponent that s/he is mistaken about the facts, believing that if we can get them to agree with us about the empirical facts, they will then adopt the same moral attitude or conceive the same moral characteristic in this particular state of affairs as we do. However, this is not always the case, inasmuch as it is possible to gain agreement about the empirical facts, and yet have differing moral judgments. As a result, the "because" clause does not function as North believes it does, since it is possible for ethical disagreements to survive the resolution of factual disagreement, and the Intuitionist is then left with intuition itself as the only evidence which can be offered for the moral judgment.

(To this the Intuitionist might reply that where ethical disagreements survive supposed factual disagreements, there is actually some factual disagreement which remains to be resolved. In other words, the Intuitionist could maintain that both sides have not reached factual agreement, even though they think that they have.)

According to West, there is a further difficulty in North's second account, namely, some evidence must be found to show the correctness of our intuitions. The fact that ethical disagreements may survive the resolution of factual disagreements indicates that intuitions are fallible, and the problem then becomes one of finding a criterion for distinguishing between genuine and false intuitions. Furthermore, we must do this while realizing that "The false claimants... carry the same inner conviction" (p. 254). If this could be done (and it seems highly dubious that it can be done, apart from what I said in the bracketed paragraph above) then this account might seem plausible. Without some such criterion however, the value of this account could be questioned, on the grounds that it makes no new contribution as an aid to resolving ethical disagreements.

I showed earlier that North's third analysis of intuition resolves itself into deduction. However, ignoring this point for the present, I should now like to discuss North's "amendment" to his own account, and West's criticism of it. It will be recalled that the former had said that, from the fact that an action involves inflicting needless pain upon others, it follows necessarily that the action is wrong. He then says that we may object to this, since no moral generalization holds without exception. It is always possible to envisage circumstances in which the generalization breaks down. This, however, only calls for a "trifling amendment." "We cannot... assert as a necessary synthetic proposition 'All acts of promise-keeping are right' or 'All states of aesthetic enjoyment are good.' But we *can* assert as a necessary synthetic proposition '*all* acts of promise keeping *tend as such* to be right' — or 'All states of aesthetic enjoyment *tend as such* to be good'" (p. 255).

West attacks the notion that such propositions are necessary. He says correctly that when we say of swans they tend to be white, we are saying, not that all swans have the quality of "tending to be white," but rather that the number of swans that are white exceeds the number of those that are not; that if anything is a swan, the chances are that it will be white. Therefore, in all such cases, it is always a class of

things or events which is being referred to, and we are saying of this class that most of its members have a particular characteristic. The sentence then becomes *"Most A's* are *B's*," and this is not a necessary proposition.

West's second criticism, which is also correctly applied to North's account, brings out very clearly why moral propositions cannot be asserted to be derived in a manner analogous to geometrical propositions. West says that the need for the amendment which North introduced is incompatible with the account he gave of the manner in which we come to know both the moral characteristics of individual actions and states, and the moral generalizations themselves. North has said that we intuit the moral characteristic as following from some empirically ascertainable features of the action or state. West adds, however, that if this is true then "We should have implicitly learnt a moral generalization: but it would be one asserting *without qualification* the entailment of the moral characteristic by these other features of the case... If, then, it is true that we intuit moral characteristics as thus 'following from' others, it is false that the implied generalizations require the 'trifling amendment'; and if it is true that they require the amendment, it is false that we so intuit moral characteristics" (p. 256). With this criticism I entirely agree, since if it is asserted that the moral characteristic of an action or state of affairs follows from some specific empirically ascertainable qualities such as inflicting needless pain, then it should be the case that the generalization requires no amendment. Nevertheless, North could possibly avoid this criticism by altering his theory. In the first place, he must abandon the analogy between geometrical and ethical generalizations. In Geometry, when, for example, we prove that the three angles of a triangle are equal when the three sides are equal, then no matter what additional circumstances are introduced, the angles will still be equal in this particular triangle, or any triangle like it. Ethical generalizations, on the other hand, of the kind which North attempted to derive, may not hold when other circumstances are introduced. Thus, for example, although certain actions may be considered to be right in one society, they may not be so considered in another, due to the introduction of different circumstances. Intuition, it could then be claimed, rather than being analogous to Geometry, is somewhat more analogous to Hume's theory of the role of reason and sentiment in decisions of praise and censure.1 Hume says that, after all the circumstances are laid before us by reason, taste makes us feel from the whole a new sentiment of blame or approbation. In a similar way, the Intuitionist could assert that, after all the relevant empirical circumstances of an act or a state of affairs are known, we then intuit that it is, or is not, right, or good, respectively.

This theory, I admit, does appear to have serious defects. For example, it could be asked how we are to determine which circumstances are relevant and are to be taken into account, and which are not. To this, the Intuitionist could answer that there is no accurate method for determining which state of affairs will be good on the whole, or which act will be right on the whole. Hence, we can never know these things with absolute certainty. However, we shall be more likely to decide correctly on these is-

sues by taking such considerations into account than if we do not. Each situation or act may involve new circumstances, and all that we can do is to consider those which we believe to be relevant (including possible consequences of our actions), and then decide whether it is good or right on the basis of our investigations.

The other problem with this theory is a far more serious one to the Intuitionist, and it is one that I have already discussed. It is the difficulty that stems from the fact that ethical disagreements may survive factual disagreements, and, consequently, a criterion must be provided for distinguishing genuine from false intuitions. To this, the Intuitionist might say, first, that it is true that we do not, in fact, have any criterion, apart from intuition itself, to determine the truth or falsity of ethical judgments. Nevertheless, it is possible, as I said earlier, that our ethical disagreement has not survived factual agreement, for both parties might not be in agreement on the issue concerned, even though they think that they are. Therefore, if the factual disagreement were actually resolved, then ethical agreement would follow. (This of course, presupposes that all ethical disagreement is rooted in factual disagreement, and some would, I suppose, want to challenge this presupposition). Or, the Intuitionist might say that, if intuition is all that we have for solving ethical disagreements, then we should use it in the manner outlined even with its defects unless, as North says in one place, someone has something to offer in its place. It may be that our moral judgments — or at least some of them — will be false, but we have no other choice but to consider the circumstances of a state of affairs or an action to the best of our ability, and then derive an ethical judgment from them. Furthermore, the Intuitionist might argue that, assuming all ethical disagreements can be resolved through factual agreements, that we have no criterion to determine whether our intuitions are correct of not raises a very uninteresting problem. Since (a) we would all be deceived, and never know it; and (b) no remedy to this deception can be found. This situation would then be analogous to a remark Hume made in the conclusion to Book I of the *Treatise of Human Nature* where he says that "we have... no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all."2 Although for the Intuitionist, it would be a choice between a false intuition and none at all.

With this, I have completed all that I wish to say concerning West's criticisms of North's position. Several comments, however, need to be made on various parts of this paper. In the first place, it is evident that any arguments I have put forward in defense of Intuitionism in the light of West's attack are themselves subject to a more critical examination. And this I have not attempted to do, since it would take us far beyond the intended scope of this paper. Nevertheless, I have attempted to show that Intuitionism can at least attempt to stand up to criticism. Even in light of my defense of it, however, it can be asked whether the theory in itself is of any significant value, and to this I should answer that it depends largely on whether North's statement is true that "these feelings (i.e. moral feelings) are not identical with awareness"(p. 251). That is to say, if we have an idea of moral characteristics apart from our moral emotions, then a theory is necessary to account for their

derivation. Intuitionism is such an attempt. On the other hand, if our knowledge of moral characteristics derives solely from our own moral feelings, then of course, there is no need for Intuitionism, or for any other such theory. It is this problem, in my opinion, which requires an answer before one criticizes Intuitionism, for we may find after such an inquiry that there is no need for Intuitionism in Ethics at all.

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NOTES

[1] Page references to P. F. Strawson's article as reprinted in Sellars, W.and Hospers, J., (Ed.), *Reading in Ethical Theory*, Appleton- Century- Crofts, Inc., 1952.

КУЛЬТУРНОЕ ЕДИНСТВО И МНОГООБРАЗИЕ: ПОИСК ИСТОКОВ ЭТИЧЕСКИХ РАЗЛИЧИЙ

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На протяжении истории человечества одни культуры стремились воздействовать на другие в вопросах определения истины, добра и зла, норм нравственности. На протяжении всего развития истории философии предпринимались попытки разрешить вопрос об истоках нравственных несоответствий, с тем, чтобы требования морали обрели подлинную универсальность. Одной из теорий, существовавшей на протяжении веков и обретшей широкую известность после публикации труда Дж. Мура «Основы этики» (“*Principia Ethica*”), является «*этический интуитивизм*». В настоящей статье я обращаюсь к возможно более подробному анализу этой концепции, изложенной П. Ф. Стросоном в книге «Этический интуитивизм».

CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND MORAL INTERACTION: SOME HUMAN INSIGHTS

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In some ways Hume's ethical theory as propounded in *A Treatise of Human Nature* and in *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* might well be called moral psychology and moral anthropology. From looking at how humans are constructed and how because of that we construct our societies he provides us with an account which he hopes will be helpful to us as we think about how we should live and how we should develop our social relations. Indeed the very last sentence of the *Treatise* states his hope: "And thus the most abstract speculations concerning human nature, however cold and unentertaining, become subservient to *practical morality*; and may render this latter science more correct in its precepts, and more persuasive in its exhortations."[1]

Now, while I am not one to find Hume's "abstract speculations" to be either cold or unentertaining, I am surprised how often I do find them useful to the analysis of problems in contemporary practical morality. Today I want to show how this is so with respect to one contemporary moral problem, namely the difficulties that arise in increasingly ethnic mixed modern societies because of the different moral perspectives arising from different cultural backgrounds. I don't believe I need to detail examples here. Given the increasingly mixed societies that are coming about through globalization, in both Europe and North America, I am sure that all of us are aware of many. And while I don't propose that Hume can provide us with a panacea, I do think he can provide us with some useful insights.

What I propose to do is first to construct and then to don a pair of Humean moral spectacles, through which I shall look at some of our problems of culture clashes. My analysis will consist of four parts. First, I shall examine Hume's view of the relation of reason and sentiment in moral contexts. Next I shall add his analysis of sympathy to give his general picture of moral evaluation. I shall then look at his analysis of cultural differences, and, finally, I shall draw from Hume some hints for helping to resolve some of the problems of multi-cultural or multi-ethnic interaction.

Reason and Moral Judgement

A few years ago I presented a paper on Hume's legal theory.[2] After the session a colleague asked me how one could reconcile Hume's view of the origin of justice with his view of the limitations of reason. How, that is, can Hume say in Bk.III, part 1, that "Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judg'd of ...,"[3] but shortly thereafter, in Part II of Book III, say we adopt the rules of justice because "nature

provides a remedy in the judgement and understanding, for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections?"[4]

Hume has an answer, and one that, I believe, will also be helpful for the final section of this paper. Much of Hume's enterprise in the *Treatise* is to undermine rationalist ethics. "Nothing," he says, "is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, that to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and to assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates."[5] Reason is claimed to be eternal, invariable and of divine origin, but passion blind, "unconstant" and deceitful.

There are, I think, two things that Hume finds wrong with the rationalist claim. The first, which he argues more explicitly, is as follows. To say that reason and passion can be in conflict is in effect to commit a category mistake. Reason deals with truth and falsity. We reason about abstract ideas, as in mathematical reasoning, or about matters of fact, as in causal reasoning. But we act on the basis of sentiment, passion, emotion, etc. In Hume's words,

> 'Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry'd to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction.[6]

Without any desire to act there will be no action. Reason may well play a part. I desire to lose weight. Reason tells me that if I eat less I shall lose weight. Therefore, I decide to eat less. In Hume's words again: 'Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object: And these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience."[7]

Now, of course, my desire for short-term pleasure may cause me to overeat (as it often does), but this is because my long-term desire for a healthy life is in conflict with my short-term desire for another beer and some more chips. What is important here is to see that the longer-term cooler passion is one that has more potential involvement with reason. To add to my example of eating, I might have to do a lot of research to find out what I need to do to lose weight. As Hume says in *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*,

> ...in order to pave the way for such a sentiment, and to give a proper discernment of its object, it is often necessary, we find, that much reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated relations examined, and general fact fixed and ascertained. ... Here therefore *reason* instructs us in the several tendencies of actions, and *humanity* makes a distinction in favour of those which are useful and beneficial.[8]

So while it might appear that my desire for the next beer is opposed by my reason, in fact it is opposed by my long-term desire to lose weight, which is *informed* by my reason.

This, by the way, is precisely how Hume argues with respect to justice. The rules of justice reflect our self-interest in the long run (and that of our families and others with whom we are naturally most sympathetic), and our reason informs this general desire. By having legal rules instituting justice, and by coming to act habitually in accordance with them, we strengthen this behaviour pattern, and so are more able to overcome our other natural tendencies towards selfishness, limited generosity, and short-term gain. Hume's gentle forces of custom and habit, it should be noted, are part of how we determine that our long-term interest can withstand the temptations of our short-term desires. Parents know, for example, that allegiance to the principle of justice "will have greater force, when custom and education assist interest and reflexion...."[9]

Of course the detail of the arguments Hume used to get to this point has occasioned an incredible amount of philosophical debate, which makes my analysis undoubtedly very oversimplified. But it also illustrates what I believe to be Hume's second problem with rationalist moral thought. In an early letter, written when he was 23, Hume noted that every moral philosopher

> consulted his fancy in erecting schemes of virtue and happiness, without regarding human nature, upon which every moral conclusion must depend. This therefore I resolved to make my principal study, and the source from which I would derive every truth in Criticism ... as well as in Morality.[10]

Humans are creatures of both reason and sentiment. To emphasise only one part of our nature is to denigrate the complexities of the human, which Hume was not about to do. While Hume, at least the Hume of the *Treatise,* was perhaps over-determined to root out the errors of rationalism, he was also concerned not to ignore human complexity when trying to explain human psychology and human social interaction. And an important key to that, as Hume so well reminds us, is that our sentiments play a basic role in the development of our character and in our behaviour. And, at the same time, while ethical reasoning is instrumental reasoning, it would be wrong to say it is "merely" instrumental. For it too is crucial for our ongoing ability to live well with each other.

Sympathetic Human Interaction

Studying how it is that we come to live well together is of course a goal for Hume's ethical theorising, since, as Hume emphasised, we are by nature social animals. Of all the creatures of the universe, it is the human creature

> who has the most ardent desire of society, and is fitted for it by the most advantages. We can form no wish, which has not a reference to society. A per-

> fect solitude is, perhaps, the greatest punishment we can suffer. Every pleasure languishes when enjoy'd a-part from company, and every pain becomes more cruel and intolerable.[11]

Rather than being solitary creatures we are embedded in society. And it is this part of human nature that needs to be looked at in order to complete the sketch of Hume's moral theory needed before I can address our contemporary problem of culture clash. How, I ask, does one get from the basic individual tendency to seek pleasure and avoid pain to the internalization of moral principles? How, that is, does the moral point of view come to exist? The answer, of course, is to be found in Hume's doctrine of sympathy.

Hume introduces "sympathy" in the section "Of the love of fame" in his analysis of the passions. He observes, "No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own...".[12] He then goes on to note how humans "find it very difficult to follow their own reason or inclination, in opposition to that of their friends and daily companions," and how, "a cheerful countenance infuses a sensible complacency and serenity into my mind; as an angry or sorrowful one throws a sudden damp upon me." Hume takes this sympathetic interaction as a clear and undeniable fact of human nature, just as is our social nature: "All of this is an object of the plainest experience, and depends not on any hypothesis of philosophy."[13] All philosophy can do is provide a theoretical explanation.

Hume's explanation is basically pretty straightforward. Because humans are so alike both perceptually and emotionally, when we observe the sentiments or passions of others, the ideas we form of them are converted into our impressions. The feelings of others, that is, naturally evoke the same feelings in us. And of course, the more similarity we have those with whom we interact, the more sympathy we will discover.

> Accordingly we find, that where, beside the general resemblance of our natures, there is any peculiar similarity in our manners, or character, or country, or language, it facilitates the sympathy. The stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person.[14]

Now, how does sympathy go together with reason and sentiment to produce our moral views? The answer is as follows. Being creatures with certain desires and needs, we find that that which satisfies those desires brings us pleasure and provokes a positive attitude in us. So it is not surprising that Hume often reminds us that we are strongly influenced by motives of self-interest. But he recognises we are not only self-interested. The phenomenon of sympathy determines that we can also

feel pleasure at the pleasure of others, and pain at their pain. This "extensive sympathy" determines that while we are self-interested beings, we are also benevolent. We do care about others.

Accordingly, moral evaluations arise either from direct perception of benefit or from reflection upon the general benefits to be gained from accepting certain rules or principles. We ask whether a person's character benefits ourselves or society, and if does we deem him virtuous. We reflect that the principles of justice are the most practicable way of securing the possession of necessary goods in the long run, both for ourselves and for others, and so we approve their instantiation in society. The sentiments of moral good and evil, in Hume's words, "may arise either from the mere species or appearances of character and passions, or from reflexions on their tendency to the happiness of mankind, and of particular persons."[15] Our moral system, then, consists of a complex interaction of emotion and reason, of self-interest and benevolence, all founded upon a common human nature.

Cultural Differences

But, and here we get a step closer to my promised application of Hume, while Hume holds there is a common human nature, and a common basic moral sense, he does not at all insist that there will be identical moral views in every society. Indeed, as he notes in "Of Some Remarkable Customs," "irregular and extraordinary appearances are frequently discovered in the moral, as well as in the physical world."[16] He explains why in his essay "Of National Characters." There he notes that while particular individuals in states will certainly vary, there will still be national characters: "that each nation has a peculiar set of manners, and that some particular qualities are more frequently to be met with among one people than among their neighbours."[17] The argument for similarity within a state is that of sympathy: "The human mind is of a very imitative nature; nor is it possible for any set of men to converse often together, without acquiring a similitude of manners, and communicating to each other their vices as well as virtues."[18]

Cultural characters, however, will vary from nation to nation because of their different histories and conditions: "the nature of the government, the revolutions of public affairs, the plenty or penury in which the people live, the situation of the nation with regard to its neighbours, and such like circumstances."[19] Moreover,

> though nature produces all kinds of temper and understanding in great abundance, it does not follow, that she always produces them in like proportions, and that in every society the ingredients of industry and indolence, valour and cowardice, humanity and brutality, wisdom and folly, will be mixed after the same manner.[20]

There are thus many contingent circumstances that will produce significant cultural differences from one place to another.

However, it is important to see that in recognising cultural differences Hume is neither contradicting nor abandoning his claim of common human nature, or of common ethical underpinnings. In discussing the way in which laws differ from place to place in the *2nd Enquiry*, Hume draws a useful analogy between humans and birds.

> All birds of the same species in every age and country built their nests alike: In this we see the force of instinct. Men, in different times and places, frame their houses differently: Here we perceive the influence of reason and custom.[21]

However, the houses will not be completely different for "all houses have a roof and walls, windows and chimneys; though diversified in their shape, figure, and materials." This degree of similarity arises, of course, because the purpose of building houses remains the same across societies, *i.e.*, to provide us with a place to eat, sleep and attend to our domestic duties while being sheltered from the elements. Accordingly, while there are differences in housing design and structure because of contingent differences, at the level of purpose there remains an identity across cultures.

Hume believed the same analysis could be made for the cultural differences, which he has pointed out to us. In "A Dialogue," which Hume placed at the end of the *Enquiries*, he finds great differences in the moral views of the contemporary French and classical Athenians. But, he argues, if one looks at the first principles of morality both would claim to have one will find them to be the same. They share, for example, a general evaluation of what is meritorious; *e. g.*, "good sense, knowledge, wit, eloquence, humanity, fidelity, truth, justice, courage, temperance, constancy, dignity of mind."[22] The basic principles of virtually all human moral schemes are the same, Hume argues. What are different are the social histories, the contingent circumstances of society, which have produced cultural differences. He sums up the argument in "A Dialogue" as follows.

> Though many ages have elapsed since the fall of Greece and Rome; though many changes have arrived in religion, language, laws, and customs; none of these revolutions has ever produced any considerable innovation in the primary sentiments of morals ... It appears, that there never was any quality recommended by any one, as a virtue or moral excellence, but on account of its being *useful*, or *agreeable* to a man *himself*, or to *others*. ... All the differences, therefore, in morals, may be reduced to this one general foundation, and may be accounted for by the different view, which people take of these circumstances.[23]

Resolving Cultural Clashes

At this point I have constructed the Humean spectacles, and I now wish to see if wearing them can help to analyse at least some ethical problems of cultural and ethnic difference. They help to draw three useful prescriptions, one from each of the

sections I have developed. Let me start with the last section. Consider the following case, which I encountered when working with a hospital ethics committee. An elderly Japanese woman was diagnosed with terminal cancer. Her granddaughter, who was the primary care provider, begged the care team not to tell the grandmother the diagnosis. They felt they must, since the doctrine of informed consent has been enshrined in Canadian medical practice. That doctrine is based upon the principle of autonomy, which allows people to make decisions about how they are to lead their lives. In the case of medical care, if we are to respect people's autonomy, then we need to allow them to make decisions about their care, and they cannot make those decisions without knowing their diagnosis.

The daughter argued that her grandmother was a traditional Japanese person, and that terminal illness is not discussed in Japanese culture. Japanese patients normally would expect to be buffeted from the tensions surrounding dying. Given these facts, the care team should realize that the grandmother genuinely would not want them to tell her of her terminal illness. Just as the principle of autonomy gives patients the right to know it also gives them the right to choose not to know. So in this case the grandmother's autonomy would be best preserved by not telling her. The team was persuaded, and the diagnosis was never directly discussed with the grandmother.

The point here is that what appeared to be a moral disagreement based upon cultural differences was not really a clash of basic moral principle. When one stepped back and looked at the principle the moral disagreement was resolvable. In "A Dialogue" Hume may or may not have been right that all morals have the same basis. But he is surely right that different social and cultural histories can give different outcomes to the same moral principle. Hume gives us a very useful dictum: when encountering apparent moral difference at a particular level, see whether there is agreement at a more general level, and then see if that allows resolution of the apparent disagreement.

Of course, in order to resolve apparent disagreement it is necessary to be able to discuss that disagreement. And when individuals before us are seen as totally alien, because of their different appearance, behaviour, social customs, etc., it becomes very difficult to have any kind of meaningful dialogue. When a society encounters this sort of problem, it would be wise to think again of Hume's doctrine of sympathy. I earlier quoted Hume wherein he pointed out that similarity, of manners, character, country or language, as he put it, "facilitates the sympathy." The corollary, of course, is that where there is less resemblance there is less facilitation of sympathy. But it is the presence of sympathy that allows us to "enter so deep into the opinions and affections of others, whenever we discover them."[24] Accordingly, the question is "How can we facilitate a greater sympathy among people of different cultures?"

The answer is the same one that he gives as to why peoples develop national characters; they do so by interacting with each other. When people have frequent intercourse, when we regularly interact, it "makes us enter deeply into each other's

sentiments, and causes like passions and inclinations to run, as it were, by contagion, through the whole club or knot of companions."[25] In terms of cultural understanding, Hume's dictum would be "Familiarity breeds sympathy."

While Canada is hardly a perfect example of cultural accord, it is the world's most successful country in terms of multi-ethnic harmony. It has managed this over the last four decades by consciously setting up mechanisms that encourage intercultural interaction. Rather than being told about others or just being urged to be tolerant, we actually come to know *the* other. We have had national programs setting up cultural centres and cultural events, wherein different cultural backgrounds were celebrated, and to which other cultural groups were invited. We have helped businesses set up in ethnic neighbourhoods to attract people into them. We have set up innumerable programs to help immigrants and refugees get on their feet, and have provided programs to support people of different backgrounds to be involved in the process. The result is that to a large extent what might have been strange has become familiar. Greater sympathy has become possible, and the underlying similarities are seen as more important than the surface differences. Familiarity breeds sympathy, which in turn breeds the possibility of greater harmony.

The rational dialogue that sympathetic interaction can allow does not always allow reconciliation through finding different ways of instantiating the same basic principles. Sometimes, cultural behaviours that have a point in one society will be completely counter-productive in another. Let me take an extreme example, but one with which we have had to struggle. In many sub-Saharan groups there has grown a tradition of circumcising pre-pubescent females or, as it tends to be called in Canada, female genital mutilation. In Canada these operations are seen, quite simply, as an ongoing and unnecessary repression of women. The girls who have them are denied the very possibility of sexual satisfaction. In the traditional cultural setting, where there are very limited resources, and the girls might need to "fit in" with a cultural tradition in order to live at all, there might well be some utility in allowing the operation. But in Canada there is no such utility. The cultural practice has significant negative value, so is not acceptable. Sometimes erroneous conclusions need to be, as Hume says, "corrected by sounder reasoning and larger experience."[26]

Cultural practices that are at odds with basic moral principles need to be changed. Those that differ from ours, but are not at odds with basic principles, need to be tolerated. Reasoning, sometimes very complex reasoning, to be sure, can often tell us which is which. But though reasoning can often show a sound basis for changing cultural practices, it is often not sufficient to bring about change. Hume has reminded us forcefully of the deep role played by our passions, and how engrained our habits, including our moral habits can become. Indeed, this is just the flip side of how it is that we make the practice of justice a successful one in society. And that leads me to my last Humean maxim: *Reason can discover, but not often implement appropriate social change.*

The result is that in situations wherein rational persuasion and dialogue are not sufficient it becomes necessary to use legal coercion. This is not necessarily a failure.

As Hume has shown so well, laws are a necessary condition of assuring the rules of justice in any complex society. Of course we must be very careful; we must be sure that our analysis is sufficient. The imposition of legal penalties on a person most certainly does have negative utility for that person. And we of course should not thereupon abandon discourse and interaction with the affected cultural group. Having them interact with other cultural groupings that do not have their disallowed practice may well operate on both their intellect and passions to help facilitate the disappearance of this particular cultural artefact from their community. The law is a tool that needs to be supplemented with reason and experience.

Let me conclude simply by noting that the study of Hume's ethics does demonstrate clearly how complex morality is, but it also gives us some excellent tools for analyzing that complexity. When we don our Humean ethical spectacles we do not see the ecosystem of our contemporary ethical problems as a less complex one. But we do see it more clearly. And because of that we can do a better job of clearing some paths.

NOTES

[1] Hume, David, A treatise of Human Nature, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised by Ph. Nidditch, Oxford University Press, 1978. P. 621.

[2] Bassford, H.A., Hume's Legal Theory, in: Studies in Early Modern Philosophy (Summer, 1997).

[3] Treatise, p. 470.

[4] Treatise, p.489.

[5] Treatise, p.413.

[6] Treatise, p. 414

[7] Treatise, p. 414.

[8] Hume, David, Enquiries Concernng the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, L. A. Selby-Bigge. Ed., Oxford University Press, 1961. P.173.

[9] Treatise, p. 500.

[10] The Letters of David Hume, ed. J.Y.T. Greig, 2 vols., Oxford, 1932. I, p. 16. Quoted by T. E. Jessup, "Some Misunderstandings of Hume," Revue Internationale de Philosphie, No. 20 (1952); reprinted in Chappell, V. C., ed., Hume: A Collection of Critical Essays, Anchor Books, New York, 1956. Pp. 39–40.

[11] Treatise, p.363.

[12] Treatise, pp. 316–317.

[13] Treatise, pp.319–320.

[14] Treatise, p.318.

15 Treatise, p.589.

[16] "Of some Remarkable Customs," in David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, Eugene F. Miller, ed., Liberty Fund, Inc., Indianapolis, 1987. P. 366.

[17] "Of National Characters," in David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, p. 197. Today this essay has become infamous, primarily because of Hume's stated suspicion that blacks are naturally inferior to whites. If he had lived in the present he would have readily found examples black successes in manufacturing, arts and sciences (which he proposes as a test), and would not have made his erroneous inductive inference. Regardless, and not surprisingly, many of his references to national character betray prejudices of Hume's times.

[18] "Of National Characters," p. 202.
[19] "Of National Characters," p. 198.
[20] "Of National Characters," p. 203.
[21] Enquiries, p. 202.
[22] "A Dialogue," Enquiries, p. 334.
[23] "A Dialogue," p. 336.
[24] Treatise, p. 319.
[25] "Of National Characters," p. 202.
[26] "A Dialogue," p.336.

КУЛЬТУРНЫЕ РАЗЛИЧИЯ И НРАВСТВЕННОЕ ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВИЕ: НЕКОТОРЫЕ ИДЕИ

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В данной статье утверждается, что в нравственной философии Д. Юма — несмотря на то, что она разработана еще в XVIII веке — есть ценные идеи для решения современных этических проблем, таких как разница в нравственных точках зрения, проявляющаяся при общении разных народов. В статье представлен анализ воззрений Д. Юма на соотношение разума и чувства, его учения о симпатии и анализ культурных различий. С опорой на этот анализ показано, как ряд проблем мультикультурного общества может быть решен благодаря изучению взглядов Д. Юма.

RELIGION AND THE GLOBAL QUEST FOR JUSTICE AND MORALITY: REFLECTIONS AND THESES

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This short paper originated in handouts for a team-taught, interdisciplinary course "The Quest for Global Justice" at Pacific Lutheran University. Course readings have incorporated philosophical, history-of-religions, and social-scientific perspectives that tak Конгресce religion seriously in non-reductionistic ways as a contributor to justice. The original materials are only slightly edited for this conference presentation. Part I considers Religion and the Quest for Justice and Morality; Part II offers Modest Concluding Theses about the quest for global justice. A brief bibliographic listing at the end indicates sources of allusions or basic ideas.

Part I: Religion and the Quest for Justice and Morality (Handout from 1999)

Religion, since it contributes for good or ill to basic orientations within the life-world, is deeply bound up with questions of justice and morality. In a time when the significance of religion may seem questionable in relation to important worldly institutions because of metaphysical doubts or religion's illiberal or plural forms, it is important to review this worldly relationship carefully. Religion's contribution may seem rather ambivalent. For example, while religious fundamentalism has had a deep political and economic impact across the globe (ironically) in both furthering and resisting the global markets of the West, religious humanism has also been directly involved in justice quests through the U. S. Civil Rights movement or Latin American liberation theologies.

A functional definition of religion stands ready to aid this discussion: Religion is "a set of symbolic forms and acts that relate humankind to the ultimate conditions of existence."[2] This definition leaves aside for the moment whether or how religion is "true" in order to be clear about its role in human affairs. If some form of traditional religion is missing in life, it is nonetheless replaced by something that plays a similar role — a life-philosophy or "mythology" that symbolizes for individuals and groups where they ultimately stand.

However symbols of the ultimate (or: ultimate symbols) arise, it would often seem that they are experienced as "given" (in tradition or revelation). They condition human understandings of identity and purpose, which are the basic wellsprings of morality and justice. Morality relates to the *mores* (Latin) of a people, its customary actions, which are rooted in basic <u>ideas about right and wrong</u>; justice depends upon such notions in assessing <u>what is owed</u> to individuals and groups. Western re-

ligions have derived morality and justice from a divine realm that is felt to be "more real" than that plane upon which humans are operative. Both the Hebrew Scriptures and the Quran refer human obligations to the standard of God's will. Injustice or immorality arise with the violation of that will. The sacred text is frequently considered as a literal blueprint for ideal morality and justice.

Recognition of both the symbolic nature of religion (including its sacred traditions and scriptures) and its "final" importance in consideration of the goals of moral systems and just actions will open up powerful critical perspectives upon the role of religion and allow discernment of its healthiest functions in human affairs.

Religion, i. e. a complex of ultimate symbols, conditions the religious actor. Scripture and tradition have been important preoccupations within Western Christianity, that religious tradition which reverberates most loudly in the writer's experience. Lutheran ministry not surprisingly is focused around "word and sacrament" (symbolic form and act). These ultimate symbols nurture faith. This will be a key term in the remainder of this discussion.

Faith receives definition in the Christian scriptures as the "hypostasis of things hoped for."[3] It supports and sustains actions taken in hope. This writer therefore furthers the definition as

> An interpretation of (human) being in relation to ultimate reality that is symbolically grounded and life-creating, life-redeeming, and life-sustaining.

This definition incorporates the insights of Bellah about religion's functions as well as central emphases of the classic Christian creeds (three articles: creation, redemption, and sanctification). Such an understanding of faith means that moral or justice actions are undertaken with life-enhancing goals in mind. Morality and justice, though, as the twentieth century's sad record attests, can be distorted through other mythologies and lead to the morality and justice of the gas chambers. (One of the most dangerous aspects of Naziism was its religious configuration.) Somehow, a critical understanding needs to be able to distinguish the basic directions of these terms. Asking after the final ends of moral or justice actions, then, is an essential task. At what do such activities aim?

In our times, such questions remain moot in face of important sociological facts. Individual self-interest is probably a more defining motive in our individualistic times. Individual moralities tend to cancel each other out. There is very little direction in common. All that one can find are associations for limited political ends. Or, justice is whatever an individual can establish (consider recent examples of "road rage"). Even religion is "an individual option."

There are "reform" movements and groups that arise to challenge individualism. These attempt to establish a "common belief or truth" in the face of individual decisions. Here a vital distinction needs to be perceived. For the truth quotient of

beliefs—whether of sectarian religious groups or political parties—needs careful assessment. Do such beliefs contribute to the larger life-enhancing purposes attended to in "faith"? In philosophical tradition, truth has been defined as mere consistency. Beliefs of groups can be thought to be true when simply consistent (never mind that such beliefs do not square with those of other groups); when they are of such quality, they become ideological. Indeed, ideology can afflict both individuals ("my opinion's as good as anybody else's") and groups. One can easily see here, since ultimate symbols condition beliefs about morality and justice, that ideology can distort the quest for morality and justice.

The mainline traditions of organized or ecumenical Christianity offer other options. These in various ways stay in touch with older traditions and larger currents of culture in the interest of creative inspiration. (The analogy of artist or composer comes to mind.) Mainline or ecumenical Christianity appreciates, for example, that philosophy has also recognized truth as correspondence-to-reality. This is the more important criterion of truth, and one that must be embraced by religions representing "faith" as defined previously. For only when beliefs are tested against the beliefs and experiences of others that often do not neatly correspond does a real commitment to truth emerge. Faith as the guarantor of religion's healthy role sponsors an open quest. With such commitments, religious denominations like the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America can sponsor genuine universities that offer classes like this one. The quest for global justice and morality is only as good as the attempt to bring these core conceptions into accord with reality—even ultimate reality.

Thus informed decisions about what we believe in these matters, and how religion is configured in our lives, are of inestimable significance to the quest for justice and morality.

Part II: The Quest for Global Justice: Modest Concluding Theses (Handout from 2001)

Justice defined

Justice traditionally has been understood as giving persons their due—either in terms of rewards or punishments. For Aristotle and most of Western thought, individual justice stands within prior social relations; both Aristotle and modern CEOs legitimated justice under conditions of social inequality. Biblical justice attempted to overcome inequality (Israelite prophets). Certain world religious traditions have attempted to transcend ordinary justice based on an irreducible individual worth perceived in light of divine love (Bergson connects such developments to dynamic religion and varieties of mysticism). Such historical developments lie behind modern individualist notions of and struggles for justice. What direction should the quest take for the future? The following theses may stimulate further thought or conversation.

— Now the order which prevails in human society is wholly incorporeal in nature. Its foundation is truth, and it must be brought into effect by justice. It needs to be animated and perfected by men's love for one another, and, while preserving freedom intact, it must take for an equilibrium in society which is increasingly more human in character. (Pope John XXIII).

Theses about global justice in the twenty-first century

Justice is best served by holistic and human politics

— global injustice has taken a number of specific forms over the past five hundred years, particularly a politics of narrow economic interest (e. g., Bellah's two primal crimes)
— special-interest or single-interest politics are bound by "gravitational forces" of closed morality (Bergson, Hunter)
— political action must be energized by human vision (Bergson; Bellah on positive freedom; Nussbaum's capabilities) and tempered by wise and prudent judgment (Bellah)

–Science tells us how to heal and how to kill; it reduces the death rate in retail and then kills us wholesale in war; but only wisdom — desire coŋrdinated in the light of all experience–can tell us when to heal and when to kill. (Will Durant)

Justice is best served by an ecological economics

— the global market (created by Western capitalism) and the internet (created by the Department of Defense) have made the globe smaller and internationalism more perceptible, but have not resolved problems perceived in earlier forms of internationalism (Ancient Near East, Roman Empire, New World)
— the major economic entities in the global economy are international corporations, but these will not be a source of international stability
— the problem of regulating corrosive economic development (slash-and-burn capitalism, industrial mining, etc.) in favor of some organic economics of sufficiency and ecological balance must be solved
— an economics destructive of humane community is no more desirable than an economics that destoys the natural environment
— an economics of cooperative interdependence (enlightened self-interest) is to be preferred over an economics of competitive independence (narrow self-interest)

–It is the nature of privileged position that it develops its own political justification and often the economic and social doctrine that serves it best. (John Kenneth Galbraith)

Justice is best served by an education that encourages self-knowledge, recognizes cultural traditions as the basis of human value, develops social capacities and habits of critical reflection and persuasion, and investigates the profound relations between thought and social action

— central values in higher education are expressed in the following intellectual pursuits: creating conditions for intelligent and critical communication, knowing and understanding where we've come from, developing capacities of respect and openness toward diverse traditions and peoples, recognizing irreducible differences, assessing critically human values posited in cultural traditions
— profound human values produce and guide action for social justice
— how do we stay in the justice-quest for the long-haul? the need to distinguish short-term "causes" from long-term, sustainable commitments
— cultural "faults" rooted in incommensurate or conflicting values (analogous to computer system faults) need to be recognized, discussed, reconciled, or transcended—e. g., negative freedom without cultural formation or responsibility (Bellah), conflicts within the liberal tradition (Hunter), helpfulness of comparative cultural perspectives (Nussbaum)

— *The most profound decisions about justice are not made by individuals as such, but by individuals thinking within and on behalf of institutions. (Mary Douglas)*

Justice is best served by worldviews or conceptions of ultimate reality mediated through symbolic realism (ultimate symbols mediate important, though indirect, information about what is ultimately true and good)

— the representation of reality has enormous implications for notions of justice or actions a/effecting justice
— "symbolic realism" (Bellah) identifies the necessary metaphorical mediation of ultimate reality (consider the role of metaphor in Bergson's philosophy or Stone's literary art)—terms like "God," "ultimate reality," "the Good," "ultimate meaning" attempt to communicate realities not directly accessible
— in a post-Kantian world, wherein metaphysics has fallen under severe critique, "ultimate reality" is most often discussed as moral assumptions
— religion (Lat.: *re*=back, *ligio*= bind or link; expressed in certain peculiar symbolic forms and acts) links individuals to ultimate reality through specific communities and traditions, provides grounding
— symbolisms of ultimate reality need critical evaluation; those historic religions that refuse to absolutize the results of myth-making (Bergson) or have a concern about idolatrous religion used to support injustice (Israelite prophets, Jesus) are more helpful in the quest for global justice since religion historically has been used to perpetuate injustice

— When I speak of love, I am speaking of that force which all the great religions have seen as the supreme unifying principle of life. Love is the key that unlocks the door which leads to ultimate reality. (Martin Luther King, Jr.)

Part III: Resource List (including sources of quotations)

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King, Jr., Martin Luther, *Strength to Love*, New York: Harper & Row, 1963.

Nussbaum, Martha, *Sex and Social Justice*, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Stone, Robert, *A Flag for Sunrise*, New York: Vintage Books, 1992.

NOTES

[1] The syllabus is still viewable on line at: http://www.plu.edu/~jensenmk/326-02.html. Course has been co-taught with Professor Mark K. Jensen four times in the International Core sequence at Pacific Lutheran University (1999–2002).

[2] Bellah, Robert N., Religious Evolution, in: *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World*, New York: Harper & Row, 1979. P. 21, adapted.

[3] Hebrews 11:1; the Greek word *hypostasis* literally means "standing under" or "supporting," though it is usually translated here "assurance."

РЕЛИГИЯ И ГЛОБАЛЬНЫЙ ПОИСК СПРАВЕДЛИВОСТИ И НРАВСТВЕННОСТИ: РАЗМЫШЛЕНИЯ И ТЕЗИСЫ

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Эта краткая статья подготовлена на основе коллективного авторского междисциплинарного курса «Поиск глобальной справедливости», прочитанного в Тихоокеанском лютеранском университете. Курс предполагал нередукционистское рассмотрение религии как явления, способствующего становлению справедливости с философской, религиоведческой и социологической точек зрения.

Первая часть может быть озаглавлена «Религия и поиск справедливости и нравственности», во второй части содержатся краткие выводы исследования поисков глобальной справедливости. В кратком библиографическом перечне перечислены источники, с опорой на которые создавалась статья.

RELIGION AND RITUAL

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When the relationship between religion and ritual is considered, a series of questions, problems and difficulties arise: Can religion be discussed without explicitly or implicitly saying something about the existence of God? Can God even be spoken of in scientific discourse? Is God not the other through whom we speak but who cannot be made the object of speech? Is God not beyond reason, language, imagination, and therefore inconceivable (Derrida / Vattimo 2001)? If the defining religious experience is not available to thinking but only to faith, what can be said about God, religion or faith in the context of a scientific discourse, without missing precisely the specificity of religious experience: the discovery of the limits of the *conditio humana* through a faith in God (Wulf 1997)? While maintaining an awareness of this aspect of God available only to faith, other areas of religion appropriate to scientific analysis can be identified (Luhmann 2000). The relation between religion and ritual constitutes a frontier zone partially available to scientific discourse and partially removed from it. Ever since its origins, the study of religion has been concerned with the connection between religion and ritual (Michaels / Pezzoli — Olgiati / Stolz 2001). There has been controversial debate as to what degree the staging of rituals produces religious experience and belief, and how much it is the belief that leads to the creation and performance of certain rituals. But the alternatives set up by these two positions fall short; rather it should be assumed that the performance of rituals produces religious experience, while at the same time these rituals express and represent the religious experiences underlying them. The relationship between religion and ritual varies according to culture and historical epoch. This is true for the various European cultures and even more so for non-European cultures.

The following sketches the development of the relationship between religion and ritual in the German cultural sphere since the Middle Ages. The historical changes in the relationship between religion and ritual will be identified. The starting point of this examination is the assumption that the present-day loss in religious meaning goes hand in hand with changes in the staging and performance of rituals and ritual structures, although the relationship between religion and ritual cannot be fully explained causally or functionally. The loss of religious meaning is most apparent in the changes in religious institutions: in empty churches, in numerous secessions from the Church and in difficulties recruiting pastors and priests. Less affected is the political influence of the Church. But it is doubtful that the loss of meaning in ecclesiastical-religious life leads to a fading of religious questions and to the disappearance of religiosity in individuals. Max Weber argued that while the thesis of the

demystification of the world as a result of the development of modern rationality was, on one hand, correct, it needed to be supplemented by an opposing thesis and corresponding research, in which new forms of mystification of the world and the meaning of the holy for contemporary life were examined (Kemper/Wulf 1997). In the same way there is a need for a study of the new religious phenomena spreading outside the realms of Christianity and the Church, and which in some sense are coming to replace phenomena once exclusively anchored in Christianity and in the Christian Church.

For a long time in Europe it was Christianity and the Christian Church who had the monopoly on providing answers to the big questions about the beginning and the end of the world and of man, as well as about the forms and norms of human life. Thus the origin of the world and of man lay in God. Christianity also had an answer for what happened to man after death. If a godly life was lived then "eternal" life was the reward. Religion and the Church promised salvation from suffering, pain and transience. They offered an explanation of the cosmic order and gave man a place in it. In the hereafter, they promised, was an overcoming of death and a compensation for the injustices suffered in this life. Christianity and the Church occupied the human imagination, not only with laws and prohibitions, but also with stories about good and evil, with images of a successful life, of hell and paradise, of salvation and happiness. For the people of Europe, Christianity was the great producer of meaning, security and a fulfilled life. For this it had developed many rites, stories and forms of expression. The performance of ceremonies at church and in the home brought about a living practice formed by Christian values, norms and models, in whose context people knew what to do, say and believe.

The rituals of the primarily oral culture of the Middle Ages played an important role in the production of this body of practical religious knowledge embodied in Christianity (Muir 1997). In them the great events of Christianity are staged, performed and thereby made visible. But these are not merely brought to people's attention as additions to religious texts, songs and prayers, but have to be participated in as viewers or as actors. In this way central religious events not only become perceivable but performative. Through the continual repetition of these real and imaginary religious actions, they inscribe themselves through a mimetic process into the imagination and the bodies of the participants, educating and shaping them. A practical body of Christian knowledge is produced, permeating all aspects of life and shaping its everyday actions and behavior. Because of the central role Christianity plays in all aspects of life, Christian rituals also structure the daily, weekly, monthly and yearly routines of everyday life. These religio-ritual acts do not have to be legitimated. They are simply there and "convince" with their apparent naturalness. Unquestioned, they create order, community and meaning. The presence, visibility and performativity of Christian rituals standardize daily life and lead to a *compulsion of the ritual*. A life deviating from them is impossible; the consequence would be exclusion and persecution. The history of heretics, the Cathars for instance, Inquisition, the *Malleus*

Maleficarum or confession testimonials make this evident. Deviationists become scapegoats; the violence inherent in the religion and in society is projected onto them. One becomes a scapegoat and a victim of violence by not participating in the rituals producing, confirming and perpetuating the Christian community. Through his nonparticipation in the performative execution of Christian rituals and ritualizations, it becomes evident that someone doesn't belong; he consequently loses the protection of the community, which draws itself even more closely together against the outsider. In societies in which religion and the Church play a central role in the processes of the cultural interpretation of meaning, the relevant rituals create a high degree of visibility and performativity.

The relationship between religion and ritual changed fundamentally with the Reformation. This happened as a result of the transition from a more collectively organized faith to one centered in the individual. The way to God no longer passes through church, tradition, and the mediation of the priest, but rather includes the individual reading and interpretation of the Bible and, with their help, the thematization, observation and exploration of the self. Insight into human guilt and incompleteness, as connected with original sin, is the goal; only on this basis does faith arise, and only through faith, *sola fide*, is salvation possible. With this new emphasis in Protestantism, the individual and his path to God move into the center of religion. "Luther not only destroyed the *cordon sanitaire* the Church had instituted between the believer and God, but also dissolved the system of orientation that had been valid up until then: Where the Church once observed and advised her believers, the individual must now observe himself and seek advice from 'his' God" (Soeffner 1995, p. 45). With this inward orientation it becomes important for the Protestant Christian to see not only the works and products of mankind, but also and especially the motives and convictions undergirding them. Not human deeds, but rather their background becomes important. God sees and judges not only actions, but also the convictions underlying them.

With this turn to the individual and his inner life in Protestant Christianity the relationship between religion and ritual also undergoes a change. Many traditional, collective rituals do continue to produce and maintain the faith. The rituals associated with the great Christian holy days carry on being performed. The staging and production of baptism and communion rituals also continue to produce their community building effects. But at the same time, new ritual forms come to articulate and manifest a faith in God. Rituals more heavily centered on the individual develop. These rituals use writing—in diaries, confessions, letters, etc.—thereby producing a new kind of relationship to the self and to God as well as a new form of education. The *rituals of literacy* developed in close connection to Protestantism contributed significantly to the development of modern rationality, historical consciousness and to the emergence of goal-oriented and systematic action. They have become the new techniques of education. These inward-oriented processes of self-formation increasingly acquire greater significance; accordingly the ritual techniques are also inward-

oriented and create new forms of relating to the self and to God. So for instance the ritual writing in a diary centered on experiences with God is an individual activity, but in pietism, for example, is shared with many others. Although the ritual act of writing in a religious diary is carried out by an individual, it, at the same time, produces a ritual community of those who give an account of their religious experiences in such a ritual. An imaginary community comes into existence, in which everyone knows himself to be connected with everyone else. This community is not tied to an immediate bodily presence, but rather abstracts itself into an *imaginary community*, produced by the collective aim and activity of isolated individuals. These forms of imaginary, collective experience of isolated individuals usher in new subject-centered models of education and behavior, which have increasingly gained in significance since the Reformation. They share a biographical orientation as well as a high degree of self-observation and reflexivity. The search for God and the search for self come together in indissoluble form in these rituals. This search is all the more tortuous in that it cannot reach its goal. Man cannot be sure of God; it is God who accepts man; grace and salvation come from God and cannot be won by human deeds, which are only relevant in this world. The search for self-knowledge and self-formation takes on an intermediary position between the two.

The example of the religion concept in the letters of Pastor von Goethe in the year 1772 shows that the *Enlightenment* brought about a transfer of religious themes to the modern conception of the individual. This transformation is already contained in the Protestant teaching of the two kingdoms, according to which it is man's responsibility to structure his life according to his capacities. Although his faith allows him to enter into the kingdom of God in this world, salvation can only be won through the grace of God in the beyond. The energies directed at self-discovery in connection with Luther's question "How can I get a gracious God," and the new competencies developed in this process contribute to the emergence of the differentiated modern individual. For Goethe,

> the union with the divine therefore no longer takes place through the soul freed from the body, but rather "through the soul as directed by the body...The divine (is) always grasped with the help of the senses and through sensory signs...In place of the conditioning factors of 'earthly suffering,' 'the world' and 'the flesh,' which alienated the soul from its creator and thereby necessarily from itself, society now steps...Salvation in the beyond, the goal of all striving as predetermined by the religious tradition, is reinterpreted as the realization of the individual nature in this world. Individuality thus continues to be construed as a deviation from general rules and demands. But the value system has been reversed. The general rules and demands have lost their connection with the divine and are henceforth characteristic of the social, *per se* considered to be alienated from the truth. The individual constitutes itself as deviating from it, as divine (Willems/Willems 1999, p. 337ff).

This development has far reaching consequences. It leads to a differentiation of the social and to a sacralization of the individual. At least in Protestantism the focus of religious practice is transferred from the church community to the individual. The *perfecting* of the individual comes to be the program of the Enlightenment. The development and constitution of the self, as well as its education and formation come to be the central tasks of the individual. With the focus of the educational process on the individual, the concept of *incorrigibility* as it is repeatedly emphasized by Christianity retreats into the background. The *perfecting of the incorrigible* comes to be the goal of education and personal formation (Wulf, 2001; Kamper/Wulf, 1994). Whatever stands in its way has to be overcome. The rituals and ritualizations of education and personal formation take over the central position of religious rituals. Human salvation is no longer God's affair but rather the task of education, whose role it is to perfect the individual. Accordingly the rituals and ritualizations in this area becomes especially important. The introduction and realization of *universal, compulsory school attendance* is a crucial step here. As a ritual organization, the educational institution works to effect the worldly improvement of mankind. The focusing of cultivation and education in the earthly kingdom is effected by the state's takeover of school supervision. While religion increasingly becomes the affair of the individual, relegated to the private sphere, school and education in turn become a public matter, finding their expression and representation in rituals and ritualizations (Wulf et. al. 2001).

This transformation is carried out in Wilhelm von Humboldt's *theory of education*. If at first it was a matter of limiting the influence of the Church, now the limits of the power of the state in the educating of the individual are thematized. The determining of the individual from the outside, allowing him only minimal possibilities to determine himself, infringe upon the *indeterminate educatibility* of every individual, each of whom carries the responsibility for his own creative development. The purpose of human life is seen as the "*highest proportioned formation of one's strengths into a whole*." "*Freedom* is the first and indispensable requirement for this education. But apart from freedom the development of human strengths requires something else, closely related to freedom, namely a *diversity* of situations. Even the freest and most independent person achieves only a low level of maturity when placed in monotonous conditions." (Humboldt 1960, vol. I, p. 64). "Highest formation" does not mean high, universally binding educational norms, which the individual must come to embody. Nor does "proportioned formation" mean universally binding proportions of educational content. Rather the individual must be granted the freedom to determine his educational processes himself, and the diversity and variety of these processes must be promoted. For this the internal nature of man requires an exterior. Human thought and action can only develop as it acts on a "not-human", i. e. on the *world*. Only through work on an exterior can the restlessness given by energetic human nature find peace and an "internal improvement and refinement." Education means "the conjoining of our selves with the world into the most general, lively and free interaction" (Humboldt 1960, p. 235).

A connection with God has come to be replaced by the task of conjoining the self with the world in a free and lively interaction. If it was once the "*imitatio Christi,*" it is now the *mimetic appropriation of the world* and the mimetic relationship to the self, *self-mimesis*, which play a central role in the constitution of educational processes. With the help of mimetic processes an expansion of the individual into the outside world and an increasing conformity to the world takes place (Gebauer / Wulf 1992, 1998). This conformity to worlds outside of the individual leads to the development of the outward oriented energies characteristic of human life. In Humboldt's understanding the structuring of the outside is at the same time a structuring of the inside. Insofar as education aims not at power but at the formation of the strengths of the individual in an encounter with the outside world, it is mimetic. In an increasing conformity to outside worlds, mimetic processes lead to the appropriation of the foreign. This causes the outside world to become the inner world. The outside world is transferred onto images, which are incorporated into the inner image world of the individual. It is through this mimetic conjoining that the individual opens up the world for himself or herself and, at the same time, is opened by the world. These educational processes, centered on the individual in this world, are open-ended in principle. A further step toward the self-empowerment of the individual, a belief in oneself and one's potential, lies in what Humboldt already recognized as the necessity of *self-mimesis*. Without mimetic processes directed at oneself, self-formation and self-reflection of the individual are not possible. Only with the help of self-mimesis is a "higher perfection" of the self possible (Wulf 2001).

A differentiation of societal sectors, institutions and organizations goes hand in hand with a turn to the earthly realm and to the individual. Religion and rituals undergo a transformation in these processes. With the turn of religion to the world, the sacred character of rituals diminishes. Many of them no longer have a claim to universal validity and instead acquire a specificity of region and sector. This is true both for their staging and performance characteristics, as well as for their performativity (Willems / Jurga 1998; Wulf / Gụhlich / Zirfas 2001). Rituals gain meaning as stagings of the social. Their performative quality produces communities, whose roots are no longer in religion. Nietzsche's reference to the death of God conceptualizes the new situation of a "society without baldachin" (Soeffner 2000). The expansion and pluralization of business, politics, law and administration require an increase in individualization. The diversification of spheres brings about a growth in their *complexity* and thereby a demand for the education and competency of individuals. So on one hand industrialization and globalization contribute to the development of individuals, while on the other hand only the education and development of individuals make industrialization and globalization possible. The individualization of belief leads to a belief in individualization. In reference to society and the individual the developmental dynamic is thereby transferred to *this world*. One no longer has to wait for the beyond to live a life in paradise; rather, these conditions can potentially be realized in this world. This would seem to result in a regression of transcendence

experiences, what is rather observed are new forms of *secular piety* (Plessner). This includes the sacralization of the subject (Wьnsche 1997) and with it, the growing interest in therapy. The *sacralization of the individual* means that the expectations that were once placed on God are now levied on man.

While religion and the Church once played the role of treating questions of life and meaning, the Church today shares this task with many other institutions. Included are the diversified educational institutions, the therapy and counseling organizations, but also literature and art as well as the ubiquitous new media. These institutions and organizations offer clarifications on the place of man in the world, and answers to questions of love, happiness, suffering and death. They impart direction and standards for feelings, attitudes and actions. With their new techniques they communicate new images of the world and humankind. What they almost all have in common is their focus on the individual and their claim to be helping him in resolving his career and family problems. Even for those institutions and organizations that do not fend off questions relating to the beyond, it becomes clear that there is a lack of competence for questions of transcendence. Accordingly the educational, therapeutic and counseling institutions treat problems in such a way that they correspond with the earthly orientation of these institutions. So on one hand they step into the place of sermon, confession and pastoral care, while on the other hand leaving aside the dimensions of death, the beyond and salvation. These fundamental questions tend to be replaced and displaced by concerns of life structuring, so that a focus on the individual as located in this world is maintained.

With this rejection of the "great transcendence" the *here and now* comes to be the center of attention, along with efforts towards an "*innerwordly salvation*." No longer essential are the insight into guilt, the need for repentance and a trust in the grace of God, but instead the overcoming of alienation, the development of freedom and autonomy, as well as the working out of a wide variety of life styles. As a *manager of himself*, the individual belongs to many different living environments at once; he has to relate these to each other and to design, organize and realize his life in accordance with them. The Christian religion loses her public character with this development. The uniform Christian worldview with its closed cosmology and anthropology irretrievably breaks apart. Christianity enters into competition with other religions as well as with political and scientific world views. Religion becomes an *option* for the individual. Christianity thereby becomes a commodity in the *market of religions*, *worldviews and faiths*, amongst which an individual can choose. Instead of encountering a monopoly of truth in the Christian churches, the individual is confronted with a *religious pluralism*, one the one hand making him feel insecure, on the other feeding his fantasies of omnipotence. If man was once born into a religion, a culture, a language and a living environment, which he was normally unable to leave, the *sacralization of the individual* encourages the idea that he can now determine the cultural and social foundations of his individual life (Hahn 2000). No longer is it God who chooses man, but man who chooses God and a religion. Religion

becomes a segment of human experience, no longer staking a claim to a complete framing of individual life or a complete characterization of man. Instead the individual assembles a patchwork rug of worldviews and final perspectives, so that the expression "patchwork identity" becomes appropriate.

With religion and Christianity's decline of significance and the loss of a Christian concept of the beyond for more and more people in the present-day industrial world, the Christian religion is losing her universal character and her visibility. Christianity is becoming an "invisible religion" (Luckmann 1991). Only on a few days a year and at certain moments in an individual life, especially during the Christmas season, at births, weddings and funerals, does the Christian religion become visible again for a short period, only to then retreat into the background again. Religion is visible in the great religious rituals, whose stagings and performances bring about the participation of the individual in traditional, collective arrangements. This is true for the religious festivals and celebrations, whose success is made possible by their ritual character. The performance of such rituals leads to a performative production of communities (Wulf et. al. 2001). With the bodily performance of the rituals, with their iteration, a self-affirmation of the celebrating community takes place, be it of a communal Christmas celebration or a party of mourners at a funeral. The differences between the participants in the ritual are worked out in the stagings and performances, helping to create a community. In such cases, religion offers the opportunity, serves as an invitation, to ritually come together in the name of God. Moments of intensified experience take place, differentiating themselves from everyday life, inscribing themselves in the memory and demanding for repetition.

The individual's turn to the earthly realm, the becoming invisible of religion, the differentiation of spheres and the need to live in heterogeneous worlds brings about the loss of meaning for monolithic, all-embracing rituals. In the state, in society, in politics and business, these *macro-rituals* become less important. They are replaced by smaller rituals, which are to some degree specific to their sphere. Depending upon the various institutions, organizations and societal areas they belong to, these rituals change and become more specific, reaching fewer people as a result. Insofar as most contemporary people live in many different segments of society, they participate in very heterogeneous rituals and ritualizations, many of which are familiar and valid to only one particular field of experience. Such partial rituals include the rituals of science, which help to produce knowledge, or the rituals of leisure, where the ability to move is a prerequisite for participation. With the differentiation of religion and other areas of society, the intensified nature and visibility of rituals diminishes, but not their meaning. This development also involves a diversification and differentiation of the rituals themselves. Like Christianity, many rituals have lost their visibility, but not their role for the all the more pressing task posed to the individual—that of producing partial communities. With the diminishing of the monopolizing status of religion and her rituals, a development of diverse rituals takes place, only valid in a limited context, and constituting these contexts in turn.

As many partial religions and world views have come to replace the Christian religion (Hohner / Kurt / Reichertz 1999), so the ritual guidance and production of meaning no longer takes place in a few visible, all-embracing rituals, but rather in multiple, context-specific partial rituals. Individuals have a relatively wide range of flexibility in constructing these rituals, and they serve to overcome the diversity of their various living spheres and to relate them to each other. As the role of religion has changed throughout history, so have rituals. In both cases this has to do with the changing status of the individual. In the case of religion the individual chooses whatever is appropriate for his lifestyle; in the case of ritual it is no different. Here too the individual has an unprecedented freedom to modify, repeal or redesign the rituals. Just as in the religious realm, this occurs much less than is possible. In the same way that the individual can, in principle, choose his religion and world view, he can to a large degree also choose what ritual forms he wants to live with and how he wants to construct them. This theoretical freedom is however significantly limited due to the subordinate role played by rational and reflexive knowledge in both religion and ritual. Instead a practical knowledge gained in mimetic processes determines the participation in religion and ritual, and limits the choices of action more significantly than the myth of the autonomous, entrepreneur-like individual will admit. The diminished visibility of religion and ritual does not mean that they no longer play a role for individuals and society, but is merely an indication that profound changes in the religious sphere have taken place, requiring further study.

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РЕЛИГИЯ И РИТУАЛ

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Проблема взаимоотношения религии и ритуала является не до конца доступной для научного дискурса. Подобные взаимодействия культурно и исторически обусловлены. В статье дается обзор динамики взаимоотношений религии и ритуала в немецкой культурной традиции, начиная со Средних Веков.

Настоящее время характеризуется потерей религиозного смысла, что наиболее очевидно в переменах в церковных учреждениях. Некогда исключительно

религия и церковь занимались проблематикой поиска смысла жизни; в настоящее время церковь разделяет эту сферу со многими другими институтами. Единое христианское мировоззрение с герметичными антропологией и космологией сегодня распадается. Христианство входит в соревнование с другими религиями, а так же с политическими и научными точками зрения на мир. Религия становится предметом *выбора*. Христианство оказывается продуктом на *рынке религий, мировоззрений и вер*, из которых человек может выбирать. Современный человек существует в ситуации *религиозного плюрализма*, что с одной стороны приводит к развитию чувства незащищенности, а с другой — подпитывает уверенность в собственном могуществе. Религия проявляет себя не в организации целостной жизни человека и общества, а в крупных религиозных ритуалах, приуроченных к заметным событиям социальной жизни или большим праздникам, что позволяет человеку принять участие в традиционных общественных мероприятиях. В остальные моменты жизни присутствие религии неочевидно. Но уменьшающаяся значимость религии и ритуала не означает, что они больше не играют присущей им роли в жизни человека и общества. Это свидетельствуют лишь о глубине перемен в религиозной сфере, требующих дальнейшего изучения и интерпретации.